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Since 1937, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
has marketed hydroelectric power to utility and industrial
customers in the Pacific Northwest.

In 1982, the agency

found itself in a new role, one which required it to acquire
whatever power resources were needed to meet the demands of
the region's utilities.

In particular, its Administrator

had to confront the problem of how to deal with the
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escalating costs of the troubled Washington Public Power
Supply System's nuclear plant projects.

In response, BPA

undertook the preparation of its first independent regional
power forecast.

The process by which this forecast was

produced was intricate and multidimensional, involving a
variety of parties having stakes in the outcome of the WPPSS
decision.

Application of the Multiple Perspective Concept

to this process illuminates its technical, organizational,
and personal dimensions and, in doing so, uncovers both
strengths and weaknesses in the forecast.
Examination of the forecast from the technical
perspective revealed an elaborate set of interlinked models.
Baseline, high, and low forecasts were developed based upon
different sets of economic projections and different
assumptions about conservation and resource acquisition.
The organizational perspective revealed BPA to be in a
transitional stage.

Its more traditional engineering

functions waned in relative importance, as new functions
grounded more heavily in economics (ratemaking, forecasting,
conservation, resource acquisition, and financial management) swelled.

Interorganizationally, environmentalists,

ratepayer groups, and the region's utilities all had strong
but contrasting interests in the outcome of any decision
regarding the fate of the WPPSS plants.
The personal perspective revealed that each of the
Administrators heading BPA since the early 1970s defined
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the agency's approach to the resource planning problem
differently.

In the early 1970s , where major regional power

deficits seemed imminent, Donald Hodel, then Administrator,
approached this problem as one having an engineering
solution:

build capacity ahead of need.

When his successor,

Sterling Munro, was confronted by slowing load growth and
increasing regional concern over rate disparities and
environmental protection, he focused upon a predominantly
political solution:
lation.

the passage of Regional Power Act legis-

Finally, Peter Johnson, Administrator at the time

of the 1982 forecast, facing the economic strains placed
upon the Northwest by WPPSS, reframed the problem as one
having a business solution.
Taken together, the Multiple Perspectives yielded the
following conclusions about BPAs 1982 forecast.
BPA's range forecast constituted a major improvement
over the point forecasts preceeding it.

It did, however,

leave important classes of uncertainty unexplored and the
region vulnerable to certain events or outcomes.
BPA's models were better suited to address certain
issues important at the time of the 1982 forecast than their
predecessors (e.g. rate provisions of the Regional Power
Act, conservation potential, etc.).

The model of the

national economy, however, remained a black box, potentially
significant feedbacks

(e.g. electricity prices on economic

variables) were not represented, and the sheer size and
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elaborateness of the modeling system placed practical limits
on its use.
The technical review process surrounding the forecast
ultimately resulted in a new consensus within the power
planning community on load futures

(i.e. low growth).

This

review process centered on choices between existing models
and, to the degree it required a fluency in econometrics and
engineering concepts, undoubtedly excluded potential
valuable insights.
A stronger method of dealing with forecast uncertainty
is needed, one which utilizes a disaster-avoidance strategy
and plans for high impact/low probability events (such as
oil shocks, Depressions, nuclear accidents, etc.).

This

method need not involve the use of large models, but should
seek to incprorate qualitative insights from persons
normally outside the technical sphere.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW:

LOADS, FORECASTS, AND POWER PLANNING

The passage of the Regional Po\rer Act in 1980 reflected
a shared recognition of the need for more extensive and
careful planning of the region's energy resources.

Not

surprisingly, in parallel with this increased concern for
resource planning there has emerged a concern for the development of reliable long-term electricity demand forecasts.
For most of the Bonneville Power Administration's existence,
an overabundance of power and the ready availability of new
hydroelectric sites made demand forecasting relatively simple: elementary trend extrapolations sufficed.

When elec-

tricity is cheap and readily available, the incentives for
conservation and efficient resource allocation are few.
Under such conditlons, no major changes in resource mix or
development strategy are to be expected.

When new resources

are expensive and potentially damaging to the environment,
forecasting becomes more difficult technically and more sensitive politically because demand projections way be used to
justify decisions dlfferentially affecting the population.
In the current situation not only has the complexity
of demand forecasting grown, but a need to understand the
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practical implications of such forecasts more clearly has
become paramount.

New generations of econometric

a~d

end-use models used for forecasting allow a wider array of
social, economic, and political factors which influence
demand to be dealt with.

At the same time, however, they

introduce complexity (and often ambiguity) and sometimes
conceal judgmental manipulations buried in the elaborate
structures of the models.

Such introduction of judgment,

along with the inevitable imposition of practical and
organizational constraints on methodology, render forecasting a dynamic activity, and one that cannot be understood or evaluated by technical criteria alone.
Under the terms of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act, the primary responsibility
for long-term regional forecasts and resource acquisition
plans lies with the Regional Council's staff.

SPA, however,

is required to make resource acquisition and f1nancing
decisions which depend, at least in part, on a long-term
projection of electricity demand growth.

In the past, BPA

has been a participant in the Sum-Of-Utilities forecast of
the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee
(PNUCC).

In the period immediately preceding the publica-

tion of the Council's official regional forecast and
regional plan in 1983, SPA's decisions were based entirely
upon its own first independent long-range demand forecast,
developed using a methodology and a set of models which
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closely resemble those ultimately adopted by the Council.
Hore specifically, this independent forecast required the
development of primary economic and demographic inputs, the
iterative use of an electricity supply pricing model with
demand forecasting models (for residential, commercial, and
industrial sectors), and ongoing public involvement during
the forecast development period.
Given the regional importance of the BPA forecast and
the complexity of the associated technical and non-technical
factors, a thorough analysis of the forecasting process as
well as the methodology is warranted.

The aim of this

dissertation is to perform such an analysis of the BPA
forecast.

The main methodological tool to be employed is

the Multiple Perspective Concept developed by Linstone et al
(1981), described in detail below.

The objectives of the research described in this
dissertation are threefold.

The first 1s to understand more

clearly and completely how forecasts of energy and, more
specifically, electricity loads affect regional decisionmaking processes in the areas of economic and power
planning.

Within the forecasting and futures research

communities there is fairly widespread acceptance of the
idea that the chief task of forecasters is not to predict
exactly what will occur in the future, but rather to provide
planners and decision makers with information which will
help them better anticipate future possibilities (or future
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consequences of present decisions).

In recognition of the

possible effects of forecasts as self-fulfilling or
self-denying prophecies, point forecasts specifying a single
future are increasingly being replaced by range and
contingency forecasts which explore the consequences of
different sets of potential events and circumstances.

Even

in such a broadened (and to some extent self-critical)
forecasting context, however, it is essential to explore
what Ascher (1978) refers to as "core assumptions", usually
unstated assumptions about background or context factors
which influence the behavior of the variables or trends
under investigation.

The first objective, then, is to use

the Multiple Perspective Concept to gain a better understanding of the elements and assumptions which give shape to
the numerical values embodied in the final forecast.
The second and complementary objective is to gain a
better understanding of the process of forecasting.
Forecasts are used as data upon which decisions are made.
The information needs of decision makers serve to define
both the research questions asked and the models selected to
answer them.

Moreover, the varieties of problems which

forecasts address can be seen to undergo development over
time as members of the forecasting and decision-making
"communities" interact.

Interactions among the numerous

elements of the forecasting process are complex and multidimensional.

The Multiple Perspective Concept, with its
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explicit recognition of distinct technical, organizational,
and personal dimensions of problem solving or decisionmaking situations provides a useful tool in explicating the
dynamic, interactive characteristics of demand forecasting.
The third and final objective is to develop and demonstrate further the usefulness and applicability of the
Multiple Perspective Concept (the MP Concept) as a tool for
researching complex aspects of decision making.

The power

forecasting context chosen for the research described in
this dissertation, characterized as it is by the use of new
models in a politically sensitive situation engendering a
modicum of organizational restructuring, is ideally suited
to analysis using the Multiple Perspective methodology.
Application of this conceptual and methodological framework
to the forecasting situation descibed should result in the
fulfillment of the first two objectives.

In addition,

however, a generalization of findings on the use of the MP
Concept and the interrelation between the perspectives is an
important additional goal of the research.
Before beginning an examination and analysis of BPA's
first independent long-term forecast, however, it is
necessary to take a closer look at both the context in which
the forecast was performed and the tool to be used for the
investigation.

The remainder of this chapter thus focuses

upon the history of power planning in the Pacific Northwest
and the characteristics of the Multiple Perspective Concept.
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BACKGROUND:

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR COLUMBIA
RIVER RESOURCE PLANNING

Current regional power planning efforts, and the
forecasts used to support them, may be fully understood only
by placing them in an historical context.

The resources of

the Columbia River, along with its numerous tributaries,
have been central to the sustained development of the
Pacific Northwest, and have in many ways formed the core of
the region's economy.

A brief examination of the history of

the development of the Columbia River system is thus
necessary to illuminate the numerous issues which surround
the use of its waters, particularly as they relate to power
resource use and planning.
The New Deal and the Growth of the Northwest
The modern-day development of the Columbia River had
its roots in the Depression years of the 1930s.

Appalled by

the poverty of the then relatively underdeveloped Northwest,
President Franklin Roosevelt author!zed the construction of
the first of a series of dams along the Columbia in March,
1933.

Authorized under the National Industrial Recovery

Act, the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams typified the
multiple-purpose Public Works Administration projects of the
era.

In addition to creating a wealth of jobs at a time

they were desperately needed the projects allowed funds from
the Federal Treasury to be funnelled into undertakings
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designed to stimulate economic growth; undertakings of a
scale well above what small governmental bodies or private
interests could afford to implement.

Specifically,

positioning massive dams at key locations along the Columbia
served to control floods, enhance navigation (and, hence,
commercial transport), expand recreational opportunities,
and promote irrigation through the control of streamflows.
Perhaps most significantly, the dams permitted the region to
tap the awesome hydroelectric potential of the Columbia
River system.

With the facilities subsidized by Federal

funds and constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers, the
hydropower generated at the damsites promised to be both
cheap and abundant -- perfectly suited for Roosevelt's
objective of the rural electrification of the Northwest.

On

August 20, 1937 Roosevelt signed the Bonneville Project Act,
creating the Bonneville Power Administration within the
Department of the Interior.

This act established BPA as a

power marketing agency, empowering it to bu1ld and operate
transmission facilities necessary to encourage the widest
possible use of electric energy, giving preference and
priority of its use to public bodies and cooperatives
(Springer, 1976).
Over the next thirty years, the addition of twenty more
Federal dams along the river essentially transformed it from
a freeflowing stream (w1thin which many varieties anadromous
fish flourished) into a series of manmade lakes.

As long as
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the Federal government was willing to invest U.S. Treasury
dollars in these large scale projects (built at relatively
low cost) electric power was both cheap and abundant.

Not

only was BPA able to market power from the Federal based
hydrosystem to the public bodies and cooperatives of the
region which comprised its "preference customers" but it
also had plenty of power to sell to other groups, most
notably Investor Owned Utilities (IaUs) and Direct Service
Industries (DSls).

The latter group was composed of large,

electricity-intensive industries, such as aluminum, which
settled in the region during World War II.

These industries

remained after the War, signing long-term contracts with BPA
guaranteeing them a reliable electricity supply.

DSls were

"serviced directly" in that they maintained their own transformers and bought power directly from BPA rather than from
the public or private utilities within the region.

Inexpen-

sive electricity also brought industrial and commercial
customers to the region who did not buy directly from BPA,
but benefitted substantially from the Federal hydrosystem.
Underlying this trend of regional growth was a set of
dynamic processes which was essentially self-amplifying.
For a long period of time the network of dams was somewhat
"overbuilt" -- that is, the system was capable of generating
more power than was needed.

Under conditions of surplus, it

is to everyone's advantage to seek new customers and raise
demand levels.

This is because when the construction,
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operating, and maintenance costs associated with the power
system are spread over a larger base the costs per kilowatt
are lower.

Low rates also promote the use of electricity

where alternative fuels might be substituted if they were
price-competitive (e.g. electric resistance space heating in
homes instead of gas heat).

--+::::===--tNEW CUSTOMERS

RATES

GENERATING
CAPACITY

+
Figure 1.
growth

Relationship of rates, resources, and regional

Figure 1 represents this dynamic in the form of what is
called a digraph.

A '+' above an arrow indicates that the

element at the head (point) of the arrow is influenced to
change its size or value in the same direction as that of
the element at the arrow's tail (i.e. if the tail element
increases or decreases so also will the head element).
Conversely, a '-' indicates that the two elements change in
opposite directions; an increase in the value of the tail
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element will produce a decrease in the head element while a
decrease will engender an increase.

What the digraph in

this generalized form omits, however, is the strength of the
links and the exact sequencing of the reciprocal impacts
(i.e. the time lags).

During the Northwest's growth period

hydroelectric generating capacity was added in large chunks
on a regular basis as the Corps of Engineers continued to
exploit the sites along the Columbia River System promising
the highest yield.

The influx of new customers into the

region was steady enough that wholesale electricity rates
were among the lowest in the country and rate increases were
minor.

In the late sixties and early seventies, however, a

number of developments took place which were destined to
change this situation.
The Hydrothermal Power Plan. wpPSS. and the Regional POwer

The signing of the Columbia River Treaty in 1964 and
the subsequent construction of the intertie connecting the
Northwest with the Pacific Southwest in many ways heralded
the end of an era of the growth of cheap hydropower in the
region.

The treaty allowed the joint U.S.-Canadian con-

struction of a final series of dams near and above the
canadian border.

In the short-term, these projects resulted

in a sizable power surplus.

Canada's share of this surplus

was especially large in proportion to the population of
British Columbia.

As a consequence, one of the conditions
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of the Treaty specified that the

u.s.

(i.e. SPA) would

promise to purchase a share of Canada's surplus.

The

intertie permitted SPA to sell available surplus power to
Cali fornia.
Despite the bountiful supply of hydropower available to
seemingly any customer desiring it, it became apparent that
virtually all the potential sites for high-head, Federally-sponsored hydro projects had been exhausted.

Projections of

continued high demand growth suggested to the power planners
of this era that alternative sources of generation would be
needed to prevent anticipated power deficits.

SPA's

response to this perceived need was the development and
institution of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan in 1968.

As a

power marketing agency, SPA did not possess the authority to
build any generation.

Under the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan,

however, SPA entered into a "net billing" arrangement
with its preference customers.

Under net billing SPA

acquires the power generated by thermal plants constructed
by the public utilities which comprise its preference
customers and integrates this power into its transmission
grid.

BPA assumes the preference customer's share of the

costs of the new thermal plants, and averages these costs
with those of the less expensive hydropower.

Regional power

rates then reflect this melded cost of thermal and hydroelectric energy.
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Perhaps the most significant of the thermal resource
development projects undertaken were the five nuclear plants
constructed primarily by the Washington Public Power Supply
System (WPPSS), a consortium of 16 public utility districts,
with secondary participation by major investor-owned
utilities in the region.

While BPA assumed a role in the

financing of only the first three of the five plants, all
were planned and sited in anticipation of the major power
shortages then predicted to occur in the mid-1980s which
provided the impetus for the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan.
Progressively, increasing regional demand for
electricity and ambitious new thermal plant construction
altered the dynamic illustrated by Figure 1, modifying
primarily the strength and timing of the reciprocal impacts
depicted.

New generating capacity was being added in the

form of coal and nuclear plants sponsored by various public
and private utilities instead of the usual form of largescale, relatively regularly scheduled Federal hydro
projects.

Whereas the Corps of Engineers' expertise was

largely a known quantity, that of the contractors involved
In the construction of the various thermal projects was not,
and, In retrospect, proved highly variable in quality from
project to project.
the case of the WPPSS

Cost overruns, sometimes immense (as In
nucl~ar

plants), plagued and delayed

construction and, to the extent that these costs were
incorporated into rate structures, caused a series of
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"jumps" in the price of electricity.

Moreover, because a

surplus of hydropower was no longer available, the regions's
IOU's could no longer depend upon BPA for their power
supply.

They now were forced to take a back seat to the

region's preference customers.

As

a result, private

utilities had to rely more heavily upon expensive thermal
power than their public utility counterparts, creating
significant rate disparities in the region.

Along with a

growing concern for the potentially hazardous enviromental
impacts of thermal plants (particularly nuclear), these rate
disparities triggered a number of political responses.

A

variety of groups actively championed conservation as an
environmentally sound and cost-effective alternative to
increased thermal generating capacity, some of them
intervening in facility siting procedures.

Additionally,

several pieces of legislation were prepared, target ted at
the differential regional electricity rates.

DRPA

(Domestic and Rural Power Authority) would have transformed
all of the residential and small farm customers in the state
of Oregon, largely served by rous with noticeably higher
rates, into a large public utility district, thereby
entitling them to preference customer status.

The Pacific

Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Bill
(known familiarly as the Regional Bill) was proposed in the
1970s and finally enacted in 1980.

Reflecting the pr1or1-

t1es of an impending energy "crisis" as perceived during the
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19705, the Act established a Regional Power Planning Council
comprised of eight members, two persons appointed by each of
the governors of the four states in the region (Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, and Western Montana).

The Council is respon-

sible for developing a twenty-year demand forecast and
resource acquisition plan giving conservation and renewable
resources priority over any new non-renewable energy
sources.

The Act also considerably augmented BPA's respon-

sibilities in the region, requiring it to acquire all the
resources necessary to supply wholesale power to any
utilities applying for it.

Under the power allocation

strategy defined by the Act, BPA's existing preference
customers enjoy electric rates which cannot exceed what they
would have been without the passage of the Act.

Investor

owned utilities are permitted to "exchange" power for their
residential and small farm customers, priced at the
utility's average wholesale cost, for electricity at the
lower Federal rate, thereby considerably reducing regional
rate disparities.

The DSls, in effect, provide rate relief

for the IOU's domestic and rural customers through rate
increases they bear in exchange for long-term firm power
contracts that would otherwise not be available.

Subject to

these requirements, Bonneville must project demand and
purchase whatever power is needed to prevent shortages,
employing the same priority ranking for resource acquisition
as does the council.
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POWER FORECASTS AND THEIR ROLE IN SHAPING THE NORTHWEST'S
FUTURE
It was thus in a set of circumstances very different
from what had served for over thirty years as the regional
status guo that BPA assumed its new and augmented roles and
responsibilities.

Severe cost overruns on new thermal

facilities, increasing rate disparities, and a growing
advocacy of conservation and environmental protection had
undermined the dynamiCS of steady regional growth.

In the

wake of the passage of the Regional Act, resource and rate
planning became matters of increasing concern: BPA could not
afford to compound the consequences of mistakes and misjudgments which it inherited from the 1970s.

BPA's first

independent long-term forecast, prepared in 1982 (a full
year before that of the Regional Council) was thus destined
to prove central to a number of financially critical and
politically sensitive decisions concerning the Power System.
A major factor compounding the sensitIve nature of
BPA's forecast was the role earlier forecasts has played in
shaping some of the region's emerging problems.

Beginning

in 1954, the Pacific Northwest utilities Conference
Committee (PNUCC), a consortium of all of the region's
utilities, prepared 11-year (and, after 1968,o20-year)
forecasts of loads and resource requirements for the west
Group Area (a geographic domain, largely congruent with the
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Northwest Region, except for the omissions of portions of
eastern Oregon and Idaho).

PNUCC's forecast for the west

Group Area, known as the Sum-Of-Utilities (SOU) forecast,
was produced, as the name suggests, by simply adding
together the forecasts submitted by the DSIs, IOUs, and
public utilities in the region.

Bonneville was a regular

participant in the SOU forecast, producing demand projections for a number of the public utilities that lacked
their own load forecasting capabilities.

The ostensible

strength of this approach is that it allows each utility to
take a hard look at its own service territories; territories
about which it is presumably best informed.

In practice,

however, a wide variation in forecasting expertise and
sophistication exists among the member utilities of PNUCC,
and key assumptions about economic and population growth and
the elasticity of demand with respect to price which each of
the utilities made in preparing their own forecasts were
often inconsistent.

Between 1968 and 1978 the projected

twenty-year average annual rates of growth (AARGs) expressed
in the SOU forecasts were conspicuously high, though falling
from 5.3\ to 3.8\ very gradually over this period (Marshall,
1978:23).

However they may have differed in their judgment

of specifics, virtually all of the member utilities assumed
that the regional economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s would
continue unabated through the periods described in the
forecasts and that power would remain sufficiently inex-
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pensive that

~atepayers

would maintain existing consumption

levels, even in the face of inevitable rate increases.

In

addition to the efficacy of these assumptions in inflating
10ng-te~m fo~ecasts,

cited as sources of

seve~al

othe~

incentives have been
this period

ove~fo~ecasting du~ing

(Ernst and Ernst, 1976): the legal requirement of utilities
to supply anyone requesting power, the perceived moral
obligation to prevent power shortfalls, and (so long as the
~egulated

retu~n

on investment exceeds the cost of capital)

the tendency to add capital equipment in
ove~all

revenues.

unde~pinnings

orde~

to

inc~ease

Though, in hindsight, the erroneous

of these forecasts appear self-evident, at the

time a 5\ AARG of regional electricity demand was generally
accepted as realistic, and utility planners championed the
inc~eased

construction of thermal plants in response to

their belief in the reliability of these estimates.
Notably, eighty-eight of the region's utilities

~esponded

by

joining the construction consortium for the ill-fated WPPSS
nuclear projects 4 and 5, endeavoring to avoid a power
shurtfall anticipated to occur in mid-1983.
The lower growth power consumption

patte~ns

of the late

1970s suggested that the demand projections contained in the
SOU forecasts might prove unrealistically high.
recession, slowed regional
effects of often escalating

g~owth,

the~mal

and

conce~n

plant

Economic
about the

const~uction

costs on future rates led to speculation about the
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consequent impact of these factors on the size of loads.

A

number of alternative regional forecasts were developed in
response to the perceived severity of this uncertainty.

In

1977, PNUCC began using an econometric model (described in
more detail in Chapter II) developed by National Economic
Research Associates (NERA) as a cross-checK for its
forecast.

~OU

This model's demand projections, however,

basically tracked those of the SOU forecast and, as such,
did not provide a noticeably different alternative to the
utility industry's "conventional wisdom" (twenty-year growth
rates ranging from 4.11 to 5.46 percent, with a mean of
4.55\ in the first year of the model's use).

Substantially

different growth rates, however, had been produced several
years earlier by the Washington State University (WSU)
Environmental Research Center.

In 1975, the WSU research

group prepared a set of three thirty-year (1971-2000) demand
projections for electricity, natural gas, oil, and coal for
each of the states in the Pacific Northwest (PNW).

The

end-use model employed by WSU projected demand for four
consuming sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, and
extractive) based upon various sets of assumptions regarding
population and fuel prices.

The WSU forecasts were markedly

lower than either PNUCC's SOU or econometric forecasts,
displaying 30-year AARGs ranging from 1.43 to 2.38 percent
(Harshall 1978:31).

Early in 1977, the Natural Resources

Defense Council (NRDC) in Palo Alto, California prepared an

19
end-use analysis of power demand in the Northwest.

Building

upon other studies (particularly a 1976 report prepared for
BPA by the consulting firm of Skidmore, Owings, and Herrill)
rather than employing an econometric or end-use model,
NRDC's forecast focused upon potential conservation savings
in the region.

Assuming that virtually all of the waste of

electricity could be eliminated by conservation (without
zegard to the nature or effectiveness of the incentives
needed to bring about these demand reductions) and that no
thermal plants would be built other than those approved or
under construction in 1977, NRDC projected a modest 2.41
percent annual growth from 1975 to 1985, followed by a
slight decline in loads (0.95 percent) between 1985 and
1995.

Lastly, in 1978, the Northwest Energy Policy Project

(NEPP) released a twelve volume report evaluating regional
energy issues and policy options.

Included in the report

was a series of forecasts (low, medium, and high) of
possible energy futures for the Northwest.

Prepared using

an econometric model (to be described in detail in the next
chapter) the average annual growth rates for electricity
through the year 2000 were 1.43, 2.93 and 4.38 for the low,
medium, and high scenarios respectively.
When, by the early 1980s, loads fell far short of
almost all predictions, rate hikes became increasingly
frequent, and skyrocketing construction costs forced WPPSS
projects 4 and 5 into mothballs, any official forecast which
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would be used to dizect power and conservation resource
planning decisions tended to be viewed with mistrust, or at
least great caution, both by the general ratepaying public
and the numerous special interests in the region.

It was in

this context that BPA produced its first independent longterm forecast, the subject of this dissertation.
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT: THREE VIEWS OF THE
FORECAST
Given the recognized impacts of forecasts on past
resource planning and the significance of the decisions
facing BPA and the region in the early 1980s, it is not
surprising that BPA's first independent long-term forecast
was an object of considerable concern and attention.

In

order for this forecast to be useful as a guide to the power
planning decisions facing the BPA Administrator and the
region, it was necessary that the models and methodology
used in its development display greaten sophistication and
comprehensiveness in dealing with resource, rate, and
conservation policy alternatives than their predecessors.
Moreover, in order for this forecast to be accepted by the
numerous parties to be affected by consequent power
planning, it was helpful, if not necessary, to open up the
processes of input development, model testing, and forecast
preparation to public involvement.
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In no sense, then, can the forecast and its development
be understood simply as a technical exercise uninfluenced by
historical precedent, institutional priorities, or political
considerations.

The process of its development was multi-

faceted: as such, thorough comprehension of the forecast and
its ramifications require consideration of a wealth of
technical and non-technical factors.

An investigatory tool

ideally suited to the tasks of examining and analyzing such
factors is the Multiple Perspective Concept, a recent
outgrowth of research in the areas of technology assessment
and systems analysis.
The systems approach to research and problem solving
rests upon the premise that problems are complex and
interrelated and that their solution is predicated on, in
some way, comprehending them as a whole rather than as
isolated, independent fragments.

This basic premise,

however, has undergone fundamental reinterpretation as
systems research had matured.

As

Nehnevajsa and Menkes in

Linstone et al (1981) have noted (in the context of technology assessment) a number of basic stages of development
may be identified.

stage I extended the basic calculi and

optimizing techniques of narrowly-defined systems analysis
(or operations research) to encompass a range of concerns
other than economic feasibility.

"The whole" of most

problems was acknowledged to be larger than previously
characterized by cost-benefit evaluation.

stage II aimed
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for "comprehensiveness" in impact identIfIcation and

evaluation.

"Wholeness" was sought in schemes attempting to

address all of a problem's key quantitative and qualitative
dimensions.

stage III emerged from a recognition of the

futility involved iil the .werly ambitious goal of comprehensiveness.

Instead, it identified the generation of an array

of good-risk contingency plans and policy options as a more
useful and practical way to address "whole" problems of
conceT.~

to decision makers.

The Multiple Perspective Concept rests upon the premises of the third stage (and shows promise of moving research into stage IV as it transcends some of the limits of
traditionally-defined "rationality").

It seeks to provide a

number of useful inSights developed from different perspectives applied to a single decision process or problem area.
Based upon the insights of political analyst Graham Allison
(from his 1971 work, Essence of Decision; Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis) and developed by Linstone et al (1981)
the concept recognizes three distinct, though cOt'l.plementary,
perspectives for viewing a decision area: a technical
perspective (T), an organizational perspective (0), and a
personal perspective (P).
The T-perspectlve is the one commonly associated with
research and structured inquiry.
tigators, it is the
or considered.

~

For a great many inves-

strategy of inquiry ever employed

The T-perspective is premised on notions of
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cause-and-effect, objectivity, and prediction by completely
rational means.

Problem solving aims at optimization and

employs formal analysis, quantification, and modeling
towards this end.

The T-perspective is also frequently

reductionist in character and biased against the individual
or unique phenomenon.
By contrast, the O-perspective typifies in the
"inquiry" conducted as part of the daily round of organizational life.

Managers, bureaucrats, and staff personnel

in organizations do not deal with the world in the abstract
or from a detached point of view.

Real practical necessi-

ties and organizational needs shape the ways they look at
things and the ways they go about doing things.

The

O-perspective is both objective and subjective; it "sees"
the world according to a mix of standard operating
procedures and uncertainties, aiming at satisfactory rather
than optimal solutions to problems.

Both investigation and

implementation tend to be incremental and reflect the
parochial priorities and planning rituals of the
participants.
Finally, the P-perspective is the most unique and
idiosyncratic, reflecting the subjective visions and
"partial rationalities" of particular individuals.

Although

individuals often view the world in ways which fuse false
certainty, simplification, and needs for esteem with their
rationales for action, it is often the unique viewpoint
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which illuminates or explains otherwise incomprehensible
events.

Perhaps more importantly, individuals act in terms

of their perceptions and in ways shaped by their personal
histories.

While the individual may indeed disappear into

the crowd, he or she may also be the prime mover in major
events, bringing specific abilities to bear upon circumstances in ways that engender unique results.
The goal of the Multiple Perspective Concept is to
illuminate decision areas through the simultaneous application of the three perspectives.

As noted above, the

perspectives are distinct but complementary: they not only
tend to concentrate attention on different objects but also
proceed from very different paradigms of thought.

They thus

together form a more complete picture of the world though
they can not be derived from a more comprehensive framework
by means of a single logic.

Table I (reproduced from

Linstone et aI, 1981) summarizes and contrasts the salient
features of each of the three perspectives.
Some precedent exists for the critical evaluation of
applications of systems analysis and forecasting which is
performed using complex models.

Both Berlinski (1976) and

Andersen (1977) have leveled criticisms against the use of
systems dynamics models (Andersen doing so using a framework
which is, in many ways, a direct "ancestor" of the Multiple
Perspective Concept).

The specific application of the MP

Concept to the forecast product (and associated procedures)

TABLE I
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES
'l'ECHNICAL ('I',

ORGANIZATIONAL (0,

PERSONAL (PI
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developed by BPA for their first independent regional load
forecast forms the basis for this dissertation and proceeds
in series of steps reflected in the sequence of chapters.
Chapter II focuses upon the forecast from the dominant
viewpoint of science and technology, the T-perspective.
Each of the models used in the regional forecasting effort-the NEPP and PNUCC econometric models, the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory Residential and Commercial End-Use
Models, and the BPA electricity supply pricing model are
discussed and diagrammed, as is the system by which their
outputs were interlinked.

The methods by which primary

model inputs were developed are discussed.

Finally, the

models and methodology are critically evaluated.

This

entails generic comparisons of the strength and weaknesses
of econometric and end-use models, an identification of
limiting core assumptions associated with the modeling
enterprise, and a discussion of the results (i.e. the
forecast product) and their reliability.
In Chapter III, the a-perspective is applied to the
forecasting process, viewing it as a response of BPA's Power
Requirements staff to the challenge placed upon it by
internal organizational needs (e.g. tailoring modeling to
the variOUS, and sometimes conflicting needs of ratemakers
and planners elsewhere in the organization) and outside
agencies (e.g. PNUCC, private utilities, the Regional
Council).

To understand the organizational underpinnings of
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both challenges and responses affecting the forecasting
process, it is necessary to describe the principal actors in
the power planning arena, the standard operating procedures
by which they operate, and the changes or developments in
their institutional enviroments.

Descriptions of intra-

organizational developments center on an enumeration of
BPA's new responsibilities under the Regional Act, the
growth and development of several Divisions

du~ing

BPA's

recent internal restructuring, the application of standard
and ad hoc operating procedures in the forecasting effort,
and the dynamic, interactive character of organizational
needs as they constrain or steer the technical process of
forecasting.

Interorganizationally, BPA's changing rela-

tionship with the Council, established regional forecasting
bodies, and the involved public is documented and analyzed
to see how its influence is felt on the forecast.

The goal

of this analysis is to see what forces (or actors) in a
changing organizational situation in the region (and in BPA)
helped give shape to an important piece of technical output
(i.e. the BPA forecast) upon which significance decisions
were at least partially based.
In Chapter IV, the P-perspective is used to illuminate
yet another dimension of the forecasting process.

Key

actors and outstanding decisions affecting the course of the
demand forecasting effort are identified and their significance assessed.

Included here are both the actions of the
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staff and "non-technical" decision makers (e.g. the Power
Administrator) which modified or gave direction to the
events shaping the forecast product.

Analysis is directed

toward identifying personal and situational characteristics
which predispose principal actcIs towards their behavior.
Chapter V cross-cues the insights obtained through the
application of each of the three perspectives (i.e. displays
their interdependencies), producing a composite or integrated picture of BPA's forecasting effort.

It is in this

chapter that the "explanatory" powers of the Multiple
Perspective Concept are demonstrated.

Whereas the previous

three chapters explored the forecasting process through the
"selective lenses" of each of the perspectives individually
this chapter builds a composite picture illustrating the
interpretation of elements identified and isolated in the
earlier chapters.

Included in this chapter is an investi-

gation of the issue of "validation" of the insights gained
through the use of Multiple Perspectives.

Following guide-

lines proposed by Linstone (1984:321-327) a digraph
representation of the dynamics of interaction between the
perspectives is presented.

Such a representation not only

displays a picture of overall findings clearly and unambiguously, permitting critical evaluation and, potentially,
reinterpretation, but also yields new insights through
analysis of cyclical and indirect impacts between the
perspectIves.
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Finally, Chapter VI summarizes and concludes the
research.

It focuses both upon conclusions about the BPA

20-year forecasts derived through the application of the
Multiple Perspective Concept, and upon general conclusions
on the use of the MP Concept in research on decision areas.
This includes a set of propositions about the appropriate
domains and methods of application of each of the perspectives and general comments on the types of problems a
researcher may expect to have to deal with using the HP
Concept in an organizational context.

CHAPTER II
THE T-PERSPECTIVE
FORECASTS, DECISIONS, AND PLANS: THE TECHNICAL CONTEXT FOR
MODEL USAGE
Most generally, the intent of forecasts, whatever the
domain of their application, is to assist decision makers in
dealing with the uncertainty associated with the future.

In

situations where forecasting is performed, the forecasts
provide the decision maker with selected "vistas" of the
future "state of the world", based on various assumptions or
speculations.

Forecasting is thus perhaps best understood

as fundamentally interlinked with the activities of planning
and decision making.

Planning may be though of as "the

process of preparing a set of decisions for action in the
future, directed at achieving goals by optimum means".
Decision making, in turn, consists of the act of selecting
one from several courses of action (Martino, 1978:332-337).
In all but the most trivial situations, the decision maker
is confronted with some aspect (or aspects) of the
environment over which he has little or no control but which
nonetheless critically impacts the mission or task he is
responsible for carrying out (e.g. consumer demand for
goods, services, or energy).

Informed decision making,

whether a part of short- or long-range planning, requires
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an assessment of the likely state of the environment, and it
is this role which forecasting attempts to fill.
Forecasts, however, may differ widely in terms of the
amount of information they yield, the number of issues they
address, and the variety of questions they are able to
answer.

Forecast sophistication is a function of the

techniques or models used, the resources available, and,
perhaps most importantly, the scope of the associated
planning effort.

In situations where the environment is

relatively unchanging or where key decision makers see the
future as unfolding in a relatively straightforward fashion,
forecasts tend to be viewed as reasonably precise statements
of what is going to happen.

By contrast, where the environ-

ment is viewed as complex and turbulent and the future as
fraught with uncertainty, planning is aimed at devisIng
reasonable courses of action in the face of a variety of
contingent events.

The forecasts associated with such

planning tend to be more complex, addressing a wider
spectrum of environmental variables and providing potentially valuable information about the contingencies
envisioned.
Both the overall methodological strategy and the
specific technique (or techniques) employed in a forecast
are, in large part, functions of the perceived needs of
decision makers and the planning philosophy

espous~d,

though

quite obviously, decision makers, planners, and forecasting
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technicians may incorrectly assess the situation and proceed
in an inappropriate fashion.

The simplest, and in many ways

the most risky, methodological strategy is to produce a
point forecast, which aims at an accurate description of a
single "most likely" future state of key elements in the
environment.

Unless the environment is extremely stable

<and extremely simple in its behavioral characteristics)
such a forecast is apt to provide a poor base for planning.
Range forecasts remove some of the risk normally associated
with point forecasts by defining the upper and lower bounds
to a region within which the values of outcome of future
events or trends are thought likely to fill.

The conditions

which define the boundaries of the range usually do not
differ qualitatively from those of a single point forecast;
rather it is the magnitude of influence of certain crucial
variables which is subjected to variation.

Planning based

upon range forecasts is thought less risky because it is
geared to a accommodate the variety of possible future
states falling within the posited boundaries.

Unfortun-

ately, where the character of the environment is subject to
more rapid change, range forecasts are insufficient to
address the full spectrum of qualitatively different futures
that may be considered reasonably likely.

A scenario or,

more correctly, contingency analysis, seeks to explore the
significance of different constellations of possible occurrences to planning and decision-making efforts.

Such
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analysis is predicated upon a recognized need for highly
flexible planning options, and, as such, associated
forecasting techniques and models tend to be more complex,
since they must address a wider variety of events, trends,
or policy consequences.
The specific forecasting tool (or tools) selected is
also primarily a function of planning and decision-making
needs (though, clearly, the sheer availability or workability of a technique or model in a given situation is
additionally of central importance).

Most generally, these

techniques may be grouped into two major categories:
exploratory and normative.
Exploratory forecasting techniques start from the
present situation and project the future of some variable
(or variables) or concern by making various assumptions
about continuation of past or present patterns of growth and
activity (Martino, 1978:287).

Although these techniques may

vary rather widely in terms of their complexity and sophistication, they all are suited to planning in environments
where basic relationships among elements do not vary
appreciably over time (even though the particular values or
states the elements may assume).

Trend extrapolation and

correlation are perhaps the simplest of exploratory techniques.

Both plot the change in a dependent variable

against a single independent variable whose behavior is
more stable or at least better known (in the case of trend
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extrapolation the independent variable is time).

Any causal

mechanisms which might link the variables remain unknown, in
effect burying possible complex linkages between the variables considered and othe factors in the "black box" of the
trend or correlation relationship.

Growth curves constitute

marginally more sophisticated techniques for plotting trends
against time, requiring prior knowledge of the upper limits
of the value of the dependent variable -- something which is
neither always known or even always applicable.

Econometric

models consist of linked, simultaneously-solved regression
equations (derived from historical relationships between
each dependent variable and one or more independent variables) whose terms are based upon economic theory.

Such

models display noteworthy differences in size (ranging from
several to several thousand equations) and accuracy.
Generally, econometric models explicitly address a somewhat
wider range of environmental factors than most exploratory
techniques and are particularly appropriate where price,
income, or productivity are significant "drivers" of the
trends under consideration.

Finally, simulation models,

first developed in an engineering context, may be used to
illuminate the unfolding of a wider variety of processes
over time.

A simulation attempts to "imitate" the dynamic

characteristics of the real world system it models by
performing a series of numerical calculations which follow
the changes of the states of that system over time (Gordon,
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1978:9-10).

In contrast to other exploratory forecasting

techniques, simulations are "white boxes" which endeavor to
explicate the structure of causal connections between system
elements, though, admittedly, what is embodied in a simulation model's structure is what its developers believe to be
the structure of the real world (which mayor may not be its
true structure).

The mathematical equations connecting

variables reflect observed (or adjudged) relationships
thought to endure

ov~r

time.

As such, they share a weakness

of other exploratory techniques: they cannot address
structural changes in real world relationships which might
occur in the future.

The strength of simulation models is

the "intermediate output" which they produce in arriving at
their final calculation; namely, the description of interactions between system elements which may be useful for
decisionmaking.
Normative forecasting methods seek to identify what
type of future conditions are most desirable with the
objective of bringing them about (thus, the name "normative").

This is accomplished through techniques which

permit the forecaster to layout the full array of
alternatives so that critical comparisons can be made.
Where the system or process being analyzed can be described
in terms of causation, hierarchy, or levels of complexity
relevance trees (which permit cost-benefit comparisons
between different systems required to fulfill a number of
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missions) may be used.

By contrast, where a system may be

broken down into nonhierarchical elements which can be
altered independently, morphologies (which enumerate a row
of different alternatives for each of the problem parameters
forming the columns of the matrix) are appropriate.

Final-

ly, in the cases where all the alternative routes or sequences by which a task or mission may be accomplished can be
mapped, mission flow diagrams may be employed (Martino,
1978:287-317).

Normative methods are best used where

decision makers and planners have a great deal of control
over the courses of behavior which key elements will follow.
Where the full spectrum of alternatives cannot be readily
specified, or where decision-making power is insufficient to
affect critical environmental parameters, normative methods
are of limited use.
While this classificatory distinction between exploratory and normative forecasting methods is a useful one, two
qualifications need to be made.

The first is that there are

commonly used techniques which may fall into either category
(or both categories) depending upon how they are used.

Most

notable are informed judgment ("genius forecasting") and
Delphi, an anonymous, iterative technique for evoking and
structuring expert opinion on various forecasting issues and
topics.

Whether these techniques are to be regarded as

exploratory or normative is dependent upon whether they are
used for, respectively, predictive or policymaking purposes.
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A second. and perhaps more important, qualification is that
the distinction between exploratory and normative techniques
is not as sharply drawn as first may appear to be the case.
Even though decision makers may not be able to control the
major "environmental" factors which their forecasts address,
they are quite often able to influence them (albeit indirectly and incompletely) through their decisions, frequently
without suspecting they are doing so.

self-fulfilling

prophecy refers to a condition where an image of the future
helps bring about events which might otherwise not have
occurred.

For example, the widespread belief in an imminent

stock market crash can result in a pattern of reckless
selling and trading which in fact serves to drive the market
down.

conversely, self-denying prophecy refers to a condi-

tion where a probably correct image of the future (based on
current trends) results in actions by decision makers which
bring about a very different set of outcomes.

Forecasts of

severe resource depletion, for example, may bring about increased exploration for and conservation of materials,
thereby averting a foreseen crisis.

Thus, where planning

and decision making can affect the environment which an
"exploratory" forecast addresses, that forecast can have
very real normative, pollcymaking consequences.
The BPA 20-year regional demand forecast subjected to
analysis in this dissertation was geared to planning
resource acquisitions and ratemaking in lieu of the Regional
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Council's April 1983 forecast and resource plan.

The

forecast used three sets of economic and demographic
projections and policy assumptions to produce a range of
demand growth trajectories (baseline, low, and high) within
which actual electricity consumption is anticipated to fall.
The method of forecasting was to employ an interacting set
of demand and electricity pricing models in an exploratory
mode (though, as will be seen in the Chapter V a number of
parties in the region questioned its possible "normative"
consequences).

The "system" of interacting models used in

the BPA forecast is described in the section that follows.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BPA FORECASTING SYSTEM
The BPA forecasting effort was carried out over a
number of months in three stages designed to allow the
interested public and opportunity to criticize, comment, and
make suggestions on the execution of the forecast.
stage One: In December of 1981, a preliminary set of
regional economic and demographic projections were prepared.
The public was invited to examine the credibility of the
projected values of such variables as regional employment,
population, income, and fuel prices as well as the method of
their derivation.

At roughly the same time, the technical

merits of four demand models being considered for use in
BPA's first independent long-range forecast of electricity
consumption were reviewed by the staff.

The Northwest
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Energy Policy Project (NEPP) All-Sector Model of electricity
use, the Pacific Northwest utilities Conference Committee
(PNUCC) Econometric Model, and the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) Energy Use Models for the residential and
commercial sectors were used to simulate four possible
energy growth scenarios for the region exemplifying different levels of conservation program implementation.

The

results were published and made available to the public.
Stage Two:

In April of 1982, BPA released a draft

~

forecast of electricity consumption in the Pacific Northwest
along with a revised set of economic/demographic projections.

For the forecast, a somewhat more sophisticated

approach was taken than was the case for the earlier model
review.

Separate economic and demographic inputs were

prepared for public and private electric utility service
districts.

The ORNL Residential and Commercial Sector

Demand Models and the industrial portion of the NEFF Econometric Model were used in tandem with an electricity supply
pricing model to determine private and public utility loads.
Stage Three:

In July of 1982, the final version of· the

20-year demand forecast was released.

Only slight model

changes were implemented between draft and final forecasts.
The sundry changes in model input assumptions prompted by
public comment and the substitution of the results of the
Brookhaven Pulp and Paper Process Model for the NEPP model's
highly counterintuitive results for that industry resulted
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in a minor decrease in the projected average annual rate of
growth over the 20-year period from 1.7 to 1.6 percent.
The major development characterizing stages Two and
Three of the forecasting process was the development of a
price-responsive system of interlinked models.

Fuel price,

as the 1970s have effectively taught, is a prime determinant
of energy consumption.

People will not only use larger

amounts of energy for particular tasks when the source of
that energy is abundant and cheap but will also employ the
energy for a larger variety of end-uses.

As the price of a

fuel rises, consumers characteristically curtail their use
of that fuel or switch to a cheaper competing source of
energy.

Conversely, energy demand is a central factor in

determining energy price, particularly in the case of
electricity.

As the demand upon established power-genera-

ting resources approaches their capacity, new facilities
must be built or developed to accommodate anticipated
increases in consumption.

New resources are more costly to

construct, and the power they generate is, correspondingly,
sold at a higher price.

This higher price for new energy

will, in turn, tend to dampen demand.
The system of models developed by BPA designed to deal
with this interrelationship between electricity supply and
demand is depicted in simplified form in Figure 2

b~low.
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Figure 2. The BPA system of forecasting models.
overview of inputs, models and outputs.

An

The first component is the one in which the economic/
demographic inputs needed to operate the demand models are
prepared.

While some of the inputs used by the demand

models are not region-specific (e.g. parameters for
engineering or econometric relationships used in the model)
the values for

a number of the basic driving variables

(e.g. non-electric fuel prices, employment, population,
lncome) are and must be derived in-house by BPA staff.
Regional inputs (broken down by public and private electric
utllity service districts) are developed from national
economic models (i.e. the Data Resources Inc., or DRI,
model) various industries' own projections of employment and
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productivity, and several BPA in-house models (e.g.
population).
The economic/demographic projections serve as inputs to
the second system component which is comprised of three
energy demand models; the ORNL Residential Model, the ORNL
~ommercial

Model, and the industrial and street lighting

portions of the NEPP model.

Both of the ORNL models are

hybrid economic/engineering models which are particularly
well suited to policy analysis applications.

The NEPP model

is an all-sectors, all-fuels econometric model, though only
portions of its total capabilities were used for the BPA
forecast.
The third component of the forecasting system is an
electriCity supply pricing model developed in-house at BPA.
Orginally known as the Integrated Supply Demand Model, the
current priCing model substitutes the ORNL and NEPP models
for its demand module.

The pricing model takes as its input

the sector-specific demands calculated in the second
component of the forecasting system and develops a set of
prices based upon the least-cost mix of new resources needed
to meet the projected loads.

The stream of prices so deriv-

ed in turn becomes input for the demand models which are
rerun to develop a secondary estimation of future consumption.

These

ca~culated

demands are again entered into the

pricing model, and the iterative process continues until an
equil1br1um of both price and demand 1s reached.

,
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The fourth and final component is where the output of
the

fo~ecasting p~ocess

is adjusted and tallied: energy

consumption estimates broken down by fuel type (though in
fact the official
city),

~ate

fo~ecast

document focused upon electri-

pool, (i.e. public vs.

p~ivate),

use (e.g space heating, lighting, etc.).
tions

we~e pe~fo~med exte~nal

sector, and end

Seve~al

calcula-

to the models, and these

ultimately affected consumption estimated totals.
irrigation loads (developed using a

B~A

were added into the residential load.

irrigation model)
l~rigation

calculated only once and did not change from
iteration with the pricing model.

~rojected

loads were

Similarly, loads for

federal agencies and direct service industries (OSls)
compiled

f~om

to

ite~ation

we~e

long-term contract demands (which were not

subject to price changes during contract lifetimes) and
added to commercial and industrial loads respectively.
Commercial Hodel and

NE~~

ORNL

street lighting submodel loads

were pooled during the iterative process to approximate
commercial demand.

Finally, for the pulp and paper indus-

try, the output of the Brookhaven Pulp and

~aper ~rocess

Hodel (run at Brookhaven Laboratory) was substituted for
that of the NEPP model.
As

noted above, the actual structure of the models

forming the

B~A

forecasting system embodies a complexity not

displayed in this cursory overview.

The next sections

examine the models and procedures in greater detail.

ENERGY DEMAND AND ENERGY SUPPLY: THE MODELS USED IN BPA'S
FORECAST
A problem with the foregoing discussion of major types
of forecasting is that focusing upon a relatively few
general features which distinguish a technique obscures
whatever internal complexity may be present in a given
application.

Though simple in principle, each of the models

used by BPA employed a significant number of assumptions
which were represented with varying degrees of explicitness.
To un4erstand the forecast fully, it is necessary to
delineate the entire methodology employed in arriving at the
economic and demographic prOjections used as model inputs
through the iterative, concatenated use of sector demand and
electricity pricing models to the final calculation of
20-year demand growth.
This major subchapter details both the overall
methodology and the internal structures of each of the
models employed in the BPA forecast.

First, the basic

components of the system of models are presented in broad
stroke in an overview section which focuses upon how the
system as a whole operates, what role each of the models (or
components) plays, and how these models are interlinked.
Next, each indivldual component is examined In detail, its
internal operating structure (and the concomitant technical
assumptions) laid bare for examination.

Finally, the larger

forecasting system is reconstructed, but at a higher degree
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of detail and resolution than in the overview section.

The

resulting "master" input-output diagram should allow each
model calculation to be referenced to each of its antecedent
calculations, transformations, and assumptions.
Economic/Demographic Projections; Inputs to Energy Forecasting Models
In order to forecast the energy future of the Pacific
Northwest it is necessary to develop a set of projections of
economic/demographic conditions characteristic of the region
to serve as inputs to the demand models for the various
sectors.

For BPA's 1982 long-term forecast, projections of

a number of key variables reflecting changing economic and
demographic conditions were prepared.

Three distinct

streams of values for such factors as employment, population, income, housing, and fuel prices were developed to
represent conditions which would conceivably characterize
baseline (i.e. "best guess"), high, and low energy consumption (this was done for both public and private utility
service districts).

These projections are developed by the

Economic Studies Section of Power Requirements using a number of different models and techniques.
While the projections of economic or demographic
variables are done separately, each using a distinct procedure and embodying a unique array of assumptions, the
derivations are interdependent to the extent that the
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calculated values of one variable (e.g. employment) are used
as inputs to the models used to compute the values of other
variables (e.g. population).

This interdependence renders

the entire set of projections more internally consistent
than would be the case if each variable were projected in
isolation from each other but, at the same time, makes the
consequences of many assumptions "hereditary", or embedded
in final values other variables assume.

Figure 3 provides

an overview of the relationship of the models employed in
the development of the set of economic/demographic projections.
Outputs of the Data Resources Inc. (DRI) model of the
national economy are used for a number of purposes: as inputs to the models used to project the future values of
economic and demographic variables, as direct inputs to the
demand models, and as standards for determining high and low
ranges.

The economic base model refers to a technique (not

an actual computer model) for deriving non-basic industry
employment from projectlons of employment in basic (i.e.
exporting) industries (which are calculated in a variety of
ways depending upon the particular industry).

Employment

projections are used as inputs to the BPA population model
(which develops future values for both population and
households) and the BPA income model, which also uses the
output of the population model in the calculation of total
personal and per capita income.

The BPA housing model takes
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Figure 3. Schematic of Models used for economic/
demographic inputs. A diagram of data flows between
models.
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the number of households as determined by the population
model as an input to develop estimates of total housing
stock, new construction, and average unit size for homes for
the-forecast period.

Finally, fuel price projections for

energy sources competitive with electricity (i.e. natural
gas, oil, and coal) are prepared independently of the other
BPA models, though DRI projections are involved.
Having taken an overview of the relationships existing
between the techniques employed to develop individual economic or demographic projections, it is now appropriate to
examine each of these techniques separately and in greater
detail.
The DRI Model of the National Economy.

Data Resources

Incorporated is one of a number of firms which prepares and
operates models of the

u.s.

economy which may be accessed or

operated by subscribers to their computer service.

Three

distinct prOjections of national economic trends from 1980
to 2006 were utilized by BPA: TRENDLONG2006B (a baseline
projection), OPTIMLONG2006B (an optimistic, "high case"),
and PESSIHLONG2006B (a pessimistic, "low case").

While this

model is essentially a "black box" to its users, a number of
basic assumptions may be identified.
TRENDLONG2006B represents, or embodies, the following
assumptions.
no major economic mishaps (such as oil price shock or
untoward policy shifts)
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average annual rate of population growth .9\ by 1985,
.8\ by 1990, and .6\ by 2000
potential output grows by average annual rate or 2.8%
in 1980 and 2.3\ in 1990
growth of labor force slows to 1.0\ per year in the
1980s and .8\ from 1990 to 2000
labor force participation rate increases to 66.8\ of
population by 1990 and 67.5\ by 2006
employment growth continues at an average annual rate
of 1.7\ between 1980 and 1990, declining to .9\ between 1990
and 2006
annual inflation rate drops from 7.9\ in 1982 to 6.4\
in 2006
both energy prices and energy consumption increase
slowly (1.9\ per year in 1980s, 1.4\ afterward)
housing starts recover from current slump and average
1.87 million units from 1981 to 1990 and 1.69 million from
1991 to 2000.
Optimistic and pessimistic trends also assume a relatively smooth path of economic growth without any major
mishaps.

They differ from the mean, or baseline, growth

trajectory in a manner which is more quantitative then
qualitative.

50

In OPTIMLONG2006B
average annual rates of growth (AARGs) of potential
output are 3.5\ for the 1980s and 2.6\ from 1990 on to the
end of the forecast period
inflation settles down to 5\ per year in 1986 and
averages that value until 2006
employment in 2006 is increased by 4.7\ over the base
case
labor force participation increases to 71.4\ in 2006
For PESSIMLONG2006B
The AARG for potential output is 2.3\ through 1990 and
1.8\ form 1990 to 2006
the rate of inflation rises to 10\ in 1986 and remains
at that level through 2006
year 2006 employment is down 4.7\ from TRENDLONG2006B
labor force participation is limited to 64.4\ in 2006
Outputs of the DRI model are used in three distinct
ways.
First, some of the outputs of the model are used in the
sector demand models without any alteration or modification.
Included here are DRI projections of the AARG of industrial
productivity, interest rates, gross nation product (GNP),
consumer price index (CPI), and implicit price deflators
(based upon GNP and personal comsumption expenditures, or
PCB) •
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Second, a number of the ORI national model outputs are
used as inputs to the other economic/demographic models depIcted in Figure 3.
Specifically
The housing model uses state level projections of
housing starts.
The model used for projecting employment in the timber
industry uses the GNP forecast.
The regional income model uses u.S. contributions per
employee, U.S. per capita property income, and U.S. per
capita transfer payments, and
Fuel price calculations employ ORI estimates of prices
for crude and retail petroleum, natural gas, and coal.
Finally, the ranges of the three ORI trend lines were
used to establish proportional ranges in the high and low
case values of many of the BPA's regional projections.
The Economic Base Model.

The name given to the overall

methodology for· projecting regional employment is 'economic
base model'.

'Kodel' here refers to a way of determining

employment from non-basic industries from a series of
calculations which project employment for each of ten basic
(i.e. exporting) industries individually.

The economic

assumptions behind the economic are represented in the
digraph in Figure 4.

(NOTE:

An

arrow from one element in

the digraph to another indicates that the element at the
arrow's tail influences the element at the arrow's head.

If
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Figure 4. Dynamics assumed by economic base model. A
digraph of relationships between basic and non-basic
industries. (Detail of Figure 3, Box 2)
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the arrow is 'signed' with a '+' the change in the affected
element is in the same direction as that of the element
impacting it; whereas a

I_I

indicates a change in the op-

posite direction.)
Basic industries are those which export their output to
consumers outside of the region.

As

such, they are essen-

tially "driven" by external demand which spurs increased
productivity which, in turn, requires increased employment.
Industries classified as "basic" include agriculture, food
processing, lumber and wood products, pulp and paper, chemicals, primary metals, electronics, transportation equipment, mining, and Federal government.

Growth in basic in-

dustry correspondingly stimulates the growth of non-basic
industry in the region.

Demand for the products and ser-

vices of non-basic industries encourages increased production and employment.

The actual calculation of non-basic

industry employment 1s cazzled out by applying an employment
multiplier to total projected basic industry employment.
The multiplier, consisting of the ratio of total to basic
industry employment, was derived by calculating this ratio
for each year from 1950 to 1979, by state, and then extrapolating to the end of the forecast period.

Applying the

multiplier to projected basic employment yields total
employment.

subtracting basic from total employment pro-

duces the total non-basic industry employment for forecast
years, which is then disaggregated into distinct sector

54

categories based upon historical trends and national
projections of individual industry growth.
Thus, the values which the projections of non-basic
industry employment assume are dependent upon the size of
basic employment in the region.

Figure 4 would seem to in-

dicate that regional employment is completely demand-driven
and subject to continued growth as long as unfilled demand
for exports exists.

In reality, however, basic industry

growth is limited by a variety of resource, price, and
policy constraints which are, to a large degree, industryspecific.

For this reason, employment in each of ten basic

industries is projected using a distinct methodology, as
well as its own distinct data sources, which reflect the
unique circumstances affecting its growth and development.
Projecting employment in agriculture involves embracing
somewhat greater uncertainty than is the case with other
basic industries.

A reasonable share of farm employment 1s

comprised of migrant and part-time family labor, a fact
which makes precise estimation difficult and virtually requires some use of judgment.

BPA estimates were prepared

from data originating at two sources.

One was the reports

of state level agencies which document historical employment
(and disaggregate it to county level).

The other was Bureau

of Economic AnalysiS (BEA) projections of state and county
level employment in agriculture.

Essentially, BPA

judgmentally modified the trend described by BEA so that
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projections-were more consistent with the historical employment statistics from the state agency reports.

High and low

ranges were placed around the baseline employment projections using the ranges, though not the actual values, developed in a 1979 study by the Northwest Agricultual Development Project (NADP).

As

a check for the credibilty of the

BPA projections they were cross-compared with those
developed by the Census of Agriculture and the

u.s.

Depart-

ment of Agriculture's Crop Reporting Board.
For the food processing industry, historical employment
data at the county level obtained from

s~ate

partments were subjected to a trend analysis.

employment deTrends were

modified slightly where information from county level
sources indicated specific industry expansion plans.

High

and low ranges were developed around the baseline trend for
food processing employment based upon DRI national
employment ranges for the industry.
A computerized model first developed for the

u.s.

Forest Service was used to develop the baseline employment
figures for the lumber and wood products industry.

The

Timber Assessment Harket Hodel (TAMH) determines levels of
future prices and production by Simulating interactions in
the markets for stumpage, lumber, and plywood as constrained
by the biological growth of the timber resource base.

u.s.

Using

Census forecast of national population and DRI middle

range GNP projections, the model produces a forecast of
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industry output.

These TAHH forecasts are disaggregated to

the state level and multiplied by a ratio of worker-years
per unit of industry output, yielding total industry employment.

High and low projections were based upon past rela-

tionships between employment and new housing starts and DRI
high and low projections of national housing starts.
Employment in the pulp and pape; industry was forecasted in two different ways.

For primary product sectors

(pulp, paper, and paperboard) employment estimates were made
by analyzing current

u.s.

Forest Service forecasts of re-

gional pulp production and earlier forecasts of regional
pulp production levels (both of which suggested virtually
stable employment levels for the duration of the forecast
period).

In the converted paper product sectors employ-

ment-to-population ratios were calculated and multiplied by
preliminar¥ population projections.

Because growth in the

pulp and paper industry Is tightly constrained, high and low
ranges could not deviate greatly from the baseline.

They

were derived by varying the start-up times and production
levels of new plants.
The chemicals (and allied products) industry baseline
employment was also projected to grow at a moderate rate.
Industries in this category may be subdivided into three
main groups: chlorine-caustic, agricultural chemicals, and
nuclear fuels processing and engineering (1.e. Hanford).
For each group, h1storical data was obtained from state
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agency reports.

Projections, however, were developed

differently for each group.

Chlorine-caustic employment

growth is calculated by correlating it with changes in the
pulp and paper industry (where such chemical products are
used routinely).

For the agricultural chemical industry,

employment growth was considered proportional to DRI projections of national industry employment.

Finally, for

nuclear fuels (a very constrained area of growth) industry
estimates of potential growth were judgmentally adjusted.
High and low ranges were developed by applying different
estimates of the Pacific Northwest's share of national
employment to DRI national industry employment forecast.
For the high case, the historic growth of the region's share
was extrapolated to the end of the forecast period, and the
resulting values applied to ORI's optimistic trend.

For the

low case, a constant share equal to the 1980 value was
applied to the DRI pessimistic economic projection.
Employment in primary metals was projected in two
different ways, depending upon the metal under
consideration.

Primary aluminum smelters obtain almost all

their electricity from BPA.

Since sales are not expected to

increase significantly over the next 20 years, aluminum
production growth was assumed to occur only because of
modernization of existing plants and the addition of the
planned Alumax plant.

From reports on plants modernized

since 1979 and knowledge of planned efficiency improvements
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in other plants, projections were made of anticipated primary aluminum output increases and the additional labor
force required (adjusting for increased productivity).

High

and low ranges were established by varying demand and electricity prices relative to the base case.

The high case

assumed greater demand and increased production (and employment) due to further price-induced modernization.

By con-

trast, the low case assumed lower demand, less modernization, and the termination of plans to construct Alumax.

For

"non-aluminum" primary metals regional growth (based on
historical values and anticipated developments in specific
facilities) was indexed to national trends for the industry
developed by DRI.

High and low ranges were likewise indexed

to DRI optimistic and pessimistic trends.
Fer the electronics industry in the PNW employment
projections were based upon both the public statements of
individual companies and the reports of both state departments of economic development and local agencies.

From

these projections, each state's share of DRI's national
employment estimates was determined.

For the high case,

these same shares were applied to the DRI optimistic projection.

For the low case, the states' shares were judg-

mentally reduced (to represent a slowing in the relative
growth of the regional electronics industry) and applied to
the DRI pessimistic national industry employment projection.
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The transportation equipment industry is comprised of
three main subgroups: aerospace (chiefly Boeing), ship and
boat building, and miscellaneous other (motor vehicles,
railroad eqiupment, and travel trailers;.

For each of these

subgroups, specific industry estimates of anticipated employment were obtained and judgmentally adjusted to be consistent with other forecasted economic trends.

High and low

ranges for transportation equipment were developed by determining the share of each state (except Washington) of DRI's
estimates for the base case and applying these shares to the
appropriate employment estimates in the optimistic and
pessimistic trends.

Because of historically wide swings in

the industry in the state of Washington, its average absolute change in yearly employment for the last 20 years was
determined and that amount added to (high case) or subtracted from (low case) baseline values to approximate its
range.
The mining industry is extremely resource-dependent and
its employment only determined by demand to a limited degree.

Kine-specific estimates of employment were developed

from historical values and scaled up or down to reflect
different levels of production for high and low cases.
Finally Federal government employment, limited by each
Administration's hiring ceilings, was obtained from in-house
estimates, with high and low cases representing, respectively, relaxed and tightened hiring restrictions.
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Table II summarizes the primary industry employment
derivations.
The BPA Population/Household Hodel.

The BPA population

model employs what is known as a cohort-component method for
projecting population change.

Cohorts are persons born

within a distinct period of time (in the case of the BPA
model, every five years).

The components of population

change are fertility, mortality, and migration.

The model,

in effect, operates by "aging" the members of each cohort in
the existing population at five year increments, making adjustments for births, deaths, age and sex composition
changes, varying labor force participation
and out-migration.

~ates,

and in-

The model produces state level popula-

tion estimates which are split into public and private
service territories by disaggregating 1980 county level
census data using percentages of residential customers served by public and private utilities.

These percentages were

modified slightly where employment projections indicated a
change of proportion of total employment in public or private service areas.
A more detailed representation of the operational
structure of the population model is depicted in Figure 5.
The model is based in the year 1970 and accordingly begins
its operation using 1970 population values (although it was
operated to match the 1980 age composition of each state).
Age- and sex-specific fertility and suryiyal rates (taken
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TABLE II
BASIC INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT ESTIMATION
Industry

Employment periyation

High/Low Adjystment

Agriculture

- judgmental adjustment of - NADP high/low
BPA projections based
ranges applied to
on state level agency
BPA-calculated
reports
baseline

Food Processing

- trend analysis of state
employment departments
(modified for specific
industry expansion
plans)

- state's shares of
national employment applied to
DRt optimistic &
pessimistic trends

Lumber & Wood
Products

- TAMM forecasts of regional production
disaggregated to state
level & multiplied by
employment/output ratio

- DRt projections
of optimistic and
pessimistic case
housing starts
applied to BPA
base line

pulp and Paper

- primary product: USFS
projections & earlier
BPA forecasts converted
paper products: employment/population
ratios multiplied by
preliminary population
projections

- star t-up times
and production
levels of known
plants scaled up
or down

Chemicals

- chlorine-caustic:
correlated with pulp
and paper growth
agricultural: growth
proportional to
national DRI baseline
nuclear fuels: judgmental adjustment of
industry estimates

- each state's share
of national employment extrapola ted to 2000,
shares applied to
ORI's optimistic
trend for high
case, constant
share (1980 level)
assumed for low
case derivation
from DRI pessimistic trend
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TABLE II (Cont'd)
Industry

Employment Deriyation

High/Low Adjystment

Primary Metals

- aluminum: industry
estimates of production (including
modernization) correlated with employment, Alumax added

Electronics

- public statements of
individual companies'
expansion plans and
projections of state
depts. of economic
development

- state shares applied
to DRI optimistic
trend for high case,
reduced shares
app lied to DRI
pessimistic trend
for low-case

Transportation
Equipment

- judgmental adjustment
of aerospace industry
estimates of growth
and expansion~ nonaerospace shares taken
from historic data
and ORI base l i ne
national trend

- states' shares applied to ORI optimistic -& pessimistic
trend except for WA
where avg. absolute
yearly employment
change added to or
subtracted from
baseline

Mining

- mine-specific employment estimates

- baseline estimates
scaled up/down to
reflect different
levels of mine production

Federal government

- aluminum: high case
adjusts demand &
amount of modernization upward, low
case assumes lower
demand, less modernization. no Alumax
non-aluminum: regional
non-aluminum: state
historical estimates
shares of national
indexed to ORI baseline
employment applied
to ORI optimistic
and pessimistic
trends

in-house estimates
(given current hiring
ceilings , existing
Federal facilities)

- in-house estimates
(relaxed or tightened
hiring ceilings)
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Figure S. The BPA population model. A flowchart of
calculations. (Detail of Figure 3, Box 3)
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from state Depts. of Vital Statistics for the historical
period and from national projections of the U.S. Bureau of
Census from 1980 to 2000) are then applied to the base year
values to produce a preliminary 1975 population value.

To

this preliminary value, labor force participation rates
(also age-and sex-specific) taken from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics are applied, yielding the portion of the
1915 labor force filled by "survivors" of the 1970
population who are of working age.
This labor force value, however, does not reflect the
net migration of workers occurring from 1970 to 1975 (just
as the preliminary 1975 population figures do not reflect
total net migration).

A calculation of the total 1975

~

ployment is developed using the economic base model described in the previous section (though, prior to 1980, the employment values are actuals, not estimates).

An unem-

ployment adjustment, accounting for frictional unemployment,
is then performed to convert total 1975 employment into the
total 1915 labor force.

This "employment-derived" labor

force value was developed by applying participation rates to
preliminary 1975 population.

The difference between these

two values constitutes the net migration of workers.

Since

many migrating workers characteristically bring (or take)
their families with them, the net migration of workers is
multiplied by an adjustment factor to yield the net migration of population.

This resulting value is then added to
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(or subtracted from) the preliminary 1975 population value,
producing a final figure reflecting mortality, fertility,
and migration.
From the final 1975 population value, the number of
households is calculated by applying headship rates (i.e.
proportion of persons heading a household) to each age-sex
group and summing the forecasts for each of the groups.
Headship rates are taken from national projections developed
by the U.S. Bureau of Census.
Once the final population and household values are
calculated for 1975 the population is once again "aged" 5
years to 1980 and the set of calculations begun again.

This

process is repeated until the forecast horizon (2000) is
reached.
The high and low ranges for population were developed
by varying some of the key model input values, based upon
changes in fundamental assumptions.

For the high case, high

employment, higher levels of labor force participation,
lower fertility (since more childbearing-age women shift to
the work force), and high headship rates were assumed.

By

contrast, the low case assumed lower employment and labor
force participation, highter fertility, lower headship rates
and higher unemployment adjustment.
The Housing Hodel.

The housing model used at BPA

utilizes the output of the population model to project the
total housing stock, new housing construction, and average
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house size for four housing types: single-family attached,
single-family detached, multifamily, and mobile home.
Projections are done on a state level and aggregated to
regional totals.

Since housing projections are driven by

outputs of the population model, the public-private split
for housing is simply accomplished by using public and
private population values.
The internal structure of the housing model is depicted
in Figure 6.

A breakdown of households by age class is pro-

duced by multiplying age-specific population estimates by
headship rates.

(These values are taken from the population

model discussed in previous section).

Occupancy rates for

the four types of housing are determined from three factors.
The first is a set of base year (1980) occupancy rates,
developed from residential survey data developed for PNUCC
and BPA by Elrick and Lavidge.

(For 1980, no further

calculation is perfomed: the values are used as taken from
the survey data).

The second is a penetration rate which

estimates the preference choices among the housing types for
new construction.

This penetration rate is derived from DR!

state level projections of housing starts.

The third and

final factor is a distribution rate which allows the additional construction to be allocated among the various age
groups in the population.

These distribution rates are

calculated from residential survey data.

For each year in

the forecast period after 1981, the occupancy rate is cal-
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Housing
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Total Now
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Reprinted from (B?A, 1982b:43)
Figure 6. The BPA housing model. The derivation of ho~se
holds, average unit size and new construction. (:etail of
Fi9~re 3, Box 4)
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culated by adjusting the previous year's occupancy rate to
account for the penetration rates of new construction
(distributed among the various age groups).
Multiplying the number of households by occupancy rates
gives the breakdown of occupied housing units.

Total hous-

ing stock is next derived by adjusting occupied housing
stock for vacancies.

This is accomplished by dividing

occupied housing by one minus the vacancy rate (taken from
Annual Housing Syryeys).
Having calculated the total stock for a given year, the
housing model next determines new construction.
done in several steps.

This is

New net construction represents the

construction of new homes to accommodate the needs of a
growing population.

It is simply the difference between a

given year's total housing stock of a given type and that of
the same category for the previous year.

Next, replacement

construction (new homes to replace those which were demolished) is calculated by multiplying the previous year's
total stock by a replacement rate (assumes an average life
of 56 years for a conventional home, 24 years for a mobile
home).

Finally, total new construction is derived by summ-

ing net new and replacement construction.
The final output of the housing model, average unit
~,

is estimated using a simple vintage model which dis-

aggregates the total stock of houses into groups constructed
in the same year.

From the residential survey data are ob-
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tained the average unit size of the existing stock (by vintage) constructed prior to the base year, the average unit
size for new homes (assumed to remain equal to the average
size of the most recent vintage covered by the survey), and
the breakdown of the base year housing stock by vintage.
For each forecast year units which must be replaced are
removed from the oldest available vintage.

After this has

been done, average unit size is calculated by taking a
weighted average of all the Vintages.
High and low ranges for housing were developed simply
by substituting high and low values for population and
headship rates for those used in the baseline run.
The Income Model.

An econometric model was recently

developed by BPA staff to project both personal and per
capita income by state.

The model first projects the

various components of income and performs successive
aggregations to arrive at total personal income.

As such,

the intermediate outputs (i.e. the income values of the
various components) of the model are also of significance
(some of them are, in fact, used in the demand models).
Figure 7 provides a detailed representation of the
internal structure of the income model.

USing an econo-

metric equation, the incomes for various sectors of the
economy are calculated as a function of employment (by
category) and U.S. average earnings (also by employment
category).

The employment estimates are those developed by
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BPA, while the average earnings for each category are
obtained from DRI.

The categories thus calculated are

non-durable and durable manufacturing, mining, construction,
transportation, wholesale/retail trade, F.I.R.E. (finance,
insurance and real estate), services, and government.

Non-

agricultural proprietors' income, agricultural labor and
proprietors' income, and other labor income for the region
are developed as shares of national totals (DRI).

Non-

durable and durable manufacturing incomes are summed to
obtain total manufacturing income.

Transportation, whole-

sale and retail trade, F.I.R.E., services and government
incomes are aggregated to produce commercial income.

Next,

non-agricultural labor and proprietors' income is derived by
summing incomes from the manufacturing, commercial, mining,
construction, and non-agricultural proprietors' categories.
The further addition of agricultural labor and proprietors'
income and other labor income to this sum yields total labor
and proprietors' income.
Total personal income is subsequently obtained from
this last total by a series of calculations.

Property

income (a function of BPA population estimates and DRI
values for U.S. per capita income) and transfer payments
(the product of BPA population estimates and DRI U.S. per
capita transfer payment projections) are added to total
labor and proprietors' income.

From this figure is subract-

ed contributions to social insurance (the product of BPA
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employment and DRI estimates of U.S. contributions per
employee).

The resulting value is then given a "residence

adjustment" measuring the net difference between income inflows and outflows which result from such factors as commuting employees or absentee landlords and proprietors.

This

residence adjustment, based upon BPA employment values, completes the calculation of total personal income.
Finally, per capita personal income is derived simply
by dividing total personal income by BPA population estimates.
High and low range income were developed by substituting high and low BPA population and employments for baseline values and optimistic and pessimistic DRI trends for
its base case TRENDLONG2006B.
Public/private splits are Similarly determined by the
values of the BPA-derived inputs to the income model.

The

variables estimated by DRI are all national averages and, as
such, apply equally to public and private utility service
districts.
Fuel Prices.

A critical variable driving all of the

demand models is the price of fuels competitive with electricity.

The prices of oil, natural gas, and coal in the

region are calculated by BPA, though no computerized model
1s employed.

oil prices are regional, but coal and natural

gas prices vary somewhat from state to state.

No differ-

ences in non-electric fuels are observed to exist between
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public and private electric utility service areas: hence, no
public/private split needs be made.
Petroleum prices are calculated in four basic steps.
First, the relative shares (or the percentages of the total
amount supplied to the region) originating at various
sources are determined.

The shares of crude origination

from Canadian, Alaskan, Domestic, and Imported sources vary
across the forecast period.

The values assigned to the

shares for these sources are determined for the historical
period (1978) from

u.s

DOE's Energy Data Report, and for

the period from 1979 to 2000 from DRI crude petroleum projections.

Second, the prices for crude originating at each

source are determined from DOE's Monthly Energy Review
(1978-1980) and from DRI projections (1981-2000).

In the

third step, the average regional prices of crude oil are
determined by multiplying each source's shares by its
particular associated crude price value and summing.
Finally, the crude prices are adjusted for markups of refiners and retailers using price data obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and markup data from DOE.

The

resulting values describe the prices of residential, commercial, and industrial distillate fuels and industrial
residual oil.
Natural gas and coal price projections follow the same
series of steps.

For natural gas, the relative shares of

canadian, Alaskan, and Domestic sources are calculated for
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the forecast period, pipeline prices are determined from DRI
projections, an average pipeline price 1s computed, and this
average price adjusted for markups for interstate transmission pipelines and distributing utilities (based on DOE
cost and revenue data).

Retail prices of residential,

commercial, and industrial natural gas were determined for
each state as well as the whole region.

For coal, the

shares (for each state in the PNW) are produced for coal
sources in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah and contract prices
computed using DRI projections.

An average contract price

for each state is calculated and subsequently transformed
into delivered price (reflecting transportation costs also
based on DRI projections).

Delivered coal prices are

prepared for both the region and each of the states.
High and low ranges are the result of substituting
alternative DRI projections for the baseline trend in the
calculations described above.

No modification of procedures

1s necessary.
pemand Models; End-Use and Econometric Tools
The economic/demographic projections described above
were used in one or more of the sector-specific demand
models employed in the BPA forecast.

These models were run

in conjunction with a supply pricing model (described below)
electricity demand feeding into the pricing model, electricity prices input to the demand models, until equilibrium
(or convergence) was reached.

For each iteration, all of
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the models were run with a separate set of inputs corresponding to the economic and demographic characteristics of
public and private utility service areas.

As noted above,

the wholesale rates charged to investor-owned utilities
differ substantially from those of public utilities (the
Regional Power Bill notwithstanding): thus, two distinct
demand streams were produced so that the supply pricing
nlodel could determine the appr opr iate corresponding rates.
(Note: Irrigation, DSI, and federal agency loads were
calculated exogenously and not subjected to a public/private
disaggregation.

Their values did not vary from iteration to

iteration, though they were added to the demand outputs
before they were entered into the pricing model.

As a

result, they will be discussed below where final consumption
values are presented).
In addition to a baseline run (BPA's "best guess" at
the future of regional electricity demand) high and low
demand projections were developed (also employing the
public/private split and iterative operation with the
pricing model).

These alternative growth trajectories

represent the highest and lowest levels of electricity
consumption to be expected given the set of economic,
demographic, and policy constraints assumed to be effective.
In addition to using high case economic and demographic
inputs, the high demand trajectory assumed less robust
regional conservation.

Contrariwise, the low case alterna-
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tive embodied low economic and demographic projections and
assumed slightly greater levels of conservation savings than
the baseline.

Table III provides a fuller enumeration of

the assumptions embodied in the inputs to the individual
demand models.

How these assumptions affect each of the

models' operations is described in the detailed discussions
of the ORNL Residential Model, the ORNL Commercial Model,
and NEPP Industrial Model presented below.
The ORNL Residential Model.

One of the three principal

models of energy demand employed by BPA staff in producing
the 1982 forecast was the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Model of residential sector energy consumption.

The ORNL

model was one of several developed for the USDOE shortly
after its formation in 1977.

The ORNL Residential Model

embodies a hybrid structure, which reflects characteristics
of both engineering and econometric models.

The model

architects, most notably Eric Hirst, designed the basic
features of the model to address the effects of both the
relatively continuous demographic and economic trends
stimulating demand growth and the discontinuous energy
policy interventions anticipated by the newly elected Carter
Administration.

The basic structure of the model is

illustrated below in Figure 8.
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TABLE III
KEY ENERGY FORECAST ASSUMPTIONS
EXPLICIT MODELING CHOICES BY SECTOR

Low Case

Base Case

High Case

Economic and
Demographic
Projections

low projections

base projections

high projections

Fuel Prices

low projections

base projections

high projections

Conservation

BPA budgeted
programs

BPA budgeted
programs

slower penetration of
BPA bud ge ted
programs

base value

higher value

Residential
Sector

Customer Discount
Rate
base value
Appliance
Lifetimes

base l i fe times

base lifetimes

longe r lifetimes

Hous ing Size

10% smaller 1990
15% smaller 2000

constant
constant

10% higher 1990
10% higher 2000

"Other" Electricity Use

calculated by
model

calculated externally to increase
by 10%per household

calculated externally to
increase by
18% per household

Economic and
Demographic
Projections

low projections

base projections

high projections

Fuel Prices

low projections

base projections

high projections

Fuel Choice
Assumption

some oil used by
2000

little oil used
by 2000

little oil
used by 2000

Commercial Sector
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TABLE III (Cont'd)
Low Case

Base Case

High Case

Conservation

BPA budgeted
programs

BPA budge ted
programs

slower penetration of BPA
budgeted programs

Floor Space per
Employee

10' lower

constant

10' higher

Building Owner
Discount Rate

lower

base

higher

Equipment Lifetimes

base lifetimes

base li fe times

longer lifetimes

Economic and
Demographic
Projections

low projections

base projections high projec-

Fuel Prices

low projections

Aluminum Plants

Alumax not built1 Alumax built
20' of existing
capacity closed

Alumax built

Labor Productivity

lower projection

higher projection

Industrial Sector
ti~ns

base projections high projections

base projection
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Figure 8.

Schematic:

ORNL residential energy use model

The fundamental equation represented in the model
ENERGY
USE

=

ENERGY USE/
UNIT

x

• OF
UNITS

The basic unit in the case of the residential sector is the
appliances.

The model determines the number of appliances

of a given type by multiplying the number of occupied households (calculated using the BPA housing model discussed
earlier) by the percentage haying appliances (or the saturation rate).

The average use per appliance is computed by

multiplying the estimated appliance efficiency (or average
use) relatIve to the base year of 1919, times a usage inten~

factor describing the level at which an appliance is

operated.

Finally, for the heating and air conditioning end

uses, a thermal integrity index, describing the shell characteristics of the homes modeled (i.e. how efficiently the
homes hold heat), also enters into the calculation of average appliance use.
The ORNL Residential Hodel is based in 1979, and
projected changes in such factors as appliances efficiency
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or saturations are calculated as indices of base year values
given as inputs.

The model distinguishes between new (i.e.

constructed during the forecast year) and existing (i.e.
constructed before the forecast year) homes.

New equipment

efficiencies, appliance saturations, usage intensities, and
thermal integrities are computed for new homes while, for
existing homes, the values for these variables are weighted
averages of previous years' values.

Conservation policy

options are tested through the components modeling
appliance efficiency and thermal integrity by substituting
exogenously determined index values for those calculated as
a response to fuel price changes.

This capability consti-

tutes one of the two major strengths of the ORNL model relative to others used to determine residential energy use.
The other strength of the model is the detailed breakdown of
its output.

The ORNL Residential Model projects energy use

for each of 72 distinct housing type/appliance/fuel type
categories over the entire forecast period, recognizing
three housing types (single-family, multiple-family, and
mobile home), eight appliances or end-uses (space heating,
air conditioning, water heating, refrigeration, freezing,
cooking, lighting, and 'other'), and three fuels (electricity, natural gas, and oil).

Forecast totals are pro-

duced by aggregating across the various energy use categories.
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To understand the capabilities and limitations of this
model fully, it is necessary to look at each of the components identified above individually and in greater detail.
Such an examination follows Table IV below which summarizes
the variables used as inputs to the model (economic/
demographic projections prepared by Economic studies are
denoted by an asterisk).
The average use component calculates the efficiency of
the average appliance servicing the eight end uses recognized by the model for each of the three housing types.
Figure 9 charts the logic flows of the component's operation.
1979 is the base year for all average use calculations.
The values for this year were developed from the residential
survey performed by Elrick and Lavidge for BPA and PNUCC and
are given as inputs.

After 1979, the average use values for

newly constructed homes

(i.~.

"new' in the forecast year)

are estimated as a proportion of the 1979 base year value.
The index values (i.e. the proportion of the base year
values) for new construction after 1979 are derived using
efficiency/cost tradeoff curves (also referred to as technology curves).

These curves embody the concept of life-

cycle cost minimization which predicts that homeowners will
offset the higher operating costs of appliances resulting
from increased fuel prices by investing more initial capital
for more efficient equipment.

The inputs to these equipment
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TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF RESIDENTIAL MODEL INPUTS

VARIABLE

UNIT(S)

Equipment Lifetimes (by end-use)

• Years

1979 Equipment Price
(by end-use/fuel type/housing type)

• 1975-$

Long Run Equipment Usage Electricity

• Real No.

Discount Rates for Tradeoffs

• Fraction

Equipment Technology Curve Parameters

• Real Nos.

structure Technology Curve Parameters

• Real Nos.

Interest Rate for Structural Curve

• Fraction

Investment Lifetime for Thermal Integrity. Years
Load Reduction (air cond/space heat)

• Ra tio

New Homes with Air Conditioning
(by housing type)

• Fraction

Market Penetration Rate Adjustment
Coefficient

• Real Nos.

Base and Final Years for Present worth
Calc.

• Years

1979/1980 Usage Intensity

• Ratio

Real Interest Rates for Present Worth
Calc

• Fraction

Short/Long Run Elasticity

• Ratio

Implicit Discount Rate

• Fraction

1979 Base Year Average Energy Use
(by end-use/fuel type/housing type)

• Btu/Unit

1179 Saturation Rates
(by. end-use/fuel type/housing type)

• Fraction

83

TABLE IV (Cont'd)
yARIABLE

UNIT(SI

1979 Penetration Rates
(by end-use/fuel type/housing type)

• Fraction

*Housing Stocks (1979-2000)
(housing type)

• Million Units

*New Construction (1979-2000)
(by house type)

• Million Units

*Avg. House Size (1979-2000)
(by housing type)

• Fraction of 1979

*Indexed Fuel prices (1979-2000)
(by fuel type)

• Fraction of 1979

*Indexed Per Capita Income (1979-2000)

• Fraction of 1979

Number of Units Retrofit (1979-2000)
(by housing type)

• Millions of Units

Retrofit Thermal Integrity

• Real Nos.

Conservation Measures (1979-2000)
(by housing type)
- new home construction
- water heater wraps
- shower flow restrictors
- faucet flow restrictors
- low flow shower heat
- heat pumps

• No. of Units Affected

Reduction Factors for Measures

• Fractions
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Avg. Energy
Use Equals
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Year T-l

Base Year

Input:
Fuel Prices

Calculate Average
Energy Use Index
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Using Efficiency/
~--~~Cost Tradeoff
Curves

Input: 1919
Equipment
Cost

Calculated Values GOing
to A are used in the
Determination of Saturations,
Usage Intensity, and Final
Energy Use

Fiaure 9. Calculation of average energy use in the
ORNL residential model.
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efficiency/cost tradeoff curves are fuel

D~Lces.

1979 equip-

ment costs. a discount rate (representing the homeowners
perceived payback period for capital
parameters for the curves.

investment), and the

The resulting index value is

multiplied by the 1979 base year value to yield the average
use for a given type of appliance in a given type of new
home.
For existing homes, the average use is assumed to equal
the average use value calculated for the total stock of
homes for the year prior to the forecast year (e.g. for
existing homes in 1987 the average use equals that of the
total 1986 stock).

The derivation of this value is detailed

below in the section describing the final energy use cal-

culation.
The thermal integrity component, describing the efficiency with which homes maintain their interior temperatures, functions according to a logic virtually identical
to that of the average use component. This logic is mapped
in Figure 10.

Thermal integrity calculations, as the name

suggests, apply only to those modeled end-uses specifically
concerned with regulation the internal temperature of dwellings: hence the calculations are

n2t applicable to end-uses

other than space heating and air conditioning.

As is the

case with all components in the residential model, the
thermal integrity component is referenced to the base year
1979.

Thermal integrity

~

year values are given as In-
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Enter
Thermal Integrity
Component
Thermal
Integrity
Value Given
as Inputs

Yes

Thermal
Integrity
~.c:;;;...-_...

Eq u a ls

Value For
Total Stock
Year T-l

Input:
1979 Base
The rma 1
rit
Thermal Integrity • Index
X Base Year
Value

I npu t:
Investment
Lifetime
Inpu t:
Curve

Calculate Thermal
Integrity Index For
New Homes Using
Structural Efficiency/Cost Tradeoff Curves

Calculated Values Going
to B Are Used in the
Determination of Saturations, Usage Intensity,
and Final Energy Use

Input:
Discount
& Interest
Ra tes

Figure 10. Calculation of thermal integrity in the
ORNL residential model.
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outs to the model and calculated as an index value for new
homes in subsequent years (i.e. 1979=1.0 for index calculations).
For years after 1979 the thermal integrity index for
new construction is calculated using structural efficiency/
cost tradeoff curves, which are conceptually identical to
the curves used in the average use calculations except that
they apply to shell characteristics rather than appliance
efficiency.

(For existing construction after 1979 the

~

vious year's thermal integrity index for the total stock of
homes is maintained.

Its calculation is described below in

the section of the final energy use calculation).

A

number of variables enter into the life-cycle cost calculation of thermal integrity: the anticipated investment
lifetime for the thermal integrity measure, fuel prices, the
initial capital cost of the measure, discount and interest
rates, the fraction of new homes with air conditioning, the
load reduction ratio for homes with air conditioning (i.e.
air conditioning loads divided by space heating loads), and
the curve parameters.

Thermal integrity is determined, for

new homes, by multiplying the resulting index by the

~

year value.
The saturation component calculates the proportion of
homes having a certain type of appliance using a specific
fuel.

This proportion is referred to as a 'saturation' when

describing the total stock of homes and as a 'penetration'
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when applied to the vintage comprised of new homes.

The

logic of the calculation is represented in Figure 11.
In 1979, the base year of the ORNL Residential Model,
both the saturation for the total stock of homes and the
penetration of appliances in the 1979 vintage are given as
inputs.

After 1979, saturations and penetrations are cal-

culated by the model.

For existing homes, the saturation is

equal to the saturation for the previous year's total stock
of homes.

For new homes, the fuel and appliance choice is

calculated using a series of inputs.

These specified by the

user (i.e. in the input deck for the model) include

~

prices. per capita income. 1979 equipment prices. discount
rates for tradeoffs between appliances choices, and a market
penetration rate coefficient (adjusting the calculation for
market imperfections).

Two other inputs to the calculation

are produced internally by the model.

The first is the

~

dex value calculated in the average use component for new
homes.

The second is a similar index calculated by the

thermal integrity component.

The latter is applied only if

the end-use under consideration is either space heating or
air conditioning.
The usage intensity component, depicted in Figure 12,
models behavioral responses of homeowners in response to
changing fuel costs.

While over the long run, owners re-

spond by replacing old appliances with newer, more energyefficient equipment, their short-term response is to curtail
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Discount
Rate for
Tradeoffs

Figure 11. Calculation of heating fuel saturations in
the ORNL residential model.
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Figure 12. Calculation of appliance usage intensity
in the ORNL residential model.
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consumption (i.e. reduce the intensity of appliance usage)
to offset increased energy costs.
For newly constructed homes the usage intensity index
equals 1, denoting that new appliances are receiving full
expected use.

This is not surprising since the average use

algorithm specifies that new equipment choices reflect and
optimal life-cycle cost response to fuel prices in the year
of selection: hence the equipment may be cost-effectively
operated at expected levels during that year.

For existing

construction, however, full usage intensity is scaled downward (or, potentially, upward, should fuel prices decrease)
to account for changes in fuel prices taking place between
the year the appliance was installed and the forecast year.
The calculation of the usage intensity index 1s based upon
the elasticity of the homeowner's appliance utilization
response to changes in fuel prices and income.
User-specified inputs to this calculation include, in addition to fuel prices and per capita income, interest rates, a
long-run usage elasticity, the ratio of short- to long-run
elasticities, the ratio of 1979 to 1980 usage intensities,
and the base and final years for the present worth calcula-

i1£a.

Additional inputs to the calculation which are devel-

oped within the model, rather than specified by the user are
the average energy use index for the previous year's total
stock of homes (by type) from the previous year and,
Similarly, if the appliance under consideration is used for
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space heating or air conditioning, the average thermal integrity index for the previous year's total stock (also by
housing type).

The usage intensity index is used to scale

energy use values in the final energy use calculation.
The final energy use calculation, represented
graphically in Figure 13, depicts how the "products" of each
of the components are combined to produce the final model
outputs (which are disaggregated by housing type, fuel type,
and end-use).

This calculation (mirroring that of Figure 8

but with increased detail) is carried out both for newly
constructed housing units and for the total stock of homes.
Conservation policy testing is carried out at this point by
modification of values entering into the calculation.
For new homes, the calculation of energy use is a
straightforward multiplication.

The number of new homes

(i.e. new construction) is multiplied by the percentage of
new homes having appliances (derived in the saturation component) yielding the number of appliances in new construc~.

The average use of appliances in new construction is

calculated as a product of average use. usage intensity, and
(if the end-use in question is space heating or air conditioning) thermal integrity.

The resulting values for energy

use per appliance and number of appliances are multiplied
together to yield energy use fOr new construction in the
forecast year.
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For the total stock of homes, the final energy use
calculation is somewhat more complicated.

Summarily, it

Involve5 taking a weIghted average of energy U5e in new and
existing units, adjusting for demolition of older homes and
replacement of ob501ete appllance5, and applying conservation measures to existing units.

A saturation of the total

stock of homes is calculated as the weighted average of the
previous year's appliance saturation for the total stock and
penetration rates for appliance in new homes (these saturations are weighted by the total housing stock and new construction).

Adjustments are made to the weighting of exist-

ing units to account for demolitions of older homes and
the replacement of portion of older appliance based upon
user-specified equipment lifetimes.

The replacement appli-

ance mix reflects that of new units, rather than the previous year's total stock.

Multiplying the total stock

saturation by the total housing stock for the forecast year
yields the total number of appliances in the residential
stock.

The average use of appliances in the total stock of

homes is calculated as the product of the weighted averages
of the outputs of usage intensity average use, and (where
appropriate) thermal integrity components.

If BPA conserva-

tion programs are assumed to be in effect adjustments are
made to thermal integrity (for retrofits) or average use
values, scaling then down by externally determined reduction
factors in proportion to the number of units affected.

For
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space heating and air conditioning end-uses the average use
calculation is further scaled by an index value for the
average house size for the total stock (relative to the
average 1979 house).

Final energy use for the total stock

is determined by multiplying number of appliances by energy
use per appliance.
The ORNL model produces sector energy consumption
totals from the "bottom-up" first, projecting demand for
each of the 96 end-use/fuel type/housing type combinations
and arriving at final totals by means of aggregation.
Public and private forecasts are developed simply by running
the appropriate input sets through the model.

Baseline,

high, and low forecasts are distinguished not only by the
sets of inputs employed but by differing sets of operating
assumptions.

The size of new homes, treated as constant in

the base case, is assumed to be, in the low case, 10%
smaller by 1990 and 15\ smaller by 2000, and, in the high
case, 10\ higher by 1990.

Appliance lifetimes were length-

ened, in comparison to low and base cases, for the high
case: from 23 to 29 years for space heating, from 13 to 16
years for air conditioning and water heating, from 19 to 24
years for refrigeration, from 21 to 26 years for freezing,
from 18 to 23 years for cooking, and from 10 to 13 years for
'other' (lighting was assumed to have a 1 year lifetime
irrespective of which case was under consideration).

Be-

cause of the introduction of new appliances such as VCRs and
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home computers into the residential sector, the 'other' end
use for electricity was manually adjusted upward by 10% per
household for the base case and 18% per household for the
high case (internally calculated values were unmodified for
the low case).

Finally, for the high case the consumer dis-

count rate was raised, relative to low and base cases, and
BPA budgeted programs were assumed to have a slower
penetration.
To illustrate how the ORNL Residential Model operates,
the following description of its operation in the year 1990
is provided.
The average use component determines the efficiency of
appliances in the newly constructed 1990 vintage of homes in
response to changes in fuel prices.

Existing homes are

assumed to display the average use value of the total stock
of homes for 1989.
Similarly, the thermal integrity component determines
the structural efficiency of 1990 homes, while applying the
1989 total stock value to existing homes.

Thermal integrity

calculations are applicable only to two of eight end-uses,
space heating and air conditioning.
The saturation component calculates the penetration of
new appliances for the 1990 vintage of homes.

The 1989

saturation for the total stock of homes is applied to
existing homes.
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The usage intensity component derives a "scaling
factor" for the average use value for existing homes,
representing the home owner's behavioral response to changes
in income and fuel prices.

For new homes, the "scaling

factor" is equal to 1.0 (i.e. no behavioral adjustment is
made).
Final energy use calculations are made for both new
homes and the total 1990 stock.

New 1990 construction is

multiplied by the saturation, a average use, usage
intensity, and, where appropriate, thermal integrity values
for new homes to yield a energy use value.

This is carried

out for each end-use/fuel type/housing type combination.
For total 1990 stock, the total number of housing units is
multiplied by weighted averages of the values of new and
existing 1990 homes for appliance saturation, average use,
usage intensity, and, for two end-uses, thermal integrity.
Adjustments occur to account for houses torn down in 1990,
appliances replaced (in proportion to their expected lifetimes), and projected end-use specific BPA conservation
programs.

These are also projected for each end-use/fuel

type/housing type combination.

Final consumption values for

each fuel, both for new homes and the total residential
stock, are determined by aggregating categorical values.
The ORNt commercial Model.

The ORNL Commercial Model

was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1977 for
the U.S. Department of Energy, principally by Dr. Jerry
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Jackson.

Like the ORNL Residential Model (which! of the

two, was completed first) the commercial model was designed
to address a specific variety of policy consideration.

Not

surprisingly, its basic hybrid engineering/econometric
structure, depicted in Figure 14, closely resembles that of
the residential model.

Ener9Y Use
(by buildin9
type, fuel,
and end-use
Floor.pace
Served by
Each Fuel

Figure 14. An overview of the structure of the ORNL
model of commercial sector energy use.
In the commercial sector, this basic unit is a square
foot of floorspace.

The model projects the floorspace for

ten types of commercial buildings over the forecast period
(by means of either an econometric or stock-flow approach).
It then segments or partitions this floorspace by the
saturations of four basic fuels (i.e. the fraction of
floorspace served by each fuel).

Next it determines the

basic efficiency of equipment for each of five different
ena-uses (i.e. 1ts operat1ng energy use per square foot) for
each new or refitted vintage.

Finally, it determines the

level of utilization of the equipment the short-term, be-

99

havioral conservation response to changes in fuel prices.
Most basically, the commercial model differs from the residential model in three ways.

First, the commercial model is

based in 1970 rather than 1979.

While this sometimes makes

it more difficult to obtain needed data inputs, it facilitates model calibration, since it must "track" ten years of
history before reaching the forecast period.

Second, the

model recognizes a different array of building, fuel, and
end-use type.

Commercial floorspace is broken down into ten

building types (retail-wholesale, office, auto repair,
warehouse, school, health care, public, religious, hotel,
and miscellaneous), four fuel types (electricity, natural
gas, oil, and other), and five end-uses (heating, cooling,

watel: he.3.tlng, lighting, and other).

Finally, rather than

simply distinguishing new from existing buildings, the
commercial model treats each vintage (i.e. all the floorspace constructed in a given year) separately.

Since the

first vintage modeled is 1924 construction, by the year 2000
(the forecast horizon) a total of seventy-seven distinct
vintages are being dealt with separately.
The ORNL Commercial Model, like the residential model,
operates from the bottom up.

For each forecast year it

calculates the energy use for every building type/fuel
type/end-use combination (a total of 200) for each vintage
and aggregates these calculations to arrive at a final
energy use total.
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While the basic model structure, outlined above, is
relatively simple the actual calculations are somewhat more
complex.

To clarify the commercial model's operation fur-

ther, each component will be described individually in
greater detail, and a description of the calculations
carried out for an example forecast year, 1990, provided.

A

summary list of model inputs is presented in Table V (an
asterisk denotes those inputs developed by the Economic
Studies section as economic/demographic projections.)
Although the ORNL Commercial Model is based in 1970,
the floorspace component begins projection square footage in
commercial buildings after 1980.

This is because, sometime

after receiving the model from ORNL, BPA was able to obtain
ten additional years of historic data on regional floorspace.
Figure 15 depicts the fashion in which the floorspace
total for each vintage constructed between 1924 and 2000 are
calculated.

For vintage constructed prior to 1981, the

"calculation" consists of merely reading the historical
values for 1924 total standing stock (i.e. all commercial
construction built up to 1924) and the annual floorspace
additions from 1925 to 1980 from the input tape.

These

floorspace values were estimated at ORNL based on F.W. Dodge
construction data.

For vintages constructed after 1980, one

of two floorspace projection submodels may be employed.
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TABLE V
SUMMARY OF COMMERCIAL MODEL INPUTS
VARIABLE

UNIT (S)

19Z4 Base Year F100rspace stock
(by bldg. type)

• Millions of Sq. Ft.

1970 Floorspace Fractions Served by
Fuel Type/End-Use

• Percent

Yearly Additions to F1oorspace,
1925-1980 (by bldg. type)

• Millions of Sq. Ft.

1970 Energy Use/Sq. Ft. (by end-use/
fuel type/bldg. type)

• Thousands Btu Sq. Ft.

*Rea1 Per Capita Disposable Income
(1971-80, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000)

• Thousands of Dollars
(1975) dollars

*1970 Fuel Prices (by fuel type)

• 1975 Dollars/Btu X
10E6

*Fue1 Prices (1971-80, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2000 by fuel type)

• 1975 Dollars/Btu X
lOE6

Regression Coefficients for ORNL
Floorspace Forecasting Eq. (by
bldg_ type)

• Values for Per capita
Disposable Income,
Population, and a
Constant

Capital Costs of Heating, Ventilating,
and Air-Conditioning Equipment (by
bldg. type)

• Dollars/Sq. Ft.

Parameters for Efficiency/Cost
Trade-Off Curve

• Curve, Boundaries,
Years Applicable

Parameters for Discount Rate

• Rate, Years Applicable

Coefficients of Fuel Share Eq.

• Constant
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TABLE V (Cont'd)
VARIABLE
Policy Options
Building Standards
Tax Credits
Grants Program
(Schools' Hospitals)
Retrofit Program

UNIT(S!

• Applicable Years
• Applicable Years,
Credit Percentage
• Applicable Years,
Expenditure/Sq. Ft.
Reducing Effective
Equipment Costs
• Applicable Years,
Percent Reduction
in Energy Use/Sq. Ft •

••• additional inputs for Battelle Floorspace component •••
·Retail-Wholesale Employment
·Financial, Insurance and Real Estate
-Government Employment
-Total Personal Income (PI)
-Total Labor and Proprietor's Income
~Total Population
-Population Less than S
~Population Less than 18
-Population Greater than 6S
-Interest Rates
-National GNP Deflector
Costs of Construction

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

No. of Employees
No. of Employees
No. of Employees
Nominal $
Nominal $
No. of Persons
No. of Persons
No. of Persons
No. of Persons
Rate
Deflator
Nominal $
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Figure 15. Calculation of floorspace additlons In the
ORNL commercial model.
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The original ORNL submodel calculatad floorspace econometrically.

The basic regression equation computed the

total floorspace stock for a given year as a function of
population and real per capita disposable income.

The new

construction for that year (i.e. the new vintage) was
derived by taking the difference between the total floorspace for the year under consideration and the previous
year's floorspace total.

This econometric submodel was used

for the December 1981 (stage One) technical review of the
model but not

fo~

either the draft or final forecasts.

For BPA's official forecast, a new floorspace
projection submodel, developed by Battelle's Pacific
Northwest Laboratories, was inserted into the ORNL model.
The Battelle submodel calculates annual additions (not total
stock) by means of a somewhat more sophisticated stock-flow
approach.

This approach assumes that new construction is a

function of asset demand, land requirements, and construction services.

The Battelle submodel was assessed to be

preferable to the ORNL submodel for the final forecast for
two basic reasons: its theoretical underpinnings were more
sound from an economic perspective and the distribution of
floorspace among building categories was intuitively more
correct (i.e. unlike the ORNL submodel, there was no large,
unexplained growth of categories such as 'Auto Repair').
One further modification of the floorspace calculation
was performed by BPA staff which did not alter the manner in
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which floorspace was calculated but did affect the resulting
values.

The data obtained from a survey of non-residential

buildings carried our for BPA by Westat Inc. confirmed a
widely held suspicion that the F.W. Dodge data used by both
ORNL and Battelle in estimating their respective submodels
systematically undercounted annual additions by about 50 to
60 percent.
To remedy this problem an exogenous calculation was
performed to estimate 1980 and 2000 floorspace.

From the

non-residential building survey a ratio of floorspace per
employee was developed for 'Trade', 'Service', and 'Office'
employment categories.

Multiplying these ratios by cor-

responding employment estimates for 1980 and 2000 yielded
target floorspace totals.

The computer program for the

commercial model was then modified to accept a set of
interactive, user-specified floorspace mutipliers to scale
the yearly floorspace additions so as to hit target totals.
Since the F.W. Dodge undercount1ng was assumed systemat1c,
the same multiplier was applied for all building types.

In

effect, for the final forecast, the quantity of floorspace
was determined exogenously while the distribution among
building categories was a product of the historical data and
the operation of Battelle submodel •
. The second component of the ORNL model (depicted in
Figure 16) determines the efficiency of the equipment used
to service commercial floorspace (i.e. energy use per square
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Figure 16. Calculation of energy use per square foot
in the ORNL commercial model.
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foot).

This calculation is performed for each building

type/fuel type/end-use combination for each vintage (though
only for the years when that vintage is constructed or refitted with equipment).
For all vintages constructed prior to 1970, the energy
use per square foot is set equal to a historical base year
value representing the average efficiency for the total
standing stock (i.e. vintages constructed 1924-1970).

For

forecast years 1971 through 2000 the energy use per square
foot is obtained by multiplying the base year value times an
energy utilization index (EUI), representing the proportion
of the base year value used in a given forecast year.
The EUI is calculated by one of two means depending
upon the end-use under consideration.

For water heating and

"other" end-uses an efficiency elasticity (developed
econometrically) is employed which describes changes in
equipment efficiency resulting from changes in fuel price.
For heating, cooling and lighting a series of efficiency/cost tradeoff cur yes (one for each end-use) developed from
engineering analysis conducted at ORNL are used.

These

curves, in effect, plot a relationship between the capital
cost of equipment and its efficiency.

The theoretical

assumption behind the curves is that owners will seek to
minimize the life-cycle costs associated with the equipment
fitted to their buildings.

In other words, as fuel prices

increase owners will offset anticipated increases in opera-
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ting costs by purchasing more expensive, but more efficient,
equipment.

In addition to the price of fuel, the owner's

discount rate for the anticipated payback period for the
capital investment, tax credits, and subsidies in the form
of grants for institutional buildings are factors which
affect a equipment selection.
It is by means of the equipment efficiency calculation
that the ORNL model explicitly addresses conservation
through grants and tax credits (both of which function as
subsidies which increase the initial capital costs which
owners are willing to bear), discount rates (a change in
discount rates can be used to model the alterations in
perception prompted by such information as audit programs
would generate), and building standards.

The modeling of

building standards is accomplished by inserting an array of
EUIs within the computer program which correspond to the
fraction by which base year energy use per square foot
values would need to be multiplied to obtain efficiencies
matching ASHRAE 90-75 building codes.

The model calculates

EUIs based upon the fuel prices given as inputs and compares
then to the building standard EUIs.

If price-induced values

are low (i.e. efficiency is greater) they are used.

If the

building standards are lower a weighted average of priceinduced and building standard EUls is used, simulating an
expected incomplete compliance with building codes.
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The ASHRAE 90-75 codes were effective in 1979 and were
the only ones modeled for the forecast.

A second, more

stringent set of codes are available to supplant the ones
already in effect.

Similarly, an alternative set of effici-

ency/cost tradeoff curves were available for use which represented the efficiency to be expected from equipment technology more closely approaching its maxium performance predicted by engineering analysis.

These curves were not used

because highly counterintuitive results during test runs
suggested problems in their estimation.
The floorspace saturation component determines the fuel
choice for the stock of commercial floorspace.
tion is depicted by the flowchart Figure 17.

Its operaFor the entire

standing stock of buildings constructed between 1924 and
1970 a single set of saturations or floorspace fractions
(disaggregated by building type/fuel type/end-use) are used.
For vintages constructed after 1971, the penetratIon
of each of the fuels into new vintages is calculated in one
of two ways.
For all non-heating end-uses the "calculation" is a
trivial one.

The penetrations are determined judgmentally

or by means of survey information.

One hundred percent of

each new vintage's floorspace is assumed to be served by
electricity for lighting and "other" (i.e. electromechanical
devices) end-uses.

In the case of retail/wholesale build-

ings, 100\ of the floorspace is also assumed serviced by
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Figure 17. calculation of floorspace saturations by
fuel and end-use in the ORNL commercial model.
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natural gas (for a very small amount or cooking).

Fo! cool-

ing, 50.3\ of new floorspace is fitted with electric equipment; 3.8\ with gas equipment.

For water heating, 68\ is

electric, 27\ is gas, and 5\ is oil.
For heating, an actual calculation is carried out in
two steps.

First, fuel shares (i.e. the proportion of each

fuel used in the commercial sector as a whole) are calculated based upon the fuel prices in a given year and
predetermined price elasticities.

In the second step the

fuel shares are converted into floorspace fractions using
the energy use per square foot values calculated by the component previously described.

Ratios are derived for each

fuel by dividing its fuel share by the energy use per square
foot for heating using fuel.

Each of these ratios is divid-

ed by the sum of the ratios to determine the floorspace
fractions for each fuel.
The fourth and final component of the ORNL commercial
model simulates the behavioral response of building owners
and occupants to change in fuel prices (and, concomitantly,
equipment operating costs).

Since it is unreasonable to re-

place equipment every time fuel prices increase, most building occupants respond by decreasing the intensity of its
use.

The equipment utilization component, represented

graphically in Figure 18, produces what is, in effect, a
scaling factor applied to the energy use per square foot.
This value is a proportion of the full utilization assumed
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Figure 18. Calculation of equipment utilization in the
ORNL commercial model.
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for the year equipment is installed (i.e. in the year of its

installation, the equipment utilization factor is 1.0).
The calculation of the equipment utilization value for
a given year from fuel prices and energy use per square foot
value for that year.

From this product is subtracted a

similar product of the previous year's fuel price and
equipment efficiency.

This resulting term is divided by the

latter product, yielding a value representing the change in
price and efficiency relative to the previous year.

This

value is multiplied by a utilization elasticity and the
resulting quantity subtracted from 1.
Figure 19 depicts the calculation of final energy use,
wherein the outputs of the four components described above
are used to produce a demand total for a given forecast
year.

The multiplication of values here described takes

place on a vintage by vintage basis for each building
type/fuel type/end-use combination.

The final demand total

is reached by summing all of the resulting values.
While this calculation is basically straightforward, a
few features not previously discussed should be highlighted.
First, to all vintages (except the one constructed during
the forecast year) is applied a decay function, simulating
inevitable demolitions of some of the standing commercial
floorspace.

Second, every 18 years of forecast time, a

vintage's heating equipment is replaced (i.e. for each
forecast year, the heating equipment efficiencies for every
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Figure 19. Computation of final energy use in the ORNL
commercial model.
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18th vintage are recalculated).

For non-heating end-uses

this equipment replacement takes place every 9 years.

Fin-

ally, the model simulates retrofits in a fashion virtually
identical to the use of building standards, except that retrofits apply to existing rather than new vintages.

An

array of precalculated retrofit EUIs are stored in the input
data set.

The user specifies the first and last years of

the retrofit program and the proportion of standing vintages
to be affected.

The program compares the price-determined

EUIs for the vintages selected with the retrofit EUIs and
uses the lower of the two values for a revised demand calculation.

This feature was added to the model by BPA staff

but not used for the 1982 forecast.
The operation of the ORNL model is perhaps best illustrated by the use of an example of how it performs in producing a set of forecast energy use values for the year
1990.
The floorspace component calculates the square footage
in the new 1990 vintage.

Previously computed square footage

values for 1924-1989 vintages are decayed to account for demolitions.

Total 1990 standing stock is derived by summing

the resulting values for 1924-1990 vintages.
The energy use per square foot component determines
equipment efficiencies (for all end-uses) for the 1990
Vintage.

The heating efficiencies for 1936, 1954, and 1972

vintages are recalculated.

For non-heating end-uses,
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efficiencies are recalculated for 1927; 1936, 1945, 1954 ,
1963, 1972, and 1981 vintages (i.e. 9 - rather than 18-year
equipment replacement assumption).
Floorspace saturations for all fuel types are calculated for heating for all vintages fitted or refitted with
equipment.

Other vintages retain the heating saturations

they had prior to 1990.

For all other end-uses, "wired in"

penetrations are applied to fitted or refitted vintages.
An equipment utilizatiop factor for the year 1990 is
computed for each vintage still standing.
Final energy use is calculated by aggregating the
energy use totals for each of the 200 building type/fuel
type/end-use combinations for all of the 67 vintages present
in 1990.
Baseline, high, and low demand values were produced by
using corresponding sets of economic/demographic projections
as inputs.

Additionally, minor modifications were made to

conservation policy assumptions to differentiate the three
demand trajectories.
All three cases assumed building standards in effect in
1979 and grants programs for schools and hospitals from 1978
to 1987.

The building standards were rendered more string-

ent for the low case by modifying the factor used to calculate the weighted average of price and building standard
EUls so that the standards would have added influence (i.e.
simulating more complete compliance).
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The equipment replacement lifetimes for the high case
were lengthened to 22 years for heating, and 11 years for
other end-uses.

Owners were assumed to maintain equipment

of lesser efficiency for longer periods of time.
The discount rate used to approximate the anticipated
payback period for costs resulting from equipment efficiency
gains were varied from case to case.

In the base case, a

discount rate of 25\ was reduced to 23\ in 1983 to reflect
the effects of better information.

In the low case, the

discout rate dropped from 25\ to 20\ after 1980, while in
the high case it increased from 25\ to 40\ after 1980.
A number of budgeted BPA conservation programs could
not be addressed explicitly by the ORNL model (e.g. shower
flow restrictors, efficient lighting, water heater wraps).
The demand reductions for these measures were calculated
externally and the values subtracted from computed demand.
In the baseline, these savings were judgmentally reduced by
20\ to account for double counting of savings attributed to
BPA programs which would have been induced by price.

In the

low case, the same set of savings was reduced by only 10\.
For the high case, savings were halved and then reduced by
20\.
The NEPP Econometric Model.

For modeling energy use in

the industrial sector, a portion of the

Northwest Energy

Policy Project econometric model was used.

This model was

first developed by Math Sciences Northwest (MSNW) in 1977 as
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part of an energy research project sponsored by the Pacific
Northwest Regional Commission and has since undergone a
number of modifications and revisions.

Host recently, the

basic equations of the model were reestimated as part of a
contract between BPA and Applied Economics Associates (AEA),
the principals of which had been working at HSNW when the
model was first created.
The full NEPP model calculates long-term projections of
energy demand for four major fuel types (electricity,
natural gas, oil, and coal) for five comsuming sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, irrigation, and transportation).

This output is provided for the region as a

whole and each of the four states comprising it.

For

reasons described in the addendum which follows this
discussion, BPA staff chose to use only the portion of the
model applying to the industrial sector (and an algorithm
for calculating street lighting loads described below).
The industrial model (or, more correctly, submodel) is
econometric in character and relatively simple in its basic
structure.

In contradistinction to the ORNL models used by

BPA for forecasting in the residential and commercial sectors, the industrial model produces, for each of 21 Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) categories, breakdown of
consumption by fuel using a top-down approach.

Total energy

use is first calculated for a given SIC, and only secondarily are the shares of the total energy value allocated to
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va~ious

fuels.

No end-use

is

b~eakdown

econometric model, the NEPP model is not
tensive as the ORNL models,
numbe~

~equi~ing

a

p~ovided.
nea~ly

conse~vation

as data in-

~e1ative1y

of inputs, though it cannot explicitly

small
the

add~ess

policy questions which were, in large part, the

impetus for the design of the

1atte~

models.

Table VI

enumerates the inputs to the NEPP Industrial Model.
aste~isks

an

As

Again,

denote inputs obtained from Economic Studies.

TABLE VI
INPUTS TO THE NEPP INDUSTRIAL MODEL
Units
Btus X 106

Inputs
Base Year (1979) Energy
Consumption (total and by
fuel type)
*Emp10yment (by state by SIC)

No of persons-base year,
5 yr AARGs - 1980 thru
2000

*Fue1 Prices (by fuel by state)

1979-prices: 5 yr AARGs
1980 thru 2000
do11a~s/1000 kwh
do11ars/1000 cu ft
million $/1000 barrels
million $/1000 short tons

electricity
gas
oil
coal

$s-1979; 5-yr AARGs 1980
2000

* Value Added (by state by SIC)

No of days

Heating Degrees Days (by state)
G~owth

Rate in

~ate

P~oductivity

Figure 20 depicts, in
flow of the NEPP

Indust~ial

b~oad

stroke, the operational

Model.

cast, this model was employed to

(\/yr)

In the July 1982 fore-

p~oject

non-OSI industrial
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Input:
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Figure 20. An overview of the structure of the NEFF
industrial energy use model.
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loads with the exception of the pulp and paper industry
(which was modeled by Brookhaven National Laboratory, as
discussed in a later section).
The internal logic of the model is basically simple,
utilizing two types of equations: a total energy demand
equation and a cost share equation to distribute total
energy among different fuel types.
The ayerage prices of each of the fuels modeled (electricity, gas, oil, and coal) are used to calculate both an
average price per Btu (weighted by the preyious year's
consumption by fuel) for all fuels and the cost shares for
each of the fuel typed (i.e. the proportion of total industrial demand to be met by each basic fuel).

The NEPP

model uses 1979 as the base year for fuel prices and uses
five-year growth rates of these prices over the 20-year
forecast period in its calculations.

A lag structure, based

upon the values of the previous year's consumption of each
fuel (given as an input in the base year and calculated for
forecast years) was added to the cost share equation so that
fuel switching would not be instantaneous as the average
prices of different fuels altered.
The average price per Btu is subsequently used in two
calculations.

To derive total energy demand it is used

along with the number of beating degree days and the volume
of industrial output.

The growth pattern for the last vari-

able Is proxled by the model using the growth of employment

122

or yalge added (depending upon the SIC for which demand is
being projected) adjusted for changes in productivity.

This

growth pattern is applied to the previous year's demand
(given as an input in the base year and calculated elsewhere), and the resulting series of values used in the
computation of total demand.

In the second calculation,

price per Btu is multiplied by the value derived for total
demand, yielding the total expenditure (as a dollar amount)
on energy for all fuels.
The resulting amount can then be multiplied by the cost
shares to derive the expenditures for each fuel type considered by the model.

In turn, these expenditures are

divided by the average price for the appropriate fuels to
arrive at the value for consumption of each fuel (lag adjusted using previous year's consumption by fuel).
As with the other sectors, the public/private service

territory split was based on different sets of input values.
Baseline, high, and low cases were calculated using different sets of economic/demographic projections and by altering
internal model parameters to enhance the differential
effects of labor productivity on the high and low cases.
Addendum; The Roads Not Taken.

Earlier it was men-

tioned that the first phase of the BPA forecasting process
was constituted by a public review of a preliminary set of
economics/demographic projections and a technical review of
the models being considered for use.

Before going on to the
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ne~t

component of the BPA forecasting system, the electri-

city supply pricing model, it is worthwhile to consider
briefly the models

~

selected for use in the 1982

forecast.
The technical review of the models was intended to acquaint the interested public with the tools under consideration for use by BPA, not to produce a forecast.

As

such, the models were not run iteratively with an electricity supply pricing model, though they were subjected to
sensitivity testing (of key inputs and parameters) and
scenario analysis.
As

developed by BPA staff, the scenario analysis con-

sisted of a series of model runs designed to assess how explicitly the impacts of various types of conservation programs could be dealt with.

The first scenario focused upon

only price-induced conservation savings.

A second scenario

examined the effects of BPA conservation programs taken to
the end of their budgeted lifetimes while a third extended
the savings attributable to these programs through the end
of the forecast period.

Finally a fourth scenario added

further cost-effective conservation measures (e.g. retrofits, building codes, heat pumps) to those of the third
scenario.
Of the four models considered, only the ORNL Residential and Commercial Models could deal with the scenarios
without requiring excessive external calculation.

This
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performance 1s hardly surprising; since the model-building
efforts at Oak Ridge explicitly aimed at producing computerized tools designed to address such policy considerations.
The two other models considered could not deal with
these policy options internally: hence the "four scenarios"
were identical.

One of the models was the NEPP Econometric

Hodel described above.

In addition to the industrial sector

submodel, ultimately employed in the draft and final 1982
forecasts, the residential and commercial sector components
were run.

In the residential sector, the NEPP model

provides a breakdown of energy consumption by three fuels
(electricity, gas, and heating oil) and six end-use
categories (space heating, air conditioning, water heating,
ranges, clothes dryers, and net-use) but does not distinguish between housing types, in the commercial sector, the
NEPP model forecasts total energy demand, distributes it
among the three fuels, and performs a separate calculation
for total streetlighting demand.

The other model was the

PNUCC Econometric Hodel, first developed by National
Research Associates in 1976 to serve as a cross-check for
the traditional Sum-Of-Utilities (SOU) forecast.

Unlike the

NEPP model, it forecasts only electriCity demand, though it
does so for all sectors.

Like the NEPP model, it produces

some end-use detail in the residential sector, analyzing
seven categories (space heating, water heating, ranges,
clothes dryer, dishwashers, electric cars, and net-use).

In
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the commercial sector, a single econometric equation forecasts demand per customer (which is subsequently multiplied
by the total number of commercial customers).

No further

disaggregation of commercial demand is produced.

Finally,

in the industrial sector a single econometric equations is
used to calculate electricity demand per unit of value added
for each of twelve industries (these values are then multiplied by the value added for each industry).
The ORNL models were selected by the staff because of
their apparent superiority in producing finer degrees of
disaggregation of output and because of their explicit conservation modeling capabilities.

The NEPP Industrial Model

was selected over its PNUCC counterpart for inclusion in the
BPA system of forecasting models primarily on the basis of
three technical criteria: it was more recently reestimated
(by AEA), it provided a more detailed breakdown of industrial demand (i.e. more SIC categories), and it dealt with
three fuel types rather than only one.
The supply Pricing Hodel
Interacting with the demand models descibed in the previous section was the BPA Supply Pricing Model (SPM).

Prior

to its modification in 1982, to reflect the mandates of the
Regional Power Planning Act, the model was known as the Integrated Supply Demand Model.

First prepared for BPA's 1979

Rate Environmental Impact statement, the model originally
contained both supply and demand components (as the name
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suggests).

The operation of the demand component was based

upon a paper prepared by Kent Anderson of National Economic
Research Associates for the PNUCC while the supply portion
was developed internally by BPA staff.

The 1982 version of

the SPM, as noted earler, uses the loads produced by the
three sector-specific demand models as inputs and produces a
set of prices by rate pool which are fed back into each of
the demand models.

This process is repeated until equili-

brium, or convergence, is reached.
In most general terms, the Supply Pricing Model performs two fundamental calculations.

First, it determines

which resources are selected to serve the loads of the
different rate classes in the region.

Second, it develops a

set of wholesale and retail rates based upon the cost of the
resources used to meet regional demands.

Underlying the

model's operation are the assumptions that, by 1985, private
utilities In the region exchange all of their residential
and small farm loads with BPA in accordance with the terms
spelled out in the Regional Act (70\ in 1982, with 10\
yearly increases thereafter); that all public and private
utilities sign net requirements agreements with BPA; and
that BPA acquires power from thermal plants currently under
construction at the dates they are scheduled to come online.

The input variables used by the model in performing

the abovementioned calculations are summarized in Table VII.
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As

has been the custom in previous sections, the inputs

provided by Economic Studies are noted by an asterisk.
TABLE VII
INPUTS TO THE SUPPLY PRICING HODEL
Inputs

Units

Loads (by sector, public/private)
*Inflation rate
*Escalation rate
Interest (by project or plant)
Amortization (by project or plant)
Replacement costs (by project or plant)
Generation costs (by project or plant)
Construction costs (by project or plant)
Distribution costs (by sector)
Secondary Power Harkets

Gigawatt hours
Rate (real no.)
Rate (real no.)
Percentage
Thousands 1980 $
Thousands 1980 $
Thousands 1980 $
Thousands 1980 $
Hills/Kwh
Loads (av HW)

Most basically, the SPH compares loads for a given year
with the power supply available and determines the cost of
whatever resources must be acquired to meet demands.

While

this is quite elementary in principle the accounting
framework embodied in the model is rather elaborate.

Figure

21 provides a simplified representation of the operating
logic of the model.
The SPM taps three resource pools for the power needed
to meet regional loads: exchange resources (power generated
by IOUs entering into exchange agreements with BPA), new
resources, and the Federal Base System (FBS).

The histori-

cally low electricity rates in the Pacific Northwest have
primarily been due to the availability of cheap hydropower,
and it is the question of the equitable allocation of this
power that was perhaps the primary impetus of the Regional
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Figure 21. An overview of the structure of the BPA
supply pricing model.
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Calculate FBS
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Act.

The FBS is defined to include all Federal hydro

~esources

plus any thermal resources under contract with BPA

at the date of the enactment of the Regional Power Bill
(this included Hanford and BPA's shares of Trojan and WNP 1,
2, and 3).

The FBS becomes fixed when the last of the three

WPPSS nuclear plants comes on-line.

Prior to this date,

however, it is necessary to calculate the size of the FBS
and determine whether the power supplied by its resources in
a given year is adequate to meet the demand of the load pool
comprised for public agency, federal agency, and residential
and farm exchange customers.

If FBS supply exceeds the

demand of these customers, the remaining FBS power is
available for meeting the loads of other customer classes.
On the other hand, if demand exceeds FBS supply,

~

resources must be tapped (first exchange, when new resources) to meet the needs of the above described load
pools.
The final allocation of resources to rate pools occurs
after the accounting for FBS generating capacity has been
completed.

Prior to 1985, DSI customers receive first

access to any remaining FBS power, while after 1985 any remaining FBS capacity is pooled with other on-line resources
and used by both DSI and net requirements IOU customers.
Should on-line resources not prove sufficient to meet regional loads the model

~

other available resources not

currently on-line or, after these are exhausted, generic 200
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megawatt thermal facilities until supply matches

de~~nd.

Resources are acquired so as to conform to the requirements
of a least-cost mix determined external to the SPM (using a
linear programming model, not run iteratively with the forecasting system, by BPA's Power Resources Division).
Finally, the model allocates secondary energy available from
the Federal hydrosystem during seasons where temporary
surpluses are available.
After having determined which resources will serve
which load pools, the SPM calculates both wholesale and retail rates for the various consuming sectors based upon the
generation, replacement, and new construction costs associated with hydro projects and thermal planes.

(These calcu-

lations take account of inflation and escalation rates,
interest, and amortization).

For any forecast year, FBS

costs are calculated based upon the operation and maintenance costs associated with the working system and additional costs associated with FBS projects not then on-line.
For IOYs entering into exchange agreements with BPA, their
average system costs are determined.

For

~

customers,

rates are determined differently prior to and after 1985 (at
which time the DSIs, in effect, provide rate relief for
residential and small farm exchange customers).

Before

1985, DSI rates are based upon exchange and other resource
costs (including FBS power when available).

After 1985, the

model calculates a public retail industrial rate and sets
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the DS! rate equal to this value.

If this value is less

than the floor rate set for PSIs by provisions of the
Regional Act (which one would expect to be the case) the
difference between the two PSI rates is derived.

This

difference is multiplied by the projected PSI loads and the
,esulting ,eyenues a,e dlst,lbuted to preference and exchange customers.

Subsequently, a new public utility ,etail

industrial rate is calculated and the procedure for determining PSI rates continued iteratively until the difference
between the PSI rate and the public agency industrial rate
is less than one mill per kilowatt hour.

After this con-

vergence is reached, PSI rates are adjusted by applying a
reserve credit which reflects the value of interruptible
load provisions in the PSI contracts (This adjustment is
also made for pre-1985 PSI loads).

Calculated rates for all

customer classes are then adjusted to account for projected
secondary sales revenues and dist,ibution costs.

Final re-

tail ,ates fo, public utility custome,s are based upon a
melded cost of FBS and purchase power.

For

~

customers,

residential rates are based upon exchange costs whereas
industrial and commercial rates are based upon average
system cost.
The disaggregation of economic/demographic projections
and regional loads to correspond to the service territories
of public and private electric utilities was conducted explictly for the purpose of iteration with the SPM.

The SPM
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utilized public and private loads (by consuming sector)
simultaneously in calculating electricity prices, whereas
the demand models were run twice (for each iteration with
the pricing model), first using public, then private inputs.
For the high and low cases, the SPM used the appropriate corresponding set of high or low inputs.

Addition-

ally, several of the internal operating assumptions of the
model were modified.

In the high case, the secondary power

rate was double that of the baseline and low case.

The low

case assumed a two year scheduling delay in WNP-3.
Projections of Regional Energy Consumption; outputs and
Adjustments
Having depicted both the derivation of the key inputs
and the operation of the major models used by BPA in the
preparation of their first independent long-term demand
forecast, it is now appropriate to conclude the technical
description with a discussion of the results.

Before doing

so, however, it is necessary to describe several adjustments
performed on the outputs of the demand models so that the
loads of all customer classes were represented in the forecast results.

With one exception, these adjustments were

performed on each iteration of the demand and pricing
models.
Adjustments of Regional Loads.

The demand models

descibed above projected the loads for the major consuming
sectors: the residential, the commercial, and the indus-
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trial.

Taken together, however, the outputs of these models

are still less than the total regional loads: they must be
adjusted to include streetlighting, irrigation, and contract
demands.
Streetlighting loads are calculated using a single
econometric equation taken from the NEPP all-sectors model.
Total electricity demand is a function of two independent
variables: the average price of electricity and population
(by state).

The streetlighting model is run twice per

iteration, once for public and once for private service
areas.

The resultant loads (produced for the region as a

whole as well as for the individual states) is added to
those produced by the ORNL Commercial Hodel before being
input to the Supply Pricing Hodel.

(Any savings attri-

butable to BPA conservation programs are subtracted from the
econometrically produced demand values).

Public/private

splits, and high, baseline and low outputs are determined
strictly by the values of the independent variales used as
inputs and the estimated levels of associated
savings.

~onservation

The streetlighting model performs new calculations

each iteration.
Irrigation loads, like streetlighting loads, are added
to public and private demands for each iteration with the
pricing model.

Unlike streetlighting loads, however, the

irrigation values are not calculated anew with each iteration.

Though values differ for public and private, high,
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low, and basellne, they are determined only once in an
external calculation: hence the same value for, say, baseline public irrigation loads is added to the total demand
each iteration.

The irrigation model (like the Economic

Base Hodel, a series of paper-and paper calculations) projects irrigation demands, by state, in three steps.

First,

per-acre crop irrigation water requirements are determined
for different types of crops.

Next, the weighted per acre

farm water deltvery requirement (i.e. crop needs plus
evaporation and transpiration), the water diversion requirement, and the associated per acre energy requirement
(i.e. pumping) are computed.

Finally, total water and

energy needs (requirements per acre times acreage) are
derived.

Irrigation loads are added to ORNL Residential

Hodel output before being entered into the SPH.

High case

projections assume greater irrigated acreage while the low
case assumed both reduced acreage and increased priceinduced conservation.
The demands for those customers with whom BPA has contractual obligations were entered into the demand totals
each iteration.

These loads for

~

and Federal agencies

were estimated outside of the modeling system and simply
added onto other regional loads before being input to the
pricing model.

Since these customers receive power directly

from BPA they were classified neither as 'public' nor
'private'.

Demand values remained constant from iteration
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to iteration but did vary between high, baseline, and low
cases for DSIs.
One final adjustment

was~carried

of the pricing demand models.

out on each iteration

Inspections of the outputs of

initial runs of the NEPP Industrial Model revealed a
conspicously low set of demand values for the pulp and paper
category, not appearing reasonable given industry estimates
of future growth.

As

a result, load projections developed

by Brookhaven National Laboratory for BPA using their
process model were substituted for the NEPP pulp and paper
projections.

The Brookhaven model is a process optimization

model which selects the combination of materials and
processes that minimize the cost of meeting a specified
level of demand for paper products.

Because the Brookhaven

model could not be iterated with the other models in the BPA
system, its "optimal" cost-minimizing solution does not
reflect the electricity prices developed during the final
iteration of the demand models with SPM (i.e. pulp and paper
demand remained constant across all iterations).
Results; Regional Electricity Consumption.

After

iterating the demand and pricing models until convergence
was reached, the baseline, high, and low forecasts were produced.

Overall, the BPA forecasts were significantly lower

than others prepared in the region (with the exception of
the Independent Review of WPPSS 4 and 5 carried out by a
task force at Washington state University) and posited a
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near-term power surplus rather than the power deficit
previously believed to be imminent.

The average annual

rates of growth for baseline, high, and low cases were 1.6,
2.4, and 0.8 percent respectively.
Table VIII provides a summary of the results of the
baseline, high, and low case forecasts produced by BPA in
its July 1982 forecast.

Of the three major sectors, the

commercial sector displays the greatest AARGs: 2.3\ in the
baseline, 3.1\ for the high case, and 1.1\ for the low case.
For each of these cases the commercial growth rates are
identical for public and private service areas.

Industrial

and residential sectors did not similarly display equal
growth rates for public and private sectors.

In the res-

idential sector, public and private AARGs were, respectively, 1.2\ and 1.6\ for the baseline: 2.2% and 2.6\ for the
high case: and 0.3\ and 0.9\ for the low case.

For the

industrial sector, public and private loads grew at annual
rates of 1.4\ and 1.8\ in the baseline, 1.9\ and 2.3\ in the
high case, and 1.5\ (for both service territories) in the
low case.

Because of the rate equalizing provisions of the

Regional Act embedded in the SPM, electricity prices grew
more rapidly for public utility customers between 1980 and
1990, more strongly curtailing consumption per customer.
For the contract demand customers, consumption growth
is severly constrained.

For Federal agency customers, the

growth rate is invariant between cases: 3.9\ per year on the

138

TABLE VIII
SUMMARY OF FORECAST RESULTS BY SECTOR (1000 MWH)

20 Year
BASELINE
Public Res
Irr
Corn
Stl
Ind
Private Res
Irr
Com
St1
Ind
OSI
Fed Agency
Losses
Total

22973
3360
8623
406
16263
27946
3228
14146
312
15631
21904
710 .
10155
145558

24047
3579
9796
308
17227
30283
3726
16197
215
16433
22588
1445
10938
158782

HIGH CASE
Public Res
Irr
Com
St1
Ind
Private Res
Irr
Com
Stl
Ind
OSI
Fed Agency
Losses
Total

22959
3360
8623
406
16471
27930
3228
14187
312
15626
21804
710
10171
145787

.!.ll.Q.

LOW CASE
Public Res
Irr
Com
Stl
Ind
Private Res
Irr
Com
Stl
Ind
OSI
Fed Age ncy
Losses
Total

llM.

22973
3360
8582
406
15038
27946
3228
14078
312
15543
21804
710
10049
144029

UDJl..

lll>BG

27222
3957
10714
239
18008
33506
3857
18087
179
18136
26762
1515
12048
172696

w..5..
25583
4254
11968
253
19278
36013
4254
20032
183
19942
27035
1515
12896
184845

29000
4589
13569
271
21418
38699
4589
22360
179
22234
27217
1515
13923
199563

1.2
1.5
2.3
-2.0
1.4
1.6
1.7
2.3
-2.7
1.8
1.1
3.9
1.6
1.6

26089
3613
10739
351
17738
32852
3761
17622
259
17031
22588
1445
11557
165645

28983
4008
12608
291
18533
37700
4008
21015
240
18806
27174
1515
13116
187997

32183
4455
14884
303
20304
42052
4455
24740
244
20973
27445
1515
14516
208069

35601
4882
17713
326
23802
46964
4882
29108
245
24411
27638
1515
16281
233369

2.2
1.9
3.7
-1.1
1.9
2.6
2.1
3.7
-1.2
2.3
1.2
3.9
2.4
2.4

..!.ill.

ll.2..Q.

ill.i.

llQ..Q.
24605
3835
10606
254
20049
33385
3835
17625
191
20956
21105
1515
11946
169797

20 Year
AARG
0.3
0.7
1.1
-2.4
1.5
0.9
0.9
1.1
-2.8
1.5
-0.2
3.9
0.8
0.8

llll

23168
3415
8909
306
14348
29119
3555
14755
213
15543
21278
1445
10204
146253

l.llJl.

23684
3621
9107
238
15594
31024
3621
15419
182
17122
20857
1515
10649
152632

24264
3723
9692
248
17532
32262
3723
16340
189
18927
21055
1515
11210
160680
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average.

For the DSls, baseline and high case growth is

nearly identical, 1.1 and 1.2\.

Most of the growth 1s

accounted for by the assumed addition of the Alumax plant.
In the base case DSI customers use 98.9%, rather than the
high case's 100%, of contracted demand.

In the low case,

where Alumax is not assumed to be built and existing
aluminum production declines 20%, consumption declines at an
AARG of -0.2% over the forecast period.
In all these cases, streetlighting can be seen to display "negative growth" over the forecast period.

Although

the number of lighted streets and highways grows modestly,
BPA budgeted conservation programs substantially reduce
demand by 1990.
Finally, it should be noted that the regional demand
totals are adjusted upward to account for inevitable line
losses, capacity reductions that occur during power transmission through the regional grid.

Losses are strictly

proportional to the total load and, consequently, display
identical AARGs.
THE REGIONAL DEMAND FORECAST: EVALUATION FROM THE
T-PERSPECTlVE
Now that the BPA modeling system, its components, and
its output (i.e. the July 1982 forecast) have been described, it is possible to perform and evaluation from the
technical perspective.

As the underlying leitmotif of the
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T-perspective is one of analysis, objectivity, rationality,
abstraction, and causal influence, so this evaluation of the
forecast correspondingly focuses upon such characteristics
as validity, methodological consistency and completeness,
model performance, and goodness-of-fit between the techniques employed and the objectives addressed.

Necessarily,

such a technical analysis raises a variety of broader issues
which cannot be understood without further explication of
related organizational and personal factors.

Such issues

are identified below and will be more fully dealt with in
the later chapter describing the cross-cuing of perspectives.
The technical evaluation begins with a reconstruction
of the BPA forecasting system in its entirety, this time
examining the relationships and connections between the
various models (and their operating assumptions) in much
greater and more revealing detail than was done in the
introductory overview.

This laying out of the full network

models facilitates the next step of the technical analysis,
tracing the core assumptions of the forecast back to their
origins.

In turn, the identification of core assumptions

serves as a point of departure for an assessment of the risk
and reliability associated with the forecast.

The evalua-

tion concludes with a critical look at the goodness-of-fit
of the forecast methodology with BPA's stated planning ob-
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jectives and poses some larger questions to be answered in
the final chapters of this dissertation.
Inputs. Outputs. and Data Flows; The Forecasting System
Reyisited
As

the above descriptions have revealed, there are a

large number of interlinked models in the BPA forecasting
system.

The outputs of one model may be the inputs to one

or more of the other models in the system, and, to the extent that the latter models are sensitive to those inputs,
their performance is at least in part determined, or constrained, by the performance of the former model.

In

effect, the assumptions made to run any given model are
"inherited" by any other models they feed with data.

The

significance of such assumptions may range from trivial to
paramount and their effects may be amplified or dampened as
they are "transmitted" through the network of models.

As

a

first step in the technical evaluation of the forecast it is
necessary to trace out the data flows between the models and
establish and "audit trail" which traces assumptions back to
their sources.
Two tools useful in this exercise are what are known in
digraph theory as adjacency and reachability matrices.

An

adjacency matrix provides a graphic summary of the immediate
impacts of a row variable on a column variable.

In Figure

22 the variables are the models used by BPA staff in preparing the July 1982 forecast.

An 'x' in one of the boxes
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Figure 22. Adjacency matrix for models in the
forecasting system.
indicates that the outputs of the row model are inputs to
the model in the associated column.

Thus, an entry in any

matrix cell indicates that assumptions embedded in the row
model may affect the operation of the column model and the
•
matrix as a whole provides a quick overview of the number of
connections between a given model and the others in the
system.
blank.

(Note that the diagonal of the adjacency matrix is
While a number of the models make projections using

outputs for previous years as independent variables in their
calculations -- e.g. the NEPP model's cost-share equations
-- none reenter model outputs as inputs).

Perhaps the

most

striking insight obtained from inspectIon of the adjacency
matrix is the criticality of the DRI national economic pro-
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jections as direct inputs to virtually all of the models
employed (excepting the residential and streetlighting
models).

Despite the fact that regional economic or demo-

graphic projections developed by BPA may differ from DRI's,
it is the latter firm's characterization of national economic trends which shape the BPA projections, their ranges,
and the bounds of "credibility" for their values.

Also

apparent is the centrality of fuel prices (both electric and
non-electric) as inputs to all of the demand models, whether
econometric (industrial and streetlighting) or end-use hybrids (residential and commercial).
Perhaps more revealing is the reachability matrix
(Figure 23) which, in contradistinction to the adjacency
matrix, provides a summary representation of the ultimate
impacts of a row variable on a column variable.

As

with the

adjacency matrix above, the row and column variables are the
models used in the BPA forecasting system.

An entry in one

of the cells of the matrix indicates that the output values
of one

model will affect the outputs of another model,

either directly (if the output of the row model is an input
to the column model, as in the adjacency matrix) or indirectly (if the output of the row model is an input to one or
more of a chain of models whose outputs "feed" the column
model).

To the extent that the output of a model may serve

as inputs to models which in turn produce its inputs, the
cells in the diagonal of the matrix may be non-empty.
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Figure 23. Reachability matrix for models in the
forecasting system.
Again, the breadth of effect of the DR! long-term
projections is apparent

this time, because of the

iterative cycling of demands and prices, literally all of
the models felt DRI's influence.

Most visually striking is

the solid rectangle of cell entries extending from the
residential model column through the Supply Pricing Model
column.

Because of the loop structure of the demand-price

iterations the outputs of each of the demand models
ultimately affect the values of all the demand models.

By

extension, the economic and demographic inputs to any of the
demand models ultimately affect all of them (and the Supply
Pricing Model as well).

Thus, for example, although the

outputs of the housing model only serve as direct inputs to
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the residential model, the volume of residential demand
codetermines (with industrial, commercial, streetlighting,
and irrigation demands) the amount of resources needed to be
acquired and the distribution of the associated costs.

The

resulting electricity prices feed back into all of the
demand models until iterative convergence is reached.
Also significant is the "triangle" of cells in the
upper left hand corner, representing the interlinkage of
models employed in deriving the economic an demographic
projections.

In the first phase of the BPA forecast, during

the technical review of the demand models proposed for use
in the 1982 forecast, each model was subjected to a series
of sensitivity tests.

The purpose of these tests was to

establish the responsiveness of each of the models to
changes in the values of critical driving variables.

The

sensitivity of each of the models to the particular set of
economic/demographic inputs serving as its independent variables was so tested and the results recorded.
Sensitivity tests, however, are often also accepted as
a type of risk analysis by potential model users or critics.
The responsiveness of a particular model to variations in
the values of a given input is often taken as providing an
indication of the magnitude of forecast uncertainty resulting from errors which might occur in the input.

When the

models for developing inputs are interlinked, however,
sensitivity testing of individual driving variables is com-
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pletely insufficient for even an informal risk analysis.

An

over- or undercalculation of basic employment would affect
subsequent calculations of population, housing, and income.
Each of the demand models uses several of these variables:
thus, for example, a true assessment of the risk involved in
the miscalculation of employment on the industrial model
would have to include a corresponding adjustment of population inputs.

Overall, this would be a test of what could be

called, for lack of a better name, the "concatenated sensitivity" of the models in the system.

This would involve al-

tering the values of the outputs of the first economic model
in the chain by a certain amount and monitoring the effects

at each link in the network through the convergence iteration of the demand and pricing models.
The intricacy of the connections existing between the
models in the BPA forecasting system is better captured in
the detail of Figure 24 which maps the entirety of the data
flows between models.

Included in the diagram are several

data sources in the audit trail not produced as BPA economic/demographic projections (residential and non-residential
surveys and least cost mix of resources).

These sources,

and the diagram as a whole, provide a useful point of departure for analyzing the basic core assumptions lying behind the forecast and the risk and reliability associated
with it.

DRI Hodel
of National
F.conomy

Fiqure 24.
data flows

Input-output dia9ram of HPA forecastin9 system.
in the modelinq system

A detailed representation of
~
~

-.J
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Forecasts Core Assumption;

White and Black Boxes

Although accuracy is not the sole criterion by which
the quality of a forecast may be evaluated it is probably
the most commonly used standard of judgment.
volume Forecasting;

An

In his 1976

Appraisal for Policy-Makers and

Planners, William Ascher concluded that the major determinants of a forecast's accuracy are its core assumptions,
underlying suppositions representing "the forecaster's basic
outlook on the context within which the specific forecasts
trend develops" (p199).

Core assumptions may be embedded at

various depths in a forecast (e.g. methodologies, models, or
judgments) and may be stated with various degrees of explicitness.

Ideally the forecaster will render these assump-

tions naked -- laying them out in their fullest detail as
"white boxes" for inspection and evaluation.

Fo! various

reasons, however, virtually all forecasts embed basic
assumptions in "black boxes" which register only their
effects.
The adjacency and reachability matrices (shown in the
previous section), along with the system input-output diagram, provide a good layout for identifying points at which
core assumptions are operating along the data audit trail.
Necessarily, a critical analysiS of forecast core assumptions and their consequences must proceed from a touchpoint
of theoretical objectivity and purity, even though "real
world forecasts" are invariably saddled with various practi-
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cal constraints which render them far less than perfect.
Before scrutinizing the forecast audit, trail, however, four
caveats are in order.

First, most of the criticisms leveled

at BPA models could also be applied to other demand forecasting models used in the region.

Despite certain undeni-

able shortcomings, the models used by BPA are state-of-theart for the region.

Second, although one may identify a

variety of modeling limitations, inconsistencies or omissions, their overall impacts may not be particularly significant.

For example, hundreds of thousands of dollars of

contract money could be spent to correct missing feedbacks
between models by interlinking their software with this
effort producing virtually no effect on final forecast outcomes.

Third, the identification of an unspoken core

assumption should not be considered its refutation.

Such

"limiting" assumptions may indeed be quite correct. They are
merely unacknowledged or taken for granted by those rnaki nil
them.

They should, however, be made explicit and subjected

to scrutiny.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that the

BPA system of models is "living"

it is continuously being

revised and improved.
Returning to an examination of the audit trail it will
be noted that one of the most striking features of both the
adjacency matrix and the master input-output diagram presented above was the criticality of the outputs of the PRI
model to virtually every model in the BPA system.

The DRI
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model of the national economy is a huge econometric model
which, for its users, such as SPA staff, is largely a black
box.

For the most part, staff members access its various

outputs remotely but do not actually run the model.

Though

general characteristics of the model are known, the finer
details of its operation are not.

As

a result, SPA staff,

like virtually all of the subscribers to ORI's service, must
trust that the national economic model performs its multitude of calculations correctly and that each of its components produces credible outputs.
Despite the opacity of major aspects of the ORI model,
a number of characteristics of its basic projections
(TRENOLONG2006, OPTIMLONG2006B, and PESSIMLONG2006B) are
transparent and, as such, their consequences may be examined.

Most noteworthy is the smoothness of all three trends,

which differ quantitatively, primarily in the rates of
growth of key variables or indicators.

No major economic

(and presumably social and political) mishaps are assumed to
occur over a twenty-five year period.

While this is no

doubt an artifact of the inability of ORI's econometric
model to forecast unique disruptive or discontinuous events
(i.e. catastrophes and windfalls), undisturbed economic
trends are unlikely and certainly contradict the last 25
years of history.
Furthermore, ORI's long-term trends and projections
tend to reflect the same short-term bias that more generally

151
colors long-range forecasting: the long-term future conspicuously reflects the recent past.

For instance, twenty-

five year prOjections of oil prices were quite high when the
effects of the Arab oil embargo and the Iranian hostage
crisis were being felt but the entire forecast trajectory
dropped significantly, as soon as it began to reflect its
author's perceptions of the recent (and no doubt temporary)
oil glut.

Thus, in many ways, these long-term projections

fit Ackoff's definition of reference projections: "extrapolations from the past into the future under an assumption
we know to be false: that things will continue to be done
and to happen as they have in the past: that is, without
significant interventions by decision makers or the
environment" (1978:60).

What is of crucial importance Is

how conscious users are of this assumption of constancy and
the uses to which they put the results.

These issues will

be addressed below in the discussion which concludes this
chapter.
As noted earlier, the economic base model is, in fact,

a series of techniques for projecting employment in each of
a number of basic industries and from the resulting values
infering the size of the non-basic industry workforce.
Though employment is a central driver for many of the
models the procedures for its derivation (by major industry
category) are perhaps the least well-structured of any
modeling carried out in the SPA system.

Judgmental ad-
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justment of industry trends is necessary because of (not in
spite of) the sensitivity of tt.e various components of the
forecasting system to changes in employment: economic activity in regional basic industry is too intimately linked to
specific business enterprises and developments to entrust
its projection to mechanical trending.

Unfortunately, how-

ever, such an approach to basic industry employment estimation leaves the forecast vulnerable to (or dependent upon)
the quality of not one but a number of data sources (e.g.
industry estimates, state employment records, Census of
Agriculture, etc.).

From the standpoint of "consumers" of

the BPA forecast, each of these sources constitutes yet
another black box.
A fundamental underlying assumption of the economic
base model is that the mix and primary characteristics (e.g.
mode of production, resource requirements, labor intensiveness, etc.) of basic industries will remain unchanged.
Allowances were made for such factors as anticipated productivity increases, but no explicit consideration was given
to such possibilities as the wholesale out-migration of key
industries (e.g. aluminum), the impacts of significant technological breakthroughs, or the effects of planned, industry-selective regional economic development.

Events of this

sort should they occur could not only push employment levels
outside the range considered for the forecast by also s1g-
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nificantly alter the pattern of growth (or, possible,
decline).
The calculation of future values of non-electric

~

prices utilizing DR! projections as inputs, mirrors the
latter in its assumption of no major economic or political
upheavals.

As such, the impacts of such political economic

events as further embargoes on imported oil or the collapse
of OPEC as a cartel (neither an implausible scenarios) are
not considered explicitly.

Moreover, the calculation does

not take into account the influence of electricity prices on
those of non-electric fuels (a fact recognized by BPA and to
be adjusted for in future forecasts).

While changes in re-

gional natural gas and oil prices are certainly constrained
by international and interstate markets, they must remain
competitive with electricity.

For all practical purposes,

projected non-electric fuel prices were inelastic w1th
respect to changes in the price of electricity.
Within the demand models are embedded a number of
assumptions which, if not rendered explicit, silently influence predictions of future loads.

The NEPP Industrial

Model is econometric in nature, projecting future demands
based upon histor1cal relationships between electricity consumption and a set of price and employment related variables.

A basic assumption behind any econometric model is

that the real world causal relationships reflected by (but
not necessarily described by) the model's regression equa-
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tions will not differ appreciably in the future from what
they were in the recent past.

At least in the Pacific

Northwest, real electricity prices were not only low in relation to the rest of the United states but also displayed a
trend of "negative growth" (i.e. real prices actually fell).
The rapid increases seen in the prices of electricity and
other fuels are recent and proceed unevenly, sometimes in
parallel with one another, at other times not.

Though the

NEPP model was recently reestimated using pooled national
data to describe general consumer responses to price more
accurately, the question remains of whether or not a national data series can adequately map or represent anticipated
regional "rate shocks" or the economic reaction to a power
surplus when a deficit was expected and planned for: two
very likely near-term possibilities for the Pacific Northwest.
The hybrid econometric/end-use structure of the residential and commercial models, designed to allow users
the explicit capability to manipulate key model parameters
for policy analysiS purposes, makes them somewhat less
sensitive to the problem of regional economic change than
the industrial model.

Nonetheless, several components

assume that certain key economic relationships remain
stable.

Most notable are those governing consumer fuel

switching (choice of fuel used for equipment) and utilization (level/amount of use) behavior.

Both of the ORNL
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models were adapted to the Pacific Northwest.

Originally,

they were national models which predicted nation-wide patterns of energy consumption.

Adapting them to the Pacific

Northwest entailed the introduction of region-specific
inputs (i.e. the economic/demographic projections) and the
modification of base year values using information obtained
from regional surveys (also part of the audit trail not
often evaluated critically).

The regional residential sur-

vey was conducted for BPA and PNUCC by Elrick and Lavidge.
The commercial survey (of regional building characteristics), performed by Westat Inc., is not truly regionally
representative, focusing upon Seattle, Portland, and the
Tri-cities.

An assumption underlying its use by BPA was

that the floorspace per employee ratios and proportions of
floorspace serviced by different fuels in these three sites
adequately reflect regional patterns (despite the fact that
no rural areas are represented in the sample).

Aside from

these changes, however, the models were left basically
"national" in their character.

In effect, this entails

assuming that persons accustomed to low electricity prices
(and, concomitantly, high per capita electricity consumption) will respond to fairly rapid increases in prices in a
manner consistent with the national "norm".

Elasticity of

response is a function of, among other elements, perceptions
of cost and price trends and may vary across regions and
periods of time.
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Technological innovation is worthy of note as a variable with significant real world consequences which is_rarely dealt with explicitly (or adequately) by energy forecasting models.

In the case of the industrial model, tech-

nological improvement is embodied nowhere other than in the
growth rate of productivity which serves as an input variable (i.e. some portion of the productivity increase results
from new technology).

The ORNL models explicitly address

technological improvement, though not innovation, by use of
efficiency/cost tradeoff curves.

These plot equipment and

appliance efficiency changes against changes in initial
capital cost.

A life-cycle cost minimization function

specifies that as fuel prices increase, equipment owners
will invest in more efficient equipment to offset operating
costs.

In principle, both of the ORNL models can use a

series of tradeoff curves, each representing a further
development in cost-effective technological efficiency.

In

practice, however, only one curve was used in each of the
models.

Even were a series of curves available for use,

there exists no mechanism in the models for predicting what
sort of innovations would occur (although this is, in many
ways, a moot point since the model deals with end-uses and
fuels, not specific equipment configurations), what their
operating characteristics would be (i.e. on which curve), or
when they would occur (i.e. which year the model user should
select to "activate" a particular curve).

The assumption
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underlying the residential and commercial models, as they
were run in the 1982 forecast, is that the building or home
owner will select the more efficient among currently available equipment options but that the basic set of technological options will not change.
The adjustments to demand made to account for BPAsponsored conservation are predicated upon several assumptions.

The savings estimates, developed independently by

BPA's Office of Conservation, were, for purposes of the 1982
forecast, black box estimates (i.e. their paper-and-pencil
derivation was not documented).

Conservation remains a

relatively unexplored region, making the estimation of the
penetrations (i.e. percentages of customers affected) and
savings associated with a particular measure highly judgmental.

Implicit in any BPA estimates, however, are the

assumptions of continued institutional budgeting support for
the anticipated power surplus.

BPA's heavy empasis upon

conservation in recent years, like its priority treatment in
the legislation of the Regional Power Act, reflects an
attitude cultivated in the shadow of an impending deficit
which very likely will not materialize.

This casts some

doubt upon the region's continued receptiveness to conservation as its chief, near-term energy source.
The operating structure of the supply pricing model, in
its algorithm for allocating costs among different rate
classes, embodies the priorities of the Regional Act.

In
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doing so, it explicates an otherwise unstated, but nonetheless central, assumption of the forecast: the perpetuation of the Regional Act, its mandates, and the authority of
the agencies or bodies it empowers.

The centrality of this

assumption is not surprising given the legislatively-defined
obligations of the Bonneville Power Administrator (and the
agency as a whole) and the lead time required in resource
acquisition decisions (e.g. WNP 1 and 3).

From a broader

vantage point, however, there is no reason why the Regional
Power Act might not be amended or even repealed given altered socioeconomic circumstances.
The least cost mix of resources, providing the power
supply for the Pacific Northwest, is determined by a single,
non-iterated run of a linear programming model developed by
BPA's Division of Power Resources.

This model assumes that

resources will corne on-line at their scheduled completion
dates and (to the extent that the least cost mix determination was not performed iteratively with price-induced
demand revisions) that the optimal mix is essentially static
or fixed.

The not uncommon slippages of completion dates of

both thermal plants and non-thermal resources (and associated costs) suggest a more flexible (or less determinant)
scenario.
Table IX provides an abbreviated summary of the
forecast core assumptions identifed above.
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TABLE IX
SUMMARY OF FORECAST CORE ASSUMPTIONS
Associated Hodel(s)

Core Assumption(s)

DR! National Economic

• no major economic or political
mishaps
• smooth patterns of economic
growth
• trends differ quantitatively, not
qual! tati vely
• long-term future trends reflect
those of short-term past

Economic Base

• mix and primary characteristics
of basic industries remain
unchanged

Fuel Prices

• no significant supply disruption
• natural gas prices independent of
changes in electricity prices

Demand Models

• static technological capabilities
(though cost-effectiveness of
existing equipment may change)
• elasticity of national price
response better representative
of likely PNW future than regional pattern of recent past when
cheap hydroelectric power was
prevalent
• future regional fuel choice and
utilization response reflect
national patterns of recent past

(industrial)

(residentiall
commercial)
Conservation

• continued institutional budgetary
support of BPA programs
• continued consumer receptiveness
during possible power surplus
period

Supply Pricing Model

• perpetuation of Regional Power
Act
• institutional stability
• supply availability on schedule
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Forecast Evaluation;

Risk and Reliability

Having identified a set of basic core assumptions
shaping, or framing, the forecast is now somewhat easier to
assess the risk and reliability associated with it from the
T-perspective.

(Other dimensions of risk and uncertainty

are revealed through the use of 0- and P-perspectives, and
the significance of these dimensions is discussed in Chapter
VI).

In his article on model evaluation (1982: 159-168),

Labys distinguishes between two distinct assessment tasks.
Model verification procedures, or tests, determine whether
or not a model has been synthesized in a manner faithful to
its conception.

At issue are how a particular model's

operating structure embodies theoretical principles or
conceptual elements and whether that model displays internal
consistency.

By contrast, model validation is concerned

with adequacy of the model in representing the underlying
real world processes or events being modeled.

Put differ-

ently, verification is concerned with relationships, or
mappings, among internal elements while validation centers
upon relationships between model elements (most notably its
outputs) and external events, characteristics, or processes.
This distinction is useful in evaluating the BFA forecast,
first examining what validation and verification effort3
were undertaken and then delineating the areas of uncertainty which then remain.

This analysis must be carried out
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on two distinct modeling levels: the level of the system as
a whole and that of the individual models.
Though not all of the individual models depicted in
Figure 24 are operationally interlinked (in the manner of,
say, the various portions of a computer program) the larger
system they comprise does, in the strict theoretical sense,
constitute a model (in this view, each individual model
constitutes a component submodel of the system as a whole).
Given the data interdependencies existing between the components of the forecasting system -- models developed individually and differing both in methodological bases and
conceptual approaches -- the basic evaluative criterion of
model verification, internal consistency, is of central
importance in evaluating the performance of the system as a
whole.

Such consistency is perhaps most conspicuously ab-

sent where internal model assumptions conflict or where
necessary feedback linkages are missing.
In the real world, the state of the social economy of
the Northwest is highly dependent upon the price and availability of the relatively inexpensive electriCity which has
been perhaps the primary source of its growth since the late
1930s.

Clearly, cheap hydropower has been instrumental in

attracting businesses, creating job opportunities, and encouraging a continued influx of population.

Changes in its

price or availability could curtail economic growth or cause
a relocation of key industrial or commercial customers to
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areas outside the region.

In short, the connections between

basic economic and demographic factors and electricity
prices are rich and bidirectional.

As a model, the BPA

system, however, is not geared to deal with the bidirectional influences between basic economic and demographic
drivers, on the one hand, and demand and price variables, on
the other: a fact which even cursory inspection of the
reachability matrix depicted above quickly reveals.

The

models used to develop economic and demographic projections
are insensitive to changes in the price of electricity: any
internal assumptions which might relate these variables to
electricity prices are invariant (e.g. assumptions about
high case electricity prices on employment in the aluminum
industry) despite the fact that demand and price are dynamic.

The risk associated with the overall organization

system is thus proportional to the strength and significance
of the feedback linkages

~

modeled (e.g. electric to

non-electric fuel prices, demands to least cost mix, demands
to irrigation, etc.).

These linkages may, in fact, be of

slight significance (in which case the existing model structure satisfices), however, this should be proven rather than
assumed.

A more fully representative modeling system would

closely resemble a macromodel of the regional economy,
though empasizing those factors most intimately concerned
with the market for energy.

At the time of this writing,
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however, no regional modeling system approached this level
of sophistication any more closely than BFA's.
The "composite" nature of

~he

BFA forecasting system

renders model validation difficult in anything more than the
most elementary sense (i.e. checking the accuracy of its
output values as actual electricity sales data becomes
available).

Statistical evaluation criteria, such as those,

which can be utilized in association with econometric or
regression techniques but not with the performance of the
end-use models.

Moreover, without the addition of critical

feedback loops the system as a whole cannot run to reach a
complete equilibrium state.

Ex post forecasts of historical

demand are not particularly helpful, even if the necessary
data should prove available, because of the pivotal role of
the pricing assumptions of the Regional Act which did not
operate historically but which constitute the most significant of foreseeable policy constraints.

As a consequence

of these limitations, the "risk assessment" carried out by
BFA staff in association with the forecast was confined to a
judgmental evaluation of the probabilities of actual demands
falling within the bandwidths defined by baseline, high, and
low case projections (i.e. 15\ likelihood loads will exceed
the high case, 35\ between low and baseline, 40\ between
high and baseline, and 10\ below the low case).

Without a

more precisely defined method of evaluating the validity of
the system as a whole, however, assessment efforts must
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direct attention toward the separate components, despite the
possibility that the system could function suboptimally even
if all submodels performed as intended.
Individually, the models incorporated in the BFA
forecasting system have been evaluated with various degrees
of explicitness.

For many of the models (usually those

involved in developing economic or demographic projections)
the principal criterion of evaluation seemed to be the
general acceptability of the reasonableness of the results
by the forecasting and user communities.

Though the income

model is econometric in nature, and was subjected to
statistical analysis at the time of its development, the
other economic and demographic projections models cannot be
similarly validated.

All can, however, be verified to the

extent that the mathematical algorithms used in making the
projections can be identified and assessed.
The model validation and verification efforts actually
undertaken during the first phase (i.e. the technical
review) of the forecast taking place in December of 1981.
The models finally chosen, one econometric (industrial) and
two end-use hybrids (residential and commercial) display
unique (and constrasting) strengths and weaknesses which
become most readily apparent during model evaluation.
The NEFF model used for forecasting demand in the
industrial sector displays three distinct strengths which
characterize many econometric models: it is basically simple
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in its structure (relative to the models used in the residential and commercial sectors), it requires relatively
little data as input, and its performance may be evaluated
statistically.

In the recent past, model verification

efforts included the reestimation of the model's equations
(by AEA) and the addition of a lag structure rendering price
response non-instantaneous, both of which presumably
rendered the model more faithful to the economic realities
represented.

Model validation of the NEPP model, as with

all econometric models, consisted of the standard test of
statistical goodness of fit (of predicted to actuals over
the historical period) and sensitivity analyses.
The ORNL models display somewhat different characteristics.

As amalgams of engineering simulation and economic

(or econometric) models, they embody the potential of
displaying the strengths of both approaches.

As simula-

tion models (with "white box" structures) they are designed
to calculate a number of useful "intermediate outputs" (e.g.
average energy use per unit, number of projected units,
usage intensity levels, fuel choice) in the process of
deriving their final products (projections of energy use
levels).

The outputs such models produce are thus potent-

ially more varied and useful than those produced by similar
econometric models.

End-use models, however, are extremely

data-intensive, requiring large numbers of varied inputs in
order to operate.

Though their basic conceptual structures
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may be reasonably simple, they embody a large number of
internal equations to arrive at their final results.
Finally, they contrast with econometric models in that their
overall operation cannot be evaluated statistically (though
their econometric components may be).

These characteristics

impose definite limitations (and demands) upon model evaluation efforts.

The rather elaborate internal structures of

the ORNL models render model verification a more complicated
process.

To test for internal model consistency, a large

number of basic variables must be tested.

During the tech-

nical review phase, both ORNL models were subjected to extensive sensitivity testing of key inputs and fundamental
model parameters.

With the exception of a noticeably weak

cross-price response (i.e. the effects of a change in price
of a fuel on the consumption of substitute fuels) the models
responded appropriately.

Model validation is even more

difficult to perform than model verfication on end use
hybrids.

Without statistical goodness-of-fit procedures,

validation is limited to ex post forecasts (forecasting for
historical periods) 'or comparison of forecast values with
actuals as they become available.

At least in this regard,

the commercial sector model was somewhat better validated
since, being based in 1970, it could be "fine tuned" to
"track" ten years of history (i.e. hit 1970 and 1979 energy
consumption control totals).

The residential model was

based in 1979 and hit the appropriate target total for that
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year, though it could not be tested against any historical
period.
Several areas of risk associated with the demand models
remain in spite of verification and validation efforts.

In

the case of econometric models, such as the NEPP model, the
real significance of statistical evaluation criteria can be
misunderstood.

Statistical goodness-of-fit indicators apply

to the past (i.e. the historical relationship between independent and dependent variables) but not necessarily to the
future.

Though the terms (i.e. variables) in the regression

equations of an econometric model characteristically mirror
fundamental relationships posited by economic theory, they
do not imply causal connection.

Correlations (or regres-

sions) may reflect a series of diverse, but implicit, causal
relations within which the independent and dependent variables are situated.

The apparent stability of the rela-

tionship between a given dependent and independent variables
may thus be predicated upon the constancy of socioeconomic
"background factors" which, if disturbed, alter the relationship between the terms embodied in a regression equation.

More simply put, the structure of the portion of the

real world modeled may be more intricate than that of the
econometric model and may undergo sufficient change that the
model equations no longer represent it well.

Only under

stable economic and political conditions will the goodness-

166
of-fit of historical relationships between variables be
meaningful in the long-range future.
The very detailed structure of end-use models which is
touted as a major strength is also a source of potential
weakness.

Both of the ORNL models are extremely data-inten-

sive: they each require a large volume of diverse inputs in
order to function.

Generally, as the number of required

inputs increases so also does the likelihood that needed
data will not be available.

In such instances, key input

values must be developed by extrapolation, simulation,
estimation, or, frequently, judgment.

Though the use of

judgment does not necessarily entail decreased accuracy
(e.g. Ascher, 1978:82), in fact, notes that, in survey of
econometric models "judgment-free econometric models are
considerably less reliable than comparable models using some
judgmental input") it does tend to mask a model's "normal"
performance and, if its role is not explicitly acknowledged,
obscure the validity and generalizability of results.
Though BPA staff members were quite explicit about the
sources of inputs and parameters, it was not possible to
assess the

~

implications of judgments (or errors in

judgment) on the forecast (e.g. a portion of the historic
floorspace additions data used as input to the commercial
model was estimated by the model builders at ORNL, though
the procedure was not explicated in detail).

Thus, despite

credible results from sensitivity tests, a band of uncer-
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tainty associated with judgmental adjustment (or development) of inputs surrounds the utilization of the end-use
models.
The SPM is a simulation model -- a sort of automated
accounting structure for spreading anticipated construction,
generation, and operation costs over a number of rate pools
and customer classes.

Verlflcation of such a model is

routine and necessary, carried out in the debugging of the
associated computer code and, subsequently, in test runs.
Validation, however, is not particularly critical since the
SPM is not a forecasting model and does not itself predict
the future (though it is driven by predicted demand).

What

is critical is that the model's embodiment of assumptions
about ratemaking (as outlined by the Regional Power Act) and
resources acquisitions are credible and consistent -- something determined by verification.
To summarize, as with all forecasts the uncertainty
associated with the future imposes certain risks (in the
non-technical sense of the term) and limits the reliability
of the findings produced by BPA.

Forecast reliability is

determined by an evaluation of the models and methodology
employed

their verification and validation.

The models

employed in BPAs forecasting system were tested and subjected to perhaps greater public scrutiny and comment than
any previous regional forecast.

In many cases, this exam-

ination of the various elements of the forecasting system by
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the forecasting and user communities in the region was a
primary mode of evaluation (e.g. assessing the credibility
of assumptions and resulting values associated with key
economic and demographic projections).

Demand forecasting

models were subjected to a technical review (including
detailed scenario analyses and sensitivity tests) several
months prior to the draft and final forecasts.
Despite relatively extensive evaluation efforts, a
number of areas of risk remain.

(As

noted above, some of

the areas of risk fall in the province of the 0- and
P-perspectives, and will be discussed in the concluding
chapter to this dissertation).

The forecasting system,

taken as a whole, lacks certain feedback loops which presumably are present in the real world.

Effects which are in

reality bidirectional are given unidirectional representation.

A

~

system equilibrium, however, may, in fact,

differ only marginally from forecast values.

In other

words, this lack of feedback from demands and prices to
economic/demographic projections (also, it should be noted,
conspicuously absent from other regional demand forecasting
systems or models) casts additional doubts on forecast
reliability, though, it in no sense conclusively constitutes
a significant flaw.
The Pacific Northwest has displayed a unique set of
circumstances surrounding electricity usage: abundant power,
falling real electricity prices, and mild weather.

Econo-
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metric models must be specified using either region-specific
historical series (which reflect conditions no longer existent) or more general (pooled or cross sectional) national
data.

The NEPP Industrial Model's equations were estimated

in the latter fashion.

Thus, risk is associated with the

underlying assumption that industries accustomed to unusually high levels of electricity consumption will, when faced
with rather abrupt rate increases, respond with "average"
consumptive behavior.

The operation of data-intensive

end-use models used for residential and commercial forecasts
rests upon a larger volume of questionable date (and
judgmental adjustments) than most econometric models,
offsetting to some extent the benefits of their detailed,
well-structured outputs and policy testing capabilities.
Risk and reliability, however, must be assessed in the
context of stated forecast objectives, (and ultimately
evaluated in terms of actual forecast needs).

The next

section, which concludes this chapter on the T-perspective
focuses upon the fit of the BPA forecasting methodology to
the planning purposes it was designed to address.

In

Chapter VI, the appropriateness of these planning objectives
are evaluated from T-, 0-, and P-perspectives, with significant additional insight resulting.
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Ends and Means; The Forecast in the context of PlannIng
Objectives.
At the beginning of this chapter it was asserted that
from the standpoint of the traditional T-perspective
approaches both the overall methodological strategy and the
specific techniques associated with a forecast are, or
should be, determined by the planning objectives to be
addressed.

However much the competent use of models and

methods may reduce uncertainty, the final product must
answer the correct questions if it is to be useful.

An

evaluation of a forecast must assess the appropriateness of

,

the procedures followed to broader planning objectives.
The nominal objective of BPA's first independent
forecast was to provide the Administrator with information
necessary for him to make defensible decisions about which
resources to acquire to meet his obligations to the region
under the Power Act.

Thus, in the parlance of the opening

section of this chapter, the "set of decisions for action in
the future" constituting the power plan were specific acquisitions to be needed to maintain a workable load-resource
balance.

The forecast provided information on those

anticipated loads and the corresponding rates to be charged
to dIfferent customer classes.

On the methodological level,

a "most likely" (i.e. baseline) forecast was developed along
with high and low growth scenarios to provide resource
planners with credible limits on the range of acquisitions
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to consider in developing an optimal generation mix.

On the

level of models, the demand forecasting capabilities reflected a need to address the important effects of conservation while the ratemaking algorithm of the SPM embodied
the priorities of the Regional Power Act.
Given that the objective of the BPA forecast was indeed
to determine what quantities of generation capability (or in
the case of conservation, generation substitutes) will need
to be acquired in the near future, a range approach renders
a measure of the associated uncertainty described above less
critical.

What is crucial, from the standpoint of planning,

is that a number of "parcels" of new resources can be
identified which can be acquired as needed to meet future
load requirements.

The flexibility associated with such a

planning strategy -- mapping out a series of resource alternatives to address a range of load growth scenarios provides
additional latitude for actual demand to differ from that
predicted by the forecasting system.

Under such a planning

philosophy, actual loads may deviate from the baseline
trajectory without serious consequence, so long as they do
not fall outside the "boundaries" formed by the low and high
cases.

In the context of this planning philosophy (and

stated objectives) the method (i.e. range forecast) and the
models underlying the BPA forecasting system are appropriate
choices (though, for the purposes of resource and conserva-
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tion acquisitions, the demand models actually
disaggregated than

a~e

more

fa~

necessa~y).

Establishing that a forecast is well-fitted to stated
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given observable social, political, cultural, and economic
trends in the region.
Since forecasts are an integral part of the decisionmaking process, they help give shape to the future (rather
than merely attempting to describe inevitable outcomes).
The forecasts upon which the decision to build the WPPSS
nuclear plants was based proved, at least in part, selfdenying: the high costs incurred trying to meet anticipated
high demand raised rates to the point that consumption fell
below the levels which would otherwise have been attained.
Detractors of BPA's forecast similarly argue that a low
forecast could be self-fulfilling in that needed resources
would not be built based upon forecast conclusions, thereby
restraining normal growth.

Both the decision-influencing

effects of the forecast and the novel challenges the region
must face as it experiences a series of "rate shocks"
suggest that a more ambitious approach to power planning
and, correspondingly, forecasting may be required.

A range

forecast (driven by smoothed national economic "reference
projections") may adequately define a "bandwidth" of resource needs within which actual loads may fall but it
cannot address qualitative socioeconomic shifts or serve to
prepare decision makers for the type of critical situations
they might have to face.
The chapters which follow investigate the BPA forecast
through the lenses of the 0- and P-perspectives, define the
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broader arena of energy issues related to power planning
decisions, and suggest where information needs surpass what
current forecasting techniques are capable of providing.
Chapter V cross-cues insights from the three perspectives,
looking at key relationships between them.

The concluding

chapter, taking as its point of departure the insights of
all three perspectives and the cross-cues, will suggest
another possible approach to regional energy forecasting:
one geared to a wider spectrum of issues and considerations.

CHAPTER III
THE O-PERSPECTIVE
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR PRODUCTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
O-PERSPECTIVE
While SPA's first independent long-term forecast
reflected a wide variety of often diverse technical considerations, it was also the product of a large, internally
differentiated organization.

As such, its contents were

additionally shaped by a number of considerations to which a
purely technical outlook is blind.

To recognize the imprint

which organizational processes and procedures left upon the
forecast, it is necessary to employ a paradigm of inquiry
alternative, but complementary, to that of the technical
analyst: the organizational or O-perspective.
The O-perspective examines the manner in which organizations actually operate, viewing their decision-making,
problem solving, and production processes as the output of
one or more internal units responding to both the challenges
and causal factors that comprise its social, economic,
technological, and physical environments.

Characteris-

tically, organizations display internal structural and
functional differentiation.

While the units created by this

internal division of labor appear at least nominally
integrated in the overall organizational scheme, they
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are additionally characterized by parochial priorities
(which may conflict with those of others) and both formal
and informal rules for behavior.

Operating procedures for

dealing with ongoing day-to-day activity are generally
standardized, though organizations may develop

~ ~

procedures in response to new challenges or situations.

In

many cases, standard operating procedures (SOPs) evolve from
the routinization of

~

hQ£ procedures (AHPs).

Due to the

division of labor and responsibility in organizations,
problems (and their solutions) are characteristically
fractionated, with portions assigned to the appropriate
organizational division.

Even in cases where basic decision

making is localized, the information supporting it tends to
originate from a number of different sources.

The habits,

experiences, and professional credentials which form a large
part of an organization's history or institutional memory
predispose it towards incremental change and slow adaptation.

In this context, problem solving proceeds not by

optimizing but by satisficing (i.e. uSing, where necessary,
satisfactory or workable, but not necessarily the best,
solutions), observing both objective and subjective criteria.

A strategy of satisficing endeavors to avoid

uncertainty to the greatest extent possible, sometimes to
the point of ignoring it where it actually exists (Linstone,
et aI, 1981:57).
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Organizations, then, manifest an array of common
characteristics and operational dynamics which are both
mirrored and illuminated by the O-perspective.
tions,

however~

dimensions.

Organiza-

also vary along a number of significant

These variations are what give particular

organizations and their products their uniqueness.

These

variations are also the organizational features which are
identified and explained by the O-perspective.
Perhaps the most obvious, though not necessarily the
most important, dimension that organizations may differ
along is that of size.

BPA, in its entirety, employs over

3,000 persons while some of the interest groups or consulting firms it deals with are composed of a handful of
individuals.

A more important dimension of consideration,

in terms of the O-perspective, is the degree of internal
segmentation or differentiation which an organization
displays -- a characteristic which is not solely dependent
upon its size.

Organizations may be internally differen-

tiated according to structure (e.g. chain of command) and/or
function (e.g. task assignments).

The degree to which the

operation of such units or segments is integrated forms yet
another dimension of variation.

Integration is not neces-

sarily stronger in simple organizations.

The operations of

extremely differentiated organizations may fit well together
while those of internally simple organizations may display
poor goodness-of-fit and coordination of activity.
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Clearly, however, the possible problems resulting from
operational misfits or from organizational divisions working
at cross-purposes are greater in more complex organizations.
Organizations also differ as to the number and kind of
missions they attempt to fulfill.

They differ with respect

to their rates of internal change (expansion, rearrangement,
or contraction) and the degree to which their operating
procedures are standardized or fixed.

They display a

variety or spectrum of management and decision-making styles
(often in different parts of the same organization) which
range from strict autocracy to consensus.

Organizations

also vary in terms of the degree of congruence between
structure and function.

Informal or functional authority

may crosscut the legitimate structural hierarchy of control
or complement it.
A fundamental dimension across which organizations can
be seen to vary is that of the environment which they must
confront.

Environments range from highly stable or placid

to extremely turbulent and risk-filled (Emery and Trist,
1975).

Moreover, a given organization's relevant environ-

ment may change over time:

new, or different, elements may

appear which need to be addressed (e.g. environmental
protectionists) or older, established elements may change
their behavior (e.g. fast food restaurant patrons seeking
salads and a wider dietary fare).

Organizations vary

according to the quantity, quality, and rate of feedback
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they receive from their environments, making the degree of
difficulty involved in directing their actions highly
variable.

Organizations also differ in both the degree and

flexibility of their adaptations to their environments.
Those that are unable to adapt to the conditions which
constrain their actions (and provide opportunities)
eventually fail.

Those that adapt strongly to their

surroundings tend to be successful in fulfilling their
missions provided the adaptation is not so rigid that it
prohibits necessary change when key contours of the
environment undergo significant alterations.
Finally, organizations (or parts of them) differ in
terms of both the cohesiveness and type of their "corporate
cultures" (Deal and Kennedy, 1982).

Corporate cultures are

constituted by the basic concepts, values, beliefs, and
rituals maintained by an organization.

They are personified

by the "heroes" who serve as exemplars or role models for an
organization's employees and carried (i.e. transmitted and
maintained) by formal and informal networks of communication.

strong corporate cultures spell out how people are to

behave and, by doing so, provide a sense of organizational
identity which is a key determinant of success.

Unique

cultures may evolve in organizational subunits and may wax
or wane over time.
This chapter then looks at BPA and its forecast using
the paradigm of the O-perspective.

It begins by looking
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in~ard

at the intraorganizational dynamics of BPA -- changes

in its structure, revisions in agency missions, and evolution of operating procedures.

Next, the chapter looks

outward at the interorganizational environment (or power
planning arena) within which BPA finds itself.

The

redefinition of BPA's duties under the Regional Act altered
its relations with a number of parties in the region.

As a

result, these parties offered new challenges to which BPA
had to respond.

The significance and the implication of

these challenges may be better understood by identifying the
principals and examining their organizational motives,
histories, and modes of operation.

The chapter concludes by

describing the BPA forecast as an organizational output,
drawing upon the findings of the previous sections and
integrating them into a coherent picture consistent with the
paradigm of the O-perspective.
THE INTRAORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF BPA:
Oye;yiew;

A LOOK INWARD

The Climate Within the Organization

In the chapter introducing this dissertation, the role
of BPA in the continuing development of the Pacific Northwest was outlined.

As an agency of, first, the U.S. Depart-

ment of the Interior and later the Department of Energy, BPA
functioned to market the power generated by Federal hydroprojects and to maintain the transmission network necessary
to deliver this power to its customers.

For most of its
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history, engineering and construction functions comprised
the lion's share of the agency's activities and employed the
bulk of its staff.

As long as the primary form of resources

developed were high-head dams and the base of residential,
commercial, and industrial customers grew steadily, BPA's
duties and responsibilities were unambiguously defined and
its organizational modus operandi highly routinized.

In

many respects, power planning was itself an engineering
problem during these early years.
steadily of its own accord.

The market for power grew

Bonneville's chief mission was

to construct and maintain transmission facilities.
Beginning with the initiation of the Hydro-Thermal
Power Plan, however, the focus of BPA's regional responsibilities began to shift, subtly at first, later more
dramatically.

The challenges of net billing agreements,

emerging Southwest power markets, growing sentiments of
environmental protectionism, excessive cost overruns associated with the WPPSS nuclear projects and, ultimately,
Regional Act legislation provided the impetus for augmented
marketing, forecasting, and resource and conservation
planning efforts.

During this time period, the organization

grew in size as its functional emphasis shifted.

In 1980,

immediately preceding the passage of the Regional Act this
trend of growth was reflected in an agency-wide "nomenclature change" in which all units were upscaled: Divisions
became Offices, Branches became Divisions, and Sections
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became Branches.

Subsequent disproportionate growth of

particular organizational units (such as Conservation's
evolution into a Division within Power Management and,
ultimately, an independent Office) in turn mirrored the
shifts in functional emphasis.
As

the agency and the region entered the 1980s, load

growth futures were shrouded in uncertainty.

It had become

clear in the late 1980s that the high growth scenario
justifying the construction of five nuclear plants would not
materialize as expected.

Whether the growth would merely

slow enough to lessen the anticipated deficit or drop off so
dramatically that the region's resources would provide a
surplus of power in years to come was a question immediately
in need of being answered.

Under the terms of the Regional

Act, Bonneville became responsible for obtaining whatever
resources were needed to meet the requirements of any of the
region's utilities entering into wholesale power contracts
with them, giving priority to conservation and renewable
resources over thermal generation.

The Act, however, had

been first drafted at a time when a seemingly inevitable
deficit situation would have unquestionably motivated the
region's utilities to enter into power exchange agreements
with BPA in order to minimize rate impacts of resource
expansion on their residential and small farm customers.
Such power exchanges would provide a mechanism for enforcement of the Council's long-range plan.

In a surplus situa-
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tion, however, utilities might not find such power exchanges
cost-effective and Bonneville could instead find itself in a
situation where its chief problem would be how to market
power from overbuilt generating resources rather than how to
attain the maximum possible savings from conservation.
In the wake of the passage of the Regional Act,
Bonneville found itself confronting just these issues.

The

changes in the organization's structure, with the waning of
the relative importance of its traditional engineering
functions parallelled by a waxing of that of its planning
decision support system (e.g. forecasting, financial
analysis, conservation and resource assessment), reflected a
recognized need to address these uncertainties as effectively as possible.

This section on intraorganizational

dynamics looks at those units within BPA participating in
(or affecting) the forecast process, examining their chief
characteristics and describing their change and development
over time.
POwer Requirements;

Projecting Loads and the Regional

Economy
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, organiza-

tional units not only operate using habitual standard
operating procedures but develop

~

h2£ procedures in

response to both external and internal challenges during
periods of change.

These AHPs may be transitory, reflecting

temporary, non-recurring circumstances or may "ossify" into
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SOPs.

At the time of the 1982 forecast, the Division of

Power Requirements (DPR) was in the midst of a period of
relatively rapid organizational growth and change.

The

nature and significance of this change, as well as its
influences upon the shaping of the forecast, may be most
clearly seen using a perspective which contrasts the
Division's organizational structure and function in 1982
with that of earlier periods.
In the late 1960s, at the time of the conception of the
Hydro-Thermal Power Plan, forecasting functions were performed by the organizational ancestor of DPR, then called
the Branch of Power Marketing of the Division of Power
Management.

As discussed earlier, demand growth in the

region, up to that point in time, had proceeded regularly
and rapidly -- forecasts were basically extrapolations of
relatively steady trends and engineering, not resource
planning, challenges were the ones BPA as an organization
was compelled to address.

As the name Power Marketing

suggests, the problem which had traditionally been addressed
by the agency was how to sell the power having its source in
the network of high-head hydroelectric facilities overlaying
the Columbia River system.

With a heavy influx of both

population and large electricity-intensive industries in the
1940s and 1950s, and a corresponding relatively stable
growth of regional hydroelectric potential, BPA's mission as
a marketing agency was clearly and simply defined.

When
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trend extrapolations of the early 1970s indicated an
imminent condition of demand exceeding regional hydroelectric capabilities, the complexion of the mission began
to undergo change.
Power Marketing had in many ways been one of the few
havens for economists in an organization overwhelmingly
dominated by engineers and engineering considerations.

By

1971, an increasing attention paid to economic concerns
within the agency was reflected in the formation of two
Sections within Power Marketing:
Forecasting.

Economic Studies, and Load

Load Forecasting functioned primarily to

assist the region's small public utilities which lacked
technical staffs in the preparation of their submittals to
PNUCC's Sum-Of-Utilities forecasts.

Economic Studies

prepared analyses of regional and subregional economic and
demographic trends to support the preparation of load
forecasts.
In the face of apparent forthcoming power shortages,
shifting priorities in agency policy were reflected in the
form assumed by the organization's internal structure.

Had

the high-demand SOU forecasts of the early 1970s proven
accurate, the combined output of the five scheduled WPPSS
nuclear plants would have proven insufficient to meet loads
by the end of the century.

Under such circumstances, the

evident problem would not be to find new markets for surplus
power but to encourage efficient resource development and
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prudent use of conservation in the region.

When the Branch

of Power Marketing was renamed 'Power Requirements' (without
any structural change at the Section level) in the early
19705, it mirrored a progressive shift in organizational
priorities.

Subsequently, in 1975 Power ReqUirements

devolved organizationally to become a Section within the
Branch of Power Resources.

The Requirements Section per-

formed the same basic functions as before until 1977 when
PNUCC purchased an econometric model to be used as a
cross-check to the SOU forecasts.

Because, at this date,

PNUCC did not have its own independent forecasting support
staff (relying entirely upon the staffs of the member
utilities) this model was made resident on BPA's computer
system and attended to by BPA staff.
By the late 1970s, however, problems with the region's
earlier forecasts had begun to become apparent.

Growth in

the region had slowed and showed evidence of slowing further.

Additionally, legislation being prepared would place

the region's electric power planning under the authority of
a council composed of representatives of each of the four
states.

Given the failure of past planning and the need for

more varied and flexible forecasting capabilities, BPA made
a decision to expand both the role and the scope of its
forecasting efforts.
In 1980, Requirements became a Branch of the Division
of Power Resources, as an agency-wide nomenclature change

189
elevated all organizational units one level in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Shortly thereafter, however, in early

1981, Power Requirements became a Division structurally
independent of Power Resources.
Division were two Branches:

Within this newly-formed

the Branch of Economic and

utility Studies and the Branch of Energy Modeling and Analysis.

In this reorganization both the Division's responsi-

bilities and staffing levels were increased.

utility

Studies functioned in many ways in the same fashion as the
Load Forecasting Section of the Power Requirements Branch
had years earlier:

it participated in the SOU forecasts by

reviewing forecast submittals of small utilities and preparing demand projections for those not having their own
technical staffs.

Economic Studies again prepared regional

economic and demographic projections as had its earlier
counterpart.

This time, however, the projections were

tailored to the input data requirements of the new,
sector-specific demand models to be used in developing BPA's
first and subsequent independent regional load forecasts.
The development and maintenance of these models, along with
specialized data bases used to support their operation, were
the key responsibilities of the Energy Modeling and the
Energy Analysis Sections.
By 1982, Power Requirements was no longer one of the
few havens for economists in the agency.

The principal

actors in the Division responsible for the preparation of
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the long-term forecast were, however, all trained as economists, and the inherent strengths and limitations of their
disciplinary perspective strongly colored the character of
the forecast.

This organizational precedent of disciplinary

specialization undeniably exerted a strong influence upon
both personnel selection and problem-solving approaches.
The general approach of utilizing economic and demographic
projections to feed input data into complex end-use forecasting models reveals certain assumptions.

In brief, the

approach assumes that projections of key economic and
demographic drivers are sufficient to acquire a picture of
the future adequately well drawn for long-term resource
planning.

Contrariwise, it is assumed that social and

political trends, as well as true innovations in energy
technology need not be dealt with explicitly -- the range of
their significant impacts, in other words, is treated as
entirely embedded within the three economic/demographic
scenarios incorporated into the forecast.

Social, politi-

cal, and technological forecasting were apparently so
foreign to the forecast principals that they were treated as
unworkable or unimportant, despite the fact that the structure of the demand models would have permitted scenario
analyses along such lines.
Though SOPs are somewhat helpful in understanding how
Power Requirements operated during the period coincident
with the production of its first long term forecast, AHPs
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developed as the Division grew and internally differentiated
ltself prove more revealing.

SOPs played their strongest

role in the Branch of Economic and utilities Studies.

As

noted above, the utility Studies Section, reviewing utility
forecast submittals and providing technical assistance to
small public utilities in the region, functioned, in large
measure, as the Load Forecasting Section of Power Marketing
had nearly a decade earlier.

Economic Studies fulfilled the

same mission as its predecessor of the same name, though its
roles and responsibilities were augmented considerably as
BPA prepared to develop an independent forecast.
part of the same Branch as utility Studies,

Although

Economic

Studies was linked by function more strongly to the Energy
Modeling and Analysis Branch.

The specific economic and

demographic projections prepared by Economic Studies served
as inputs to the demand models maintained by Energy Modeling
and Analysis.

Though "tried and true" extrapolation tech-

niques were used to prepare some of the projections (e.g.
industry-specific employment) new, more elaborate computerized models were developed (e.g. population) or accessed
(e.g. DRI model of the national economy) to develop the
majority of the Section's products.
For all practical purposes, Energy Modeling and
Analysis was something new organizationally.

Prior to 1982,

BPA had not prepared an independent long-term forecast.
Prior to 1980, the models ultimately used to develop the
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demand projections were not even resident on the BPA
computer system.

Energy Modeling and Analysis was the

product of organizational expansion.

Though the models used

to prepare the forecast were well-structured with regard to
their data and operating requirements, there existed no
SOPs governing their use.

The new Branch, in addition to

producing load forecasts, expended a large measure of its
energies acquiring, developing, and analyzing data about the
sectors modeled.

The Energy Modeling and Energy Analysis

Sections were distinguished not so much by function but by
focus -- the Energy Analysis Section concerned itself with
residential and commercial sectors while the Energy Modeling
Section handled the industrial sector as well as peak,
hourly, and short-term forecasting.
The evolution of AHPs proceeded somewhat by trial-anderror as Power Requirements responded to four basic challenges in the period preceding and coinciding with forecast
production.

First the end-use models developed at Oak Ridge

National Laboratory had to be adapted to the Pacific
Northwest as the territory was defined by the Regional Power
Act.

This entailed the acquisition of data through surveys,

the reestimation of certain key model parameters, and
extensive model testing and sensitivity analysis.

Second,

anticipated savings attributable to BPA-sponsored programs
had to be incorporated into the forecast.

Next, the demand

models needed to be linked to the Supply Pricing Model so
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that an equilibrium state of prices and loads could be
determined.

Finally, specifics of the forecasting process

had to be subjected to public review and in some cases
modified.

The results of these four tasks inevitably bore

the stamp of the emerging Branch's style and, in many
respects, the manner in which they were arrived at generated
many of the assumptions at the core of the forecast.
Figure 25 graphically depicts the changes in BPA's
organizational structure over time.

Section level detail is

provided only for those parts of the organization which in
1982, were involved in the production of the long-term
forecast.
Rates:

Lessening Disparities Under the Terms of the

Regional Act
During the 1982 long-term forecast it was the output of
the Supply Pricing Model (SPM) maintained and operated by
BPA's Division of Rates that was the element of the 1982
forecast most critically scrutinized by both special interests and the general public.

It is through wholesale rates

charged by BPA to both public and investor-owned utilities
that the forecasting and planning process has its most
direct, and most clearly understood, impact upon the
region's residential, commercial, and industrial consumers.
Moreover, the resource scheduling and electricity pricing
assumptions reflected in the operation of the SPM were more
controversial than those constraining the results of the
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demand models.

As

noted in the previous chapter, electri-

city demand and price are linked; higher prices lower demand
which either delays or eliminates the need for certain key
within the forecast period.

~esources

While increased

electricity rates seemed a foregone conclusion for the
~egion,

the magnitude of the increases as well as their

differential effects on various rate pools were unresolved
issues.

Thus, the assumptions built into the SPM strongly

influenced who would bear the brunt of rate increases and
which utilities would be able to retrieve some of their sunk
resources.

(Costs of construction of generation projects

may be included in a utility's rate base only when the
resource is generating power.

utillties which had invested

in the WPPSS plants thus had a vested interest as to which
plants came on line in what year.)
Like the other units within BPA involved in the longrange planning

p~ocess,

Rates found its role expanding and

becoming more complicated during the late 1970s.

The

Bonneville Project Act which created the agency identified
its preference customers and established guidelines for
distinguishing between rate pools.
~esource

As long as the only

was a steadily growing network of hydroelectric

facilites, wholesale ratemaking was a straight-forward
process.

The introduction of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan,

the Canadian Treaty, the Intertle sales to California, and
the passage of the Regional Power Act all added new wrinkles
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to the ratemaking picture and though only a very small
number of the Division's staff directly participated in the
production of the forecast, virtually all were affected by
the outcome of the forecasting process.
Up until the early 1970s, ratemaking was one of a
number of functions carried out by the customer Services
Branch of the Division of Power Management.

The subdivision

of this Branch into Service Programming, Contracts, and
Rates and Statistics Sections, with their corresponding
specializations, mirrored the increase in attention which
changing regional circumstances required of the agency.

By

the time of the 1980 agency nomenclature change alluded to
earlier, Rates had become a Division with two Branches:
Wholesale Rates and Transmission and Retail Rates.

The

former Branch was the one actually participating in the 1982
forecast since the SPM was operated under its "sponsorship"
by staff in its Economic Analysis Section.

The entire

Division, however, was affected by the rate design challenges offered by the Regional Power Act, a projected energy
surplus, and the troubled WPPSS construction projects.
Rates, like Requirements, has traditionally been a
haven for economists in an organization which had been
heavily devoted to engineering concerns.

In recent years,

however, further specialization has accompanied a numerical
growth in staff.

These specializations are reflected in the

names of the Sections comprising the Division.

In addition
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to the Economic Analyses Section, Rate uesign and Rate
Evaluation Sections made up the Wholesale Rates Branch.
Cost and Transmission Rates Branch, by contrast, was divided
into Transmission Rates, Cost Analyses, and Revenue Forecast
Sections.

The organization of the entire Division centered

upon dealing with alternatives, contingencies, and uncertainties where, before a certain stability could be assumed
to characterize the ratemaking environment.

Thus, forecasts

and new planning strategies figured prominently in the
Division's evolving operations.

Individual staff members

were required to be innovative while, in many respects
narrowing their focus of concern.

While the ratemaking

provisions of the Regional Power Act, the troubled WPPSS
financial situation, and the determinant structures of
computerized modeling tools defined very specific problems
to be solved, the procedures to be used to deal with these
rate and revenue problems had to be developed ad hoc.

Thus,

economists with specialized training in ratemaking, modeling, and forecasting found their way into the center of the
Division's new mission.
Conservation;

A New Organizational Priority in the 1980s

Of all the organizational units within BPA taking part
in the production of the long-term forecast, by far the
fastest growing was the Office of Conservation.

The offic-

ial BPA forecast, as noted in the previous chapter, reflected conservation savings attributable to BPA-sponsored
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programs.

This explicit introduction of savings estimates

into the BPA forecasting and planning process signalled an
increasing significance of the new Office to the agency.
In the early and mid-1970s, when an apparent power
deficit loomed over the region, conservation first entered
into the long-range power planning process, though admittedly overshadowed by the planning of large thermal generation
projects.

Within the legislative arena the seeds of the

Regional Power Bill were being sown and within the utility
industry the need for considering conservation as an integral part of resource planning was slowly, and somewhat
grudgingly, being recognized.

In the late 1970s, an Energy

Conservation Section (soon to become a Branch with the 1980
nomenclature change) appeared within the Power Resources
Branch of Power Management, side-by-side with Power Capabilites, Power Investigations, Requirements, and Thermal
Power Sections.

At its incipience, Conservation's chief

concern was the development of energy savings programs aimed
at lessening the likelihood of a severe deficit.
In early 1981, shortly after the nomenclature change,
the newly-formed Diyision of Conservation split off from
Power Resources (at the same time that Power Requirements
underwent a similar organizational expansion).

This

fledgling Division was further subdivided into a Program
Branch and an Evaluation and Assistance Branch.

The former

group had the responsibility for designing and implementing
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SPAs various con5ervation programs while the latter unit
began the task of determining the regional markets for
conservation and assessing the effectiveness of conservation
programs already in place.

The growth of Conservation as an

organizational unit, spurred both by technical necessities
and the same political forces giving impetus to the Regional
Act, continued to proceed at a conspicuously rapid pace.
By early 1982 the Division had become the Office of Conservation with its two Branches each becoming a Division
(joined by a third, the Division of Technical Assistance).
Rapid expansion, such as that experienced by Conservation in its growth from a Section to an Office in less than
three years time, provides numerous problems along with the
resulting opportunities.

First and foremost, there is a

great deal of personnel turnover.

Not only are large

numbers of new, relatively inexperienced (at least at their
duties at BPA) employees added to the staff but more
experienced persons are applying for newly-opened highergraded positions, leaving berths behind them which must in
turn be filled.

secondly, the mix of educational back-

ground, tends to change, sometimes drastically.

In its

earliest days, Conservation was staffed primarily by
engineers (having experience with the technology behind the
conservation measures constituting the core of BPA's
programs) and "advocates" (i.e. champions of conservation or
renewable resources) with diverse academic backgrounds often
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only tangentially related to their duties and respons!b!lities (e.g. sociology, history, mathematics, political
science).

Given the relative youthfulness of conservation

research and development this was not surprising -- most
schools don't offer a 'conservation' major so most experience was obtained through special programs or other jobs.
By the time it had become an Office, however, Conservation
had begun to specialize internally.

As

such, more staff

members joined the units with more quantitative technical
backgrounds (e.g. economics, statistics, planning) needed
for revaluating regional savings potential.
A third and final problem area resulting from rapid
organizational expansion is that of functional integration,
both among the units within Conservation and between
Conservation and other Offices.

As

Power Requirements

expanded, the well-structured character of its demand models
and their input requirements made functional integration
straightforward, if not simple.

Economic Studies provided

inputs needed to operate the models maintained by the other
Branch.

How Conservation's numerous organizational

functions would be coordinated was not nearly so obvious.
In broad concept it was recognized that the Planning and
Evaluation Assistance Division would assess both the
effectiveness of conservation programs and the potential
savings yet attainable, while Programs would develop and
implement specific strategies to obtain energy savings.

No
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clear-cut methods, let alone deterministic computer models,
presented themselves, however, making the internal coordination of activities problematic and necessitating more
"trial-and-error" with technical approaches.
Conservation's integration with BPA's planning, forecasting, and resource development also begs some questions
as to its continuing role in the organization.

Most

fundamentally, Conservation's mission is to obtain the
maximum possible cost-effective power savings.

Its contri-

bution to the forecasting process is the determination of
future savings attributable to its own programs.

Yet what

appears cost-effective during a projected deficit may not
prove so during a surplus (insofar as resources already
under construction may be adequate for many years to come).
Both the initiation of Regional Bill legislation and the
emergence of a conservation unit within BPA were predicated
upon a feared power deficit in the 19805 and 19905. Ironically, with a projected surplus the need for conservation
within the region becomes called into question. Thus, at the
time of the first forecast, the role of Conservation within
the organization paradoxically was growing while its necessity given new regional conditions was becoming suspect.
Power Resources;

New Options for Electricity supply

The opposite side of the planning equation from demand
is supply.

The Columbia River system, as noted in the

introductory chapter, is overlaid by a network of high-head
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dams and transmission lines.
la~gest

This network; one of the

of its kind in the world, has supplied the Northwest

with most of its power since the 1930s when the Bonneville
and Grand Coulee Dams were first completed.

The construc-

tion of these dams using funds from the U.S. Treasury
yielded the abundant, low-cost electricity which was for
some time enjoyed by all but more recently
BPA's preference customers.

~eserved

for

First with the Hydro-Thermal

Power Plan, and finally with the Regional Act, the task of
finding resources adequate to meet the demands of Bonneville's customers has become progressively more complex.
The Division of Power Resources within Bonneville's Office
of Power Management is the group tasked with preparing a
load-resource balance in conjunction with the long-term
forecast.
The role of Power Resources, and the relative importance of certain of its functions, have changed considerably
since the early 19705.

At the beginning of that decade,

Power Resources was a Branch within the Division of Power
Management.

Its three Sections were Power Capabilities,

Power Investigations, and Hydrology -- Sections which
reflected a primary emphasis upon the use of hydropower.
These functions remained the central concern of the Branch
through the period when resource planning was based upon the
assumption of imminent power shortages.

Though BPA

championed the construction of the WPPSS plants to meet the
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loads of its public utility customers, the Regional Act was
still being conceived and the agency was not yet obligated
to acquire resources needed to provide power to any and all
utilities requesting it.

By 1980, however, a change in the

Division's (this followed the nomenclature change) internal
structure foreshadowed the role to be played under the terms
of the Act, reflective of the same issues and considerations.

Two of the three former sections had become Branches

(Hydrology was absorbed into other units), but these traditional functions were joined by three others also reflected in the Branch names:
and Thermal Power.

Requirements, Energy Conservation,

As noted earlier, within a year of this

time, the rapidly-growing Requirements and Conservation
became separate Divisions, leaving Power Capabilities, Power
Investigations and Thermal Power Branches as principal
subdivisions.

By the time of the 1982 forecast reorgani-

zation was more thorough, embodying concerns of the Regional
Act.

The Power Capabilities Branch was joined by Generation

Planning and Assessment and Evaluation.
Power Resources participated in the 1982 forecast
through the use of two models maintained and operated by the
Assessment and Evaluation Branch.

One model was a linear

programming model called the Least Cost Mix Model (LCMM),
the other a Systems Analysis Model (SAM).

The LCMM solved a

complex objective function which determined what mix of
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potentially available resources should be obtained by
certain years to meet anticipated loads at a minimum cost.
The SAM simulated the operation of the entire gridwork of
resources, evaluating its peaks and patterns of usage.

The

results of these models determined the cost and scheduling
of the resources selected by the Supply Pricing Model to
meet forecasted loads.

Thus the supply side of the resource

balance equation incorporated into the forecast.
Significant "Non-participants":

Financial Management and

the Policy Committee
Two of the more significant organizational role players
within BPA were, in the strict sense of the word, nonparticipants in the forecast:

the Division of Financial

Management within the Office of Management Services and the
agency's Policy Committee.

Unlike the other organizational

actors within BPA described above, these two "non-participants" did not play any part in developing either the forecast projections or the inputs used to produce them.

Both

were, however, central partiCipants in the particular (and
particularly important) decision making process which the
forecast was supporting.

Their specific informational

needs, however, did help shape the forecast in a number of
ways by requiring the forecasting staff to ask very welldefined questions, often in a rather narrowly circumscribed
fashion.
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The Division of Financial Management grew out of the
(pre-nomenclature change) Branch of Finance and Accounts and
the Budgeting and Planning offices of the Management Services Division in 1980.

Its expansion within the agency was

roughly coincident with that of Power Requirements and
Conservation, all reflecting the changing priorities of the
power planning environment of the late 1970s.

The slowing

of load growth in the region along with the costly delays
associated with the five WPPSS construction projects placed
BPA in an unprecedentedly awkward financial situation.

At

the same time that successful completion of the WPPSS
nuclear plants required a continued high rating for additional bonds, BPA was, for the first time in its history,
falling behind in its repayment of the U.S. Treasury for the
financing of the network of hydroelectric projects along the
Columbia.

Analysis of the bond market and the feasibility

of issuing further WPPSS bonds was a separate, but parallel
input to the load projections to be used by the Administrator in arriving at a scheduling decision for the completion
of WNP 1, 2, and 3.
The other "non-participant", BPA's Policy Committee, is
a group comprised of the Administrator, his Deputy and
Assistants, the heads of each of the Offices at BPA, and (at
least on some occasions) assorted higher staff personnel.
The members of the Policy Committee are the principal
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decision makers of the agency.

It is their decision-making

needs that ultimately determine the research, analysis, and
modeling efforts, albeit indirectly, in several ways.
First, the types of issues they must address influence the
selection and use of modeling tools and techniques.

The

selection of detailed forecasting models for sector forecasting was, in part, the result of their ability to deal
straightforwardly with various types of conservation programs which the agency needed to consider as many options in
making resource decisions.

Second, the scheduling of major

policy decisions (often dictated by Congress) sets firm time
limits within which forecasts must be prepared.

These time

limits may, under some circumstances, force the pace of
forecast development, limiting the exploration of alternatives and thus the reduction of forecast uncertainty.
Third, members of the Policy Committee make internal budgeting decisions on major allocations of agency funds.

Thus,

major data or model development presupposes upper management
agreement with the broader goals and objectives of the
technical staff in the various Divisions.

Finally, it is

the members of the Policy Committee who most directly deal
with the crises and opportunities affecting the agency as a
whole.

Since such matters are often unpredictable so are

the additional demands for analysiS which they, often quite
abruptly, place upon the forecasting staff.

All these in-
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fluences, however indirect, ultimately have a substantial
effect upon the forecast and its outcome.
THE 'INTERORGANIZATIONAL POWER PLANNING ARENA:

A LOOK

OUTWARD
Overview; The Textyre of Changing Roles and ResponsibIlIties
As a marketer of wholesale power, BPA has always been
firmly established in an arena of actors having interests in
the way the region's power was used and how its development
was planned for.

The hydroelectric output of the Columbia

River system for many years provided the bulk of the power
distributed

by~he

region's utilities, whether publicly-

operated or investor-owned, or used by Direct Service
Industries.

Difficulties concerning the allocation of power

from BPA's transmission system or the resource mix used to
meet demand were minimal -- engineering, rather than political or economic, problems.

With the advent of the Hydro-

Thermal Power Plan matters grew more complex. Investorowned utilities found themselves more reliant upon their
own, somewhat more costly, sources of electricity while
public utilities were being encouraged to "swap" the more
expensive outputs of thermal generation for less costly
hydropower.
As the decade of the 1970s progressed, the power

planning arena grew progressively more political and more
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varied in texture.

Increasing rate disparities between

public and private utilities resulted in movements to turn
Oregon's residential and small farm customers into a gigantic People's utility District which would become entitled to
a

S~lare

of the low-cost power which BPA would be obligated

to provide.

Long-term contracts drafted by BPA guaranteeing

non-interruptable power to the region's Direct Service
Industries were looked upon with increasing disfavor by
preference customers forced to develop thermal plants to
meet their own needs.

Strong environmentalist opposition

sprang up in response to the introduction of coal and
nuclear-fired generation facilities in the region, while
advocates of renewable resource and conservation chided
planners for all but ignoring "soft energy alternatives".
One of the significant outcomes of the turbulence
generated by these conflicting interests was the formulation
and ultimate enactment of the Regional Power Bill.

Even

after this legislation had been ratified by Congress, however, organizational interaction within the arena was heated
and representative of many different groups.
The impacts of the decisions based upon BPA's 1982
forecast were obviously going to be significant and widely
felt.

As a result, many organizational actors participated

directly or indirectly in the process initiated to disseminate information and solicit critical comment.

This process
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involved public meetings for a technical review of the demand models and a presentation of the draft forecast, each
followed by a comment period.
The sections which follow identify the principal actors
in the interorganizational power planning arena, their
history of involvement with regional forecasting or planning, and their special set of

inter~ts,

circumstances, and

organizationally-based biases.
The PNUCCj

A waning of Traditional Authority in Forecasting

During most of the Pacific Northwest's growth as a
region, the PNUCC (Pacific Northwest utilities Conference
Committee) has been a central actor in the electric power
planning and resource development arenas.

A consortium of

the region's utilities, PNUCC has, since its formation in
1946, largely acted in partnership with BPA in the production and distribution of power.

While BPA was responsible

for marketing the power generated from the Federally-owned
h'jdroelectric facilities along the Columbia River system and
maintaining the network of transmission lines connecting
them, it was the member utilities of PNUCC that "wheeled"
the power purchased from BPA, while investor-owned utilities
met significant portions of their demand with Federallysupplied electricity.

As noted in the introductory chapter,

beginning in 1954, PNUCC's load forecasting committee prepared the Sum-Of-Utilities forecast for long-range power
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planning.

The region's utilities thus have been instrumen-

tal in the planning of both large and small scale generating
resources and have entered into a number of joint capacity
expansion projects over the last several decades.

Most of

these projects have involved BPA directly or indirectly, the
most obvious and significant examples being the HydroThermal Power Plan, wherein BPA "swapped" low-cost hydropower for more expensive thermal generation, and the
construction (or attempted construction) of the five WPPSS
nuclear plants, the construction costs of which were underwritten by BPA.
The Sum-Of-Utilities forecast was, until the early-tomid 1970s, the only document used in regional power planning.

Naively extrapolating the region's earlier growth in

electricity consumption (essentially ignoring the factors or
dynamics underlying the growth), the SOU forecast tended to
underpredict loads during the 1950s and 19605.

In the

1970s, however, a watershed decade for the region, the
dynamics underlying regional growth altered suffiCiently
that the consequences of the naive approach at the methodological foundation of the SOU began to be seen.

Growth

slowed to the point that the forecasts made in the early
1970s appeared at first to be somewhat optimistic, then
later to be seriously overpredicting increases in regional
loads.

This led, first, to the development of a regional
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econometric model in 1977 by National Economic Research
Associates to cross-check the SOU findings.

This model was

resident on BPA's computer system and operated by BPA staff
in accordance with the directions provided by PNUCC's Load
Forecasting Committee, comprised of members of the forecasting staffs of the region's utilities.

Later, in 1980, PNUCC

established a permanent staff of its own for dealing with
forecasting and technical issues.
Politically and economically, the 1970s provided a
climate of change, and sometimes turmoil, for many of the
region's utilities.

For a long period, virtually the entire

region's utilities and industries were preference customers,
in that they were served by then-abundant hydropower
(whether they were, in fact, public utilities or not).

In

the late 19605 and the early 19705, however, concern over
the differential access to inexpensive power grew.

Pri-

vately-owned utilities relied increasingly upon their own
more costly resources to meet their customers' demand.
Public utilities, the true preference customers in the eyes
of the law, found themselves in the unaccustomed role of
building their own generating resources to meet the portions
of their loads not covered by available hydropower.

At the

same time, the wisdom of guaranteeing Federal hydropower to
the region's Direct Service Industries under long-term
contracts (drafted when plentiful inexpensive electricity

216
appeared available for many years to come) was more and more
being questioned.
The Regional Act, as noted in the introduction to this
dissertation, was an attempt to resolve these issues through
legislation.

In the power planning arena, however, growing

rate disparities signalled new and somewhat divergent interests within PNUCC.
The ill-fated WPPSS nuclear plants, constructed as a
result of high (and, in retrospect, quite naive) demand
forecasts of the 1970s became something of a bone of contention among PNUCC's member utilities.

Though nominally

the property of public utilities in Washington, several of
the plants had been heavily invested in by other utilities.
In particular the region's investor-owned utilities had
sizeable shares of WPPSS nuclear plant (WNP) number three.
BPA, which championed the development of these plants during
the Hodel and Munro Administrations, underwrote the public
utilities' investments in the plan.
BPA's 1982 forecast, to be used as a critical input in
timing the construction of WNP 1, 2, and 3 was inevitably
looked upon with concern, and to some degree suspicion, by
many of PNUCC's member utilities.

Severely slowing rates of

regional demand growth not only forced WNP 4 and 5 to be
mothballed but raised new questions about the reliability
and accuracy of any forecast used in the resource planning
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process.

A law known as Construction Works in Progress

(CWIP) prevents utilities from incorporating resource
construction costs into their rate bases until the projects
are actually completed and producing electricity.

Up to

that time, funds used for construction are a sunk cost.
While the mothballing of plants 4 and 5 was a foregone conclusion, the fate of WNP I, 2, and 3, and the funds sunk
into their partial construction, had yet to be decided.
BPA's problem was to determine which timing scenario
for the completion of WNP I, 2, and 3 would allow the agency
to get the necessary bonding on Wall street while still
meeting regional power needs.

This would be determined, in

part, through the 1982 forecast.

Given the inherent uncer-

tainty surrounding the future of load growth in the region,
however, a relatively slight difference in projected growth
rates could determine when (and if) particular PNUCC member
utilities could recover their construction costs.

Thus,

both PNUCC's resident staff and its load forecasting
committee, comprised of representatives from the region's
utilities had strong interest in BPA's forecast, its
details, and its implications.
The Regional Council;

A New Look at Resource Planning

In early 1981, a new, but significant, organizational
actor made its entrance into the power planning arena
the Northwest Power Planning Council (or Regional Council).

218
As noted in the introductory chapter, the Council was the
creation of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act, passed by Congress in late 1980.
Drafted during a period of concern over growing regional
rate disparities and the implications of a changing resource
base, the Act not only augmented BPA's regional responsibilities and powers but also established a new political
body, the Regional Council, to oversee the development of a
long-term forecast and power plan for the Pacific Northwest.
The Regional Council was developed as a regional, not a
Federal, body, comprised of two appointments by each of the
governors of the four states in the region, Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, and Montana.

Chaired by Dan Evans from

Washington, the Council included Chuck Collins, also from
Washington, Roy Hemmingway and Alfred Hampson, from Oregon,
Larry Mills and Robert Saxvik, from Idaho, and Keith Colbo
and Gerald Mueller from Montana.

Under the terms of the

Act, the Council was required to produce its first Plan in
the spring of 1983, so during the first six months of its
existence, the Council recruited the core of its technical
staff and initiated contract work for the development of
forecasting models and planning tools.
In the year and a half between its formation and the
July 1982 publication of BPA's first independent forecast
the Council began an ongoIng process of defining itself and
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its relation to both BPA and PNUCC.

Though the terms of the

Act clearly empowered the Council to produce the definitive
resource development plan for the region, they did not
detail how much latitude or flexibility the established
power planning bodies, BPA and PNUCC, had in implementing
the Plan.

The council members' rendering of the terms of

the Act saw BPA following the Council's 20-year Plan to the
letter.

From their perspective, BPA's independent long-term

forecast was at worst an unnecessary duplication of effort,
at best an interim planning tool to be superceded by the
Council's 1983 effort.

BPA, by contrast, argued that their

in-house forecasting capability was needed for several
reasons.

Host immediately, a decision on the fate of WNP 1,

2, and 3 had to be made in mid-1982, not 1983, and the
policy analysis supporting the decision required a more
sophisticated forecasting system than any that had been
previously available in the region.

In the longer run, BPA

argued that their responsibility for implementing the Plan
required dealing with many details not explicitly identified
by the Council (i.e. the Plan would not be specific enough
to anticipate the problems BPA would face and consequently
could not be treated as an action plan delineating a precise
series of tasks to be followed without interpretation).
Successful implementation of the Plan would, according to
this line of argument, require BPA to test the feasibility
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of a wide array of specific rate design and resource development alternatives -- a requirement necessitating an
in-house demand modeling capability.
The Regional Act, in many ways, curtailed PNUCC's
influence as a forecasting and planning body.

Though its

member utilities all maintained the option not to enter into
exchange agreements with BPA and rely upon their own resources to meet demand, many had invested heavily in the
WPPSS plants and had definite interest in their completion.
Assuming that the utilities would enter into power exchange
agreements with BPA and that rates would be set based upon
forecasted loads and revenues, they would also have a strong
interest in long-term resource planning.

Their own fore-

cast, following the establishment of the Regional Council,
would no longer carry the weight it formerly had, taking a
back seat to the Council's with regard to major resource
acquisitions by BPA.
The potential for adversarial relationships between the
Regional Council and BPA (and, to a lesser degree, PNUCC)
was great during the initial stages of the development of a
long-range Power Plan.

Any major differences between the

Council's official forecast and any of those used by BPA in
rate design could be assumed to engender major conflicts and
administrative difficulties.

For the most part, the rela-

tionship which evolved between the Council and BPA up to the
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time of BPA's 1982 forecast, though characterized by a
number of disagreements on specific issues, could not be
termed truly adversarial.
A great deal of potential friction between BPA and the
Council was dampened by virtue of the newness of the longrange forecasting and planning task confronting each group.
Neither group had rigidly defined SOPs to deal with these
common problem areas and, as such, both groups could still
be somewhat flexible in the manner in which they addressed
them.

Moreover, the technical staffs of each organization

were quite similar, both in terms of their backgrounds and
their general approach to the problem at hand.

Though much

smaller in size, the Council's technical staff displayed
backgrounds similar to those involved in the production of
BPA's forecast -- primarily economists and engineers with
strong skills in computer modeling.

The Council's fore-

casting system, being developed under contract at the time
of BPA's first forecast, bore very strong similarity to
BPA's, containing sector-specific demand models run iteratively with an electricity supply pricing model.

The

residential and commercial models were simply evolutions of
the econometric/end-use demand models used by BPA.

As such,

they addressed the same basic policy issues and used the
same basic input variables (the values for which were
developed by a Council staff member formerly employed by
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BPA's Division of Power Requirements}.

These strong

similarities of modus operandi considerably lessened the
likelihood of conflict between the two groups.
Thus, at the time of BPA's first forecast the Council
was at odds neither with BPA, which was required to implement the Plan, nor with PNUCC, the member utilities of which
could be affected favorably or unfavorably by its consequences.

Significant questions of how BPA might implement a

poorly conceived resource strategy, how the Council would
deal with noncompliance or reinterpretation of the Plan on
BPA's part, or how the actions of the region's utilities and
Direct Service Industries could influence the Plan's success
would have to remain unanswered until the Council actually
released its own product in 1983.
eoOE;

The Council's Precursor in Oregon?
The Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE) represents one

of the more unique organizational actors in the arena of
energy politics surrounding BPA's first forecast.

Created

by the Oregon State Legislature in 1975, in the wake of the
OPEC oil embargo and a severe Northwest drought, ODOE might
be thought of as a precursor to the Council.

Though opera-

ting on different geographical political levels, the two
organizations were developed largely for the same reasons
and to perform similar functions.
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An examination of the major policy issues identified by
DODE (and described in the 1979 edition of their annual
energy report, Oregon's Energy Future) reveals a close
correspondence to those enumerated in the Regional Power
Act:

the timing and mix of generation plants, appropriate

energy rates, coordination of the operation of the state's
electric utility systems with those of the region, acquisition of cost-effective conservation, and the development
of renewable resources.

The legislation which created OOOE

did not specify its tasks and responsibilities with the same
detail as that embodied in the Regional Act, though it did
prescribe forecasting and planning (though for all fuels,
not only electricity).
In a number of respects, DODE's technical approaches
foreshadowed those later employed by BPA in its 1982
forecast.

OOOE used several sector-specific energy demand

models to produce its forecast.

Residential sales for the

state were projected using an end-use model explicitly
considering three housing types, four age groupings, five
energy types, and twelve end-uses.

An econometric model was

used to forecast energy use of commercial, industrial, transportation, and agricultural sectors.

All of DODE's models

were "all fuels" models (since the Oepartment is concerned
with energy, not electricity, futures) and the forecasts
they produced had the added distinction of being the first
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to diverge from the more traditional high growth patterns
characterizing 1970s forecasts in favor of lower demand
projections consistent with energy use in the early 1980s.
Of the actors in the regional power planning arena OOOE
was thus unique in its prior experience with many of the issues and technical tools central to BPA's 1982 effort.
Moreover, unlike the Council, the member utilities of PNUCC,
or any of the special interest groups concerned with the
outcome of BPA's forecast, ODOE had little vested interest
in a particular set of findings.

It was in no sense in

competition with BPA, with its decision-making powers at an
entirely different level of governmental influence: it did
not serve utilities investing in thermal resources with
schedules of completion which were in jeopardy; and, while
no organization can be completely value-neuter or bias-free
in its research, ODOE has characteristically approached fuel
and resource mix planning as a problem-solver, not as an advocate of particular technologies or developmental
strategies.
NROC:

Alternatiye Futures for Alternatiye Energy
The Natural Resources Defense Council is a San Fran-

cisco-based organization concerned with, as the name suggests, the protection of the environment.

Different mixes

of power-generating resources will result in widely divergent impacts upon the natural environment.

Forecasts, as
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noted at various points above, provide the basis (or at
least one of the bases) for generation planning.

As

such,

BPA's first independent forecast, influencing decisions
affecting a large (and as yet relatively undeveloped)
geographical area, was of particular concern to NRDC.
In many respects, NRDC's view of BPA's forecast
differed diametrically from that of most of the organizational actors in the power planning arena.

During the

late 1970s when the high growth scenarios of the Sum-Ofutilities forecasts were first being challenged, NRDC
prepared a report funded by the Energy Research and
Development Administration (now part of USDOE) suggesting
that the region would need only a fraction of the capacity
in 1995 that PNUCC was then predicting.

NRDC has consis-

tently acted as a watchdog on larger power planning organizations, challenging both the technological and behavioral
assumptions underlying their forecasts and energy analyses
and offering alternative scenarios emphasizing conservation
and renewable resources.
Being a small public interest organization, NRDC has
been compelled to make extensive use of somewhat limited
resources.

Its staff has been composed of persons with a

variety of professional backgrounds (e.g. physics, engineering, and law), all sharing a common philosophy regarding the
use of energy and the treatment of the natural environment.

226
Lacking the large mainframe computers and complex models
used by utilities and energy commissions in power planning,
NRDC has nonetheless been very effective in using professional and public involvement channels to obtain the means
for conducting its analyses.

Where possible, NRDC may get

direct access to computer facilities or have special alternative model runs performed by the organizations preparing
the forecasts, analyses, or plans under scrutiny.

A common

approach used by NRDC is to perform an ex post analysis of
forecasts, identifying areas where particular judgments or
assumptions were applied, substituting alternative assumptions (and corresponding numerical values) and recalculating
the results after the changes.

(As an example, NRDC might

look at the market penetrations for home weatherization used
in a forecast, substitute more optimistic values, and assess
the impacts).

These calculations are often made with "pen-

cil and paper" rather than computers but serve to highlight
critical areas of uncertainty and force viable, but often
ignored, alternatives into consideration as power planning
decisions are made.
At the time of BPA's 1982 forecast, the region was
looking upon high growth forecasts with more than a modicum
of suspicion.

Though it seemed clear that revised forecasts

would be considerably lower than those of the mid-1970s, and
while many utilities and rate payers had definite interest
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in seeing WNP 1, 2, and 3 all completed on schedule, many
also feared that even the lowered forecasts would be overly
optimistic.

The pattern of decelerating growth of the late

1970s and early 1980s had resulted in regional loads at
levels nearer to those predicted by NRDC (in its abovementioned 1977 report) than by the SOU forecasts.

Given

this background, NRDC entered the 1982 forecasting and
planning arena as a credible champion of conservation and
alternative resource planning.
DSI's;

New Contracts. New Conditions

The region's Direct Service Industries (DSIs) have
played a significant role as consumers of Federal hydropower.

The DSls are comprised of a small number of large

industries (chiefly aluminum, primary metals, and chemicals)
which receive power directly from BPA rather than from one
or more of the region's utilities.

The first of the DSIs

arrived in the region during World War II, its output deemed
essential to the U.S. war effort but requiring the abundant,
readily-available electricity which the Pacific Northwest
was able to provide.

After the War, the DSls situated in

the region remained to be joined by others in need of cheap
power.

The DSls are extremely electricity-intensive; a

large aluminum plant consuming roughtly the same amount of
power as a medium-sized city.

Since the region's hydro-

system was constantly growing (and always somewhat over-
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-built) the OSIs were able to sign long-term contracts with
BPA guaranteeing them low-cost power over periods up to 20
years.

The OSIs maintained and used their own transformers

which allowed them direct access to BPA's transmission
network.
While power was plentiful, the existence of the OSIs in
the Northwest was largely without controversy.

When it

became obvious, however, that BPA's designated preference
customers, the public utilities of the region, would have to
begin construction of thermal resources for their own power
while the OSIs still received the hydropower guaranteed by
their contracts, public opinion began to shift.

When the

impacts of the WPPSS plants on rates was clearly recognized,
negative sentiments became stronger and many consumer groups
argued that the OSI's would be "disconnected" from BPA's
transmission system.
In the interim, the OSIs were lobbying for the passage
of the Regional Act.

Although the legislation would in-

crease their rates substantially (since they would, under
its terms, be providing rate relief for IOU residential and
small farm customers) the rates would, at least on the surface, be less than in other locations and firm power would
be guaranteed.
The low power costs in the region have more than offset
the increased transportation costs, both for the import of
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raw materials and export of industrial output, which the
DSIs had to bear by virtue of locating in the northwestern
corner of the U.S.

Though the DSIs calculated that the

expected rate increases would not be so severe as to render
maintaining their locations no longer cost-effective, many
in the region had serious doubts about both the future of
rate increase and the market value of the DSIs products.
Were the DSIs to close all, or even some, of their plants,
the region's ratepayers would be forced to bear the costs of
both the unpaid portions of the hydrosystem and any thermal
plants on-line at the time of the DSIs departure.

While

this was not a major concern of the DSIs at the time of the
1982 forecast, many of the other actors in the power planning arena justifiably viewed their behavior as a major
uncertainty.
The Northwest Natural Gas Distributors;

The Other Guys

Given the abundance of hydropower which has been
routinely available in the Pacific Northwest, it becomes
easy to overlook the fact that regional energy futures
encompass more than just electricity.

Although BPA's models

project usage of "all fuels", the forecasts they produced
were never intended to be anything other than electricity
forecasts.

The consequences of decisions based on antici-

pated load growth, however, impact not only consumers of

230

electricity but, less directly, consumers of natural gas (as
well as other fossil fuels).
The formation of the Northwest Power Planning Council
in 1980 signalled an imminent increase in the degree to
which energy policy in the region would be subject to
deliberate direction.

One option available to consumers of

electricity confronted with price increases is to select
natural gas (or oil) as a substitute fuel for space heating,
water heating, and boiler operations.
As

noted in the previous chapter, in any areas of en-

deavor where the shape of the future is determined, or at
least influenced, by the outcome of the present deciSions,
forecasts (and plans) may serve as self-fulfilling prophecies.

In large part because of the low cost of electricity

in the region, natural gas has never played the role in the
Pacific Northwest that it has in other parts of the country
(though its role has hardly been insignificant).

In the

late 1970s, natural gas prices began to follow the increases
of its sister fuel, petroleum, and concern about the wisdom
of becoming overly dependent upon fossil fuels grew.

In the

early 1980s, however, the economics of energy in the region
began to show signs of change, as the nation regained its
balance after the second major oil shock concurrent with the
first series of rate increases resulting from the higher
costs associated with new thermal generation projects.
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Potential existed for new regional markets for natural gas,
but this potential could be affected by electricity resource
and conservation planning decisions.

For example, if, in an

attempt to prevent anticipated power deficits, the region's
electric utilities offered residential customers significant
rebates or subsidies for adopting conservation measures in
all-electric homes, this could serve as a major disincentive
for home owners (or builders) to install natural gas heating.

Given the added political authority of the newly-

formed Regional Council to enforce its regional power plans,
the gas companies were not unreasonably concerned about how
their industry would be affected.
Because BPA would, under the terms of the Regional Act,
be the key force in implementing regional power plans, and
because BPA's first forecast would precede the Council's by
a year, the natural gas distributors in the Northwest considered it to be a document meriting critical attention.
Most important to the gas companies was that non-electric
fuel price projections be reasonable (by their reckoning)
and that the demand models capture fuel choice and fuel
switching over the forecast period.

High natural gas prices

(relative to electricity) and poor representation of fuel
switching would tend to elevate load projections, resulting
in further acquisition of resources and conservation by BPA.
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This, as noted above, could potentially affect the natural
gas industry's regional market.
The "Expert" Groups;

Consultants and Research Qrganizations

Yet another set of participants in the power planning
arena are what might generally be termed expert groups,
consulting firms and research organizations (often
university-based) with expertise in model development and
evaluation or familiarity with specific issues underlying or
related to the forecasting and planning process.

These

groups have, at a bare minimum, a professional interest in
participating and, in the case of consulting firms, potentially a financial interest as well, since the research
contracts could result from issues raised.

These expert

groups are spokespersons for various types of modeling,
analysis, or policy considerations and, if they display
organizational biases, these are the result of past experience or research specialization rather than financial
interests in resource decision outcomes.
Qf the

~

expert groups addressing varous aspects of

research crucial to power planning only a few had direct
influence upon the forecast, usually through the public
involvement process but sometimes by virtue of independent
investigations in the same research areas conducted in
parallel with BPA.

These groups are identified below.
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Charles Rivers Associates (CRA) is a Boston-based
consulting firm with considerable experience with energy
forecasting models.

In 1981 and early 1982 CRA developed a

series of regional forecasts with the same research group at
Washington state University that spearheaded the NEPP
project.

These forecasts were developed using modified

versions of the end-use models employed by BPA in their
forecast.

One of the members of the WSU research team had

earlier been a member of BPA's Power Requirements staff.
Two consulting firms performed independent evaluations
of BPA's forecast.

One was National Economic Research

Associates, the developers of the PNUCC econometric model.
The other was Energy ventures Analysis, a New York-based
firm with experience analyzing energy trends in various
parts of the country.
Three other research organizations contributed to the
forecasting process through public involvement channels.
The Survival Center located at the University of Oregon, is
a group chiefly concerned with environmental protection and
energy alternatives.

POWER (People's Organization for

Washington Energy Resources) is a ratepayer's protection
group concerned largely with the impacts of potential
resource decisions upon the electricity consumer.

Finally,

the Futures Research Institute, located at Portland State
University, is concerned with all forms of forecasting and
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prediction, with special emphasis upon issues of technological change and its impacts upon society.
The Media;

Selectively Reflecting the Issues

One last organizational "actor" must be mentioned
the mass media covering both BPA's forecasting effort and
other significant energy issues in the region.

The role of

the mass media is complex; both direct and subtle in its
operation.

Investigative reporters, editorial columnists,

or television personalities may confront participants in the
energy arena directly concerning critical issues. More often
the media work indirectly, as their name suggests, occupying a position between the actors and between their arena
and the public at large that comprises the news audience.
Objectivity in reporting the news is an ideal which is
in some sense approachable but in no way attainable.

Few

major newspapers or electronic media with a general audience
deliberately falsify or color their reporting.

News, how-

ever, may never be sterile data but must be presented in a
fashion such that it will relate to the lives and interests
of those receiving it.

News reporting, therefore, invari-

ably presents its subject matter in a particular context.
It serves to reflect the world, but in a selective manner,
attaching importance to the portion of events and issues
which it presents to its audience while relegating other
portions into an oblivion of non-acknowledgement.

This
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selective attention reflects what is of interest to those in
a reporter's particular audience (e.g. the impact of nuclear
plant construction delays on employment in the Tri-Cities
area) often reinforcing or strengthening existing perceptions or opinions.

The media also may serve as opinion

leaders (rather than merely as indices of opinion), actively
drawing attention to events, issues, or interests which may
have been otherwise overlooked or ignored by most of the
audience.

Thus, in organizational arenas, such as that

characterizing regional power planning, the media serve to
bring the general public into the decision-making process,
albeit indirectly, and may, in some instances, be used by
key actors to exert influence upon their co-participants.
The specific influences of the region's media representatives upon the forecasting process will be detailed in
the chapter on cross-cuing.

A general observation can,

however, be made that, in light of the above discussion,
media in areas potentially more seriously affected by
decisions resulting from the forecast (e.g. the Tri-Clties)
would be expected to view BPA and its actions in a much more
critical light than other parts of the region.
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THE ENERGY FORECASTING ARENA THROUGH THE O-PERSPECTIVE:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The above sections have described the participants in
the production of BPA's first independent forecast.

Some

had major roles, others participated as minor organizational
players, often affecting the final forecast product indirectly.

This chapter has, consistent with the O-perspec-

tive, focused upon the forecast as an organizational output
(or more precisely as a multiorganizational output), identifying the constellation of actors both internal and external
to BPA, and, to the extent possible, enumerating their
organizational habits, operating procedures, work priorities, and channels of influence.

In Chapter V, which traces

the cross-cues between the T-, 0-, and P-perspectives, the
players' moves and their subsequent impacts on both forecast
process and product are addressed specifically and in detail.

In most cases, the challenges to which BPA was asked

to respond were made through the public involvement process
as in the form of comments on specific technical choices
made by BPA in model, input, and forecast development.
Table X below summarizes the findings of this chapter,
listing each of the organizational actors involved and
identifying corresponding chief characteristics, operating
procedures, interests, biases (vis-a-vis the BPA forecast),
and channels of influence used in affecting the forecast

TABLE X
A SUMMARY OF
Actor

OHGANI~ATIONAL

Background/Characteristics

ACTORS IN THE

FOR~CAf,TING

Operating Procedures

PROCFSS

Interests/Biase~

Channels of Influence"

I. Intraorganizational
}>ower
Hequlruents

Conservation

Rxpamed frOID }>ower Resources
to become a separate Division
tasked with producing an
independent forecastl had
previously helped produce a
portion of the SOU forecast.
and worked with PNUCC to
run econo.etric .odel

Because mos t of the
Division's functions
were new the first
forecast was guided by
few SOBs--these related
to the development of
some of the economic
projections used in the
demand modelsi procedures for energy
forecast development
were evolved largely
froa 1) lIodel input
requireaents and
2) agency policy
support needs

Hew Divis10n wanted to
es tabllsh itself and 1ts
professional status, both
within BPA and in the
region at largel wanted
aore reliable forecast
than earlier ones used
to plan WPPSS plants
Preponderence of Division
deCision makers held degrees
in economics and tended to
see forecast.ing as economiet
chore, invariably sought
econometric solutions to
modeling problems
Channels I Direct- staff
produced deaand forecast
and aos t of the inputs

Grew extremely rapidly in
late 19705, t'1rst in
response to antiCipated
deficit then to BPA's
increased responsibilities under the teras
of the Regional Act

Few SOPs at time of
f1rst forecast, method
for determining estima tes of future savings
from BPA programs
(subtracted from forecast) newly developed
(and in process of
revision)

Wanted to establish itself
as regional leader in area
of conservation and give
BPA good reputat10n
Ambit10us and soaetiaes
optimistic view of needed
or attainable regional
conservation I faVOred.
forecasts which would show

N
W

-a

TABLE X (Cont'd)

Background/Characteristics

Operating Procedures

Interests/Blases
Channels of Influence
at mos t a saal1 and
short-lived surplus
Channels I Direct- savings
estimates used in forecast
iniirect- feedback tilrough
upper mgmt. via policy
committee representation

Rates

Ongoing role in establishing
rates for BPA's wholesale
customer.s expanied ani complicated by passage of
Regional Act. 1nd recent
addition of thermal resource
costs into rate base

Established. ratemaking
procedures amenied to
c"nform to terms of'Ac t
New responsibilities
include operation of
Supply Pricing Model in
forecast ani conducting
analyses of alternative
rate schemes

Wanted to provide
credible and riliable
information for Adllinistrator's decisions ani
minimize conflict between
BPA ani wholesale custoaera
over rates
Channe1s1 Direct- produced
electricity price forecast
in conjunction with demani
forecast, iniirect-through frequent feedback
to Power Hgr. and Administrator

Resources

Role and duties changed
after HydroThermal Power
Plan and. later. passage of
Regional Act; home for both
Power Requirements ani
Conservation before their
growth ani separation

Trad,i tional calculations of hydrosystell
output and reliability
supplemented to account
for new types of resource acquisitions.
LP model developed to
determine least cost
mix of resources

Desired to provide
credible resource decision
support information
Direct- as partiCipant in
forecast and resulting
load/resource balanc~
indirect- .tilrough Power
Mgr.

Actor

N
W
00

TABLE X (Cont'd)
Background/Characteristics

Operating Procedures

'Interes ts/B1ases
Channels of Influence

Financial
Management

New and conspicuously
important organizational
function in wake of
WPPSS difficulties

Few SOPS because of
newness of unit,
analysis of resource
cost 1JIlpacts on bond
lIarket akin to tech-niques commonly used
in private sector

Wanted to establish
reputa tion for providing
sound financial advice
in particular regarding
WNP 1.2. ani J
Channels I Ini1rectResults of financial
analysiS suggests
addi tional questions to
be answered in forecasting process

Policy
COllJllittee

Committee comprised of
top BPA decision makers

Mixture of old & new.
Existing comaittments
to unierwr1 ting WPPSS
constrains actions.
New respons1bilities
under Regional Act
ani unresolved WPPSS
problems necessitated
new solutions of which
forecast and financial
decision support are
an integral part

Needed to eMure that BPA
-fulf1ll obligations
unier Act
-stabilize rates as
much as possible
-continue orderly'
repayment of U.S.
Treasu:r:y for hydroproject loans
-resolve WPPSS dllellllla
as painlessly as
possible
Expected lower forecast
ani viewed delsy of WNP
as viable resource
alternative
Channels I Chain of COlI.IIani

Actor
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W
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TABLE X (Cont'd)
Actor

~ackground/Characteristics

Operating Proced.ures

Interests/Biases
Channels of Influence

II. Interorganizational
P!fUCC

Consortium of Northwest
utilities, prepared SOU
forecast since 1950s (BPA
partiCipated in behalf of
small public utilities
lacking forecas Ung s tarfs ) ,
SOU underforecasted through
1960s but seriously overforecasted in mid-1970s
resul ting in WPPSS plants,
many member utilities had
invested in WNP 1-5
(WPPSS utilities are also
PNUCC lIIembers)

Sua-Df-utllities
prepared by aggregating
individual utility
forecast :submittals,
econollletric lIIodel used.
as cross-:heck 19771981, small in-house
staff began routine
analysis of regional
forecasts in early
1980s, load forecast
commi t.tee (comprised
of staff from lIIember
utilitles) provide
critical comments on
forecast under
eValuation

Desired. to
-reestabllsh forecasting
credibility in region
-ensure fair interpretation and iaplelIIenta tion of Regional
Act
-ainim1ze WPPSS-related
financial difficulties
of lIIember utilities
Wanted BPA forecast to
be reasonably low but
high enough to allow
WNP completion
Channels I Dlrect- load
forecasting comaittee
cOllllllents through public
involvelllent, indirect-PNUCC upper IIIg111t to
BPA upper mgmt.

Regional
Council

Newly established body
under Regional Act legislation: elllpowered to
produce long-range regional
resource and conservation
acquisition plan in spring
of 198)

Nothing starrlardized,
though Act provided
broad guidelines for
activities, forecasting
systelll similar to BPA's
under development in
1982

Wanted to
-establlsh reputation
-establish and exercise
authority in region
Heavy emphasis upon
identifying and realizing
attainable conservation

tv
~

o

TABLE X (Cont'd)
Actor

Background/Characteristics

Operating Procedures

Interes ts /Biases
Channels of Influence
Channels, Direct- through
public involve.ent
indirect- Council aaabera
with BPA upper .gat. or
through lIedia

ODOE

state agency established
in mid-1970s-empowered to
prepare energy (all fuels)
projections and plans for
state of Oregon

Prepares annual report
containing sector
(some models h1ghly
sim1lar to BPA's).
established ODOE
planning function
similar on state level
to that of Council on
Regional level

"RDC

Organization dedicated to
environmental protection and
the development of conservation as a major energy
resource I provided critical
comment on high Northwest
estimates of load growth
in late 1970s 1n report
sponsored by FRDA

FXtensive critical
Desired ambitious
evaluation of forecast, conservatim program
planning, or analysis
implementation in
results am assUJlptionslNorthwestl LON forecast
freqUently generate
preferred to minimize
alternative scenarios
liklihood of additional
by changing specific
thermal plant construction.
key assumptions ani
Channels, Direct- through
observing impacts
public involvement,
iniirect- through legal
processes ongoing with
BPA

Wanted to maintain
leadership role in
forecasting and planning
Channels, Directthrough public involve.ant

tV
~

~

TABLE X (Cont'd)
·ctor

Background/Characteristics

Operating Procedures

Interests/Biases
Channels of Influence

DSIs

Anticipated demands
Large users of power buying
electricity directly from
established as terms
BPAI first located 1n reg10n of power contracts
dur1ng WW II and signed longterm contracts w1 th; pushed
for passage of Regional Act
when antiCipated defic1ts
see.ed to jeopardize future
firm power contrac ts

Wanted to maintain acCess
to guaranteed fira power
at low rates
Channels I Indirect-with BPA mgmt. in
contract negotiations,
through med1a

Natural Gas
Distributors

Operated under circumstances
strongly influenced by
world petroleum market
(characterized by rising
prices and uncertainty
during 19705); tmminent
1ncreases in formerly cheap
electricity prices opened
possibilities for new
regional markets

Desired to prevent power
planning or resource acquisition strategies which
strategies which would
deter switching into natural
gas(lower"forecasts with
low fossil fuel prices
preferred so electric-only
conservation policies
would be minimized)
Channels I Direct-through
public involvement (gas
distributors represented
by law firm)

Experts
-CRA, NERA,
EVA

Consulting firms with energy Work by contracts to
related experience; CRA
explore energy use,
worked on Wash. State U.
develop data, and/or

•

Newly developed, at
least regarding issues
emerg1ng from BPA forecast--gas price projections am respons1veness of BPAs models
to fuel awi tching
foci of critique

Desired to maintain or
enhance professional
reputations (and earning
IV
~

IV

TABLE X (Cont'd)
Actor

-roWER Ie
Survival

Center

-Futures
Research
Institute

Background/Characteristics

Opera ting Procedures

In.teres ts/Biases
Channels of Influence

project to develop regional
build models
forecas t s 1Jailar to BPA' s in
19811 NERA built PNUCC
model aid, along with EVA,
provided ildepeldent evaluation of BPA forecas t

potentials) 1 HERA biased
somewhat upward in evalua tion (in line with
their model's predictions)
EVA biased downward by
forecas t by analogy with
TV A service terri tory
Channels I Direct- HERA
aid EVA reports cOllllissioned. by BPA 1 IndirectCRA results used. as
evidence of BPA forecaat
credibility

Croups concerned. with
protecting consUlllers aid
natural environment

Both groups act as
wa tchdogs on energyrelated. JaB.ttersl POWER
concerned. more with
rate ilBpacts aid
resources (particularly
WHP decisions)

Wanted to minimize adverse
effects of energy development
Channels I Direct- through
public involve.ent

University-based research
organization focusing upon
forecasting, planning, aid
other forms of futures
research

In forecasting
context provides
critical comment ard
evaluation

Wanted to ensure that
issues of technology ard
lIul tiple factors affecting
futures dealt within nonsiaplistic fashion
Channels I Direct- public
involvement

.,.

to.)

w

TABLE X (Cont'd)
4ctor
Media

Background/Characteristics

Opera Ung Procedures

Interesta/B1a.ses
Channels of Influence

Disseainate information on
energy issues and events in
a manner which selectively
acquaints previously uninformed populace with issues
and/or reflects concerns and
sentiments of significant
port1ons of reader- or
v1ewership. act as catalyst
and reactant

Turn events and. information into "news"
by selective exposure
to pu~~ici influence
audience through editorial policies. often
develop detailed and
coherent pictures of
energy arena through
investigative reporting

Want to
-sell product to
public by asking
events interesting
-look out for
cODlJlunity interests
-pollee lnstltutions
1n energy arena
Slant towards forecast
variable dependlng upon
area served and how
affected
Channels I Indirectthrough influence
upon population at
large and key decision
malting figures

IV
~
~
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outcome.

Though the actors (and organizational interests or

positions) are diverse a number of generalizations can be
made about the organizational dynamics underlying the
forecast.
First, the numerous issues and concerns addressed by
the forecasting process configurate around a central focus:
the decision concerning the fates of WNP 1, 2, and 3 and its
myriad consequences.

Though the 1982 forecast was far

richer than its predecessors in terms of the number and
variety of policy considerations (or core assumptions) which
it explicitly recognized and addressed, its breadth was
nonetheless limited or constrained by its preoccupation with
these resources.

Internal to BPA, scheduling the completion

of these two plants (and obtaining the highest possible
rating for additional bonds) was perhaps the first major
task of the new Administrator.

Much of the post-1980

reorganization, which elevated the organizational importance
of Power Requirements, Rates, and Financial Management could
be described as the development and mobilization of an
internal apparatus tailored to support this and similar
decisions.

External to BPA, virtually every partiCipant had

some strong interest in the outcome of the decision and its
implications.

A large portion of the member utilities of

PNUCC had financial interest in one or more of the "endangered" plants.

Though conceding the potential problems of a
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surplus of electricity, most wanted to be able to recover
some of their costs by including them in their rate bases
something attainable only after the plants were on-line and
generating electricity.

Environmentalists and strong advo-

cates of conservation, such as NRDC, were concerned that the
plants be brought on-line if and only if absolutely necessary, that no further overbuilding of thermal resources be
undertaken, and that conservation be pursued ambitiously as
a viable resource alternative.

Finally, ratepayers associa-

tions, confronting unprecedented rate increases, were concerned with the impact of the new large plants upon their
pocketbooks.

Bringing new plants on-line prematurely (i.e.

before there is adequate load in the region to balance the
resource output) would cause more dramatic increases in cost
per unit of electricity, something ratepayers never want to
see.
A second important generalization following an
O-perspective review of the forecasting process is that, for
many of the key actors, standard operating procedures serve
as a very poor explanatory tool for predicting (or accounting for) organizational behavior.

In many respects, the

characteristics of the power planning arena of the 19805
(including the passage of the Regional Power .Act) are the
direct result of the failure of standard operating procedures of an earlier era.

For much of the region's recent
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history, steady robust load growth met by Federallysubsidized hydroelectric facilities was a reliable pattern
which could be confidently extrapolated into the future by
means of the Sum-O£-Utilities forecast.

Slowly growing (and

for some periods declining) power costs attracted enough new
industry and people that overbuilding resources was a
reasonable strategy -- resources did not remain overbuilt
for any length of time.

By the mid 1970s, however, the

factors underlying the regional growth dynamic had changed,
though the region's naive methods of forecasting and
resource planning had not.

It took several years of obvious

overforecasting before standardized procedures were first
amended then abandoned for more sophisticated alternatives.
Examination of the principal actors in the forecast
development process reveals a preponderance of young organizations with few established procedural habits.

Though BPA

was hardly a new participant in the power planning arena,
the Regional Act had augmented its responsibilities and the
organizational precedents for producing the SOU forecast
were of little use in the development of the first independent regional forecast with its array of new priorities and
models.

Likewise post-Act ratemaking and financial

management were virtually new organizational functions as
was the assessment of regional conservation potential.
Formal alterations in BPA's internal organizational struc-
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ture reflect the explicitly recognized importance of the new
challenges facing Bonneville but they provide, at best, a
partial description of the changes taking place during this
transitional period.

Perhaps most significant of the emer-

ging organizational characteristics was the interdepartmental basis of the forecasting process.

Lines of influence

(and control) over forecast development crosscut formal
chains of command as often as they followed them.

Within

those portions of the organization most heavily involved in
the preparation of the tools and models used in the forecasts, at least, management styles bore less resemblance to
traditional bureaucracy than to the corporate cultures of
innovative research and development organizations with
little standardization or routinization of activity, a
premium on innovative problem solving, and open, "lateralized" communicative relationships among participants (irrespective of their relative organizational rank or status).
Outside of Bonneville, operating procedures were
similarly tentative or transitional.

At the time of the

1982 forecast, the Regional Council had just filled its key
staff positions and was setting up the apparatus needed to
produce its own 1983 forecast and resource plan.

PNUCC had

abandoned the use of its econometric model and recognized
the need for a thorough revision of the Sum-Of-Utilities
forecast, though a number of utility representatives were
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reluctant to revise their judgments of future load growth
downward to the unprecedently low levels that seemed to
characterize the future.

Almost ironically, the two par-

ticipants which seemed to operate most frequently from
standard procedures were NRDC, which had critiqued a number
of earlier forecasts both inside and outside the region, and
ODOE, which had a "head start" working with end-use models
and dealing with the implications of lower anticipated load
growth.
A third important generalization which can be made
about the organizational dynamics of the forecasting process
concerns the channels of influence.

A number 'of established

channels for communication with BFA which had been used for
other types of decisions still remained functional when BFA
produced its first independent forecast (e.g. FNUCC committee meetings, hearings, public dealings with BFA executives,
etc.) but the mechanism used most frequently and by the
largest number of organizational actors was the public
involvement process.

While public involvement

~ ~

was

not new to BFA, the type of interaction of outside parties
with the decision support process encompassed by forecasting
~

unprecedented.

Though not a legal requirement, public

involvement was virtually a necessity given the expected
variance of the BFA forecast results from those earlier used
to guide regional planning efforts and the gravity of the
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decisions to be based upon them.

All comments and criti-

cisms were addressed by BPA staff though not all resulted in
substantive changes in forecast methodology or findings.
Fourth, though one can speak somewhat of the interests
and biases of the various groups regarding forecast outcomes, it is clear that virtually all groups would be hurt,
one way or the other, by a grossly inaccurate forecast.
Upward and downward biases are really a matter of degree.
An unrealistically low forecast would indicate a need to
delay the WPPSS plants and largely abandon any vigorous
efforts to obtain conservation, but would result in power
shortages and lost opportunities.

Unrealistically high

forecasts would burden the region with excess (and probably
unsalable) power, high rates, and a large volume of conservation which, given hindsight, would probably not prove
cost-effective.

The questions in effect addressed by the

groups affecting (and affected by) the forecast were "How
wide a band of realistic uncertainty surrounds the Northwest's load future?" and "Within this band, what forecast
would minimize our problems or maximize our opportunities to
achieve our goals?".
Finally, a look beneath the changing or newly forming
operating procedures characterizing most of the organization
reveals a sense of an emerging new stability of perception
in the power planning arena, though one that may take
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several more years to materialize fully.
marked a critical watershed.

The 1982 forecast

It was the first major

decision-supporting process to reflect the change in roles
and responsibilities wrought by the Regional Act.

The

regional power planning community was in the midst of a
transitional period of organizational change, but organizations are notorious for being resistant both to initiating
such change or living with it for any length of time.

(In

fact, the Regional Act would have been more effective had it
been passed five or six years earlier, when organizational
realignment might have delayed or avoided altogether the
plans for the 5 WPPSS plants).

One thus can see, the core

of new SOPs crystalizing as the power planning organizations
stake out their new territories and define new tasks.

CHAPTER IV
THE P-PERSPECTIVE
WHEN INDIVIDUALS DO MAKE A DIFFERENCE:

THE P-PERSPECTIVE

IN OVERVIEW

Coordination and organization of the numerous actlvities comprising a project the size and complexity of the BPA
forecast required both formal and informal structuring of
procedures by those groups responsible for their successful
completion.

In some instances, the actions of key individ)

uals are

fully~determined

by operating constraints of the

positions or offices which they occupy within their organizations.

Such actions are appropriately handled using the

O-perspective.

They are as habitual, routinized, and re-

flexive as the SOPs governing group and intergroup behavior.
Other actions of individuals are not the result of the
prescriptions of office and their ultimate effects may range
from almost imperceptibly subtle to highly directive and
dramatic.

To comprehend how and why such actions or

decisions are undertaken, a different perspective is needed
than either the highly rational one used to expose the logic
of technical choices or the process-delineating one used to
understand the dynamics of organizational behavior.

The

perspective which tightens its focus upon unique character-
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istics of an individual's training, attitudes, personality,
and style is the personal or P-perspective.
Individuals are unique, and it is the task of the
investigator utilizing the P-perspective to probe this
uniqueness to understand which of a person's idiosyncracies
are able to explain how and why an individual behaves,
responds, or thinks in a certain way.

This emphasis upon

specifics and particulars, however, should not be construed
to mean that the P-perspective is devoid of general defining
characteristics or foci of consideration.

The personal

perspective can be seen to contrast both technical and
organizational perspectives along a number of critical
dimensions.
The P-perspective is, above all else, subjective rather
than objective in its orientation towards the world, reflecting the individuality of actors in a planning, forecasting, or decision-making process.

Individuals are

responsive -- they meet the challenge of the world in the
present in a manner consonant with their unique past
learning and experience and with their own set of priorities
and goals for the future.

Behavior which often seems

somewhat irrational to the outside observer may appear
perfectly rational from the viewpoint of the individual
under consideration, given his or her limited information
and understanding.

This "partial" rationality is most often

grounded in an individual belief system which reflects a
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deeply rooted need for certainty, stability, and control.
Images, data, or interpretations of events which are inconsistent (or cognitively dissonant) with past experience are
censored, blocked, or filtered out and there is an equally
strong tendency to simplify the complexities of the world
into frameworks or variables which can be more easily dealt
with.
Individual views of the world are also strongly colored
by both underlying personality characteristics and immediate
circumstances which are highly variable from person to
person and situation to situation.

As such, they must be

examined closely in the context of their occurrence.

To

varying degrees, all persons seek security, and much behavior is predicated upon doing what will maintain one's
livelihood and preserve one's status.

Those who might be

characterized as "followers" within their organizations (and
within the world) tend to follow such a risk-adverse
strategy most of the time.

By contrast, others' motives are

strongly characterized by the need to influence, dominate,
or otherwise wield power.

status improvement, more often

than status preservation, constitutes an underlying objective for such individuals who, depending upon their degree of
competence, function as leaders or troublemakers.

Finally,

for many individuals, a drive towards self-fulfillment
constitutes a key determinant of their actions.

This drive

may express itself as a need for meaningful challenges, for
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creative opportunities i or for public

recognition~

but in

all cases its expression becomes a key to understanding why
certain individuals view the world and behave as they do.
In addition to these motivational factors, which often
are the prime movers for individual action, the P-perspective is, last of all, characterized by conspicuously short
decision-making time horizons and a high discounting of the
consequences of current activities.

Individuals normally

expect (and plan for) rather quick return on investments of
their money, time, skill, and loyalty and often lose sight
of or abandon priorities or projects which do not corne
quickly to fruition.
In analyzing complex decision-making areas, and their
consequences, one must understand how particular individuals
look at the world and the ways in which their viewpoints
either influence an outcome or provide insight into possibly
unanticipated consequences or impacts of proposed courses of
action.

In prospective studies, such as technology assess-

ments, where the objective 1s to discover how society will
be affected by the introduction of a new development, analysts should target on both the perspectives of the principals promoting the new idea, procedure, or product, as well
as those of the numerous parties to be affected.

In retro-

spective studies, where the intent is to account, as fully
as possible, for something which has already been done, the
focus is somewhat tighter, since one does not have to guess
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who possibly might be a significant participant in the
process studies but may concentrate upon persons of known
involvement.

This dissertation, dealing, as it does, with a

1982 forecasting, planning, and decision-making process
which has already been completed, falls into the latter
category.

To complement the insights of the two previous

chapters, the "prime movers" of the forecasting process will
be identified.

Their particular decisions or choices which

affected the process will then be described and, to the
extent possible, be discussed in terms of past training,
experience, or decision-making style.
MANAGING THE ORGANIZATION:

A VIEW FROM THE TOP

As illustrated in the previous chapter, BPA's 1982
forecast was the product of a large number of persons both
within and outside the organization.

But whereas the

O-perspective examines the operating procedures and habitual
responses of formal and informal groups to the challenges
the organization faces, it is the task of the P-perspective
analysis to zoom in on the unique capabilities and directive
influences of the individuals involved in these same processes.
At BPA, the Administrator through his or her direction
(or lack of it) exerts a strong influence upon both general
organizational policy and, in certain instances, specific
projects.

As with many high-ranking office holders, though
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the position dictates certain actions, the Administrator has
relatively great latitude in expressing a personal management style and orientation towards facing and dealing with
the agency's problems.

Peter Johnson, the BPA Administrator

since 1981, brought a unique combination of skills and
experience into the decision-making situation of which the
1982 forecast was an integral part.

Before focusing upon

the current Administrator, it is instructive to examine the
contrasting situations which his two predecessors faced
along with their notably different ways of dealing with
them.
The decision-making environment of the 1982 forecast,
as illustrated in earlier chapters, was shaped by a number
of forces over the last several decades.

One could, in

principle, trace its roots back to any number of specific
points in the region's recent history, but, for explanatory
purposes, perhaps the best place to begin is the onset of
Donald Hodel's five year appointment as the Bonneville Power
Administrator in 1972.
Donald P. Hodel was appointed to the position of
Administrator in December of 1972, shortly following Nixon's
reelection and preceding the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973.
calm preceding the storm proved short, however.

The

While the

oil embargo was redefining energy politics, a low water year
was straining the hydrosystem regionally.

Under Hodel, a

graduate of Harvard and the University of Oregon School of
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Law, an energy conservation program was quickly organized in
response.

Its success resulted in the new Administrator

receiving the Department of the Interior's outstanding
Service Award for the effort.

This confrontation with a

short-lived, but rather ominous, energy crisis served to
underscore one implication of the high-growth Sum-Ofutilities forecasts: the era of cheap, abundant power was
ending and new resources would have to be tapped if the
region's energy needs were to be met.

This conclusion,

first voiced in Hodel's 1973 annual report and amplified in
subsequent pronouncements ultimately resulted in the
issuance of a notice of insufficiency to BPA's preference
customers on June 24, 1976.

This notice stated that "after

June 30, 1983, BPA would not be able to serve new load
growth of its preference customers" (Norwood, 1980:262).
This perception of the possibility of imminent deficit led
to the establishment of a conservation group within Power
Resources (as described in the previous chapter) and, more
importantly, a push for nuclear generation capability in the
region.

Three of the WPPSS plants had been scheduled and

construction begun early in Hodel's administration.

The

planning of two more plants soon followed, though Phase II
of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan became held up by legal
challenges in 1975 pending the completion of a comprehensive
environmental impact statement.
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Hodel operated under an acute perception of impending
power shortfalls (or at least their possibility) and, though
the policies underlying the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan were
not long established at the time he took office, power
planning was still something which he could treat fundamentally as an engineering problem.

Generation capacity had

to be added to meet anticipated demand.

Private contractors

replaced the Corps of Engineers in the construction of the
facilties and Bonneville dealt with the projects indirectly
by underwriting the investments of the specific public
utilities but otherwise continued to fulfill its traditional
functions.
In January of 1978, Sterling Munro succeeded Hodel as
Bonneville Power Administrator.

Munro had received a

bachelor'S degree in political science and journalism from
George Washington University and, like Hodel, had studied
law.

Significantly, he had been a member of Sen. Henry

Jackson's staff from 1953 to 1975, making him a prime
candidate for an appointment to the Administrator's position
under the Carter Presidency.

BPA had, the year prior,

become part of the newly-formed Department of Energy, though
maintaining the same responsibilities it had as part of the
Department of the Interior.

Though some members of the

region's forecasting community were beginning to look upon
their high load growth projections with suspicion, at the
time Munro took office, decision makers were still readying
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for an anticipated deficit.

Munro's style was decidedly

political: he immediately concentrated "on BPA's external
relationships, and proceeded to contact the four Pacific
Northwest Governors and other leaders and groups throughout
the region, focusing " ..• on the region's faltering power
program for inclusion in a new legislative proposal for
consideration by Congress" (Norwood, 1980:262).

Munro's

former mentor, Henry Jackson, took charge of this bill,
which was ultimately passed in late 1980 as the Regional
Act.
Munro's Administration witnessed growing regional
concern over rate disparities, environmental impacts, and
resource development.

The WPPSS plants were very obviously

in difficulty even as Munro took office, due to escalating
cost overruns and repeated construction delays.

But while

the Administrator ordered an investigation by outside consultants and repeated warnings of impending power shortages,
he treated the problems of the Supply System as more local
than regional, requiring little or no intervention or direction by Bonneville.

In 1979, the cost escalations resulted

in a rate increase for BPA's customers which was totally
unprecedented.

Munro left office in 1981 with the WPPSS

problem intensifying and new, more significant rate
increases foreshadowed for later that year.
Peter Johnson toqk office in May of 1981, roughly a
half year following the enactment of the Regional Power Bill
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and just prior to the second

majo~

"rate shock" for SPA's

preference customers alluded to above.

The problems with

WPPSS were corning to a head, and it was obvious to all
within the power planning community that the first priority
of the new Administrator would be timely resolution of these
difficulties.

Though the region's forecasting authorities

were becoming increasingly aware of a slowdown in load
growth, no consensus about a new pattern had been reached
and many still feared an impending deficit.

Within

Bonneville (as noted in the previous chapter) in-house
forecasting and conservation capabilities continued to
expand.

Specifically how their expanded functions would

dovetail with BPA's revised mission under the Regional Act,
however, was not something which had been completely resolved during Munro's final months as Administrator.
Johnson's background differed noticeably from that of
his two immediate predecessors in the Administrator's
office.

Though experienced with the operations of the

public sector (he served on Idaho Governor John Evans'
Management Task Force) Johnson's strengths were within the
sphere of business.

At Dartmouth he earned both bachelor's

and master's degrees in business administration, later
applying those skills at McGregor Triangle, a Boise, Idaho
heavy construction company, and Trus Joist, a manufacturer
of wood products used in home construction.

Under the

budget- and cost-conscious eyes of the first Reagan Admin-
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istration, these skills were viewed as essential to the
resolution of the Supply System's problems, leading to
Johnson's 1981 appointment to the Administrator's position.
Consonant with his background and experience, Johnson
viewed WPPSS as a business, rather than an engineering or
political, problem.

Under his leadership, Bonneville would

not deal with the construction problems and their myriad
regional consequences indirectly but instead confront them
head-on.

A preoccupation with generating capacity, reser-

voir water levels, and transmission lines was eclipsed by
stronger concerns with "the fiscal integrity of Bonneville",
"the best interests of present and future ratepayers", and
'Iprofessional excellence", expressions which not only
appeared as new guiding principles in BPA's mission statement but which also thoroughly infused the language of
Johnson's public statements and internal memoranda (e.g.
Johnson's May 17, 1982 guest editorial in Portland's daily
newspaper

~

Oregonian).

In particular, Johnson's exper-

ience as chief executive officer of Trus Joist provided a
unique precedent for his approach to the disposition of the
WPPSS plants.
When Johnson assumed leadership at Trus Joist in 1974,
the company, like others in the wood-products industry, was
facing a changing environment, one increasingly stirred to
tubulence by the numerous repercussions of the then-recently
transformed world petroleum market on both national and
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regional economies.

Under the new CEO's direction: Trus

Joist's planning strategies were modified to reflect the
financial realities of the new economic climate.

Financial

analysis of Trus Joist's uncertain future during a period of
projected inflationary increases led Johnson to close four
of the company's twelve manufacturing plants while weathering the storms of the late 1970s.

While most of its

competitors found themselves seriously over-extended, Trus
Joist prospered, eventually reopening two of its closed
plants.

By the time of Johnson's departure after six years

as corporate head, Trus Joist's annual sales mushroomed from
6 to 76 million dollars.

Though other factors were

undoubtedly involved, it was Johnson's careful planning (as
Paul Richert-Boe notes in his profile of Johnson in the July
13-19, 1982 issue of Portland's Willamette Week) that
constituted the key determinant of the company's success.
The similarities between the situation Johnson confronted at Trus Joist in the 1970s and the one he later
confronted at BPA in the early 1980s are striking.

In both

cases, the respective organizations found themselves in
transformed, and transforming, environments where traditional methods of problem solving (or comfortable standard
operating procedures) were no longer completely appropriate.
Trus Joist faced the economic uncertainties of the inflationary 1970s, when energy and production costs grew rapidly.

BPA faced a situation characterized by construction
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difficulties, slowing demand growth, and rapidly escalating
WPPSS resource costs.

Trus Joist found itself questioning

its need for production capacity.

BPA, after years of

anticipated imminent power shortages, found itself questioning its need for generation capacity.

Within its newly

transformed environment, Trus Joist experienced a concern
over protecting its assets.

Within its new environment BPA

was similarly concerned with maintaining a rating for WPPSS
bonds which would permit additional sales to finance further
construction and with assuring the greatest possible rate
and revenue stability.
The problem-solving approaches (and, ultimately, the
solutions) implemented by Johnson at both organizations also
displayed a striking similarity -- so striking that the
guidance of the same chief executive officer in both instances is obvious.

At Trus Joist, a thorough financial

analysis of the company's assets and capabilities in light
of predictions of economic behavior provided the information
for Johnson, the CEO, to make the difficult, but in retrospect prudent, decision to close four of the company's manufacturing plants.

At BPA, newly organized financial manage-

ment and forecasting units provided analysis which similarly
recommended delaying the completion of WPPSS 1 and 3.

The

analysis produced two important conclusions: first, that
chances for adequate additional financing were slim if
immediate completion of more than one plant was attempted,
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and, second, that delayed completion of WNP projects 1 and 3
would not result in regional power shortfalls.

Armed with

this information Johnson, the Administrator, virtually
repeated his precedented successful decision, shutting down
the ongoing construction of two nuclear plants in order to
make the successful completion and functioning of a third
possible.
While it is arguable that BPA was already turning
towards a more "businesslike" approach to managing the
development of the region's generating resources, this is
true only in the most general sense.

Though the necessary

forecasting approaches (as well a some of the agency's
financial analysis capabilities) began evolving during
Munro's term of office, it was Peter Johnson's unique
experience (and P-perspective) which gave the organization's
support system its specific character.

Whereas another

Administrator might have sought to make the WPPSS decision
based upon regional consensus, Johnson brought the responsibility fully upon himself and BPA, making internal forecasting and financial analysis groups a necessity.

Whereas

a different CEO might have second guessed the judgments of
his forecasting and financial management staffs, Johnson
(along with the rest of BPA's Policy Committee) accepted the
often sensitive findings of his technical experts (though
not without careful and critical scrutiny).

This gave the

organizational units involved the opportunity to make many
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key decisions about their own development while, at the same
time, establishing the context defining the purpose of their
intraagency missions.

Finally, whereas an Administrator

lacking a successful precedent such as the Trus Joist outcome as part of his experience might not have had enough
confidence to make and stand by a difficult project-delaying
decision, Johnson opted for the unpopular, but technically
warranted, choice to delay WNP 1 and 3.

This notified the

region unequivocally that the operations of the forecasting
and financial management units were to be taken seriously as
integral parts of BPA's organization.
The character of the region's resource development
problems thus changed significantly over a ten year period.
Equally significant was the change in the manner that the
Bonneville Power Administrator perceived the problem and the
method of its solution.

Table XI summarizes the different

regional conditions faced by Hodel, Munro, and Johnson, the
experience they brought to bear, and the ways in which they
perceived and framed the problems confronting them.
To summarize, Hodel entered office in the early 1970s
at a time just before the Arab Oil Embargo.

The region's

economic growth was as robust as its load growth, and
forecasts projected these trends out to the end of the
century.

The perceived need for large thermal generation

projects to avoid power shortages was accentuated by the
impacts of the drought year which welcomed the new Adminis-

TABLE XI
ADMINISTRATORS' PERSPECTIVES ON RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Administrator

Regional Conditions

Background/Experience

Development seen as--

Donald Hodel

High levels of regional
economic and load growth
continuing from the 1960s
through most of Administration resulting in high
load growth projections;
severe drought and 1973
Arab Oil Embargo served
to underscore need to
avert power shortages
through resource and conservation development

Degree in law: three
years as Deputy Administrator under Henry
Richmond--in on ground
floor of Hydro-Thermal
Power Plan

ENGINEERING (or
Administrative)
problem: new capacity
deve lopmen twas
thought to be straightforward with BPA
backing investments
of public utility
customers for thermal plant construction

sterling Munro

First indications of slowing regional growth,
though regional forecast
projections still high:
growing rate disparities
between public and private
utility customers: WPPSS
construction cost estimates escalations becoming source of concern
and controversy: conservation promoted by Carter
Administration

Degrees in political
science and law;
member of Sen. Henry
Jackson's staff from
1953 through 1975

POLITICAL problem:
while WPPSS cost escalations were treated primarily as a
nlocal" problem of
the utilities involved, BPA's role
under Munro aimed
at the development
of Regional Act legislation to ease
growing rate disparities and in effect
expand the resource
development provisions of the HydroThermal Power Plan
N
CTI
-l

TABLE XI

(Cont'd)

Administrator

Regional Conditiqns

Background/Experience

Development Seen as--

Peter Johnson

Load growth falling off in
region; naivete of earlier
forecasting process recognized and acknowledged,
though no consensus of
"new vision" of future;
WPPSS 4 and 5 mothballed
and financial fate of
plants 1, 2, and 3 uncertain; Regional Act
legislation in place but
its implementation still
problematic

Business degrees from
Dartmouth; served on
Idaho Governor's Mgmt.
Task Force; CEO at
Trus Joist for six
years during which
time annual sales grew
dramatically, in large
part due to strategic
decision to close 4
of 12 plants during
inflationary climate
of late 19708

FINANCIAL/BUSINESS
problem: future of
WPPSS plants seen
as contingent upon
bond sales; decision
to delay plants 1
and 3 followed from
financial analysis
(and forecast)
simi lar to tha t
supporting Trus
Joist plant closing

tv

a-.
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trator into office.

The regional resources development

plan, centering upon the construction of the WPPSS plants,
was handled primarily as an engineering problem.

This is

not to say that Hodel, trained in the field of law, approached the problem as an engineer would.

Rather, the

problem was seen as a technical one: to add sufficient
capacity (and conservation) to accommodate future demand.
The Administrator, who had earlier served as Deputy to Henry
Richmond from the onset of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan,
rather straightforwardly followed the provisions of that
Plan, letting private contractors construct the plants for
the region's participating public utilities while BPA
underwrote the construction costs incurred by the WPPSS
member utilities.
By contrast, Sterling Munro treated regional resource
development as primarily a political problem.

By the time

Munro took office in 1977, the first indications of a slowdown in regional growth were becoming evident, though forecasts did not yet reflect a significant shift in perceptions.

A key issue was the growing rate disparity between

public and private utilities.

Rather than deal directly

with WPPSS's emerging problems, Munro focused instead upon
the promotion of Regional Act legislation developed principally by Henry Jackson, for whom the Administrator had
served as an aide between 1953 and 1975.
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Peter Johnson entered office after acquiring extensive
experience in construction and wood products industries.

By

1981, WPPSS 4 and 5 were doomed by the combined effects of
slowing load growth and sky-rocketing construction costs and
the fate of the three remaining plants was in doubt.
Johnson framed the situation as a business problem -- one
Which required BPA to adopt a leading role in its solution.
Drawing extensively upon his experience with a closely
similar situation at Trus Joist, Johnson utilized BPA's
newly developed forecasting and financial analysis capabilities to arrive at a difficult, but in retrospect, seemingly
prudent, decision to delay the construction of WNP 1 and 3
in order to render the completion of plant number 2
possible.
Thus, an examination of Peter Johnson's personal
background and perceptive concerning the resource development situation confronting the region at the time he assumed
the office of Bonneville Power Administrator provides vital
insights into the manner in which the organizational apparatus surrounding the production of BPA's 1982 forecast was
given its shape.

FUrther significance of these insights

will become clearer in the next chapter which cross-cues the
three perspectives.
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MANAGING THE FORECAST:

A VIEW FROM THE MIDDLE

As noted in the previous chapter, Bonneville's long-

term forecast was an organizational product of a variety of
groups within the agency.

Using the P-perspective to look

at the top of the organization -- the Administrator's Office
provides significant and sometimes penetrating insight
into unique managerial styles which strongly direct the
manner in which the organization is structured and the way
in which it functions.

By itself, however, this focus only

provides a portion (albeit a significant portion) of personal influences helping to shape the forecast process and
its ultimate product.

A P-perspective examination of

middle-level management and technical staff operations within the units specifically tasked with producing the forecast
provides additional insights which are both necessary and
complementary to those displayed in the previous section.
In certain ways, each level of an organization displays
unique characteristics.

At the top, the Administrator pre-

sides over the entire line organization and may exert strong
direction on the course which the agency follows.

At the

middle levels of the organization, such strong unilateral
influence is lacking for two reasons.

First, the span of

control of middle managers is, by definition, smaller,
addressing only a segment of interdepartmental projects such
as the long-term forecast.

Second, and of possibly greater

importance, forecasting is a problem-solving activity which,

272
at best, might be characterized as semi-structured.

The

production of a forecast is a team effort requiring diverse
expertise.

This means that although process and product may

alike bear the imprint of the authors, no single individual
directs the forecast as a plant supervisor would manage a
highly routinized production function.

The forecast, in a

very real sense, evolves from the coordinated interaction of
a number of contributing individuals.
As such, a slightly different emphasis guides the
P-perspective investigation of the forecasting process in
this section.

While individual personalities and back-

grounds remain as important foci of inquiry, greater
attention is placed upon understanding the unique circumstances confronted by the principals in the forecasting
process and the nature of the interplay between them.

As

with the previous section, though the events most immediately and directly associated with the i982 forecast will be
examined in greater detail, a significant amount of background information is also provided about the forecast's
antecedents, beginning with the middle years of the Hodel
Administration.

This, more than T- or a-perspective

analysis, helps illuminate the specific events and issues
providing motivation for the development of an independent
forecasting capability at BPA.
As described in the previous section, Donald
Hodel's term as Bonneville Power Administrator began at a
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time when regional drought3 international petroleum price
escalations, and continuing strong Northwest economic growth
all contributed to a picture of future power shortages.
The Sum-Of-Utilities forecasts had proven generally reliable
as indicators of load growth, and no new role was seen for
BPA forecasting staff beyond their usual contribution to the
SOU on behalf of small public utilities in the region.
Power Requirements (renamed from Power Marketing, a title
more appropriate to periods of abundant electricity) was
functionally subordinate to the Power Resources Branch of
Power Management, its duties clearly, and modestly, defined
in a seemingly stable load environment.
While the organizational analysis (presented in the
previous chapter) of the development of Power Requirements
into a forecasting body independent of PNUCC revealed a
sudden growth in staffing and capability in the 1980-81
period, the seeds of its transformation had actually been
planted some years earlier.

It was during the middle of

Hodel's term of office, in 1976, that the first traces of
cognitive dissonance began to cast a shadow on the consensus
perception of sustained load growth dominating the power
planning community.

Reiterating a point first made in the

introductory chapter of this dissertation, it was at this
point that BPA acquired the services of the consulting firm
of Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill (SaM) to conduct an
independent evaluation of the need for five WPPSS nuclear

274
plants.

The findings! which concluded that incIeased con-

seIvation would significantly Ieduce, if not eliminate, the
need fOI five plants, set in motion activity within BPA
which would eventually culminate in the establishment of the
agency's 1982 fOIecasting capability.
As

a Iesult of the SOM IepoIt, seveIal membeIs of PoweI

Requirements undeItook a new exercise beyond the group's
tIaditional missions of contributing to the SOU forecast and
conducting poweI marketing studies.

Along with Terry

Esvelt, then wOIking for BPA's EnviIonmental Office, Don
Hoffard and Mark Roberts attempted to develop a fIamewoIk
which would render the Skidmore, Owings, and MerIill
findings more useful.

SOM had developed their peIcentage

conseIvation savings estimates laIgely fIom other sources:
engineeIing simulations of building energy performance,
documented peIformance of test stIuctures, and miscellaneous
"expert" studies.

Different savings levels were attributed

to pIoposed education, incentive, and mandatoIY pIograms in
Iesidential, commercial, and industrial sectors.
The sources tapped by SOM usually expressed their
research results in a form such as "A building constructed
to ASHRAE 90-75 standards results in a savings of 'x'
percent relative to a typical 1974 structure".

To be useful

fOI utility planning, howeveI, this infoImation needed to be
translated into a fIamework breaking down savings by end-use
and consuming sector -- that is how much of the savings
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could come from: say: heating, cooling, or lighting loads in
commercial buildings.

Hoffard, Esvelt, and Roberts attempt-

ed to derive an end-use decomposition of the SOU forecast
using a variety of sources for relevant data (perhaps most
notably the economic statistics and projections prepared by
Don Morey who had worked in the group's Economic Studies
Section).

The results of the exercise proved enlightening

to all those involved.

Building up load projections from

sector-specific forecasts of key economic variables (e.g.
number of houses X percent electric heating X heating use
per household) resulted in electricity consumption values
conspicuously below those of the SOU forecast.

Only by

assigning the differences to conspicuously overlarge 'other'
and 'miscellaneous' use categories could the SOU totals be
captured by an end-use framework.
The following year, PNUCC first used the econometric
model developed under contract by National Economic Research
Associates to corroborate the results of the SOU forecast.
For the BFA staff members who had worked on the end-use
decomposition exercise, this corroboration, suffice to say,
proved unconvincing.

Although their perspective was a

minority one, both within the BFA and the larger community
of regional forecasters, and although their efforts resulted
in no immediate revisions in Power Requirements' mission
all would carry the insights gained from the exercise with
them through the years of the Munro Administration when they
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would take leading roles in developing the technical apparatus for BPA's first independent forecast.
At about the same time that PNUCC was "crosschecking"
the SOU forecast with its newly received econometric model,
an independent effort, the Northwest Energy Policy Project,
was being conducted at Washington state University.

As

noted in the introductory chapter this project resulted in
the development of several forecasts somewhat lower than
those of PNUCC, produced using a differently specified
econometric model.

Significantly, two members of Power

Requirements staff, Don Hoffard and Bob Lewis, worked on the
project.

Though, at this time, Power Requirements was one

of the few bastions of economists within an agency dominated
principally by engineering concerns, few of the staff economists had strong backgrounds in computer modeling and quantitative forecasting methods (in sharp contrast to the 1982
staff).

Hoffard and Lewis were notable exceptions, account-

ing for their participation in the NEPP modeling effort.
From the standpoint of the eventual development of BPA's
1982 forecasting system, this participation raised issues
which further underscored the need for a harder and more
thorough look at the varied factors underlying regional load
growth.
Even after Sterling Munro took office in early 1978,
however, skepticism concerning continued high growth in
regional electricity consumption still represented a minor-
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ity viewpoint.

Although PNUCC had revised the SOU forecast

downward for several years 1n response to the first unmistakable signs of slowing load growth, these revisions were
modest rather than a significant departure from precedent.
For the majority within the power planning community this
slowdown connoted a temporary aberration in an otherwise
stable pattern rather than the onset of a new trend.

Given

the characteristically slow and conservative responses of
both organizations and the individuals populating them to
changes in their environments, it is not surprising that the
"conversion" to a new vision of the future proceeded unevenly and was generally met with resistance by those who had
made heavy personal, professional, or financial investments
in the "official" future of high growth.

In this regard,

BPA differed little from other organizations within the
region.

Even within Power Requirements, which was specifi-

cally tasked with anticipating Northwest electricity
futures, the overriding emphasis was upon fulfilling the
traditional missions of contributing to the SOU forecast and
conducting marketing studies, rather than exploring alternative possibilities.
At first, any pressure for development of an independent forecasting capability at BPA during Munro's term of
office was slight, originating from (and largely confined
to) the group within Power Requirements that had taken the
critical look at the SOU forecast earlier.

Two critical
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characteristics of the load and resource planning environment during the Munro's years, however, provided the particular milieu which the "bottom-up" organizational effort to
build a forecasting capability internal to BPA needed to
take root and grow.

One was simply the general late 1970s

pattern of load growth, which, though still strong, continued to fall below the downwardly revised SOU forecast
predictions.

This gave greater respectability to the

assertion that the Northwest might be viewing the onset of a
new trend as opposed to a transient aberrational development.

The other characteristic was the strong push, from

many parties in the region (including Hunro himself) for the
development of the Regional Power Act legislation.

Within

Bonneville, it then became more apparent that should BPA
assume a new role of acquiring resources to meet the loads
of any of the region's utilities requesting power exchanges,
it would need to be able to perform a variety of internal
forecasts and analyses beyond its previous capabilities.
Moreover, it also became rather obvious that models other
than those in use in the region at that time would be
needed.
As

during

the Regional Act legislation was being debated
1979 and 1980, several efforts were undertaken

within Power Requirements which would in many respects, form
the core of the demand component of the BPA forecasting
system.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, as mentioned
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earlier, had, under the Carter Administration, developed
residential and commercial sector energy forecasting models
for the Department of Energy.

These models had become part

of the public domain, and, after BPA had become part of the
USDOE it was simple for the members of the Power Requirements staff to acquire Federal Region X (Washington, Oregon,
Idaho and Alaska) versions of the models "off the shelf"
(i.e. ready-made rather than specially developed for BFA
under contract).

Not surprisingly, their acquisition was

initiated by Hoffard, Roberts, and Esvelt of Power Requirements, both in response to the obvious weaknesses of other
forecasts in use at that time and in anticipation of new
demands to be placed upon the organization.

Even had the

Regional Bill not been enacted, BPA was committed to conservation assessments which would require some defensible
method of projecting both electricity sales and savings.
The ORNL econometric/end-use hybrids were, very literally,
tailor-made for the purpose.
Very shortly after the acquisition of the ORNL models,
Mark Roberts and Terry Esvelt had a regional survey of
residential housing and electricity consumption characteristics conducted, under contract, by the firm of Elrick and
Lavidge.

Within a year a somewhat different, but parallel

effort was underway in the commercial sector.

The Energy

Information Administration of USDOE was having a survey
conducted by westat, Inc., to explore the feasibility of
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using utility billing records as the basis of conducting
commercial energy surveys.

One of the test sites under

consideration was in the Pacific Northwest.

By adding

funding to the project, BPA arranged to have all three sites
selected in the Northwest (Portland, Seattle, and the
Tri-Cities), resulting in a more useful, but not fully
regionally representative commercial survey.

These surveys

were needed for three purposes, each consonant with the
directions that the organization was at that time expected
to go.

One purpose was simply to gain detailed empirical

familiarity with one or more of the major consuming sectors.
The efforts made several years earlier, to develop end-use
framework explaining the SOU forecast had raised many
questions, and identified many data needs, which such a
survey could resolve.

Second, because the ORNL models

needed to be calibrated to the Pacific Northwest, as opposed
to Region X, the survey could be used to obtain (or approximate) regionally representative values for key model input
variables.

Finally, survey results could, if and when

needed, form the basis for further analysis needed to adapt
or modify the models as required.
Last of all, a third, somewhat new effort was begun in
what had been (and soon would again be) the Economic Studies
group within Power Requirements.

Don Morey had, since the

1960s, conducted various economic analyses as part of the
marketing studies forming one of the unit's central mis-
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sions.

These analyses had both judgemental and quantitative

underpinnings, but were not performed using complex or
sophisticated computer models.

When the demand models were

received from Oak Ridge their data requirements were identified and efforts were made to develop regional values for
key variables.

In addition to survey data on characteris-

tics of the two consuming sectors represented by the models,
projections of specific economic variables on both national
and regional levels were needed.

This resulted in a new

agenda for economic analyses -- projections had to be
tailored to match the form and format of the input variables
and, in some cases, new models had to be developed expressly
for this purpose.

This last need would ultimately usher in

a connected series of computerized economic (and demographic) models.
While "bottom-up" organizational pressure for an
in-house forecasting capability originated with key members
of the technical staff, the proposed change of mission had
the support of the Chief of Power Requirements (then a
section within Power Resources), George Gwinnett.

Formerly

one of BPA's Area Economists, Gwinnett headed the Section
beginning in the mid 1970s and, during the years when the
Regional Act legislation was being debated, acted as a key
spokesperson for the group, representing its new interests
to other portions of the organization.

Up until the passage

of the Regional Act, however, support within the larger
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organization was less than wholehearted.

Though there was

no significant internal resistance to the idea of an independent forecasting capability, neither was a niche being
readied in the larger functional hierarchy of the organization.

In 1980, the newly obtained models were employed in

the preparation of a series of sector-specific conservation
assessments, but resource planning was still grounded in the
forecasts produced by PNUCC.
The enactment of the Regional Bill in late 1980, in
large measure provided the direct impetus for Power
Requirements' reorganization and reorientation.

Despite the

fact that one of Ronald Reagan's first actions after
inauguration was to put a freeze on Federal hiring, BPA
managed to open a number of new positions made necessary by
the agency's augmented responsibilities.

Though the hiring

freeze made it temporarily impossible to fill

~

of these

slots, BPA, and Power Requirements grew in the wake of the
passage of the Regional Act (and, as noted in the previous
chapter, Power Requirements grew disproportionately fast
during this period).

with BPA legally responsible to

acquire the resources needed to meet the loads of whatever
utilities willing to accept the terms of the Act, an
improved, and independent, forecasting system became a
necessity.

It was in this organizational climate that the

proposals being advanced by a contingent within Power
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Requirements were given the wholehearted support of BPA's
upper and middle management.
Approximately half a year separated the passage of the
Regional Act from Peter Johnson's appointment to the
position of Bonneville Power Administrator in mid-1981.

It

was during this interval that Power Requirements emerged as
a Division within BPA and staffed itself to levels needed
for the performance of its newly defined (and organizationally accepted) mission of producing an independent
forecast to guide resource acquisitions.

As noted earlier

in this chapter, a precise and specific definition of the
Division's mission awaited the design and development of a
decision support system geared to perform the financial
analysis required by Administrator Johnson for his 1982
decision on the WPPSS nuclear plants.

During the last

months of Hunro's term of office, however, the Division's
organizational structure was established.
The staffing chart for the infant Division straightforwardly reflected the key issues raised since the mid-70s
publication of the SOH report.

George Gwinnett, who had

been Chief of Requirements when it was a Section within
Power Resources, retained his position of leadership as
Director of the Division.

Don Morey, who had performed most

of the economic analyses for the unit's marketing studies a
decade earlier headed the Economic and utility Studies
Branch which was responsible for preparing economic inputs
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for the new

de~and

models as well as fulfilling Require-

ments' traditional mission.

The other Branch, Energy

Modeling and Analysis, concerned itself with development and
operating of the new long-term forecasting models.

The

three supervisors in this new Branch were the same persons
who had attempted, four years earlier, to develop an end-use
framework to explain the SOU forecast.

Don Hoffard headed

the Branch while Mark Roberts and Terry Esvelt respectively
chiefed the Energy Modeling and Energy Analysis Sections.
The minority viewpoint which the three had earlier shared
concerning plausible Northwest energy futures was now the
predominant one within the Division.
A slight reshuffling of key personnel took place prior
to the production of the 1982 forecast.

George Gwinnett

returned to the Lower Columbia Area Office, this time as its
head, vacating the Power Requirements Division Director's
slot.

This was soon filled by Don Hoffard, whose vacated

Branch Chief position was subsequently filled by Terry
Esvelt.

John McConnaughey then became Chief of the Energy

Analysis Section, while in Don Morey's Branch, Geoff Moorman
and Gerry Lenzen respectively headed Economic Studies and
Utility Studies Sections (the latter unit reviewed individual utility forecasts and continued BPA's participation in
the SOU but did not have a role in producing the new longterm forecast).

Though George Gwinnett continued to act as

the Division's key spokesperson through the early phases of
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the 1982 public involvement process, it was this lineup that
oversaw the development of BPA's first independent forecast.
From the standpoint of the P-perspective, a central
investigatory concern is the background or training of key
participants in a technical or decision process.

While the

past experIences of those Power Requirements figures
managing the forecast was perhaps not as critical as that of
the Administrators managing the organization, it is still of
significance in understanding the factors which, over a
period of time, shaped the development of the long-term
forecast.
As

noted in the previous chapter, Power Requirements

was one of the first groups within the traditionally
engIneering-based BPA to employ economists.

As economic and

fInancial considerations became more central to BPA during
the 1970s, training in economics became correspondingly more
widespread organizationally.

Not surprisingly, under these

conditions, all of the Power Requirements staff supervising
the 1982 forecast had degrees in economics.
It must also be noted, however, that during the latter
half of the 1970s, when the implications of the SOH studies
were first recognized, most of those involved in producing
(and endorsing) the SOU forecast were also schooled in
economics, with its emphasis upon the effects of price upon
present and future consumption.

Obviously, then something

else characterized those who first recognized the limita-
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tions of the traditional SOU outlook and spearheaded the
development of the forecasting apparatus used in 1982.
A closer look at the background of the economists who
pioneered Power Requirements' development suggests several
factors which predisposed them to revise the traditional
outlook for power futures.

First, and most immediately

obvious, was the circumstances they found themselves in.
BPA's involvement with both PNUCC and the contractors at SOM
made it imperative that someone be given the task of
attempting to reconcile the two disparate points of view.
Thus, it seems likely that whoever received the assignment
would be compelled to reevaluate, to at least some degree,
the power planning status quo.

Given that the task was an

unprecedented one, however, it could have been approached in
any of a number of different ways with varying results.
That it proceeded as it did was the consequence of a second
factor, the specific training of the individuals involved.
Terry Esvelt and Mark Roberts were, at the time of the SOM
review, both relatively new employees at BPA.

As such, they

had much less investment in the organizational precedents
which were responsible for the maintenance of the "official"
interpretation of the future.

Esvelt worked for the

Environmental Office and, in this capacity, brought several
new emphases to the assignment.

Though both Don Hoffard and

Don Morey had been with Power Requirements since its days as
Power Marketing, both had special areas of expertise

whi~h
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proved significant to the SOU evaluation project.
was one of the first in

to have a

Requi~ements

extensive background in computer modeling.
models require

fo~mal,

Hoffard

st~ong

and

Computerized

explicit, and consistent explanatory

principles, though this is not generally true of economicbased interpretations of load growth.

Morey provided exper-

ience in identifying, monitoring, and projecting economic
and demographic factors which
electricity consumption.

d~ive

changes in levels of

The availability of both his

expertise and his projections of economic activity in the
region allowed (or possibly predisposed) the team evaluating
the SOU forecast to build up a forecast from basic trends,
developing a (noncomputerized) model of sorts.

This model,

in effect, undermined any confidence they might have had in
the SOU projections.
Though the 1982 forecast was the
pe~sons,

p~oduct

and though a large portion of the

finally assumed was determined by the

of many

fo~m

which it

st~uctu~e

of the

models selected, the imprint of the key figures 1n Power
Requi~ements'

reorientation 1s

clea~.

Don

Mo~ey

had

developed (or supervised the development of) the methods
used to produce the economic and demographic projections
used in the demand models, 1n particular, the paper-andpencil techniques underlying the Economic Base Model used in
producing the regional employment projections.

In 1981,

Morey became Branch Chief, handing control of the Economic
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studies Section over the Geoff Moorman.

For the first

forecast, however, the methods in place were Morey's.
As noted above, Don Hoffard was one of the first
computer-proficient members of Power Requirements' staff.
In the mid-1970s, along with members of NERA (developers of
the PNUCC Econometric Model), he participated in the
creation of the Integrated Supply and Demand Model (ISOM).
The demand component of ISOM was the creation of NERA: the
supply (or resource costing) component was Hoffard's
contribution.

It was the supply component of 150M which,

when separated, became the basis for the Supply Pricing
Hodel which provided electricity prices based upon the costs
of scheduled resources and the priorities of the Regional
Act.
Finally, Terry Esvelt and Mark Roberts were largely
responsible for designing (or at least supervising the
design of) the model review and forecasting methodology.
The test runs performed, the evaluation criteria considered
in the modeling selection procedure, and the form which the
modeling system ultimately assumed in many ways reflected
the issues which they had earlier confronted in dealing with
PNUCC, SOH, and NROC (Natural Resources Defense Council).
At the outset of this section, it was asserted that at
the mid-levels of organizations, where activities such as
the BPA forecast are managed or directed, there is less
decision-making freedom (at least over central issues), than
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near the apex where a key individual's style or operating
priorities may shape the behavior of an entire bureaucratic
structure.

It was also asserted that at these lower levels

effective use of the P-perspective requires a close examination of specific circumstances.

The description of the

gradual shift in the perception of regional power futures
given above provides an illustration of how the personal and
circumstantial elements so central to the P-perspective
interact.

The summary comments below, which conclude this

section, should serve to highlight these important interactions.
In reviewing the specific personal factors prerequisite
to the development of the 1982 BPA forecast, three interacting elements stand out as determinants.

First, and most

generally obvious, is the specific backgrounds of those
leading the movement towards a computerized system of
models.

All of the principals in this movement who were

employed at BPA at the time of the SOM report were economists in an organization dominated by engineers.

This

training emphasized a focus upon the effects of price upon
supply and demand which contrasted with the assumptions
underlying the naive extrapolation methods employed in the
SOU forecast.

More specifically two of the key actors were

new to BPA, less bound to "official" images of the future
and more concerned with newly recognized issues such as
conservation potential and resource policy implications.
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The two other key figures! though long-time employees, had
unique training in computer modeling and regional economics,
which made them perhaps more attentive to the numerous
factors underlying load growth.

In toto, these background

profiles provided a predisposition for the group members to
look at forecasting somewhat differently.
Second, the specific circumstances these individuals
found themselves in served as a trigger or catalyst to the
gradual reformulation of an image of the future.

As noted

above, the attempt to reconcile the SOM report with the SOU
findings led to the development, on paper, of an end-use
framework which would not account for large portions of the
loads anticipated by PNUCC.

The resulting cognitive

dissonance led both to a general mistrust of continued high
growth rates in regional forecasts and to a perceived need
for a substantially revised approach to forecasting.
Finally, the general political environment (as embodied
in the policies of the reigning Administrator) provided the
milieu in which rapid expansion of forecasting capability
either was or was not possible.

Initial investigations into

conservation assessment began during Hodel's Administration,
where the problem was perceived to be avoiding severe
forthcoming deficits.

With Munro taking office, and

regional power legislation a front-running issue, the
organization became more receptive to developing an in-house
forecasting and resource planning apparatus, though tradi-
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tional views still predominated.

Full support for the

expansion plans of Power Requirements was forthcoming soon
after the passage of the Regional Act, and in 1982, Peter
Johnson's need for WPPSS financial analysis merged with the
efforts to develop sector-specific forecasts to produce
BPA's decision support system.
THE P-PERSPECTIVE -- CONCLUDING REMARKS
Examining a decision process from the vantage point of
the P-perspective, then, entails a focus upon the unique
attributes of the individuals involved.

The next chapter,

which cross-cues the inSights derived from the three perspectlves, should provlde a fuller and richer understanding
of the significance of the P-perspective.

Before moving on,

however, it is worthwhile reiterating (and to some extent
expanding upon) several key points regarding the character
of the P-pexspective.
First and foremost, investigation from the standpoint
of the P-perspective, to repeat a point made above, centers
upon what is unique to individuals involved in decision
processes.

All actions are ultimately carried out by

individuals, but it is only where choices or alternative
courses of action are available that the P-perspective is
the appropriate tool of investigation.

If an individual

reflexively follows "cookbook" technical procedures or
straightforward1y carries the actions prescribed for an
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office holder in a particular situation, these behaviors are
the objects of, respectively, the T- and O-perspectives,
regardless of how large the impacts are which can be traced
back to the particular individual undertaking the action.
By contrast, if an individual had the latitude to select one
technical procedure over another or one course of action
over another, P-perspective research would be appropriate to
explore elements of the individual's background, training,
character, motivation, or style which could explain the
choice.
A second point worth emphasizing before undertaking the
cross-cuing exercise is that the individual factors affecting complex decision processes should never be dismissed
merely as distorting biases or as personal agendas undertaken to the detriment of larger goals or organizational
activities.

While these individual factors (e.g. education,

problem-solving style, experience) clearly may have significant impact upon decision processes, they are by no means
typical, or characteristic, of the focus of P-perspective
investigation.

In fact, unique individual views or

operating styles may, in certain situations, be unique
strengths (as Johnson's business orientation to management
was in the context of the WPPSS decision) and individual
interests may complement rather than conflict with organizational or public priorities.
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Finally, it should be noted that though many individuals with their own idiosyncratic views of the world
incrementally affect decision processes only a few truly
exert shaping influences.

These individuals are always the

prime foci of the P-perspective research and their
identification is the investigator's foremost problem.
The next chapter, focusing upon the cross-cuing of the
three perspectives, will better illustrate where and how
individuals made a difference.

CHAPTER V
CROSS-CUING THE PERSPECTIVES
INTRODUCTION: CROSS-CUING - THE DECISION PROCESS IN 3-D
Having looked at the decision process surrounding the
development of the 1982 BPA forecast from each of the three
perspectives in isolation, it is now time to explore the
larger theoretical and methodological potential of the
Multiple

Perspe~tive

Concept by cross-cuing the perspectives

~

and the insights derived from their use.

More traditional

analyses of complex decision processes usually contain some
implicit cross-cues, in that researchers will veer briefly
from a dominant perspective to explain a particular outcome
(e.g. a predominantly organizational analysis may note how a
specific technical factor, such as software limitations,
predisposed a decision).

In such instances, however, there

is rarely an explicit recognition by the analyst that
alternative paradigms of inquiry are being used and, in
consequence, no attempts are made to explore the alternative
perspectives with any thoroughness.
In this dissertation, an attempt was made to make the
T-, 0-, and P-perspective investigations as independent of
one another as possible.

The idea behind this strict sepa-

ration of the three paradigms of exploration was, first, to
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characterize each of the perspectives and their use as
clearly as possible and, second, to encourage an investigative thoroughness within each of the individual domains
of inquiry.

Additionally, this segregation of findings

allows a similar clear illustration of the nature and synthetic capabilities of the subsequent cross-cuing procedure.
Cross-cuing represents the integration of the three
distinct perspectives, each with its own unique focus of
interest and mode of inquiry.

This integration, however, is

not simply a synthesis of findings into a single unified
picture nor a reduction of the varied insights of the T-,
0-, and P-perspectives to a common denominator.

The

strength of the Multiple Perspective Concept lies in the
entirely different approaches each of the perspectives takes
in viewing a single decision process.

Any attempt at syn-

thesis or reduction would simply strip away the very elements which make Multiple Perspectives useful.

Rather, the

process of cross-cuing illuminates how the perspectives both
harmonize and conflict along a number of dimensions, conveying a deeper understanding without any necessary resolution
of disparate insights.

As Linstone (1984) has described:

"The process of integration is not merely one of
assembling a composite picture from jigsaw puzzle
pieces, nor ironing out contradictions by some rules
of thumb, nor arranging the information hierarchically. Integration resembles the task of conceptualizing a three-dimensional object from one-dimensional
descriptions and two-dimensional drawings (p. 82)11.
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In many respects, cross-cuing is the "meat" of a
Multiple Perspective investigation.

It is here, where the

insights of the dlfferent perspectives interweave, that the
"reasons" behind a decision become apparent, or the possibilities arising from a new technology begin to become evident in their fullness.

In the case of BPA's flrst indepen-

dent forecast, it is in the cross-cuing of the perspectives
that the interacting forces which shaped the final product
may be identified and their relative influence assessed.
Procedurally, the cross-cuing of the different insights
into the 1982 forecast is developed below in several steps.
First of all, T-, 0-, and P-events, projects, or decisions
are laid out on three parallel timelines, each representing
the domain of one of the perspectives used in the investigation.

Because the focus of this dissertation is on the

development of the 1982 forecast, heaviest emphasis is given
to the year immediately preceding the release of the
official forecast document, since this is when both the
largest volume of relevant technical work was carried out
and the most vigorous interchanges took place among actors
in the power planning community.

To the extent that they

provide a necessary explanatory context, however, events
from earlier years (such as decisions made during Hodel's
term of office) are included in the timelines.

Although

such a tripartite chronological ordering, in and of itself,
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hardly provides a final explanation to a decision process as
complex as the one forming the subject of this investigation, this picture

~

provide insight through its compre-

hensiveness.
The second step is to determine where and how the
perspectives cross-cue one another.

Several distinct

investigatory activities are encompassed by this step.

The

organizational challenges, both originating from inside and
outside BPA during the forecast period are examined and the
extent to which they influenced the core assumptions underlying technical choices is assessed.

In similar fashion,

the personal influences of policy makers, planners, and
project managers are identified and the effects on the
substantive output of the forecast process are evaluated.
The extent of the actual impacts of technical findings on
organizational decisions and actions is evaluated.

Finally,

these cross impacts are mapped conceptually between the
timelines to provide a representation of how the perspectives interact.
To deepen the insights conveyed by this tWo-dimensional
map, digraph analyses of relationships between elements
uncovered by each of the three paradigms of inquiry are
developed in the third and final step of the cross-cuing
process.

Returning to the analogy of cross-cuing as a means

of conceptualizing a three-dimensional object from a series
of partial descriptions, the digraphs provide cross-
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sectional representations of the "depth" of the decision
process and some of the dynamics operating along this
dimension.

Often the unique "rationale" underlying a

decision process has its locus in these dynamic interconnections between T-, 0-, and P-perspectives, and can be most
clearly understood by tracing the sequence of impacts methodically from one node of a digraph to the next.
Following the completion of this digraph exercise is
the final chapter of this dissertation which presents conclusions on what the Multiple Perspective Concept reveals
about the process by which BPA prepared its 1982 forecast
and on what the case study of the 1982 forecast reveals
about the uses of Multiple Perspectives.
CROSS CUING:

THE "MAP"

pesc;ibing the Timelines - T. O. and P in Pa;allel
The first step in identifying, enumerating, and analyzing the cross-cuing relationships between the T-, 0-, and
P-perspective descriptions of the BPA forecast, as noted in
the introduction above, consists of laying significant
events side by side on distinct timelines in order to make
comparisons and posit linkages.

Figure 26 provides the

graphic representation of these comparisons (The linkages
indicated between the perspectives will be discussed in the
section that follows.

In the text, a cross cue from, say, T

onto O-perspective will be denoted 'T-O').
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To reiterate yet another point made above, because this
research focuses upon the development of the 1982 forecast,
heaviest emphasis is placed upon its immediate determinants.
Hence, the map is "most dense", as would be expected, in the
1981-1982 period where the lion's share of the technical
work and interaction between parties interested in the
implications of the forecast took place.

Descriptions of

these events, or map elements, are correspondingly detailed
and at the same time, go beyond what each of the perspectives reveal in exclusion of the others.

Particular

attention is given to the specifics of the public involvement process surrounding the 1982 forecast, for it is
through this process that technical, organizational, and
personal factors most intricately (and most significantly)
intertwine as the region's varied interests attempt to
influence resource decisions.

Events which can be seen

ultimately to have a significant effect upon the forecast
process (e.g. the institutionalization of the SOU forecast,
the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan, the 1973 011 embargo, etc.)
are also listed and discussed briefly, since they form the
frames (or contexts) within which decisions of the region's
power planning community take place.

Although the conse-

quences of all such events will be discussed in very general
terms, their effects are long-lasting and often continuous,
shaping organizational decisions and technical choices for
prolonged periods of time.
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Eyents and Impacts - A Discussion of the Elements and cross
Cues in the Map
The earliest event (1) in the map occurs in 1954 and is
significant as a frame for any discussion of Northwest power
planning.

At this time, PNUCC members first produced the

SOU forecast by simple aggregation of individual utility
forecasts.

As noted in the introductory remarks above,

historical events forming the background for the 1982
forecast are to be sketched in less detail than those within
the 1981-82 production cycle.

Although the SOU forecast is

listed under the T-perspective for simplicity sake, it also
was the product of organizational and personal elements
which, if traced out, would greatly expand the size of the
map.

Rather than do this, key 0- and P- features of the

forecast will merely be noted (as will be the case for other
pre-1982 forecasts included on the diagram).

The organiza-

tional perspectives at the time of these early forecast were
firmly rooted in a faith in growth which, in retrospect, can
be seen to be naive.

The utlilty representatives of the

time were far less versed in mathematical economics and
modeling than their heirs would be, and the techniques they
applied reflected their orientation towards the future.
Many consequences followed from this initial enterprise: a
long lasting precedent was set for simple trend forecasts as
an input to the region's power planning decisions.

Until

the early 1970's, stable (and robust) regional growth (erec-
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ted, in many ways, upon the infrastructure of Federallybased hydropower) posed little challenge to this, in
retrospect, simplistic forecasting methodology.

These early

forecasts, with their 11-year time horizons were later
supplemented by 20 year versions (element number 3 on map)
in 1968.
The signing of the Canadian Treaty (O-perspective) in
1964 (event number 2) simultaneously set new policy and
foreshadowed the end of business-as-usual for BPA.
treaty, negotiated by

u.s.

This

and Canadian governments (and

involving the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the
Interior, and BPA) established the sites for the final set
of high-head dams along the Columbia River system, concluding an era where additional cheap hydroelectric power could
be treated as a given.

At the same time the immediate power

surplus resulting from the newly acquired generation in turn
resulted in the establishment of the California Intertie so
BPA could market the power it was required by Treaty to
purchase from Canada, but which was not yet needed in the
Region.

From this point on, Intertie sales became a

critical part of BPA marketing strategies.
Element 3 on the map, the expansion of the

sou

forecast

to 20 years, was influenced by both the previously mentioned
events (T-T, O-T).

The connection with the first element is

both direct and obvious -- the methodological precedent
established in 1954 was carried over.

The forecast remained
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a simple sum of utility-specific trend

(wlth

e~trapolations

BPA preparing forecasts for small public utllities) -- the
extrapolations simply went further into the future.

In-

directly, the signing of the treaty provided something of an
impetus for longer forecast horizons in that the O-perspective considerations underlying the formulation of the
terms of the Treaty (e.g. contlnued Federal participation in
generating resource development, future regional marketing
challenges for BPA, etc.) raised questions about the longer
term future which an extended forecast would help to answer.
These concerns, however, did not extend to challenging the
assumptions underlying the SOU or to exploring qualitatively
different futures.
A number of factors influenced the formulation and
implementation of the Hydro-Thermal Power plan in 1968
(element 4, listed in the '0' column).

The T-perspective

findings of the SOU forecasts (both 11-, and 20-year) prepared in that (and preceeding) years indicated a continually
growing need for power (T-O).

This methodologically-

grounded perception posed an organizational challenge for
BPA to provide continued high levels of service to its
customers, particularly its preference customers.

Also

supporting the plausibility of these challenges were the
aforementioned realizations stemming from'the signing of the
Canadian treaty (0-0).

Decision makers and functionaries

alike had just taken a hard look at the anticipated
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limitations of the regional power supply system (even with
its newly proposed additions) and were just beginning to
assess the possible consequences of tapping different
%esou%ces for generation.
Undoubtedly, the most significant of the decisions made
in response to the passage of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan
(0-0) was that of WPPSS to begin construction of a series of

nuclear plants (o-perspective: element 5).

The Power Plan,

with its provisions for net billing arrangements with the
region's public utilities, provided an umbrella for the
financing of such construction projects.

The SOU forecasts,

at that time the sole picture of Northwest power futures,
indicated an imminent need for generation beyond the
capacity of the Columbia River hydrosystem.

It was these

load projections which further reinforced the deeply ingrained perception in the power planning community of
continued high growth, and which reaffirmed the traditional
strategy of building in advance of need (T-O).

This initial

decision, later augmented to include additional nuclear
facilities, was clearly destined to provide the all too
fixed context for power planning in the 1980s.
Within BPA, the perception of anticipated power
shortages in the not too distant future resulted in some
organizational changes (T-O).

Though functionally the unit

charged with participating in the SOU forecasts remained
essentially the same, a 1972 change of name reflected a
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somewhat altered perception of its mission within the
organization.

Power Marketing became Power Reguirements

(a-perspective: element 6), the name change was indicative
of the attitude that the unit would no longer be seeking
markets for abundant surplus power but rather searching for
ways in which to meet its customers' essential needs, or
requirements.

Though they were perceived or framed somewhat

differently, the unit's missions, contributing to the

sou

forecast and producing marketing studies, did not, in fact,
change substantially at this time.
It was in late 1972 that Donald Hodel became Bonneville
Power Administrator, bringing his own particular managerial
style and personal expertise (P-perspective: element 7) to
the Office.

As noted in the previous chapter, Hodel was

immediately confronted by a low water year,

t~xing

the

generation capabilities of the hydrosystem, and, not long
after, in 1973, the repercussions of perhaps the singlemost
significant event in recent energy policy making history:
the Arab Oil Embargo (element 8: a-perspective).

America,

and the world at large, suddenly became acutely aware of
their heavy dependence upon oil (particularly oil from
foreign sources) and of the sensitivity of their economies
to political events half a world away.

These conditions

created a sense of an "energy crisis" requiring strong and
perhaps drastic remedial responses by government and
industry (O-P).

In the wake of such developments, and in
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the face of high SOU growth projections (T-P); it is hardly
surprising that the touchstones of Hodel's Administration
were the timely and efficient development of thermal
resources (under the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan) and, to a
lesser degree, the exploration of possibilities for promoting regional conservation.
By the midpoint of Hodel's term of office, 1975, the
new energy-consciousness in the region (mirroring that of
the nation) had produced a certain polarization of attitudes.

BPA and PNUCC were more committed than ever to a

policy of supporting and promoting the growth in power
consumption expected to continue throughout the reminder of
the century.

Within BPA (P-O), Power Requirements was

organizationally subordinated to Power Resources (element 9:
O-perspective), in a limited sense, foreshadowing the more
pronounced support role for resource decisions the unit
would have later under Peter Johnson.
On the other hand, the "energy crisis" left increasing
doubt and discomfort about the shape of the future in its
wake.

In 1975, this uncertainty about energy futures led to

both technical (O-T) and institutional developments (0-0).
In the former area, the research group at Washington state
University's Environmental Research Center prepared thirtyyear projections of energy futures using end-use models
(T-perspective: element 10), and several sets of assumptions
regarding population and fuel process.

They arrived at a
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very different perception of the future than PHUCC, one
characterized by much lower rates of load growth.

Unlike

PNUCC, the organizational agenda of the WSU group centered
on the effects of various economic and demographic factors
on energy consumption behavior and conservation.

Their

methods originated in engineering and economics and in some
ways prefigured the orientations of future forecasting
groups.

In the latter area, the state of Oregon responded

organizationally to the challenge of the energy crisis by
forming ODOE, the Oregon Department of Energy (O-perspective: element 11).

This group focused an unprecedented set

of resources to the tasks of forecasting, planning, and
siting energy facilities for the State of Oregon.
This growing dispute over energy futures significantly
provided the impetus (O-T, T-T) for the publication of the
Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill report under contract to SPA
(element 12: T-perspective).

SPA's issuance of a notice of

impending insufficiency (element 13: O-perspective) took
place at roughly the same time, reflecting the firmness of
the consensus view of impending shortages.

There was,

however, sufficient legitimate disagreement over the
differences betwen WSU and SOU forecasts and concern about
the severity of impacts of more limited energy resources to
mandate a study of regional conservation potential.

The

results of this study, which seriously questioned the need
for several of the WPPSS plants before the end of the
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century, raised in turn, further doubts about the picture of
the world governing energy development in the Northwest.
Within BPA, the most direct and immediate consequence
(T-T) of the SOM findings was a Power Requirements' staff
effort to develop a framework by which the SOU forecast
could be decomposed into a sector and end-use breakdown
(element 14: T-perspective).

With such a breakdown, the

plausibility of the conservation savings estimates of the
SOU report could be assessed.

Working from available

economic and demographic statistics and progressions,
however, the group was unable to develop a framework which
would account for the forecasted sales of the SOU without
massive 'other' and 'miscellaneous' categories for residual
loads.
The most significant consequence (T-P) of this failed
resolution of SOU and SOM reports was the enduring change of
perspective it engendered in the key participants: Don
Hoffard, Terry Esvelt, Mark Roberts, and Don Morey (element
15: P-perspective).

In 1977, when PNUCC obtained its econ-

ometric model from National Economic Research Associates to
cross-check the SOU (element 16: T-perspective), the BPA
staff members could only be skeptical of its corroboration
of the SOU, given their experience of the previous year.
(PNUCC's choice of econometrics reflected the rise of
quantitatively trained technicians in their ranks.

Complex

models were becoming accepted as desirable if not neces-
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sary.)

This skepticism regarding forecasts of continued

high load growth would remain with each of the members of
this group and eventually supplant the "official" view of
the late 1970s in Power Requirements.
At about the same time that PNUCC was acquiring its
econometric model, to some extent a response to a growing
regional debate over desirable energy futures, the Natural
Resources Defense Council was releasing a forecast of its
own (element 17: T-perspective).

NRDC developed this

forecast, based upon the earlier SOH report (T-T), in a
fashion similar to that attempted earlier by BPA.

Not

surprisingly given NRDC's stated goals of protecting the
environment and promoting conservation as an alternative to
thermal generation, their forecast for the Northwest was
characterized by much lower rates of load growth, and much
heavier institutional development of conservation than
Northwest planners had envisioned.
At roughly the same time, new President-elect Jimmy
Carter brought an overwhelming concern for the development
of a national energy policy to the Office with him (element
18: P-perspective).

Heavily influenced by the then wide-

spread perception of a world energy crisis (O-T), which had
been swelling since the time of the Arab Oil Embargo,
carter, a former nuclear engineer, set in motion the establishment of a Department of Energy (element 19: O-perspective) tasked with planning and managing the nation's energy
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resources.

Under the departmental reorganization (P-O), BPA

ceased being part of the Department of the Interior and
became subordinate to DOE.
One of the key organizational divisions of the fledling
agency was the EIA: the Energy Information Administration.
Functionally, this unit was tasked with collecting data,
developing models, and preparing forecast of energy.

Sig-

nificant among its early efforts was its contract with Oak
Ridge National Laboratory to construct energy forecasting
models for the commercial, residential, and industrial
sectors (O-T).

The structure of the completed models

reflected the desires of the Carter Administration, tailored
to test various energy policies and conservation strategies,
displaying the results in an end-use categorization of great
detail (T-perspectlve: element 20).
Also not surprising was the appearance of a Conservation Section with BPA's Power Resources at about the same
time (O-perspective: element 21).

Though conservation had

been among the priorities of the Hodel Administration since
the first suggestions of impending power shortages, it was
in the climate of late 1970s organizational politics that
the function obtained its own reorganized niche at BPA.
On January 1, 1978, Sterling Hunro replaced Donald
Hodel as the Bonneville Power Administrator (element 22:
P-perspective), a political appointment perhaps reflecting
changed priorities of the carter Administration (P-P).
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Munro, significantly, had earlier worked as a staff member
for Senator Henry Jackson.

His approach to administration

(as noted in the previous chapter) was a decidedly political
response to increasing interest, and controversy, about the
regional management of energy resources.

This centered,

chiefly, on participation in the development of the Regional
Act legislation designed to promote conservation and orderly
resource expansion while minimizing disparities between rate
pools.
A technical project completed during this time period
was the Northwest Energy Policy Project forecasts of regional energy growth (element 23: T-perspective).

The NEPP

research team was comprised of representatives of academia
and the utility industry with extensive quantitative backgrounds, most fundamentally in the area of econometrics.

As

a result of the issues raised by the energy crisis and the
increasing diversity of views of desirable (or predictable)
energy futures, NEPP independently prepared a twelve-volume
report (O-T).

This report, evaluating regional energy

issues and policy options in some detail, included three
forecast scenarios of possible load growth.

Significantly,

though not nearly as low as BPA's first independent forecasts of four years later, the NEPP econometrically-derived
forecasts were considerably lower than the official planning
forecasts produced by PNUCC, the medium case displaying an
average annual rate of growth until 2000 of 2.93 percent as
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compared to the nearly 5 percent AARG of the SOU and the
PNUCC econometric forecasts.

Though the NEPP forecasts did

not supplant the SOU, they offered a credible alternatIve
projection and served to illustrate better the sensitivity
of images of the future to the particular set of models and
modeling assumptions employed in their derivation.
By early 1979, problems associated with the management
of the region's power supply had become acute, and diverse
interest groups and organizations became both more vocal and
more forceful.

For purposes of discussion, these organi-

zational responses may be treated as a cluster (element 24:
O-perspectIve), since the power planning community was
challenged to respond to virtually all of the concerns
expressed.

Ratepayer groups, increasingly incensed by the

disparities between rates charged to IOU and

~ublic

utility

residential customers, pressed for rate reform with the
State of Oregon attempting to turn its entire population
into one large public utility district through the proposed
Domestic and Rural Power Authority.

Both ratepayer groups,

and organizations promoting conservation and natural resources, questioned the legitimacy of the DSI's claim to
hydropower while the region's designated preference customers were compelled to participate in the finanCing and
construction of thermal resources.

The DSI's, by contrast,

feared that their power contracts, soon due to expire, would
not be renewed and sought the promise of a guaranteed long-
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term power supply.

Finally, and most significantly; the key

players at WPPSS were suffering one construction cost overrun after another and were hard pressed to maintain their
planned construction without assistance.
This turmoil spurred on the development of Regional
Power Act legislation (O-P), with Senator Henry Jackson
spearheading the effort in Congress (element 25: P-perspective).

Jackson and Munro were old friends from the days

when the BPA Administrator had served on his staff, and
shared both perspectives and goals regarding the proposed
legislation.

Munro worked hard within BPA to satisfy the

varied interests, and the equally varied problems, of the
region through the legislative vehicle, while leaving the
growing WPPSS problem relatively untouched.

Though BPA

offered some assistance with the financing and construction
problems, responsibility for resolving the difficulties was
left with the Supply System.
Beginning in 1979, a number of technical projects were
undertaken within Power Requirements which would ultimately
have great bearing upon the 1982 forecast.

Though staffing

levels had not increased appreciably, the tone set within
the larger organization by Munro, and the anticipation of
BPA's augmented responsibilities under the proposed Power
Act, suggested the need for an independent forecasting capability within BPA.

Terry Esvelt, Hark Roberts, and Don

Hoffard, remembering the lessons of their 1976 exerCise,
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recognized the need for a new approach to forecasting which
was capable of addressing the plethora of newly raised
issues (P-T).

As a part of DOE, it was easy for BPA to

obtain the ORNL residential and commercial end-use models
for Region 10 "off-the-shelf" -- (i.e. in finished form
without additional contract work) (element 26: T-perspective).

Region 10 excluded Montana and included Alaska.

Much of the data in the model input sets had been imputed or
calculated by the developers, so a need for better input
data triggered two survey efforts (T-T).

The first was a

regional residential survey conducted under the contract for
BPA by Elrick and Lavidge.

This survey was delivered in

1979 with analysis of the residential sector almost
immediately following (element 27: P-perspective).

The

following year, 1980, BPA "bought into" a commercial survey
already underway for DOE, adding funds to ensure that the
experimental data collection sites were all in the Northwest
(element 28: T-perspective).

Both of the new models were

used in 1980 to prepare a conservatlon assessment (T-T) for
BPA service territories (element 29: T-perspectlve), though
neither model had, at the time, been fully "loaded" with new
regional data.
Organizationally, 1980 was the "calm before the storm".
PNUCC acquired its own in-house technical staff, instead of
relying entirely upon utility representatives (element 30:
O-perspective).

Within BPA, an agency-wide "nomenclature
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change" (element 31: O-perspective) upgraded each of the
organizational units (Sections to Branches, Branches to
Divisions, etc.) because of the smallness of DOE relative to
001, but compared to what was soon forthcoming these changes

were minor.

As 1980 drew to a close, the Regional Power

Bill was enacted in

Congres~

(O-perspective: element 32),

establishing a new and substantially revised set of
groundrules for the power planning arena.

The Act, to

reiterate, established the Regional Council, comprised of
two representatives from each of the four states, empowered
to develop a long-term resource development plan for the
region.

It established provisions by which the DSI's would

provide rate relief for residential and small farm customers
of the IOUs, in exchange for guaranteed long-term power
contracts.

It established priorities for resource acquisi-

tion, giving conservation and renewable resources preference
over conventional thermal resources.

Finally, it added

resource acquisition to BPA's traditional power marketing
duties, making the agency responsible to the needs of not
only its public utility preference customers but to any
utility desiring to enter into residential exchange contracts.

In a very real sense, the passage of the Regional

Act ushered in the beginning of the process which culminated
in the release of BPA's 1982 forecast, for it was the added
responsibilities assumed by BPA which transformed a sectorspecific, regional forecast from a luxury to a necessity.
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By early 1981; the
displayed several
(O-pe~spective:

Conservation

Divisions.
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separating from

o~ganizational

Powe~

a

so~t

st~ucture

reflecting its new

(0-0).

prio~ities

Both Power Requirements and
of organizational fission,

Resources and becoming independent

At the same time, the Division of Rates

reorganized to modify their wholesale and
p~ocedu~es

of BPA

~etail

ratemaking

in accordance with the provisions of Regional Act

These changes signalled the genesis of the decision

support apparatus which would underlie later decisions
concerning the fate of the WPPSS plants.
In direct and almost immediate response to the passage
of the Act (O-T), Power Requirements began adapting the
models resident on BPA's computer system (ORNL, PNUCC, and
NEPP) to the Pacific Northwest, defined as Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, and Montana west of the Continental Divide
(element 34: T-perspective).

This involved obtaining, or

calculating, such key input values as commercial electric
space heating shares or number of multifamily dwellings
using data from the Elrick and Lavidge and Westat surveys
(T-T) as well as reestimating key model parameters and
coefficients (as AEA did for the NEPP model).
In January of 1981, Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as
President of the United states (element 35: P-perspective).
In contrast to his predecessor, Reagan favored private
sector development and management of energy resources to the
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largest degree possible.

He also sought to reduce the size

of government wherever possible.

One of his first actions

after inauguration was to place a freeze on additional
Federal hiring pending an assessment of the staffing levels
thought to be needed by various agencies.

Though affected

by the freeze, BPA was able to grow slightly at a time when
most of the Federal bureaucracy was beset with cutbacks
because of the additional responsibilities it was assigned
under the Act.

In an even more dramatic move, Reagan

sought, though ultimately unsuccessfully, to abolish DOE
an action which presumably would have returned BPA to the
Department of the Interior.

This move was foiled by a

combination of Congressional resistance and bureaucratic
inertia.
A new Republican in the White House, however, had
numerous less direct repercussions.

One which would prove

extremely significant was the appointment of a seasoned
businessman to the position of Bonneville Power Administrator lP-P).

In May, 1981, Peter Johnson took Office, bring-

ing his business and financial management skills,
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consonant with the philosophy of the Reagan Administration,
to bear upon the WPPSS problem (element 36: p-perspective).
Because Johnson's background proved to have a great
influence upon the shape the BPA decision structure would
assume, it deserves a summary recounting.

Johnson earlier

headed Trus Joist, a lumber and wood products company which,
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during the 1970s, suffered the fortunes of a slowing maIket
along with the Iest of the industIY.

AfteI evaluating

pIoduction and operation costs in light of sales projections, Johnson made a difficult decision and closed several
of the company's plants so that the remainder might prosper.
While otheI companies floundeIed, Trus Joist flourished and
eventually reopened several of the closed facilities when
profits were once again on the increase.

The situation

Johnson encountered at BPA with the WPPSS plants displayed
many of the same elements -- escalating costs, a questionable demand for the product, and over extended financial
commitments -- and, not surprisingly, his approach to the
problem reflected what had proven successful in the past.
Johnson soon discovered that BPA lacked the apparatus
needed to answer many of the financial questions whIch
required resolution if decisions were to be made on the five
WPPSS plants.

In response to this need (P-O), Financial

Management, prior to Johnson's arrival a small niche in the
large organization, followed the direction which had recently been taken by the Power Requirements and Conservation
Divisions, and began a perIod of rapid growth (element 37:
O-perspective).

This growth was reflected both in numbers

(staffing levels) and organizational importance (involvement
in key organizational decisions).
At roughly the same time, Conservation entered a final
cycle of growth, detaching itself completely from Power
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Management and becoming an independent office (element 38:
O-perspective).

Given the high priority given to the de-

velopment of regional conservation potential in the Act
(0-0), the number of the tasks assigned to the group grew
substantially and its change of status reflected the recognition of this change in priorities by BPA upper management.
Wholehearted organizational support for BPA's forecasting effort came with the enactment of the Regional Power
Bill, since it was then obvious that BPA would need to
perform certain types of analyses to support resource
acquisition decisions.

After the abovementioned models had

been successfully adapted to the Pacific Northwest region
they were subjected to a series of tests within BPA to
determine their potential usefulness as policy planning and
decision support tools (element 39: T-perspective).

Four

scenarios were constructed to see how well the models under
consideration -- the PNUCC and NEPP all-sector models, the
ORNL Residential Kodel, and the ORNL Commercial Kodel -could deal with various conservation savings -- no special
implementation mechanisms or programs were assumed to be in
place.

The resulting values produced by the straightforward

(i.e. trend- or data-driven) operation of the demand models
served as a reference against which to assess the userdetermined (i.e. program-driven) alternative.

The second

scenario examined the impacts of BPA-sponsored conservation
programs taken to their full budgeted lifetimes.

A third
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scenario extended these savings through the end of the
forecast period (2000), describing a situation where the
programs would

h~ve

their funding maintained or renewed.

A

fourth and final scenario added further cost-effective
measures (e.g. retrofits, building standards, etc.) to those
considered in the third scenario.

Only the two ORNL models,

designed specifically to answer energy policy making and
planning questions were able to distinguish between the
scenarios -- for the NEPP and PNUCC models, all four
scenarios were identical.

This difference would later

prove to be a significant one.
In late 1981, prior to "going public" with its technical reviews and economic projections (T-O), Power Requirements provided a detailed briefing to members of BPA's
Po licy Committee (element 41: O-perspect i ve) .. Though the
preliminary projections were noticeably lower than previous
regional power planning forecasts, they were received without pressure for revision.

Some minor industry-specific

economic forecasts were, however, modified based upon information provided by members of the Policy Committee.

In

part, this "hands off" approach to the staff's forecasts may
be attributed to Johnson's modus operandi of using "hard"
analysis for decision support

a strategy which had proved

successful for him earlier at Trus Joist.

In general,

however, the Policy Committee knew that the changes seen in
patterns of regional electricity use were not anomalies but
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forces that needed to be dealt with.

At a strategic plan-

ning retreat held at McCall, Idaho in the autumn of 1981
(element 40: O-perspective), a number of Policy Committee
conclusions supported the revised perception.

It was

expected that "regional load will increase at the rate of 2
to 2 1/2 percent per year in the next two years .•. but that
the rate of growth will slack off to 1 1/2 percent later",
so generally lower forecasts were not expected.

Moreover,

it was anticipated that "the region's reaction to our first
official and ensuing load forecasts will be a little better
than heretofore, and that many will credit its competence,
but that there is the potential for conflict with many
sectors of the public" -- a clear, but not particularly
novel insight given the late 1970s political climate.

Added

to this insight, however, was the comment "We would like to
be known as the premier regional entity demonstrating this
expertise" -- a sentiment recognizing the need to develop,
and trust the judgments of, a qualified technical staff.
Finally, the members of the retreat expected that "the
region might believe that we are not doing enough to achieve
conservation" (McLennan, 1981:1-2).

Given this "mind-set"

the Policy Committee gave Power Requirements the go-ahead to
release the controversial findings of its model review,
complete with its low growth rates and ambitious modeling of
conservation.
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Following approval by the Policy Committee, Power
Requirements began a public involvement process which would
span nearly six months.

While public involvement is a

cornmon practice for Federal agencies, it was particularly
important that BPA's first independent forecast be fully
exposed to the public.

Though the Regional Act had passed,

much of the controversy which prompted its formulation
lingered in the region.

Moreover, how the Power Act would

be implemented was of special concern to many of the
interested parties in the power planning arena, with the
impending WPPSS decision weighing most heavily in the minds
of the actors.

Rates, financing decisions, and environ-

mental impacts would all follow as consequences of the
forecast.
In addition to imparting information to those to be
affected by BPA's decision, public involvement also served
to provide useful feedback to Power Requirements' technical
staff.

Though their tools and techniques were "state-of-

the-art" for energy modeling, data which the staff used for
forecasting had limitations, as did the models themselves.
The public involvement process allowed BPA to tap the forecasting expertise in the region.

This could result in

anything from a greatly strengthened product on one extreme
to its general discrediting on the other end of the
spectrum.
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The forecasting process went through three stages
technical review, draft-forecast, and final forecast -- with
public comments received in the interim periods.

This sort

of interaction is of critical importance to understanding
the development of a forecast using Multiple Perspectives,
for the comments constitute interorganizational challenges
which BPA had to respond to using patently technical means.
This six- to seven-month period was when the largest variety
of forces were shaping the forecast; thus the detail of
description which follows is greater than for any other
period illustrated in the cross-cuing map.
Some qualifications need to be stated about what BPA's
public involvement was and what it was not.

The public in-

volvement process was never intended to be a means of using
consensus or consultation in structuring the overall technical decision process, and was not presented as such.

BPA

staff was tasked with developing an independent forecasting
system in a rather short period of time, given the urgency
of the WPPSS decision.

The resulting in-house capability

was intended to enable the staff to ask rate and resource
questions over and above what could be expected from the
Regional Council once its planning apparatus.
search has been prohibited at BPA.

As

Basic re-

such, models or

techniques must be developed under contract or obtained
"ready-made".

The models selected, prior to public involve-

ment, were of the species with which the utility industry is
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most familiar, econometric and end-use models.

Lack of

familiarity with other approaches (or of how to implement
them or adapt them to the region's perceived power planning
needs) limited the potential selection.

Since public

involvement began after this selection had taken place, its
agenda was constrained or focused upon selection between
alternatives and modeling improvements which could be made
within the rather narrow band of time available.
This public involvement agenda had two effects of
significance.

First it precluded, or at least minimized,

the number of first-order methodological considerations
which could be meaningfully raised or addressed.

Attention

to model detail tended to eclipse more basic questions of
the risk and uncertainty and core assumptions associated
with the overall planning and forecasting process.

Second,

the focus tended to limit the membership of the involved
public.

All persons desiring to make verbal or written

comments were free to do so.

Given the highly technical

nature of the procedures and modeling tools under consideration, fluency in the language of trends, econometrics, or
complex models was virtually a prerequisite to participation.

This largely limited the views expressed to those of

the utility community and conservation groups with extensive
training in analytical fields such as mathematics, economics, and engineering.
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As 1981 drew to a close, BPA conducted a series of
public involvement workshops designed, as noted above, to
familiarize the public with the methodology and models which
would be used to develop its first independent forecast and
to solicit technical feedback in the form of critical comments.

Though depicted as a single cell or block in the

cross-cuing map, (element 41: a-perspective), the technical
workshops in fact spanned a period of over a month.

The

cell is depicted as falling within the a-perspective because
the workshop session provided an arena for organizations to
represent themselves and their concerns.

(Backgrounds of

the individual representatives, in principle P-perspectives,
are, however, discussed where relevant.)

On December 9,

1981 a first workshop was given, focusing exclusively upon
the economic and demographic projections used to dr1ve the
demand forecasting models.

The models in turn, were re-

viewed approximately one month later in a second, two day
long workshop on January 11-12, 1982.

The rationale behind

the month lag was that should critical flaws be discovered
in the economic and demographic projections they could be
corrected over the 30 day period.

Otherwise, the subsequent

demand projections would be founded upon flawed inputs.
Practically speaking, even when forecasting models appear to
be behaving reasonably well, a few surprises generally
emerge when new inputs are entered which require reca1ibration or perhaps even correction.

Thus, from the Power
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Requirements staff's point of view, the delay between
meetings was a desirable one.
All the meetings were set up with essentially the same
format.

BPA staff members made formal presentations on

materials which had been made available in printed form.
Next, "expert" panels presented prepared comments on the
models, methods, or results under consideration.

Finally,

audience members were provided the opportunity to ask
questions or make comments (verbal or written).

All of

these pieces of the process were transcribed by a court
reporter and made available for subsequent review.
The first workshop sessions, focusing upon economic and
demographic projections, comprised two separate presentations, each followed by a discussion by four expert panelists and by five statements also prepared by experts in the
field.

The morning presentations dealt exclusively with the

projection of employment, population, and households.

By

contrast, the afternoon presentations centered upon forecasts of fuel price, interest and inflation rates, and
miscellaneous economic variables used by the various demand
forecasting models.

Panelists were selected both based upon

their familiarity with the region's economic conditions and
with the methods used by BPA staff to arrive at their
projections.
The morning presentation by BPA staff explained the
methodology by which employment, population, and housing
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projections were derived (see Chapter II) and highlighted
important trends.

Employment in lumber and wood products,

was expected first to recover from the early 80s recession
but trend steadily downward through 2000.

Pulp and paper

employment was expected to remain relatively steady across
the forecast period, transportation employment was expected
to increase slightly, while agricultural employment was
expected to decline.

Robust growth, however, was foreseen

in the electronics industry, where year 2000 employment
arrived at a value double that of 1980.

Population was

likewise expected to grow, but less rapidly than the labor
force.

Much of the increase was attributed to migration and

with heavier female participation in the labor force the
size of some of the young cohorts were predicted to shrink.
As a result of these population trends, the number of house-

holds was foreseen to increase, though the percentage of
single family detached homes was anticipated to decrease
(i.e. more heads of households but smaller families).
The morning's panelists included figures from both
business and government.

Richard slaughter, a former

Professor of Political Science, was, at the time of the
sessions, Chief Economist with the State of Idaho's Division
of Financial Management.

His responsibilities with that

agency included publishing the state's economic forecast.
His comments focused upon BPA's electronics industry forecast, which he thought was overly optimistic.
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Richard Conway, the second panelist: also had earlier
roots 1n academia, having been a Research Associate in
University of Washington's business school.

With degrees in

both engineering and regional sciences his work had included
the preparation of economic inputs on WNP 4 and 5 for the
Washington state Legislature and the development of both
input-output and econometric models for the Hawaiian
Department of Planning and Economic Development.
then-current vocation was economic consulting.

His
Conway's

remarks stressed the need to reexamine the relationship
between population and employment, and the importance of
quantifying forecast uncertainty.
William Jeske, the third panelist, had received his
academic training in both mathematics and economics.

Corning

to the session as Special Projects Manager for the Economic
Development Council of Puget Sound, he had also previously
served with both Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company
and Seattle Trust and Savings Bank.

Jeske generally liked

BPA's approach to developing economic and demographic variables, but asserted the need for industry-specific employment
multipliers and questioned the assumptions of the housing
model, noting that it seemingly ignored the effects of
disposable income.
The fourth and final panelist for the morning's
discussion was Phillip Brooks, Senior Economist for the
Research and Information Systems Division of the Montana
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Department of

With both business and

Administr~tion.

economics degrees he had previously taught economics and
statistics at universities in both Kentucky and Nevada.

In

his position with the state of Montana, he was responsible
for their state population projections.

Brooks gave a

limited endorsement to BPA's population projection methodology but felt that the factors underlying migration were
not well understood.

He also believed BPA's economic base

model was better suited to smaller geographic areas than the
region as a whole.
A number of attendees responded to the panel with
comments.

steve McLaughlin of Battelle Human Affairs Re-

search Centers felt that BPA should break out its projection
of households by persons per household.

u.s.

Brian Wall of the

Forest Service noted that projections of wood products

employment should show feedbacks from housing projections.
Wes Engstrom of Boeing commented that BPA's forecast reflected transient problems in his company's past, and that
apparent productivity increases at Boeing were the result of
more preliminary work done outside the region.

Cleveland

Anschell of Rainier Bank pointed out that the savings and
loan industry would no longer, in effect, subsidize the
housing and timber industries.
Oregon Department of Energy,

Finally, John Savage of

suggest~d

that BPA dovetail

near-term and long-term forecasts of economic activity.
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The afternoon presentations focused upon another set of
critical projections developed by BPA staff, per capita
income, interest and inflation rates, and non-electric fuel
prices.

Per capita income projections were developed by a

non-econometric modeling approach driven by population and
employment.

The regional trends represented modifications

of DRI projections, and, as in the historic period, were
forecasted to grow slightly faster than the national average
(20-year AARG 1.95 percent vs 1.8 percent).
Interest rates for the region were projected to be
essentially the same as for the nation as a whole, with
residential mortgage rates projected to fall from 12 3/4 to
10 percent by 2000.

Commercial and industrial rates were

seen to fall from 11 3/4 to 8 percent over the same period.
Inflation rates, then at about 11 percent were calculated to
fall to a low of 6.3 percent by the end of the forecast
period.
Fossil fuels estimates included 20-year projections for
petroleum, natural gas, and industrial coal.

Oil prices for

the region were, on average, envisioned to grow at 3 percent
per year to the forecast horizon.

Natural gas prices were

broken out by sector, growing at AARG's of 4 percent for the
residential sector, 4.3 percent for the commercial sector,
and 4.8 percent for the industrial sector.

Lastly, coal

prices were seen to grow at a rate of 4.4 percent per year.
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Once again, four expert panelists were on hand to
evaluate and comment on BPA's economic and demographic
projections.

The first panelist Don Reading was Director of

Policy and Administration at the Idaho Public utilities
Commission.

His training was in the field of economics,

which he had taught prior to obtaining his position with the
state of Idaho.

His remarks advocated the use of inter-

active modeling to supplant trending approaches and criticized an underlying assumption of BPA's forecast, namely
that regional wage rates would move towards national
averages over the forecast period.
Sam van Vactor, a Professor at Portland state University, was concurrently working as a consultant with the
Northwest Energy Policy Workshop.

Bringing expertise on the

fossil fuel market to his position on the panel, van Vactor
had previously served with the International Energy Agency
in Paris, France and had been the Director of Planning at
the Oregon Department of Energy.

van Vactor, focusing on

fossil fuel prices, believed that the DRI base case upon
which BPA's fuel price forecast was based was more of a high
case, and should be lowered accordingly.
The third panelist, James Scherzinger, received
academic training in both mathematics and economics.

At the

time of the BPA workshop, he worked as an economist in the
Oregon state Legislative Revenue Office where his responsibilities included oversight of the state economic and
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revenue model.

His opinion, like Reading's, was that an

interactive model should be used for developing economic
projections (rather than the sequential approach used by
BPA).

He also believed per capita income and employment to

be too high (at least for Oregon).
The final panelist was Scott Hannigan, an economist who
was manager of Pacific Power and Light's Load Forecasting
and Analysis Department.

Hannigan had earlier worked for

the Oregon Department of Economic Development and was a
member of PNUCC's Load Forecasting Committee.

Hannigan

thought BPA's results reasonable but felt the projections
were too aggregated for many of the planning purposes for
which they likely would be used.
As had occurred in the morning, several attendees chose
to make statements.

Milan Brace, representing a PNUCC task

force set up to evaluate BPAs forecasts, noted that their
consensus was that the economic and demographic projections
were reasonable, but felt that a fully developed economic
activity model should replace judgments in many portions of
the forecast.

Glen Swift, who did not state an organiza-

tional affiliation, questioned whether the assumption that
the economic downturn of the early 1980s was indeed temporary.

Charlie Allcock of Portland General Electric recom-

mended that BPA hold a workshop where underlying forecast
assumptions be identified and evaluated.

Cleveland Anschell

noted most risk associated with the economic forecast was
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downward and suggested BPA evaluate its baseline again.
Finally, Adele Newton of the League of Women Voters asked
how disagreements with the Council's upcoming forecast might
be resolved.
Slightly over a month later, on January 11th and 12th
of 1982, the demand models considered for BPA's residential,
commercial, and industrial sector forecasts were similarly
subjected to public scrutiny.

The entirety of the January

11th session was devoted to the residential sector, while
the following day's session was divided evenly between
commercial and industrial sectors.

The additional time and

attention devoted to residential sector modeling issues was
the consequence of the fact that better data collection and
analysis had been carried out in that sector.
Three residential models were reviewed by BPA staff at
the January 11th meeting: the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL) Residential Model and the residential components of
the all-sector NEPP and PNUCC Econometric Models.

In

general, the ORNL results showed noticeably lower rates of
growth over the forecast period.

More importantly, however,

the ORNL Model produced different results for each of the
four conservation scenarios, whereas the NEPP and PNUCC
models did not.
Four panelists had been invited to make prepared presentations on the model's methodologies and inputs and to
model a result and sensitivity analysis following BPA staff
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presentations on the same areas of focus.

They were

selected with the intent of providing a variety of viewpoints on the models and issues under consideration.
In selecting the panel, BPA obviously attempted to
bring in qualified and experienced speakers representing
diverse professions.

Academia, the utility industry, state

government, and environmental protectionists all found a
voice in the discussion.

But despite these apparent dif-

ferences, panelists displayed some important common
characteristics.

All were, of course, well versed in

modeling and forecasting and had rich backgrounds in their
fields.

But beyond this, all had specifically worked with,

or developed, end-use models (the ascendant methodological
form since the early Carter years) and all had been extensively involved with conservation.

To the extent that these

were focal issues at the time of this forecast, these
emphases could be appropriate.

It is worth noting, however,

that none of the panelists acted as methodological foils to
the others.

No one, for instance; sought to champion

econometric models as a generally preferred approach to
forecasting nor did anyone take a "laissez fa ire" approach
to the development of conservation in the region (i.e.
eschewing programs altogether).

More importantly, none

attempted to promote a third alternative approach to
residential forecasting which employed neither econometrics
nor end-use frameworks.

The participants apparently
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accepted that BPA's model development agenda was fixed,
thereby limiting available alternatives or were unfamiliar
with other possibilities.
John Duffield, an Associate Professor of Economics at
the University of Montana, "represented" the academic
community in the panel.

After obtaining his Ph.D. from Yale

in 1974, Duffield had done research in the area of environment and energy policy: air pollution standards, oil and gas
leasing, solar energy, and super-insulated buildings.
Additionally, at the time of the workshop, he was involved
in the development of a forecasting model for Northwestern Great Plains Coal.

Duffield gave what might be

termed a guarded endorsement of the ORNL end-use model for
the residential sector.

He thought it superior to the other

models considered, but felt that the model's treatment of
technology too simplistic.
Pat King, the second member of the panel, was a Senior
Load Forecasting Analyst for the Pacific Power and Light
(PP&L) Company, a PNUCC member utility.

Also an economist,

King had been responsible for developing PP&L's first
residential end-use forecasting model and had been involved
in evaluating the company's conservation programs.

He also

preferred the ORNL model somewhat because of its specific
policy testing capabilities.

Like Duffield, he thought the

technology curves underlying the efficiency choice component
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were weak, particularly where miscellaneous electricity use
was concerned.
A staff member of Oregon Department of Energy also

appeared as a panelist.

Tom Wilson, trained in mathematics,

had extensive modeling experience.

He had, at the time of

the BPA model review, written the code for two end-use
models, one of which was being used for ODOE's residential
forecasts.

Beyond this, his forecasting expertise extended

to issues of electricity pricing and solar economics.
Wilson confined his attention to what he considered to be
the preferred model for the residential sector, the one
developed by ORNL.

He noted weaknesses in the technology

curves, questioning the specifics of the efficiency choice
calculation, and believed that projections of new residential space heating did not account for increasing use of
wood stoves.

He suggested developing a hybrid model which

could compensate for some of these weaknesses.
The final panelist was David Goldstein, a physiCist
employed by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the group
which had, following the 1976 publication of the SOM study,
questioned the need for the WPPSS plants and the seriousness
with which conservation was considered as a viable alternative.

Goldstein had become intimately familiar with fore-

casting issues through his involvement with the California
Energy Commission and had performed extensive building
conservation potential assessment with Lawrence Berkeley
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Laboratory.

Goldstein felt that the ORNL model was clearly

superior to the alternatives based upon its capabilities for
dealing with conservation policy analysis.

The structure of

the model, he claimed, led the energy debate in the proper
direction.

Though data-intensive, the model only required

data needed for other purposes as well, and thus its use, in
effect, improved knowledge about the residential sector.
Like the other panelists, he felt the technology curves
needed reestimation.
Aside from presentations by BPA and the expert panelists, the public meeting allowed any attendees to make
comments or raise questions.

Milan Brace, a forecaster and

energy analyst who had read a prepared statement at the
economics workshop as a representative of the PNUCC
technical team a month earlier, suggested that BPA find some
way of adjusting the ORNL model to "track" a path somewhere
between those of the PNUCC and NEPP models (which he thought
more statistically valid) and then use it to perform policy
analysis.
Sam van Vactor, one of the panelists in the December
economics workshop, believed a simplified econometric model
could better handle the effects of conservation programs in
its coefficients than end-use models, since the latter had
to deal with each program individually.

Mike McHugh of AEA

suggested that the optimal solution to the modeling problem
was a "middle of the road" approach which relied on aggre-
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gate data to the fullest extent possible and then used
policy-oriented components to carry analysis further.
Lastly, Doug Woodfill of Math Sciences Northwest expressed
concern that the discount rate used in the ORNL model's fuel
and equipment choice was too high.
On the following day, the models under consideration
for the commercial and industrial portions of BPA's forecasts.

Each of these sessions were a half day in length.

There were several reasons that these sectors received less
attention than the residential sector.
The commercial sector consumed the smallest portion of
electric energy of the three being modeled, but was also the
fastest growing.

Perhaps more importantly, it was (and

remains) the most diverse in terms of building structure
configurations and consumption patterns.
however, data on the sector was sparse.

Because of this,
In consequence,

modeling efforts in that sector relied more extensively on
judgment and, correspondingly, it was more difficult for
audience participants to substantiate any disagreements they
might have with BPA's modeling methodology or results.
industrial sector was better understood.

The

The types of

productivity improvements and energy saving programs which
might be implemented were reasonably well known and, from a
modeling standpoint, the number of decision pOints (e.g.
factories, plants) were far fewer than in the other two
sectors.

Additionally, the two models being considered by
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BPA both employed an econometric methodology.

Thus, much of

the methodological controversy surrounding the model choices
for the other sectors were afforded less time than the
residential sector in the technical review with little
experienced paucity of coverage.
The commercial sector menu of model offerings paralleled that of the residential sector.

Three models were

again considered -- the ORNL Commercial Model and commercial
sector components of the NEPP and PNUCC models -- and again
only the end-use model could effectively produce distinguishable policy scenarios.
Again, BPA had selected a panel of experts to comment
on the commercial models, the methodology underlying their
use, and the findings of the resulting analysis.

Most of

the previous day's participants were once again on hand, so
the expertise of the residential sector panelists was available for discussions and, invariably, many of the audience's
concerns would resurface.

Once again the panelists for the

commercial sector were selected to provide diverse views
though the spectrum of orientations did not seem as wide as
that of the previous day's session in part because of the
more limited information existing about the sector.
(Interestingly, two of the panelists would soon become part
of the Regional Council's technical staff.)
Tom Eckman (one of the two destined to become part of
the Council's staff) was an Energy Policy Analyst at the
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consulting firm of Math Sciences Northwest.

(Members of

this firm had been the architects of the original NEPP
model, though most had moved to AEA, a rival firm).

Eckman

had been extensively involved in regional energy planning,
both as a member of Seattle City Light's Technical Advisory
Committee on forecasting and, in his consultant role, as an
assistant to the newly formed Regional Council on conservation and resource development issues.

Eckman noted the

need for an all-fuels energy forecasting model with a disaggregated structure to perform rate, resource and conservation analysis.

At the same time, he noted the problems

associated with obtaining the vast amount of data needed by
the ORNL End-Use Model.

He concluded his remarks without

endorsing any of the model choices unilaterally, the ORNL
model was clearly the best suited to meet his stated model
selection criteria.
John Douglas, of the Washington state Energy Office;
was the second panelist for the commercial session.

A

professional engineer, Douglas had dealt extensively with
energy issues both in government and the private sector
(both as a consultant and as a designer of heating,
ventilating, and air conditioning systems for Boeing).

In

his role as an Energy Policy Specialist, for the state of
Washington, Douglas' work focused upon facility siting and
technical assistance to Washington's two representatives on
the Regional Council.

Like Eckman, Douglas recognized both
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the necessity of including a conservation assessment component and the problems associated with end-use model dataintensiveness.

He also identified the need for assigning

probabilities to any forecast scenarios produced.
Laurel Andrews, the third panelist, worked as an
economist with the forecasting group at Seattle City Light
(SCL).

Prior to her employment at SCL, she had served as a

private consultant for that utility, as well as Puget Sound
Power and Light, u.S. Department of Energy, and the Electric
Power Research Institute.

Her credentials also included a

tour of duty as an Energy Policy Analyst for the City of
Seattle's Office of Policy and Evaluation.

Her comments

which centered upon a critique of the different models'
actual performance, led her to conclude that the ORNL model
was the preferred alternative due to its ability to distinguish between different types of commercial customers.

She

also recommended econometric cross-checks on any end-use
forecast.
Ken Corum, the fourth and final commercial panelist,
possessed rather unique insights into the models under
consideration.

At the time of the meeting, Corum was

departing the staff of PNUCC, where he served as an energy
demand forecaster, to occupy a similar position with the
Regional Council.

With training in both mathematics and

economics he had, prior to relocating in the Pacific
Northwest, worked at ORNL, where he participated extensively

346
in the development of both residential and commercial sector
models.

Corum focused exclusively upon the ORNL model and

its developmental needs.

Observing that the model was first

specified using national data, several components, especially the fuel and efficiency choice components, needed additional work to be adapted to the specific regional conditions of the Pacific Northwest.
The public comment period surrounding the commercial
sector presentation was less of a debate on the merits of
econometric and end-use methodology than the previous days
session, focusing more strongly on specifics.

A noteworthy

exception was the prepared statement read by Craig Casey, an
attorney representing six of the natural gas distributing
companies of the Northwest.

It was the conclusion of the

gas companies that without "finalized" models and modeling
assumptions that "little of a constructive nature" might be
accomplished at a public hearing.

To be meaningful, the

hearings would need to present electricity prices (and cost
assumptions behind them), and provide an opportunity for
public comment and questions regarding input data before the
final forecast.
The concerns of the gas companies were legitimate,
though the accusations were pretentious.

BPA and Regional

Council had the power to implement conservation programs
which through subsidies, rebates, or credits, could give
electricity a price advantage over other fuels.

Such
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programs might under certain circumstances be the result of
improper representation of comparative fuel prices in models
(or the models in proper response to them), so, other gas
companies were correct in noting that a full assessment of
BPA's models required further information.

The full public

lnvolvement process, however, did provide later opportunity
for evaluatlng the missing pieces of the forecasting system
between the draft and final forecasts.

Rather strangely,

however, BPA chose not to reiterate this point in their own
defense but rather simply let the comment be noted and
avoided a debate that might have sidetracked the presentations.
Mike McHugh, of AEA, noted that he himself had attempted to build aggregate econometric models of the commercial
sector with little success, largely due to lack of data
about the diverse patterns of consumption.

Building a

disaggregate model, he argued, would be even more difficult,
with large likelihood of serious errors.

Given these

weaknesses, cross-checks for accuracy and plausibility would
be imperative.

Phil Carver of ODOE, after noting his pre-

ference for the ORNL model, criticized the building simulations underlying the technology curves and the model's
overall price responsiveness.

Lastly, Don Dohrmann of ADM

Associates noted that the floorspace component of the ORNL
model was isolated from the policy-driven aspects of the
model.
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Unlike in the residential sector, no strong voices
favoring the PNUCC model (or something with a similar
methodology) were raised.

Though weaknesses in the ORNL

Commercial Model were evident, no alternative approach was
given serious consideration.
The concluding session of the public involvement
workshop focused upon the models proposed for use in the
industrial sector.

This session differed in two important

ways from its predecessors.

First, as alluded to earlier,

both of the models under consideration were econometric;
hence, critical comparisons focused upon specific model
strengths and weaknesses, rather than venturing into
methodological debates.

Second, because it was the final

session, the associated comment period was the last opportunity for audience participants to express themselves.

As

a result, the discussion often went beyond industrial sector
concerns embracing broader, more general, issues relating to
BPA's upcoming forecasts, its underlying assumptions, and
its ultimate uses.
For both models under consideration, only one scenario
could be considered, due to the inability to handle conservation programs endogenously.

The NEPP model produced

results which displayed an overall average annual rate of
growth roughly half a percent lower than the PNUCC model.
In large part, this difference was the result of latter
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models substantially higher predicted growth for lumber,
paper, chemicals and transportation.
The four industrial panelists, suffice to say, all had
strong backgrounds in econometrics.

Frank Taussig, the

first panelist, was trained as a mathematician and working
as Senior Economist for the Oregon Public utilities Commission.

Taussig had compiled an impressive background both in

academia and government, working on short- and long-term
economic and energy forecasting, analysis of conservation
and billing credits, and econometric analyses of electricity
demand.

At the time of the workshop, he served on both the

Regional Council's Advisory Committee as well as PNUCC's
Load Forecasting Committee.

Taussig chose to present

criteria for good forecast documentation as his contribution
to the proceedings.

Good documentation should contain clear

statements of objectives, underlying theory, data sources,
statistical goodness-of-fit measures, the model's performance over a historical time period, and relationships to
other findings.
The second panelist, Jim Abrahamson, was an economist
working to produce Pacific Power and Light's system load
forecast.

Like Taussig, he also worked with PNUCC, serving

on two forecast-related committees; the Model Development
Subcommittee and the Model Review Subcommittee.

As such,

his familiarity with the PNUCC model and its continued
development was intimate.

Though he found the PNUCC model
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more transparent and easier to use than the NEPP model,
Abrahamson found its lag structure weak and it did not
display fuel substitution effects.

The NEPP model produced

some counterintuitive behavior between industries but, until
a fresh approach could be developed, Abrahamson felt it was
the preferred model.
A representative of one of the region's DSls served as
the third panelist.

Glem Smith, Senior Energy Planning

Analyst at Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, was at
the time, involved in forecasting energy prices, business
planning (related to energy issues), strategic planning, and
acquisition analyses.

His professional experience included

work as an engineer with both Bechtel Power Corporation and
Exxon.

His academic training embraced both engineering and

business administration.
tify a preferred model.

Smith, like Taussig, did not idenHe did identify several critical

modeling needs in the sector, including an industry-specific
forecasting capability and supporting data.
The final panelist was Ed Whitelaw, a Professor of
Economics at University of Oregon and President of ECO
Northwest, a consulting firm.

His expertise extended beyond

academic through involvement with two government agencies.
He was one of the Oregon Governor's Council's Scientific and
Statistical Advisory Committee.

Whitelaw raised some more

basic issues about BPA's scenarios which all centered around
the Regional Act and its consequences.

He pointed out the
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need for a revised approach to policy analysis, without
stating a preference for either the NEPP or PNUCC model.
Several audience members followed Whitelaw's concluding
remarks with comments or concerns of their own.

John Savage

of ODOE suggested that during the near term, when BPA was
essentially committed to using an econometric approach to
the industrial sector, some mix between the NEPP and PNUCC
model be used.

Lastly, Bob Keesee, a Senior Government

Affairs Economist with the Georgia Pacific Corporation and
Wes Engstrom cautioned against stretching the application of
existing data bases too far.
The essential features of the public involvement
workshop are presented in summary form in Table XII below.
Though the workshop was an "event" classified as organizational (O-perspective) it is obvious that personal influences (P-perspective) impact the process at many points.
The table thus identifies the participants, their
organizational affiliation (and, its interest or priorities)
their background, their critical comments, and the
anticipated effect implementing their suggestions would have
on BPA's forecast.
Before reviewing and analyzing the results it is worth
making an observation about the use of Multiple Perspectives
in such contexts.

In the quest for explanatory simplicity,

it 1s all too easy to treat cross-cuing relationships
reductionistically.

Thus, a somewhat cynical characteriza-
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tion of the public involvement process would view the
comments of different organizations' representatives as
self-serving fabrications, designed solely to promote (or
safeguard) the organization's own limited interests with
little concern for other parties.

While this type of

behavior is hardly unprecedented in the business world, it
is not generally representative (and is not apparent in the
BPA example).

The process by which organizational interests

are represented is much more subtle and not always obvious
to the parties actually involved.
which, and the extent

t£

(Likewise, the process by

which, the agenda of the overall

public involvement process was constrained also is often not
obvious, as will be made clear in the next chapter.)

The

Multiple Perspective Concept, within its three distinct
paradigms of investigation, gains further value as a tool by
means of its usefulness in elucidating such subtleties.
Technically speaking, in 1982 there was, as the verbal
interchanges sketched above indicate, a great deal of uncertainty both about the load futures for the Northwest and the
ability of the available models to represent them adequately.

Many of the participants in the power planning commun-

ity recognized that the choice of one method (or judgment)
over another, though perhaps somewhat arbitrary, could have
decidedly non-arbitrary effects.

It was general knowledge

that the fate of the WPPSS plants would likely be decided by
the forthcoming forecast, and this decision would affect
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nearly all the participants through their direct investments, impacts on the environment, or secondary economic
consequences.

Thus, there were many potential areas for

debate or contention where interpretations alternative to
BPA's could legitimately (from a T-perspective standpoint)
be brought to bear as counterarguments.

(As

will be seen

later, this tactic, though not prevalent at the abovedescribed model review, was to be a more common one once BPA
presented an official draft forecast).
Turning to the results in the Table, several points are
worth noting.

First of all, it can be fairly safely assumed

that all participants desire to maintain (or cultivate)
their professional reputations through their actions in such
meetings.

This desire was explicitly listed as an organiza-

tional interest, however, only when this appeared to be the
overriding interest of the organization, as with conSUltants
and university scholars who literally earn their living by
selling their ideas.

Secondly, for a number of participants

(usually those working for local or state agencies and
making comments on the economic projections) consistency
with their own work was cited as a key interest.

While part

of the desire for consistency between forecasts can be
viewed as the result of professional pride of the participants own work (i.e. they felt their forecasts were
"right"), on more practical grounds BPA's forecasts and the
plans it would engender were foreseen as having significant
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economic repercussions.

If the state or local forecasters

were correct in their anticipations of the future, different
projections by BPA would, by extension, create flawed plans
as a likely consequence economic problems for their areas.
The overlap between P- and O-perspectives can be seen
in the technical comments made.

Inevitably, the technical

comments reflect the participants past or present efforts.
Only in some instances do they reflect what the participants
were then currently working on, as with the representatives
from the utilities and state agencies.

In a small number of

cases, comments could be seen to be explicitly aimed at
influencing an outcome in the interest of the participant
valuing it (e.g. the gas companies formal statement, or
NRDC's open agenda for promoting conservation as related to
model selections).

But though individual participant's

comments did not always exert influence on BPA's forecasting
effort to bring it more in tune with their organizations'
goals, none of their expert opinions could be seen to work
against their organizations' own priorities in any way (i.e.
individual comments were not inconsistent with the organizational interests as described in Chapter III).

This pat-

tern will be seen below to hold throughout public involvement.
In the month that followed the model technical review
workshop BPA evaluated the verbal (and, where some of the
participants chose to echo their sentiments along a more
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formal channel, written comments received and made its model
selections (element 43: T-perspective).

Not surprisingly,

the choices were, as described in Chapter II, the ORNL
models for the residential and commercial sectors and the
NEFF model for the industrial sector.

Given the leanings of

the BPA staff prior to the workshop, these choices were
comfortable ones.

The inadequacy of available econometric

models had been recognized by the staff who had originally
acquired the ORNL models as a result of their disenchantment
with the SOU forecast and its "corroboration" (P - T) and
the need to account for policy impacts (0 - T) was well
known.

Though some voices were raised against end-use

models, no good alternative was offered which could be
implemented within BPA's forecast schedule (e.g. econometric
or hybrid models).

Moreover, most of the panelists had

given limited endorsement to the approach embodied in the
ORNL models, so the selection was hardly made in the face of
resistance.
In the case of the NEPF Industrial Model, it was chosen
over the PNUCC model largely because of the fact that the
former model had been respecified using more recent data.
Debate over these two models had, at best, been lukewarm so
the selection was

ce~tainly

non-controversial.

A somewhat more significant development occurring at
the same time was the completion of the Supply Pricing Model
(described in Chapter II) which determined electricity rates
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for different groups within the region.

Comments at the

public involvement workshop regarding BPA's "unstated
forecast assumptions" were primarily aimed at the operation
of this model, since it was in its structure that BPA's
interpretation of the Regional Act was embodied (0 - T).
With its completion, the key missing piece in BPA's modeling
system was in place, and ready to be used in the draft
forecast.
In March of 1982, a preliminary version of the draft
forecast was completed (T-perspective: element 44), using
the abovedescribed models and incorporating a number of
ideas discussed at the January public involvement workshop.
As

with the model review, results were formally presented to

the Policy Committee for evaluation prior to public release
(O-perspective: element 45).

Minor changes in both economic

inputs and demand forecasts resulted from this internal
review.
The draft forecast was completed in late March (element
46: T-perspective) incorporating the considerations identified by the Policy Committee (0 - T), though its public
release was delayed until April for a number of reasons to
be discussed below.

The draft forecast included a range of

scenarios (baseline, high, and low) for both economics and
electricity sales and a set of corresponding probabilities
of occurrence.

The ORNL models were used for residential

and commercial sectors, while the NEPP model was used for
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the industrial sector.

OS! sales were estimated from

contract demands, streetlighting sales from another small
sUbcomponent of the original all-sector NEPP model, and
irrigations sales were calculated outside the forecasting
system using paper-and-pencil techniques.

The only

policy-based conservation included in the forecast was that
expected to be obtained from BPA budgeted programs.

The

demand models were run iteratively with the Supply Pricing
Model until equilibrium of prices and loads was reached.
(Because of the small degree of change between draft and
final forecasts a detailed discussion of specific technical
choices is deferred until later.)
Summarizing the draft results briefly, in the base case
regional economic activity was foreseen to exceed that
projected by DR! for the nation as a whole.

This resulted

in an average annual rate of growth of 1.7 percent for total
loads in the region with residential, commercial, and industrial sectors growing at rates of 1.6 percent, 2.2, and 1.6
percent respectively.

These values were unprecedentedly low

for forecasts to be used in region-wide power planning.
High and low forecasts likewise were noticeably lower than
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios previously seen in the
region.

High case loads for the region grew at 2.5 percent

per year over the forecast period (2.5 percent residential,
3.4 percent commercial, and 2.1 percent industrial).

By

contrast, regional load growth for the low case was pro-
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jected to proceed at a 0.8 percent AARG.

Commercial and

residential sectors both displayed a 0.9 percent rate of
growth while the industrial sector grew slightly more slowly
at a 0.7 percent AARG.
As the release date for the draft forecast, and the

anticipated consequent decision regarding the fate of the
WPPSS plants, drew near, a concern grew over what Bonneville's forecast would mean to the region.

stockholders in

the nuclear plants, drawing inferences from the findings of
the earlier technical review (and, very likely, from
"unofficial" sources within the agency), feared that the 20year forecast would be so low that work would be stopped on
one or more of the construction works in progress (element
47: O-perspective).

As noted earlier, until such construc-

tion projects were completed, their costs could not be
absorbed in the rate bases of participating utilities.

The

outcome of Johnson's forthcoming decision was of obvious
concern to these actors in the power planning arena.
This concern was voiced to Senator James McClure (o-P)
who requested that, prior to its release, BPA's forecast be
subjected to an independent review and evaluation by a firm
or organization outside the region (P-perspective: element
48).

In response to this suggestion (P - P), Peter Johnson

arranged for an independent review of the draft forecast to
be conducted by National Economic Research Associates,
(P-perspective: element 49).
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Dr. Lewis Perl of NERA arrived at BPA roughly one week
before the forecast was made publicly available and began a
critique of the BPA forecast (O-perspective: element 50).
NERA, it should be remembered, had developed the PNUCC
econometric model not used by BPA which had tended during
the technical review period to display higher load projections than the other models considered.

As such, it was a

firm whose credentials would be accepted by the concerned
parties within PNUCC -- in large measure the reason for
Johnson's selection (P - 0).

By way of technical approach,

Perl essentially played "devil's advocate", challenging key
assumptions or methodological choices with plausible alternatives, each of which generally would have the effect of
raising the forecasts BPA had developed.

These challenges

were generally consistent with NERA's econometric research.
Regarding economic projections, NERA felt that income per
employee growth was understated but that electricity prices
might increase faster than anticipated (the latter would
tend to decrease load growth).

Regarding models, NERA

echoed some sentiments voiced during public involvement,
noting that the residential and commercial sector model were
more disaggregate than desirable and endorsing a "multiple
model" approach to forecasting loads in the various consuming sectors.

The price and income elasticities in the

residential model were considered unusually low.

Though the

resulting effects of such elasticities for electric and
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non-electric fuels would be offsetting, increasing the
income elasticity to levels thought appropriate by NERA
would raise the residential forecast.

In the commercial

sector, NERA took exception to BPA's revised method of
determining floorspace based upon employment rather than
income, noting that this lowered the forecast.

Moreover,

the naive subtraction of BPA conservation savings from
commercial sales in effect "double counted" some of the
savings which were included in the model's response, further
lowering the forecast.

The NEPP Industrial Model was viewed

as containing several specification errors which overstated
the speed and extent of price responsiveness, which would
have made the forecast too low.

NERA's overall conclusions,

released concurrent with BPA's draft forecast, were that the
growth should range from 0.8 to 3.0 percent instead of 0.8
to 2.5 percent per year and that the base case (1.7 percent)
was biased to the low side and would more realistically fall
in the 2.0 to 2.2 percent neighborhood.
On April 2, the draft forecast (and the results of the
NERA study) were made publicly available, in the wake of a
press release to media throughout the region (O-perspective: element 51).

Three volumes comprised the forecast

report: a forecast summary, and two technical appendices.
The latter documents, one focusing upon economiCS, the other
upon demand models, provided thorough details on the models,
methods, assumptions, input values, and results embodied in
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to BPA's report were, predictably,

in the region's major newspapers.

As noted

in Chapter III, the media shapes as well as disseminates
information and attitudes.

In order to make "good copy", a

newspaper article must distill facts of most immediate
Significance to its readers, sometimes "creating" issues in
the process.

In general, the newspapers throughout the

region drew out the conclusion that, given the forecast
results, BPA might delay the completion of one ot more of
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the three viable WPPSS projects.

On April 6, the Portland

Oregonian highlighted Peter Johnson's comment to a Seattle
audience that BPA's load forecast might be low.
article

t~eated

The

the uncertainty surrounding the results

fairly and the consequent uncertainty about when the three
plants would come on line.

The article's headline "Energy

Predictions by BPA Said Low" did, however, seem to cast some
suspicion upon the forecast's credibility.

By contrast, in

the Tri-Cities, where the postponmentof WPPSS plant completions would have stronger repercussions on those employed in
their construction, the tone of articles was harsher (and
somewhat slanted).

In an April 7 article entitled "Tri-

Cities Being Killed by BPA Draft Report", Tri-Cities Herald
reporter Jack Briggs quoted WPPSS risk analyst Jay Maidment
as calling the report "shoddy statistical work put together
in a political environment".

In the same article he noted

that NERA's reinterpretation of BPA's range and base case
would call for continued construction of all three WPPSS
plants, and quoted WPPSS spokesman Gary Petersen's (false)
observation that neither WPPSS nor the public had any
involvement in the forecast's development.
comments were received formally by BPA over a period
lasting from April to June.

In the early weeks following

the release of the draft forecast, however, comments were
sparse due to two reasons.
to

th~

First the technical appendices

forecast, which contained detailed descriptions of
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models, inputs, and outputs were released several weeks
after the summary document.

This meant that a thorough

evaluation of the forecast had to wait. Second, and of at
least equal importance, was that the consensus in the region
was that Johnson was about to finalize his decision on the
fate of WNP 1, 2, and 3.
On April 19th, the results of the analysis of regional
resource alternatives was made public (element 53:
T-perspective).

Based upon the results of the draft

forecast (T - T) and subsequent financial analysis, the
report concluded that:
"Considering the interests of the ratepayers and the region
as a whole, continuing WNP 12 and 13 on current schedules
and extending the construction of WNP 11 best preserves and
protects the economic and financial integrity of BPA and the
region (BPA, 1982d:2).
This conclusion was based upon 1) the perceived likelihood of a power surplus in the 1980s and 1990s, (power
forecast), 2) a review of the relative costs of different
resource options and their impacts on electricity prices in
the region (rate analysis), and 3) an analysis of the constraints on financial markets and credit worthiness of BPA
under different resource development scenarios (financial
analysis).

The findings of the financial analysis effect-

ively prohibited the completion of all three plants.

sales

of additional bonds would only be underwritten for an amount
short of what would have been needed to finance the
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scheduled completion of all three plants on their intended
schedule.

The rate analysis suggested that the delay of

WNF-1 would result in a somewhat lower rate increase than if
WNF-3 scheduled completion was extended instead.
Based upon these findings (T - F), Peter Johnson made
the decision to delay the scheduled completion of WNF-1
(element 54: P-perspective).

Undoubtedly, however, his

earlier experience with a similar situation at Trus Joist
helped provide a certain assurance about the decision that
might otherwise be missing.

At the time of his announcement

of the decision, Johnson also cited a second independent
review of BPA's forecast which provided sharp counterpoint
to NERA's findings.

Rather than prepare a point-by-point

critique of BPA's methodology, as NERA had, Energy ventures
Analysis Inc. (EVA) an East-coast consulting firm, evaluated
the BFA forecast by means of an analogy.

Comparing BFA and

the Pacific Northwest with the only similar Federal marketer
of hydropower, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), EVA
noted that, when faced with rate escalations comparable to
those anticipated for the PNW, consumers in the Tennessee
Valley had curtailed electricity use to the point of
declining loads.

Based upon this, EVA concluded that BPA

loads would likely be flat through 1985 and not exceed 1.2
through the early 19905.

EVA's "counterpoint" was used to

illustrate that uncertainties could surround the load
estimates on both the high and low sides.

By offsetting
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NERA's comments the EVA findings made BPA's baseline and
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Johnson (P - 0), explaining the

findings of BPA's resource assessment (T - 0), and its
implications to the region (O-perspective: element 56).
Over the three-month period that BPA staff received
comments on their draft forecast, the prepared responses.
Some of these took the form of modifications to draft inputs
or modeling assumptions.
which the staff

dete~mined

Other responses to challenges
could not or should not be met

with methodological changes, were in the form of

~itten

replies (i.e. counterarguments or explanations of why
requested changes were not possible.)

In late June, a

revised final forecast was completed (T-perspective: element
57), in many ways similar to its
ove~all

p~edecessor

(T - T) with an

AARG of 1.6 percent, but containing revisions

motivated by public comment (0 - T).

On July I, the final
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forecast was released to the public at large (O-perspective:
element 58).
Brief summary descriptions of the forecast results were
presented in Chapter II.

Having described the flow of

events leading to the forecast's culmination, it is now
appropriate to detail the numerous specific technical
choices made, primarily, in response to challenges posed by
the various parties in BPA's audience.

Because the connec-

tions between technical review, draft, and final forecasts
are better understood by means of direct comparisons, the
changes between the forecasts are listed together below
(rather than spread throughout the description of crosscuing).

First, the influences of the comments summarized in

Table XII in the draft forecast are enumerated.

The subse-

quent revisions between draft and final forecasts are then
described.

Finally, BPA's verbal responses (and rebuttals)

to technical challenges, as listed in the technical documentation, are discussed.
In its overall methodological structure, both BPA's
draft and final forecasts reflected a number of concerns
voiced by members of its audience.

While these comments

were not always the decisive factor in determining these
technical choices, they at least contributed to the shaping
of the final selections, if in some instances only reinforCing BPA staff preferences.

Following the technical

model review with its various conservation scenarios, BPA
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opted to produce baseline, high, and low forecast of electricity consumption (as well as economics and demographics)
with distinctions between public and private utility rate
pools.

While this did not result in utility-specific fore-

casts as earlier suggested by Tom Eckman of Math Sciences
Northwest, it did distinguish between the customer groups
distinguished by the Regional Power Act.

As illustrated in

Table III, the three forecast scenarios varied not only
according to levels of economic activity but also numerous
assumptions on energy use, conservation programs, and WPPSS
plant financing.

These assumptions might be termed overt,

in that they were consciously made as parametric choices for
model operation.

These overt assumptions were explicitly

laid out in detail, as requested by representatives of PNUCC
and Northwest natural gas distributors.

As

also noted at

various points in this dissertation numerous covert assumptions on such factors as technological innovation, institutional perpetuation, and legislative irrversibility remained
unexplained in the background, essentially because they were
"non-issues" in the minds of the BPA modelers and their
audience, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter of
this dissertation.

Associated with the range of forecasts

was an assignment of probabilities (which had been suggested
by John Douglas of the Washington state Energy Office).
These probabilities were assigned judgmentally following the
finalization of the forecasts.
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Model selections for the three major consuming sectors,
though based upon a set of evaluative criteria, reflected
the recommendations of panelists and participants at the
technical workshop.

The generally preferred ORNL models

were selected for residential and commercial forecasting
while the NEPP Econometric Model was used in the industrial
sector.

Time and resource limitations prevented BPA staff

from pursuing any major new modeling development such as
combining the "best" elements of the models as suggested by
John Savage of ODOE and Mike McHugh of AEA.

For similar

reasons, no back-up models were maintained for an econometric cross check as suggested by representatives of PNUCC
and SCL.
Of the possible conservation options discussed at the
technical review, only one was chosen by BPA to be embodied
in their draft and final forecasts.

The decision was made

to look only at conservation savings attainable from means
under Bonneville's direct control.

These more "assured"

savings were those projected to be obtained from BPA
sponsored programs in existence or budgeted at the time of
the 1982 forecasts' production.

As

such, this treatment of

conservation did not explore what might be obtained from
individual utility programs on those which the Regional
Council might promote -- explorations which groups such as
NRDC would have preferred to see.
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As noted above, the ORNL Econometric/End-Use Model was
chosen to prepare the draft and final residential forecasts.
With the exception of Sam van Vactor of PSU and Mike McHugh
of AEA who advocated econometric (or hybrid) alternatives,
all of the participants at the model review workshop had
given endorsements (though not unqualified) of the ORNL
model.

Some modifications of input variables and key

parametric values did take place between the technical
review and the draft forecast.

Aside from revised economic

and demographic projections and electricity prices from the
newly-completed Supply Pricing Model (which served as inputs
to all of BPA's demand models) a number of base year values
were revised to fit the Pacific Northwest Region.

The

residential survey conducted by Elrick and Lavidge was used
to derive values for base year energy use per appliance,
energy usage, fuel saturation and penetration rates, and new
appliance penetration rates.

To account for savings due to

BPA-sponsored conservation programs (including the effects
of weatherization, shower flow restrictors, water heater
wraps, faucet flow control devices, and solar or heat pump
water heater replacement) some adjustments were made to the
structure of the model to downscale the appropriate final
end-use electricity sales.
upon estimates of

saving~

affected households
tion.

These adjustments were based
per household and numbers of

receiv~d

from the Office of Conserva-

Choices for behavioral and technological variables,
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the latter a major source of concern to workshop participants, reflected data provided to BPA staff by contractors
continuing development at ORNL, most specifically Eric Hirst
and Janet Carney.

(Additionally, some technology curve

parameters for retrofit homes were developed by BPA staff
using National Association of Home Builders Research
Foundation data).

As such the technology curves, though not

explicitly geared to technological frontiers, were as
current as ongoing research at the time, and the staff felt
that as such, they were hardly outdated, as NRDC had earlier
asserted.

Suffice to say, John Duffield's preference, a

graded series of curves representing progressive technological developments was beyond the scope of current
research.
For the commercial sector, the ORNL model had been
supported almost universally as the preferred choice at the
technical workshop, and 1t was the one used for both draft
and final forecasts.

Several features of the model had

concerned participants and resulted in various staff
responses.

The original econometric approach to projecting

commercial floorspace centered on a simple regression equation with population and income as independent variables.
Though not producing unreasonable responses overall, predictions for specific building types were often improbable
(e.g. high auto repair growth).

In response, BPA just added

a new, more sophisticated floorspace submodel which produced
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credible patterns of floorspace growth.

Unfortunately, the

new submodel systematically under forecasted over the historical period so an exogenous calculation of total
floorspace was made based upon employment (described

in

more detail in Chapter II), and the predicted, disaggregated
floorspace values were adjusted upwards correspondingly.
This gave a more plausible set of floorspace estimates, but
did not address the issue of the lack of policy feedbacks
noted by Don Dohrmann of ADM Associates.

Such a change,

though desirable, was not only impractical in terms of
needed time and effort but also would have been impossible
to support without significant additional research.

The

technology, or efficiency/cost tradeoff, curves were also a
major source of concern, but most suggested improvements
necessitated major research to be first carried out under
contract (which BPA staff was, in fact, initiating at the
time).

Though BPA staff recognized that regionalized curves

were needed, as noted by Ken Corum of the Regional Council's
staff, and that there were indeed some flaws in the curves,
as pointed out by Phil Carver of ODOE, only minor calibration adjustments were undertaken.

These consisted of minor,

judgmental alterations of the slope parameter of the curve
which increase the accuracy of the model's tracking of
actual consumption from 1970 to 1980.

Finally, the model

was somewhat altered to enhance its conservation policy
testing capabilities.

In its unaltered form, the model's
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structure accommodated the simulation of a 1978 grants
programs for schools and hospitals and 1979 building
standards affecting all commercial construction.

The

modification allowed savings from BPA-sponsored programs
(shower flow restrictions, water heater wraps, energy
efficient lighting, and financial incentives) to be subtracted from the appropriate end-use after projected consumption was calculated.
Participants at the technical workshop appeared to show
no overwhelming model preference for the industrial sector.
Jim Abrahamson of PNUCC and PP&L had given a nod to the
NEPP model as an interim solution to industrial forecasting,
but little other support was again (at the same time, it
should be noted, no one championed the PNUCC model).

The

model was chosen by BPA staff primarily because the data
used by AEA to respecify the model's econometric equations
~as

more current than that used in the PNUCC model.

Forecast results for separate SICs (Standard Industrial
Classification) were presented, though separate models were
not used for different industries (as would be sufficient to
fully satisfy Glen Smith's desire for industry-specific
forecasts).
Irrigation, street lighting, and electricity pricing
models (described in detail in Chapter II) had not been
presented to the general public prior to the draft forecast,
so none of BPA's modeling choices for those models were
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responses to outside "challenges".

This did not, however

hold true for the final forecast (as will be noted below).
Because economic/demographic projections needed to be ready
for use roughly a month before forecast deadlines, the high,
medium, and low projections presented at the December
workshop were those used in preparing the draft forecast.
All changes resulting from public comment were incorporated
into the final forecast, and are discussed below.
Table XIII summarizes modeling choices made for the
draft forecast in response to issues or concerns identified
during the earlier technical review process.
Though a number of changes took place between draft and
final versions of the BPA forecast, the overall effect in
terms of magnitude of change was slight.

Base, high, and

low regional loads respectively dropped by 202, 552, and 851
average megawatts.

A sizeable portion of these admittedly

modest reductions came in the industrial sector, as the
result of a modified lag structure in the NEPP Hodel and
revised assumptions concerning DSI power consumption.
For the residential sector, six basic changes were made
which were not the result of new economics or electricity
prices.

Based upon US DOE survey information appliance

lifetimes were lengthened and equipment purchase prices were
revised.

In response to comments from PNUCC staff following

the publication of the draft forecast, new thermal integrity
curve parameters for natural gas and fuel oil heating were
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TABLE XIII
TECHNICAL CHOICES MADE BY BPA FOR ITS 1982 FORECAST
Overall forecast
•
High, medium, and low demand scenarios based on both
different economics and modeling assumptions
•
Only new conservation modeled was due to BPA-sponsored
programs
•
Public and private utility rate pools treated
separately
•
Judgmental probabilities associated with forecast
distribution
•
No fundamental or structural changes to models reviewed
in workshop
Residential sector
•
ORNL model selected
•
Revised base year values for energy use per appliance,
energy usage, full saturation and penetrations, and new
appliance penetrations
•
Model structure altered to handle BPA conservation
savings
•
Behavioral and technological parameters updated where
possible
Commercial sector
•
ORNL model selected, new floorspace component added
•
Technology curves underwent minor recalibration
•
Model structure altered to represent BPA conservation
savings
Industrial sector
•
NEPP model selected
•
Results presented for separate industrial classifications
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used, which were set equal to those of electrically heated
homes.

This change had the effect of making gas and oil

more competitive as heating fuels in new homes, lowering
electricity consumption somewhat.

Base year space heating

usage values were altered to reflect "normal" rather than
1980 weather.

Conservation estimates were also revised as a

result of new estimates prepared by the Office of Conservation.

Finally, an erroneous estimate of single family

dwellings in private utility service areas was corrected.
In the commercial sector, modeling changes were equally
modest.

Although the floorspace projection methodology used

remained unchanged from the draft forecast, revised
employment values altered the percentage of total regional
floorspace standing in public and private utility service
districts at the 1980 and 2000 endpoints for the exogenous
calculation.

Secondly, at the request of PNUCC, base year

(i.e. 1970) energy use per square for heating was weather
normalized, so that the model's starting point for energy
projections was not biased by meteorological conditions
unique to 1970.

Finally, in response to comments contained

in the NERA review of BPA's forecast, conservation savings
estimates introduced as model inputs were judgmentally
reduced by 20\.

The reason for this was to compensate for

double-counting conservation savings.

Presumably some of

the efficiency improvements captured in the efficiency/cost
tradeoff curves and elasticities derived from historical
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data were the result of consumers taking the same measures
in response to price increases as those encompassed by BPA
programs.

The adjustment thus focused on customers who

would have conserved on their own but used BPA programs as
the vehicle towards those ends.
Industrial sector modeling showed more extensive
changes between draft and final forecasts.

In response to

comments from NERA, Seattle City Light, and PNUCC, Bonneville staff altered the lag structure of the NEPP model, so
that responses to price changes were gradual rather than
instantaneous.

This both smoothed the pattern of predicted

growth and lowered the magnitude of loads.

Individual

employment projections were prepared for the chemical
industry which permitted the NEPP model to distinguish
electricity sales growth in this industry.

Industrial

conservation estimates received from the Office of Conservation were also revised slightly between draft and final
forecasts.

Because of counterintuitive results for sales to

the pulp and paper industry, demand projections for that
industrial classification were performed on the Brookhaven
Pulp and paper Process Hodel and substituted for those
derived by the NEPP model.

Finally, while contract demands

were still used to produce the OSI forecast, it was no
longer assumed that loads would attain and stay at the 100
percent level, since they had not in the past.

Rather,
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post-1985 DSI loads were, rather conservatively, reduced 1.5
percent.
Economic and demographic projections going into the
final forecast were also revised substantially, though the
methods of their derivation remain substantially the same.
Although several participants at the December workshop (i.e.
Milan Brace, Don Reading and James Scherzinger) had noted
the desirability of an interactive model, such as undertaking was practically impossible within the timeline of
forecast development (though a regional economic model was
being developed under contract at that time).

The major

changes in the forecast were the result of DRI's periodic
revision of the national economic projections underlying the
development of most of the demand model inputs.

An addi-

tional general characteristic of the revised economic projection was a stronger reflection of the downturn characterizing the economy in 1982.

Projections for population,

income, and housing were lower through 1985, representing
the effect of a longer recession (and reflecting concerns
expressed by James Scherzinger, John Savage and Cleveland
Anschell at the December workshop).

This downturn was also

embodied in lowered base case lumber and wood products
employment forecasts (in part, a response to Brian Wall's
comments).

High and low case projections were revised

upward and downward respectively, widening the range of
future alternatives addressed.

As with the range of demand,
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subjective probabilities were assigned to the economic
scenarios (echoing Richard conway's sentiments that forecast
uncertainty should be quantified).

staff judgment was that

there was a 10 percent likelihood that actuals would fall
below the low, a 35 percent likelihood between low and
baseline, 40 percent between baseline and high, and 15
percent above the high.
A number of more specific changes in the development of
economic projections were undertaken for the final forecast.
Fossil fuel price projections were lowered substantially, in
response to comments made by Sam van Vactor and representatives of Northwest Natural Gas.

At the same time, price

differences between the consuming sectors were increased.
On the basis of new Census information, headship rates were
revised downward and, as a consequence of the new DRI projections, rates of new housing construction and occupancy
were revised.

Increased replacement rates were the result

of shorter average dwelling lifetimes.

The implicit price

deflators used to adjust the various projections for
inflation were also modified slightly in response to the DRI
national economic forecast update.

Finally, several of the

industry-specific employment estimates were revised, often
in response to issues raised at the workshop.

Transporta-

tion equipment and primary metals employment were downwardly
adjusted.
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The response to Richard Slaughter's concerns about the
employment forecasts for the electronics industry, the
ranges were broadened to capture possible business cycle
variation.

Last of all, at the suggestion of Wes Engstrom,

Boeing staff experts were contacted and their advice used in
the calculation of Boeing employment futures.
Changes were also made to the remaining component of
BPA's forecasting system, the electricity supply Pricing
Model.

Revisions chiefly concerned the resources included

in the model's array of generation choices and cost calculations.

Five coal-fired plants formerly included in the

resource schedule were removed, since their completion
seemed dubious.

Generic 500 MW plants were substituted if

additional resources were needed.

The list of future

available hydro resources was expanded based upon estimates
compiled by PNUCC.

The completion of WNP-l was also delayed

five years based upon the assessment of the need for its
capacity in the draft forecast.

Plant costs were revised

based upon PNUCC estimates and conservation costs based upon
new BPA Office of Conservation estimates.

On the basis of

updated information obtained from the Corps of Engineers and
the Bureau of Reclamation, capital costs for Federal hydro
projects were recalculated.
effects of curtailment

ri~hts

Also recalculated were the
on DSI loads.

Finally, a new

component was added to the SPM to account for the effects of
future income tax liability on system costs.
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Table XIV below summarizes the changes between draft
and final forecasts.
As

noted above, BPA's forecast documentation contained

one other element of significance:
issues raised by outside parties.

wzitten replies to
This is explicit

challenge-response behavior as identified by the O-perspective.

Given the fact that this was BPA's first independent

forecast, and that major decisions were made based, in part,
upon its findings, it was critical that underlying technical
choices be justified to the greatest extent possible.

The

appendices to the forecast documents provided BPA staff with
the opportunity to respond to their critics and defend (or
at least explain) their methodological decisions.

Described

below are responses to comments which did not result in any
of the modeling or methodological changes discussed above.
These responses are reported as they were prepared by BPA,
with no evaluat10n of their accuracy or correctness.

The

forecast is evaluated in the final chapter of this dissertation.
Though the end-use models ultimately selected for use
in residential and commercial sector modeling were most
heavily endorsed by workshop participants, some parties
questioned the desirability of such highly disaggregate
tools.

Representatives of PNUCC, Seattle City Light, and

later NERA all felt econometric models should be used, at
least at a minimum, as a cross-check.

BPA staff reiterated
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TABLE XIV
A SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL CHANGES BETWEEN DRAFT ANO
FINAL FORECASTS
Residential Sector
•
Appliance lifetimes lengthened
•
Equipment purchase prices revised
•
Thermal Integrity curve parameters revised
•
Space heating usage values weather normalized
•
Residential conservation estimates revised
•
Erroneous value for single family dwellings corrected
Commercial Sector
•
Floorspace "target" values revised
•
Space heating use/sq. ft. weather normalized
•
Conservation savings adjusted downward to minimize
"double-count"
Industrial Sector
•
Lag structure of NEPP model altered
•
Chemical industry projections separated out by NEPP
model
•
Industrial conservation estimates revised
•
Pulp and paper forecast prepared on Brookhaven model
•
051 loads assumed 1.S percent below contract demands
Economic/Demographic Projections
•
ORI national projections revised
•
Lower population, income, and housing projections
through 1985
•
Lower lumber and wood products employment forecast
•
Range widened, subjective probabilities assigned
•
Fossil fuel price projections lowered
•
Headship rates revised downward
•
Housing construction and occupancy rates revised
•
Implicit price deflators altered
•
Employment projections for transportation equipment,
primary metals and electronics industries updated
Electricity Pricing Hodel
•
Five coal-fired plants removed from resource portfoliO
•
List of future hydro resources expanded
•
WNP-l delayed five years
•
Plant and conservation costs revised
•
Curtailment rights on OSI loads recalculated
•
component added to account for future tax liability
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the need for conservation analyses, consistent with the
Power Act, which only the end-use models were capable of.
They also noted the desirability of a cross-check with other
models but noted the weakness of existing econometric models
and the impracticability of developing new ones within the
timeframe of the forecast.
Several organizations questioned Bonneville's treatment
of conservation.

NRDC criticized BPA for not including any

treatment of anticipated Regional Council-sponsored programs.
BPA responded by noting that this was its intention,
and that the 1982 forecast was only to serve as a starting
point for load/resource planning.

NERA and PNUCC thought

programmatic conservation might better be treated as a
resource than as a component of demands.

BPA cited the need

to have end use sales reflect demand reductions due to
conservation.
PNUCC, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Survival
Center, and Central Electric Cooperative all questioned the
probability assessment and the placement of the high and low
cases.

BPA staff reiterated that the probability assign-

ments were purely judgmental in nature nad that the high and
low cases represented scenarios which were not to be conceived as absolute upper and lower bounds on load futures.
Though judgmental, the judgments involved were laid out
explicitly.
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NERA noted that the BPA forecasting system was so
complex that knowledge of it tended to be highly segmented
and dispersed throughout the agency.

BPA acknowledged this

potential problem, noting that supervisory staff had recognized the issue of consistency early and checked it carefully.

The disaggregated character of the modeling system

was, however, thought to be both necessary and desirable by
the staff, given the complexity of issues to be addressed.
PNUCC observed that BPA's models were not well suited
to capturing short-term seasonal and business cycle fluctuations which might be of key importance in activities such
as ratemaking.

Bonneville staff responded by noting the

problem and announcing work-in-progress to develop a consistent short run forecasting model.
Critics of the ORNL Residential Model focused upon its
performance in areas of price and income responsiveness.
Energy ventures Analysis, POWER, Seattle City Light, and
NRDC all questioned the price responsiveness of the model
(with EVA and POWER contending the model understated response).

As

a response, BPA staff presented the results of

sensitivity analyses performed during the testing phase, and
argued the reasonableness of the results.

Seattle City

Light and NERA both felt income responsiveness was too low.
Staff noted that only a portion of the model's income elasticity was apparent from findings since some responsiveness
was "hard-wired" in the model by means of exogenous para-
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meters.

The overall responsiveness, BPA claimed, was con-

sistent with research findings.
PNUCC criticized BPA for using different discount rates
for different appliances in determining residential life
cycle cost minima.

staff replied that literature revealed

that customers indeed seemed more willing to "gamble" with
less expensive items, so different rates were appropriate.
NRDC had argued that there was no evidence to support the
thesis that residential customers actually made appliance
selection decisions using life-cycle cost minimization.
Staff counterargued that the methodology was fully consistent with economic theory and an acceptable predictor of
aggregate response.
Members of Seattle City Light staff noted that the
declining electricity use per square foot values produced by
the ORNL Commercial Model were inconsistent with the results
of other econometric models with the region.

BPA responded

that in the end-use models certain factors increased use per
square foot while others more strongly decreased it.

In-

creases in equipment efficiency, which appeared reasonable
during sensitivity testing, were the chief source of the
decline in unit electricity usage.

Several parties making

comments questioned the complex price response mechanism of
the ORNL model.

NERA and Seattle City Light both felt that

the model over-responded to price increases.

Energy

ventures Analysis thought that it might have overestimated
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the time laq before price-induced conservation takes hold
and Seattle City Light also believed it underestimated fuel
switching to electric space heat.

In response, BPA staff

noted that most econometric models used in the region which
might be used as a basis for comparison were specified over
data compiled during a period where electricity prices in
real dollars were falling.

This pattern no longer held,

with prices increasing rapidly, and customer response was
thought likely to be in the process of changing.

Hence,

accepted notions of appropriate types of levels of response
might be inaccurate.

BPA defended the commercial model's

performance based upon its calibration to historic fuel
sales between 1970 and 1980.
The NEPP model displayed output elasticities less than
one (i.e. a 10 percent increase in output produced less than
10 percent increase in electricity consumption) for several
industries, and both HERA and PNUCC felt this was indicative
of a specification error.

BPA acknowledged a specification

error, but noted that non-uniform expansion within the
industries noted could produce such results.

PNUCC also

noted that the model was specified over national energy data
and, as such, suffered from aggregation and locational
biases.

BPA again acknowledged that this problem merited

additional research, but defended the specification of the
model, pointing to the use of pooled time series cross
sectional data which alleviates the problem of locational
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bias.

EVA and the Survival Center question the inclusion of

the unbuilt Alurnax Plant among contract demands in the OS!
forecast.

BPA asserted its belief that the recession would

end world aluminum demand would likely justify the additional smelter.

PNUCC criticized the omission of wages from the

total industrial energy equation.

BPA noted that AEA's

specification allowed wages to be factored out of the demand
function, but admitted that wages are important and that
respecification would be considered.
that the forecast

i~nored

Finally, NROC claimed

industrial cogeneration.

Bonne-

ville pointed out that cogeneration was being treated as a
resource and, as such, was dealt with in a separate resource
assessment.
The forecast for the irrigation sector, though not part
of the January technical review, was the target of several
critics.

PNUCC noted that the model used to develop the

forecast was conspicuously lacking in explanatory economic
factors.

BPA staff responded that an electricity price

variable was being added to the model to address such issues
in future forecasts.

NROC voiced several criticisms,

namely, that the model ignored potential conservation
inducing alternatives, that BPA should treat irrigated areas
on the basis of their actual locations, that BPA overestimated the trend toward sprinkler systems from gravity, and
that the forecast failed to address the effect of irrigation
on hydro-generation capacity.

BPA responded with explana-
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tions, rather than modeling changes to all those comments,
emphasizing that the model was newly-developed and did not
contain all the features that might be desired (e.g., priceinduced conservation responsiveness), that irrigated acreas
were assigned energy and water intensive qualities based
upon 14 hydrologic subregions, that a study was being
commissioned to explore the issue of sprinkler and gravity
lrrigation, and that hydro generation capacity issues would
be dealt with in a resource assessment.

Finally, Joseph

DeLuca, a private citizen, commented that BPA projected
irrigation needs were low, based on minimum increases in
land cultivation curbed by high inflation

rates.

BPA

responded that though inflation rates partially accounted
for the levels of loads, other factors (such as changing
farm marketing conditions, energy and other costs) were
largely responsible for the levels of sales.

Even if

inflation rates were lowered, electricity sales would not
change drastically.
Methodological considerations underlying the development of economic and demographic projections were a key
focus of numerous comments.

The economic base model at the

center of the projections had been criticized by William
Jeshe (Economic Development Council of Puget Sound) for not
having industry-specific employment multipliers and by
Phillip Brooks (Montana Department of Administration) for
not distlnguishing migration which is not the result of
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seeking employment from that which is.

BPA responded that,

in the former case, the derivation of specific multipliers
was ruled out by time constraints (but would be part of a
model under construction) and that, in the latter case, the
economic base model, though not designed to explain reasons
for migration, did project net migration in a manner consistent with one assumption about the needs and composition
of the labor force.

BPA also noted that its methodology in

development would allow age distributions for migrants as
well as disaggregations for income projections.

POWER

suggested that BPA was using obsolete data to arrive at a 75
percent share for the single family home portion of residential housing.

BPA explained that the 75 percent value was

not an assumption but a constant consequence of how DRIs
projections of housing starts reflect age-specific household
preference rates and the changing age composition of the
population.

The University of Oregon Survival Center

questioned the validity of the simplifying assumption that
housing stocks adjust instantaneously to demand.

BPA

defended the simplifying assumption on the grounds that data
was not readily available to develop such a lag structure
and that staff did not feel that the absence of such lags
would strongly affect out year values.

Southern california

Edison questioned why national, rather than regional, variables were used to project industrial productivity and why
GNP price deflators were used instead of a Producer Price
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Index in industrial sector inflation assumptions.

BPA

responded that reliable estimates of regional productivity
were unavailable and that projected inflation was not a
direct input to the industrial model but only used to ensure
consistency between income and fuel prices in real terms.
Hence, the particular inflation index used was unimportant.
PNGC made several detailed criticisms of BPA methodology.
First, they challenged BPA's method for developing population estimates from the "bottom-up", treating it as a
function of basic industry employment.

This, they claimed

resulted in forecasted population growing at about half the
20-year historical rate.

BPA countered by noting that,

regardless of the approach taken to projecting populatIon,
the two factors decisive in historical Northwest growth, the
post-war baby boom and accelerated net in-migration, could
not be seen to contInue growing.

Thus, a "top-down" alter-

native would not be likely to yIeld much higher estimates.
Second, PNGC claimed that BPA's treatment of labor force
participation was inadequate since they did not appear to
consider the.market factors affecting It.

BPA responded by

noting that the Bureau of Labor Statistics projections used
by BPA implicitly embody the market factors of concern.
Finally, comments from the Futures Research Institute noted
the primacy of core assumptions in shaping forecast projections and the likelihood of new basic technological
Innovations clustering in the near future.

BPA responded
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that assumptions were laid out in as much detail as judged
to be useful to lay readers and that new technologies and
industries are somewhat included in projections of employment in existing industries.

(It should be noted that sec-

tions of this dissertation look rather carefully at these
last areas of the concerns).
A final category of comments concerned the electricity
prices developed using the Supply Pricing Model.

Once again

NRDC and PNUCC were the chief sources of critical comments.
NRDC asserted that BPA's wholesale rate increases for preference customers (20 percent) were not adequately reflected
in projected electricity prices, that the costs of the WPPSS
plants would have stronger rate effects than the price
forecast indicated, that BPA's 70 percent capacity factor
for thermal plants was too high, and that interest rates
seemed inconsistent between thermal resources and conservation and biased against the latter.

BPA responded by noting

that the wholesale rates for preference customers had not
been finalized (i.e. 70 percent was at best a tentative
number), that the WNP costs only triggered significant
increases in the near term, remaining more constant in the
long run, that the 70 percent capacity factor, though high,
used a portion of secondary hydro energy to displace an
equivalent amount of thermal generating capacity (lowering
the latter proportionally), and that the borrowing rate used
1n resources cost calculations was set by Congress and not
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subject to reinterpretation.

PNUCC also questioned the

accuracy of BPA's calculation hydro capacity, with particular concern about the estimate of thermal energy reduction.
They suggested that BPA use an approach in which monthly
hydro availability would be modeled for each of the 40
historical water years.

BPA responded that they were

examining such a strategy but were uncertain as to whether
or not it would yield much additional accuracy.

POWER

believed BPA had underestimated the costs of power from new
resources.

BPA pointed out that final forecast cost

estimates had changed from the draft and were based on a
least cost mix resource analysis.

The Survival Center also

noted the problems with resource costing, suggesting that
BPA first purchase cheaper resources.

BPA reiterated its

methodology on generic resource costing using a least cost
mix analysis and noted that this analysis was to be expanded
into the forecasting process to deal with the very issue
raised by the Survival Center.

Finally, Joseph deLuca, a

private citizen commenting on the forecast, noted the absence of any mention of hydrogeneration capacity loss due to
fishing enhancement.

BPA acknowledged the omission but

pointed out that this was a resource analysis, rather than a
forecasting issue, and that such planning would, in any
case, be premature before the Regional Council prepared its
fisheries assessment.
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TABLE XII
COMMENTS ON BPA's FORECAST AND RESPONSES
TOpic
Area

Org/Persons
Commenting

Summary of
Remarks

BPA
Response

Choice of
models

PNUCC, SCL,
NERA

• Econometric models
should be used as
cross-check

Conservation

NRDC

• No treatment of
Counc i l prog ralllS

PNUCC, NERA

• Conservation better
treated as resource

• Idea sound but
end-use models
needed for policy
ana lys is
• Omission deliberate
conservation in
forecast only
starting point
• End use sales must
reflect savings,
therefore conserva t ion v iewed on
demand side
• Probabilities subjective, based on
staff judgment

Probability
assessment
Forecasting
system

Forecast
horizon
Residential
model

Commercial
model

Industrial
model

PNUCC, BIA
• Not clear how BPA
Survival Center
arrive at probabiliCentral Elec
ties or high-low
Coop
NERA
• System so complex
• Disaggregation
that knowledge widely
necessary to deal
dispersed throughout
with issues: care
organization
taken to ensure
consistency
PNUCC
• Models not suited to • Observation correct
for near term:
short-term fluctuashort term models
tion
under development
EllA, POWER,
• Price responsiveness • Sensitivity analSCl., NRDC
ys is sugges ted
questionable
results reasonable
• Research indicated
• Different discount
differential wilrates for appliances
lingness to "gaEble
on different appliances
NRDC
• No empirical evidence • Methodology confor life cycle cost'
sistent with economic theory, good
minimization
prediction in
aggregate
SCL

• Declining use/sq,ft,
volumes inconsistent
with other estimates

NERA, SCL
EVA

• Model's response
to prise questionable

PNUCC, NERA

• NEPP model elasticities suggest misspecification

• Efficiency improvements outweighed
factors reusing
use/ft 2
• Difficult to assess
responsiveness visa-vis region's
econometric model:
consump tion pa tterns changing,
model well calibrated to 1980-90
• Error lik~ly part
of problem: nonuniform ex~ansion
also possible
explanatory
factor
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TABLE XV (Cont'd)

Irrigation
model

PNUCC

• Model specified over
national data, locational and aggregation biasis likely

EVA, Survival
Center

• Alumax Shouldn't be
included in OSI
forecast

PNUCC

• Wages should be part
of NEPP total energy
equation

NROC

• Industrial cogeneration ignored
• Model lacked key
economic explanatory
factors
• Model ignored conservation

PNUCC
NROC

• Irrigated acres
should be treated
according to location
• Trend toward sprinklers overestimated

Joseph de
Luca
Economic/
demographics
projections

Economic
De ve lopme n t
Council of
Puge t Sound
Montana Dept.
of Admin.

POWER

Survival
Cen te r
Southern
California
Edison

• Area for additional
research; pooled
cross-sectional
time series data
best available
• Projected end of
recession and increased aluminum
demand would justify Alumax
• Good area for research, specification allowed wages
to be factored out
• Cogeneration dealt
with as resource
• Electricity price
va r iable to be
added
• Model newly developed, room for
factor development
• Irrigated acres
were treated according to locational sub region
• Study being conducted

• No mention of irriga- • Issue would be
tion on hydro base
part of resource
analysis
• Projected irrigation • Forecast load
needs low based on
levels only partly
effects of inflation
result Qf inflation
• Employment multi• Scheduled prohibpliers should be
ited adding new
industry-specific
multipliers, new
model would have
them
• Irrigation not due
• Base model doesn't
to need for employseparate reasons
men t should be
for irr iga tion
separated
consistent with
behavior of labor
force
• Single family house
• Share for singlebased on obsolete
family homes based
on calculation,
data
not assumption
grounded in old
data
• Housing stocks should • Assumption simplistic but effects
not respond instanonly significant
taneously to demand
in near term
• Reliable regional
• Regional variables
estimates of proshould be used to
ductivity unavailderive productivity
able
• Producer Price Index • Only use of inflation index in
should be used for
industrial model
inflation in industo ensure consistrial sector
tency
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TABLE XV (Cont'd)
PNGC

• Population estimates
low as a result of
BPA's approach

• Labor force participation rates ignored
rna r ke t
Futures
Research
Institute

• Core assumptions
shape forecast and
should be listed
•

Supply
Pricing
Model

NRDC

• Major factors In
historical growth
no longer operative, popUlation
would decrease
unde r any me thodology
• Statistics used to
develop projectionr
embody market
effects

•

•

•

•

PNUCC

•

POWER

•

Survival
Center

•

Joseph de
Luca

•

• Assumptions listed
in detail judge
adequate for intelligent lay audiences by BPA
Cluster of new inno- • New technologies
vations likely in
and industries
somewhat included
near future
in employment projections for new
indus tr ies
Wholesale rates for
• Wholesale rates had
preference customers
not yet been estabunderstated
lished, forecast
values reasonable
• WNP costs result
Impact of WPPSS
costs on rates underin signif icant
increases only in
represented
water
Capacity factor for
• Capacity factor
for hydro large
hydro too high
because of thermaldisplacing secondary generation
• Borrowing rates
Interest rates inused were mandated
consistent for
by Congress
thermal and conservation
Hydro capacity cal• Strategy already
investigation, but
culations quesadditional accuracy
tionable, should
questionable
model historical
years
• Costs changed from
Costs of power from
new calculation
new resources
based on least cost
underestimated
mix analysis
Cheaper resources
• Least cost mix
analysis to be exshould be purchased
tended to future
first
choices in forecast
period
• Hydro loss study is
No mention of hydro
part of resource
loss due to fishing
analysis, not
enhancement
forecast; such
an:; l,'::i is

3W~ it:~d

Council recDmmendations

400

Table XV below summarizes the technical challenges to
which BPA provided written (as opposed to modeling) responses.

Identified in the table are the party (or parties)

making the comments, a short summary of their remarks, and a
"shorthand" description of BPA's responses.
In the chapter which follows, the one concluding this
dissertation, a series of structured comparisons will be
made between conclusions (or insights) gained from the use
of Multiple Perspectives in contrast to those gained from
the individual perspectives in isolation.

This demonstra-

tion of the efficacy of Multiple Perspectives involves the
detailed use of the products of the cross-cuing exercise.
Rather than duplicate this process, this chapter will simply
draw out more general conclusions and offer some emergent
insights into the significance of BPA's forecast development
to power planning in the region.
The above cross-cuing process revealed a number of
significant influences between the three "streams" of
events.

Technical products often serve as precedents for

establishing (or modifying) organizational missions, for
basis individual decisions, and for comparing later technical efforts.

Organizational challenges (both intra- and

interorganizational) often shape the questions which require
technical response, as well as the methodology by which they
are answered.

Personal influences have effects on various

levels of organizations, sometimes determining overall
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pollcy In ways which, in turn, set deflnlte technical dlrections: at other times providing the seeds for organizational
reorientation (with its concommltant technical revisions).
Above all, the cross-cuing exercise illustrated how substantive changes in policy (and decisions) is the outcome of the
semi-structured interplay of T-, 0-, and P-elements, and
identified several areas deserving greater attention.
Ultimately, the impact of the BFA forecast must be
judged interorganizationally, where it heralded a new
perception of the future.

Undoubtedly, at the time of the

final forecast's July publication there were many parties
which did not believe BFA's forecast, did not endorse their
choice of models or methodology, or did not find that staff
replies to technical comments convincing.

Given the time-

line for the WNF 1 and 3 decision and the development of the
supporting energy forecasts, BFA could be expected to do no
more than uncover the technical alternative best suIted to
the demands placed on them and openly acknowledged this.
Major model development efforts were precluded durlng the
six-month public involvement period, and this practical
constraint was generally recognized by participants.

As a

consequence, major change to load projections could only
result if a a serious methodological error could be identified in BFA's operation of its modeling system

(Errors that

might exist in data prepared by other sources such as DRI,
would likely go undetected by either BFA or members of its
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regional audience).

BPA prepared some sort of "reasonable"

response to each challenge and, in doing so, defended its
forecast.

The final result was a set of numbers which would

have to be treated as "official" by anyone entering into
resource agreements with BPA, even if they felt the forecast
to be in error.

The forecast development process forged a

new "consensus" which would itself help shape the future of
the region.
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A DIGRAPH INTERPRETATION OF THE FORECAST PROCESS
From the standpoint of systems research, the Multiple
Perspective Concept allows complex problems to be approached
not only from different disciplinary points of departure,
but also from different paradigms of inquiry.
~esulting

Only findings

from the T-perspective are capable of being sub-

jected to validation procedures in the strict scientific
sense of the word.

Corporate and judicial decisions cannot

be subjected to statistical checks of reliability, validity,
or goodness-of-fit.

They can, however, be presented in such

a fashion that the rationale of investigation as well as the
evidence or information used may be reconstructed, (though
not the subjective weighting process used for integrating
the evidence).

This allows potential critics to evaluate

the object of description and, if desired, construct another
plausible interpretation, much as two lawyers build their
contrasting arguments from the same evidence.
In social sciences dominated by empiricism, such as
cultural anthropology, field researchers deal with some of
these issues by, in effect, separating their roles as
reporters from their roles as interpreters of the findings.
They strive to keep descriptions as few of interpretation as
possible, which permits their audience to arrive at diffe~ent

conclusions from the same data.

In this disserta-

tion, efforts were made to present findings of each perspec-
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tive independently.

Internal consistency and, to the

e~tent

possible, comprehensiveness were sought in each case.

Simi-

larly, the cross-cuing exercise above was primarily narrative, with most of the major conclusions drawn out in the
chapter which follows.

The detail of description went

somewhat beyond what was required to reconstruct the
dissertation's concluding remarks.
But, the true strength of Multiple Perspectives comes
from the use of T-, 0-, and P-findings in conjunction with
one another.

This allows the multidimensionality of the

object of research to be revealed.

Because this goes beyond

simple description, it is essential that the emerging
multidimensional picture) or its most critical features) be
presented unambiguously and formally.

Digraphs constitute a

useful and potentially powerful tool targeted. towards this
end.
Although the fundamentals of digraph usage were explained in earlier chapters, further remarks on their application to the problem of tying together insights from the
three perspectives are warranted.

Following guidelines

presented by Linstone (1984:321-327) the nodes or elements
in digraphs are the perspectives, while the arrows, as
always, indicate the direction of influence.

The signs

associated with the arrows (appropriate where relations can
be presented as positive or negative) reflect the direction
of the influence of one perspective upon another.

A plus
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sign (+) represents "reinforcing the attitude toward, or
feasibility of, a policy".

conversely, a minus sign (-)

connotes "counteracting the attitude toward, or feasibility
of, a policy".

In the context of the analysis below,

"policy" will be interpreted broadly enough to include
selections of technical methodology.
In addition to creating a picture which lays out the
relations between the perspectives explicitly, digraphs also
allow the researcher to uncover the dynamics underlying the
interactions between them.

Signed digraphs accomplish this

by permitting the interpretation of cycles or feedback loops
among perspectives.
tion.

Two basic rules guide this interpreta-

First, a "loop is positive or impact amplifying if it

has zero or an even number of minus signs negative or impact
counteracting if it has an odd number of minus signs."
(Linstone: 1984:323).

Second, the total effect of any given

point on a digraph on any other specific point 1s the sum of
the effects of all the paths or cycles between the two
points.

(Effects may be direct, or indirectly expressed

through intermediate points).

When all effects are positive

or all are negative, their sums are, respectively, positive
and negative.

The sum is indeterminate when there are both

positive and negative effects via different poles.
Figure 27 below depicts the interactions of perspectives surrounding the development of the 1982 forecasts.
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Figure 27. A digraph representation of multiple
perspectives surrounding BPA's 1982 forecast
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The perspectives represented are as follows:
Tl

econometric demand models

T2

end-use demand models

T3

other demand modeling techniques

01

Financial Management

02

Power Requirements

03

Conservation

04

outside participants in BPA public involvement

P1

Administrator

P2

Power Requirements' leaders
Before looking at the flows and cycles embedded within

the system of relations depicted in the digraph, a few
linkages should be explained.

P2 is split off from 02 to

distinguish between the effects of individuals' experience
on model and methodology selection from those resulting from
newly evolved organizational procedures.

A number of

specific individuals in Power Requirements (those who had
earlier worked with the SOM report and later emerged in
leadership positions) had negative experiences with the
region's existing econometric models (P2Tl negative) and
more positive (or at least more promising) ones with the
ORNL end-use models (P2T2 positive).

P2 is, in many re-

spects, an antecedent to (or precedent for) 02.
From the organizational standpoint, 02 is strongly
constrained by the needs of BPA's Financial Management input
(i.e. the WPPSS study (01»

and proper implementation the
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terms of the Regional Act by Conservation (03).

The former

needs favor a forecast methodology which provides "a best
guess" at resource requirements (range).

The latter needs

suggest the desirability of conservation and rate scenario
capabilities in model selection.

Financial analysis needs

are given the stamp of importance by the management
priorities of the Administrator (PlOl positive).
From the standpoint of the forecasting unit (02), both
Tl and T2 are acceptable alternatives (despite individual
preferences).

Thus, 02T2 and 02Tl are both positive.

Both

Tl and T2 could easily be used in a financial analysis
context, so TlOl and T20l are both positive.

T2, however,

is ostensibly better suited to conservation policy analysis.
Hence, though T203 is positive TI03 is negative in sign.
The training and professional experience of Power Requirements staff also left them unfamiliar with other possible
technical approaches (T3) which could have been used for
forecasting purposes and might - or might not have been
accepted by the power planning community.

(The significance

of paths not considered - both models and planning strategies - is discussed at greater length in the next chapter,
which evaluates what has thus far been described).
Looking at the cycles involved, both cycles passing
through T2 (i.e. 02T20302 and 02T20l02) are positive.
contrast, only one of the cycles passing through Tl is
positive (i.e. 02TlOl02 is positive while 02Tl0302 is

By
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negative).

Thus, when looking at the organizational influ-

ences on technical choices (constrained, it should be noted,
by the set of choices made available) the reasons for the
model choices are clear.
When looking at the sum of effects on T1 and T2 other
dimensions of the choice of approaches become apparent.
Influences from P2 and 04 both give extra weight to the
particular methodology that was developed, though these
preferences are probably outweighed by the organizational
consideration described above.
Several comments need to be made about 04.

Because the

comments received by BPA were varied, there was no universally preferred set of models or methodology.

Preferences

leaned towards the end-use models, however, so the signs are
placed on dashed lines to indicate a less than unified
perception.

More important is the reason 04 is linked only

to T1 and T2.

As noted in the remarks introducing the

description of the technical workshops, the public involvement agenda was contrained to look among preselected models
for their strengths and weaknesses.

Membership in 04 was

technically open to anyone wishing to participate.

Techni-

cians, however, were the primary group 02 contacted through
mailing lists.

Because 02 could not be selective among the

technicians participating (i.e. could not impose 01 or 03
concerns on outsiders) 0204 is unsigned and represented by a
dashed line.

Under BPA's timetable, totally different
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approaches were not deemed readily irnplernentable, thus there
is no linkage between 04 and T3.

Also, although technical

comments influenced more than simply BPA evaluation of the
end-use econometric demand models (i.e. numerous input and
parametric changes resulted from the comments) it was only
at Tl and T2 that major substantive methodological choices
could potentially be modified (at least within the time
frame of the 1981-1982 forecast cycle).
The perspectives listed outside of the frame labeled
with names rather than symbols have been added to show
broader influences which affected model and methodology
selection in less direct and obvious ways.

Economists and

engineers have, and continue to be the dominant force in the
utility industry (though there is currently a trend away
from narrow specialization) and the- influences of these
disciplines are shown by means of dashed lines.
Econometrics was used heavily in the models represented
by Tl and T2.

It also was a mainstay of the training of

members of 02 and most of the members of 04.

Conservation

concerns also figured heavily in the forecast development
process.

03 was largely made up of conservation specialists

who, despite somewhat varied academic backgrounds, shared
common objectives regarding the promotion of efficient
energy use.

In the model development community, conserva-

tion engineers have developed simulation tools for building design which permit the exploration of the effects of
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equipment changes on energy consumption.

The tools were an

integral part of the development of T2 but not Tl.

General-

ly speaking, then, this illustrates how the tools selected
for consideration embodied familiar ideas and concepts.
Also, depicted outside the process are various parties
whose primarily qualitative insights are potential valuable
for load forecasting and power resource planning, but who,
lacking fluency in the lingua franca of modeling, have
difficulty accessing the review process.

Included in this

category are many business leaders, lawyers, policiticans,
and government officials.
Finally, what is missing from this digraph provides
additional insight into the forecasting process.

Conspicu-

ous in its absence is another perspective to support the
consideration and possible selection of a different modeling
approach (T3).

Both Tl and T2 are supported by "coalitions"

withln the power planning community.

No group can be seen

to champion any alternative approaches to forecasting and
modeling, however, and, given the composition of the participant groups involved in the forecast development
process, none is likely to emerge.

Thus, the digraph

suggests the need for a stimulus from outside to prevent
disciplinary inbreeding and widen the sphere of consideration to include additional technical approaches.

Multiple

Perspectives can be used as a device for obtaining these
fresh alternative Viewpoints.
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To summarize, the digraph construction exercise
produced the following conclusions.
•

T1, the use of pure econometric models, was supported

directly by 02 directly, Pi and 01 indirectly.
opposed by P2 and 04.

It was

One cycle (02T10102) supported T1

while another cycle (02T10302) opposed it.

The model was

good for financial analysis considerations by weak on
conservation policy testing.
•

T2, the end-use model approach, was the more strongly

supported alternative.
its selection.
selection.

P2, 02, and 04 directly supported

Pi, P2, 01 and 03 indirectly supported its

Both cycles associated with T2 (i.e. 02T20102

and 02T203T2) are positive.

Thus, the organizational conc-

erns of 03 (conservation assessment) tipped the process
towards T1.
•

The review process was, as noted earlier, constrained

to focus upon comparisons between models already available
for use.

As will be described more fully in the next

chapter, unless some mechanism is used to incorporate the
insights of non-economists and non-engineers, th1s process
cannot help but manifest the symptoms of disciplinary
lnbreeding.
The potential for development of digraph techniques in
conjunction with Multiple Perspectives is

gre~t

and could,

in and of itself, constltute the topic of a dissertation.
One obvious area of development, which could provide a
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bridge between the digraphs and available structural
modeling techniques, is that of assigning weights to the
relations.

Questions of the strength of influence of the

Administrator on organizational priorities (and resulting
procedural choices), for instance, cannot be answered simply
using signs.
Obviously this is not a trivial project.

It would

involve ascertaining the strength of perceptions (i.e. how
firmly certain things are believed to be) as well as the
organizational responsiveness to d1fferent influence.
Policy Delphi could provide a starting point for this
endeavor, though it would have to be carried out virtually
concurrent with the decision processes under consideration
to prevent perceptual or attitudinal "revisionism".
Digraphs thus explicate relationships between perspectives in ways difficult to duplicate by other means.

While

resolving certain issues, however, their use in turn raises
other.

The concluding chapter of this dissertation, in

evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of BPA's forecast
methodology, examines important implications of the relationships embodied in the digraph above (as well as some
relationships not embodied therein).

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
TYING THE THREADS TOGETHER: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER
In the preceeding chapters, BPA's 1982 forecast was
scrutinized by means of three sets of lenses:
and P-perspectives.

The T-, 0-,

To the fullest extent possible, these

perspectives and the insights which they yielded were kept
separate and distinct.
tives cross-cued.

Only afterwards were the perspec-

This strategy was designed to illustrate

the additional aepth and dimens10n of insight possible to be
ga1ned from us1ng the multiple perspect1ves together.

It is

through cross-cuing that the full explanatory power of the
Multiple Perspective concept becomes apparent.

It is now

time to draw out the conclusions wh1ch this exercise
yielded.
At the outset of this dissertation, three research
objectives were defined, all of which w1ll be met in the
conclusions that follow.

The first two concern what the

methodology of the Multiple Perspective Concept reveals
about how forecasts influence resource planning and decision
making and how forecasts are produced through an ongoing,
essentially interactive process.

The section which follows

lays out the conclus10ns about BPA'S forecast, and the
process by which it was produced, focusing first upon those

415
conclusions

~esulting

f~om

the use of each

pe~spective

ltself and then identifying the additional insights
using the

f~om

tive.

de~ived

in combination.

pe~spectives

The final section

by

explo~es

It examines what this

the

thi~d

pa~ticula~

the Multiple Perspective Concept.

and last objec-

study reveals about

He~e a~e

listed the

strengths and weaknesses of the MP Concept experienced in
this investigation of BPA's
fo~

fo~ecast,

its use and application to

new recommendations

~esearch

problems, and

specific areas perceived to be in need of further development.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE FORECAST: WHAT MULTIPLE
PERSPECTIVES SAYS
In this section, conclusions about Bonneville's
cast

de~ived

f~om

the use of Multiple

presented.

First, conclusions

T-, 0-, and

P-pe~spectives

To some extent, these

fo~e

Pe~spectives a~e

a~~ived

at by means of the

used by themselves

~eite~ate rema~ks

a~e

made in

listed.

othe~

chapte~s,

but they also often

elabo~ate

or emphasize key points which have become clearer

given the bigger
conclusions

pictu~e

~esulting

~eflect pa~aphrasings

produced by this study.

from

c~oss-cuings

which

Second,

are described.

These are listed according to the type of interaction
between the perspectives (e.g. T on 0, 0 on P, etc.) and, as
noted above, illustrate the additional values of a multiple
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perspective approach when contrasted with the conclusions
obtained from the application of the perspectives in isolation.

Finally, the forecasting and planning process is

evaluated as a whole, based upon the full range of insights
yielded by this investigation, with heaviest emphasis placed
upon the area in many ways most central to futures research:
risk and uncertainty.
Conclusions from the T-perspectiye
1.

BPA's Modeling System was More complex than (and at

Least as Sophisticated as) any Previously Used for Regional
Electricity Forecasting.

A point which Bonneville staff

raised at numerous occasions during technical workshops and
public involvement was that the models they selected and
developed were designed to address selected complex issues
(e.g. conservation policies, electricity pricing).

In order

for these models to satisfy that criterion, they themselves
embodied a complex structure.
Two points need to be noted.

First, model complexity

and sophistication, though often g01ng hand in hand, are not
identical.

A model need only have an intricate and detailed

accounting structure to be complex.
its structure may actually be simple.

The ideas embodied in
By contrast, a model

which is sophisticated embodies elaborate or elegant theory
in its structure, but that structure need not be complicated.

Second, neither complexity nor sophistication in any

sense endow a model with superiority over alternative ap-
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proaches, nor do they guarantee improved performance.

Com-

plex models may simply aggregate or disaggregate simulations
of real world events without changing the ultimate results.
Sophisticated models may be difficult to specify or support
with adequate data.

In worst instances, the theory under-

lying their construction, however elegant and cherished by
model users, may ultimately prove misguided, yielding
untenable results.
The disaggregated nature of BPA's overall modeling
system, and several of the models within that system,
definitely produced a more complex system than used before,
as asserted above.

This disaggregation, however, is not

necessarily more sophisticated than some of its predecessors
(e.g. NEPP, ISOM).

The enhanced ability to address specific

conservation policy issues of concern to BPA which earlier
econometric models were not capable of addressing at least
outweighs whatever deficiencies the system might have in
terms of internal consistency and completeness.

It is thus

best judged at least as sophisticated as its predecessors.
2.

BPA's Selection of Oisaggregate End-Use Models for

Forecasting Loads was Technically Warranted.

It seems

readily possible to debate the relative merits of end-use
vs. econometric models ad nauseum.

Both approaches may

display unique strong points; neither necessarily produces
more accurate results (nor do they necessarily produce
results meaningful for decisions).

While econometric models
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may be evaluated accord1ng to a number of stat1stical
goodness-of-f1t measures, the data over wh1ch they are
specified may be poor or descriptive of a unique set of
h1stor1cal c1rcumstances.

End-use models mix the1r methods,

and are so data-intensive that judgment must be used very
freely to fill gaps in inputs.

The particular end-use

models BPA evaluated (and ultimately selected) responded at
least as reasonably to a battery of diverse tests as their
econometric alternatives.

Their internal structures

additionally permitted simple and direct policy analysis.
This latter capability justified the selection of the two
ORNL models.
3.

The Use of a Range of Forecasts Constituted a pefinite

Improyement Over Single Trajectory Point Forecasts.

As

long

as its methodology is carried out correctly, there 1s in
principle nothing technically inferior about using a single
"best guess" for a forecast.

Given the changing pattern of

load growth in the late 1970s and the failure of earlier
point forecasts to track actual electriCity sales, the
establishment of baseline, high, and low forecast scenarios
was a major area of improvement in the BPA forecast.

By

using scenarios rather than statistical "confidence intervals" (not a practical alternative given the disaggregatre
nature of BPA's forecasting system)

BPA made possible more

thorough evaluation of sources of forecast error.
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4.

Iterating Price and Demand Models Allowed BPA to Couple

the Best Features of ISDM with its Disaggregated Modeling
System.

Electricity price and demand are intimately linked

in the real world and it is essential that this linkage be
represented in any regional power planning forecast.

The

Integrated Supply and Demand Models (ISDM) coupled a
predecessor of BPA's Supply Pricing Model with an econometric demand component.

By developing a pricing model

embodying the often complicated rate provisions of the
Regional Power Act, and allowing this to run iteratively
with its demand models until an equilibrium set of loads and
prices were reached, BPA enhanced its forecasting capability.
5.

BPA's Technical Documentation Made the Models Used.

Their Inputs. Their Results. and the Assumptiqns Behind them
Explicit to a Degree unprecedented in Regional Demand
Forecasting.

To be evaluated thoroughly, a forecast and its

assumptions must be laid bare in full detail.

BPA's three

stages of documentation (technical review, draft, and final
forecast) described in detail all the models under consideration as well as those actually used for the forecast.
Inputs to models were listed exhaustively and output results
of both "official" forecasts and major sensitivity tests
were presented in detail.

Of at least equal importance,

efforts were made to render explicit the assumptions made
about electricity prices, levels of economic activity,
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conservation, and resource availability underlying the three
forecast scenarios.

This allowed evaluation of forecast

error and the identification of possibly overlooked issues
by BPA's primary technical audience.
There are, however, basic "core assumptions" implicit
in such a forecast Which go unacknowledged, not because of
any attempt to deliberately conceal them, but rather because
they are taken for granted by the forecast authors.

(This

is usually an artifact of the disciplinary backgrounds and
methodological leanings of the technical staff.)

By way of

example, the perpetuation of the Regional Act in its
original form and BPA's roles and responsibilities were
assumed unchanging.

The Direct Service Industries, major

consumers of electricity energy, were also assumed to be
content to remain in region as rates rise despite attractive
opportunities elsewhere.

When such assumptions remain tacit

they limit the number and kinds of technical questions asked
and, by extension, the alternative courses of action considered.

(The importance of core assumptions will be dis-

cussed at greater length later in this chapter.)
6.

BPA's Treatment of conservation in the FOrecast

waS

Accectable as a Starting Point for Policy Analysis but Only
as a starting Point.

During the technical review of the

models under consideration for use in its forecast, BPA
explored a variety of conservation scenarios designed to
illustrate their capabilities.

For the draft and final
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forecasts,

ho~everi

conservation was treated in a fashion

which the staff acknowledged to be only a starting point.
The demand models were run so as to simulate only those
programs already in place or those over which BPA had control.

This treatment, though technically acceptable, left

unexplored not only the amount of savings attainable from
additional programs (e.g. Regional Council) but also the
various factors affected by and affecting such programs.
7.

The pRr National Economic Model. Though. in a

Fundamental Sense. Serving as the Starting Point for the
Forecast. Remained Largely a Black Box to its Users.

DRI

(along with Chase Econometrics and Wharton) is generally
accepted as a primary source for projections of national and
regional economic and demographic behavior.

Its national

economic model is mammoth in both size and complexity.
Because of this, most subscribers to its services do not
actually operate the model but use packaged routines to
access and massage its projections in light of data from
regional sources, generally based the development of model
inputs on DRI's numbers.

Though the staff understood the

operation of the national model in general terms, it remained largely a black box both to them and their technical audience, opaque in terms of both operations and
assumptions.

Though strongly counterintuitive results of

the national model would undoubtedly be recognized by users,
other types of miscalculation would not.

Forecast inputs
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would~

in such a case, be vulnerable to any problems inher-

ent in the national model.
8.

Though very Detailed. BPA's Forecasting System Left the

Effects o£ a Number of Potentially Significant Feedbacks
Unexplored.

While the iterative feedbacks between electri-

city sales and prices constituted one of the basic strengths
of BPA's forecasting system, its data and information flows
were more generally unidirectional.

Economic and demograph-

ic inputs were derived in a series originating with DRI's
national projections and inputs to the demand models.
While, in reality, changing electricity prices may directly
or indirectly influence employment, migration, and linked
economic factors, BPA's modeling system did not represent
such interdependencies.

Without additional research, it is

difficult to assess whether or not these omissions are
significant (or whether or not they are significant when
changes in prices exceed critical thresholds).
9.

Though BPA's FOrecast Range

waS

Deyeloped Using

Well-Defined and Explicit Methodologies. the Probability
Assignment Associated with that Range

waS

not.

The

assignment of probabilities to BPA's range of forecasts was
performed by Power Requirements staff at the request of
upper management following their advanced review of the
draft.

While the methodology underlying the development of

the range had been well thought out, with consideration
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given to different levels of economic activity, resource
availability, and conservation, the probability assignments
were made judgmentally ex post with no explicit methodology.
In effect, these numbers convey a sort of "gut level"
reflection of the staff's confidence in their work, not a
systematic evaluation of the conditions embodied in the
three scenarios compared to some set of historical behaviors.
Though such "seat of the pants" assessments are not
technically sophisticated, they are perfectly acceptable
provided that their authors acknowledge their judgmental
underpinnings (which BPA did).

As a summary reflection of

forecast confidence, however, they are somewhat inconsistent
with the high degree of disaggregation in the model1ng
system.

Attempts to improve upon such an approach by adding

more formal methodological structure generally fall along
one or more of these lines.

First is decomposition -- the

factors taken (or not taken) into considerat1on are laid out
explicitly and component probabilities assigned.

This

yields the advantage of allowing users and critics to assess
staff judgment and substitute their own, if felt necessary.
The disadvantage is that some method of aggregation must be
used.

This usually leads to a second line of "improvement",

the development of a statistical method for combining probabilties.

Such methods confer the advantage of explicit-

ness, but reflect the infamous computer science acronym GIGO
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(Garbage In, Garbage out).

The ultimate probability assign-

ment, though arrived at through the use of algorithms,
is only as strong or as weak as the underlying judgments.
Statistical techniques designed for hard, interval-scale
data cannot compensate in any way for weaknesses in judgment
or inaccuracies in perception.

The final strategy for

improvement attempts to develop hard numbers from historical
data.

Such data is frequently unavailable.

When it can be

obtained, the resulting probability distributions mayor may
not capture all the important outcomes that will be experienced in the future.

If the future differs qualitatively

from the historical period over which data was collected,
the resulting distribution will not be applicable.

The

development of any of these alternatives, however, was not
something that could be carried out in the time BPA had
available.
10.

pespite the Fact that BPA P;oduced a "state-of-the-Art"

Forecast. its staff was Fo;ced to Work with (and sometimes
around) Maio; pata Weaknesses in Some Secto;s.

Until the

mid-1970s, energy forecasting, particularly in the Pacific
Northwest, was largely non-problematic: both energy availability and price appeared stable, as did demand growth.
Because of this, little data about patterns of energy consumption and their relation to building, dwelling, or
factory production characteristics was collected.

This

situation left forecasters and analysts of the 1980s unable
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to obtain

~ey

pieces of inforro3tion about the foci of their

concern.
BPA expended a great deal of resources obtaining the
best available data, but in some cases what was available
contained conspicuous weaknesses.

Particularly in the

fast-growing, but internally diverse, commercial sector
descriptive data was particularly weak.

As a result, por-

tions of the forecast were ultimately dependent on data
developed by simulation or judgment (somewhat negating the
supposed strengths of the disaggregated end-use models).
This potentially lessened the reliability of those portions
while at the same time making them difficult to refute or
contradict.
11.

BPA's Forecast was Extremely Conservative in its

Treatment of

~£bnologlcal

Change.

Relative to earlier

regional power forecasts, BPA's treated the effects of
technological change with both greater detail and explicitness.

The commercial and residential sector demand models

developed their projections of energy use by means of
technology curves measuring efficiency improvements against
anticipated equipment operating costs.

The industrial model

used productivity as an input, and embedded within the
values of that input were assumed improvements in technology.

Technological innovations, however, were not

forecasted either inside or outside the modeling system.
Technological change, where modeled, was essentially
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represented as the improvement of existing technologies,
rather than the development of new ones.

consequently, the

resulting forecast does not allow the evaluation of the full
range of impacts of energy technology on economics and power
consumption.
12.

The structure of the Demand Models Somewhat Predisposed

them Towards Lower Results than their Econometric
counterparts.

Each generation of demand forecasting models

seems to focus heavily upon the weaknesses of its predecessors.

The two ORNL models placed greatest emphasis upon the

simulation and representation of conservation policy.
Though the answers the models produced were reasonable,
their structures encouraged analysis which posed polIcy
questions specifically about savings (as opposed to marketing opportunities, technological innovation effects, etc.).
As

a result, heavier emphasis was placed upon the correct

representation of demand-reducing conservation programs.
13.

The Final Forecast was Produced with a Number of

Unresolved Modeling Problems.

At best, simulations

represent reality imperfectly, necessarily omitting details
or elements which are of potential relevance.

At worst,

they severely distort the reality they strive to represent.
BPA staff worked with a complex set of models

~hich

provided

a representation of regional economic activity and power
consumption behavior which was extremely detailed (though
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such a level of detail is not necessarily the most appropriate for decision making).

While the overall responsive-

ness of the models tested credibly, a number of problems
were detected during the public involvement period Which,
for various reasons, went unresolved (e.g. NEPP elasticities, and lag coefficients, ORNL Commercial Model price
responsiveness etc.).

Under certain, possibly extreme

conditions, such problems could prove significant.
14.

Though Proceeding from Different Methodological Bases

and Yielding Contrasting Results. Both Forecasts Were
Produced Using Legitimate Alternative Approaches.

NERA

chose to critique BPA's forecast point-by-point from the
perspective of a "devil's adVocate" contending that BPA's
forecast was too low.

Challenging input values and pro-

posing alternative methods for critical calculations, NERA
In effect produced a higher "forecast-by-adjustment".

By

contrast, EVA, maintained that the Northwest was entering
new territory where old guideposts would be ineffective.
Using forecast-by-analogy as a method, EVA projected BPA's
future based upon the experience of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.

This yielded noticeably lower results (i.e.

BPA's forecast too high).

Both of these studies yielded

some insights regarding uncertainties of load futures.
Taken together, however, they only scratch the surface of
the full spectrum of possibilities which confront the
Northwest power community.

A comprehensive technical review
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of the BPA forecast would require much more than the productlon of a pair of counter forecasts (as is discussed later in
this chapter).
Conclusions from the O-Perspectiye
1.

Though SOPs are Generally the Proper Starting Point for

understanding Organizational Behayior. the Actions of BPA's
Forecasting Group Can Only be Understood by Understanding ad
hoc Procedures.

Standard operating procedures are the

habitual ways organizations go about doing things and, as
such, they go a long way towards explaining why a group took
the action they did.

Organizations, however, do change,

usually slowly, but under some conditions change is, for a
brief period, rapid.

The standard operating procedures for

preparing forecasts and planning for loads which had been
used in the 1970s proved inadequate.

It was largely in

response to this failure that the Regional Power Act was
passed and that BPA expanded its resource and conservation
planning capabilities.

The 1982 forecast was produced by

newly formed groups in Power Requirements, Rates, and
Conservation.

Because both the organizations and the tasks

they performed were new, in effect evolving along with the
forecast process, SOPs were not particularly useful as
explanatory devices.

It was necessary to look more at the

specifics of the evolving ad hoc procedures which, if
successful, would become the SOPs of the groups involved.
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2.

At the Time of the 1982 Forecast. a Mixture of

Corporate Cultures May be Seen Operating Within BPA.

Deal

and Kennedy developed the notion of corporate cultures -groups of individuals comprising an organization and sharing
common values and worldviews -- to distinguish successful
from unsuccessful companies.

In large organizations,

particularly ones undergoing major structural changes lIke
BPA, it is possible and useful to identify different types
of corporate cultures at different organizational levels.
Thus, while the core of BPA could still be best viewed as a
highly structured bureaucracy confronting slow feedbacks
about its performance, the newly formed groups within it
which were charged with developing the forecast functioned
in many ways more like the cultures of "think tanks".
Within these groups innovation was high, procedures evolved
through a lot of trial-and-error, feedback through public
involvement channels was quick, and within-group communication was highly lateralized.

This concept of multiple

corporate cultUres heightens understanding of organizational
drivers as well as misfits.
3.

The ascendancy of Forecasting and Resource Analysis in

Terms of Relatiye Importance is Reflected in the structural
Changes Recorded in BPA's Organizational Chart.

While it is

true that important actions do not necessarily follow formal
lines of organizational influence, major shifts in orientation usually result in structural changes as well.

A
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revIew of BPA's organIzatIonal charts IndIcates a late
1970s-early 1980s shift in emphasis from engineering to
resource planning and management.
4.

The Early 1980s Reorganization at BPA can Best be

viewed as an Organizational Problem-Solving Response to the
Regional Act and to the Growing wpPSS Problem.

As

the 1970s

moved to their conclusion, the problem of financing the
uncompleted WPPSS nuclear plants became one which BPA
realized it would have to confront itself.

At the same

time, the outlines of the Regional Power Act, which entailed
new responsibilities for BPA, was taking shape.

The

reorganization of the Agency with emphaSis on conservation,
forecasting, ratemaking, resource planning, and financial
management prepared BPA to meet just those challenges.
5.

Functionally. the Production of BPA's Forecast Crosscut

Formal Organizational Lines of COmmand.

Although the newly

revamped organizational structure mirrored the revised
priorities of the agency, responsibility for the production
of the long-term forecast was distributed over several
Divisions and even Offices.

Understanding how the coordi-

nation of the project took place thus required looking
beyond, or between, the formal lines of command to the
subgroups actually tasked with producing the forecast and
studying their procedures of operation.
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6.

The Public Inyolvement Process

waS

the one Most Heavily

Used Channel for Outside Parties to Influence the Forecast.
Because Bonneville is a Federal agency answerable to the
public, a number of channels (e.g. hearings, court cases,
information requests, professional meetings) are available
to interested parties to obtain information or action.
Public involvement through meetings and correspondence is a
common feature of the agency's dealings but rarely is it
used as extensively as it was during the preparation of the
1982 forecast, although the agenda behind this process was
admittedly limited in its scope, (as noted in the previous
chapter and discussed at greater length below).

In large

measure this was because BPA staff recognized both the
importance and the sensitive nature of the forecast (and its
uses) and structured the public involvement process more
than Is customarily the case.

Thus, almost all the "chal-

lenges" which came to BPA did so via this channel.
7.

The Two Primary Groups of stakeholders Participating in

the Public Inyolyement Process were those with Financial
Interests in the wpPSS Plants and those Advocating the
Primacy of Conservation as a Future Resource.

During the

public involvement process, both at the workshops and
through correspondence, a number of diverse parties revealed
themselves through their participation.

These included

academics, utility representatives, consultants, ratepayers,
environmentalists, and public officials.

Two groups of
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stakeholders were represented most heavily in the process.
First were those PNUCC member utilities with investments in
the WPPSS plants which would be strongly affected, in terms
of both finances and their own resource planning by BPA's
decision to complete, delay, or terminate any of the plants.
Second were the advocates of conservation and environmental
protection (NRDC, Survival Center) who wished to ensure that
BPA took full account of conservation alternatives in their
forecasts.
8.

Despite pifferent and Even Opposing Interests.

virtually all Parties COmmenting on BPA's Forecast Would be
Hurt by the Effects of a Grossly Inaccurate Forecast.

A

constraining factor on comments was the effect which would
have resulted from BPA taking action on a remark.

If BPA

seriously overbuilt resources in response to comments
received by, say, shareholders in the WPPSS plants, they, as
well as BPA, would have to bear the consequences.

If the

need for conservation was overestimated, the region would
find itself obtaining savings during a surplus period, and
would likely be reticent to acquire further additional
conservation even were 1t needed.

Thus, subtle pressure

existed for interest groups to look hard at what they were
proposing and keep suggestions "reasonable".
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9.

The Process Surrounding the peyelopment of BPA's 1982

Forecast Signalled an Emerging Realignment in the Regional
Power Planning Community.

The Regional Power Act had

created new roles for BPA, PNUCC, and the other members of
the region's power planning community.

Though the Regional

Council was not a major player during public involvement,
BPA's methods of forecasting and resource planning closely
resembled those under development for use in the Council's
Plan.

In many ways (e.g. conservation alternatives con-

sidered, resource costing and ratemaking methodologies, load
ranges) the development of the 1982 forecast foreshadowed
the role the Council would play in the region while defining
the "rules of the game" (i.e. acceptable planning ranges)
for other actors as well.
Conclusions from the P-Perspectiye
1.

By Establishing overall Agency Policy. Each of the

Three Recent Bonneville Power Administrators pefined how BPA
would Perceive and Respond to the Resource Planning
Situation in the Region.

Resource planning first became

something of a regional problem at the time of the HydroThermal Power Plan, when it was realized that future loads
could not be met simply with hydropower.

Under Donald

Hodel, the development of thermal power and, secondarily,
conservation, were the agency's foremost priorities.
Sterling Hunro, the development of Regional Power Bill

Under
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legislation was at the forefront.

Finally, under Peter

Johnson, financial planning, chiefly targeted at enabling
the agency to deal with the WPPSS problem, became a new
agency touchstone.

In each case, the approach and orien-

tation of the Administrator was reflected in both the structural and characteristics of the organization.
2.

As the P-Perspectiye Would Predict. Each Administra-

tob's View of BPA's Resource Planning Problem was Strongly
Influenced by his Background.

While it 1s clearly the case

that the complexion of the Northwest's resource planning
problems, and the region's dominant perception of them, have
undergone change since the early 1970's, it is also true
that each of the last three Bonneville Administrators have
approached the problems faCing them in manners consistent
with their backgrounds.

During Donald Hodel's term of

office, the region appeared in imminent danger of severe
power shortfalls.

Hodel, whose background entailed a law

degree as well as an Assistant Administrator's position with
BPA, adopted an approach very similar to traditional BPA
operating procedures.

He treated resource development as an

engineering problem (i.e. building sufficient capacity to
meet anticipated loads) which would be directed according to
the administrative provisions of the Hydro-Thermal Power
Plan.

When Sterling Munro assumed leadership, he brought

his political expertise to bear upon increasing regional
disagreements on rate, resource and environmental issues.
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The development of Regional Power Act legislation was a key
means of addressing this issue.

Finally, Peter Johnson

approached the festering WPPSS problem as a business problem, bringing his extensive experience in the area to bear.
3.

To the Extent that Peter Johnson Defined how BPA's

Forecasting Apparatus Would be Used in a Financial
Management Situation. he Helped Giye it Shape.

The

selection,of models and development of needed inputs was
carried out by BPA staff.

A large portion of this work was

carried out, or at least initiated, during Munro's term of
office.

It was not certain, however, at that time exactly

how these models would be used.

The critical questions

Peter Johnson asked about the WPPSS situation, and the way
he asked them, required BPA to perform analyses different
from what had previously been attempted.

This involved the

development of a financial analysis capability and its subsequent integration with load forecasting results.

The

nature of this integration in turn contributed to the shape
the load scenarios assumed.

It was through this series of

linkages that Johnson as Administrator could be said to
shape the development of the forecast.
4.

Johnson's Successful Experience at Trus Joist. which

Strongly Paralleled the Situation he Confronted with wpPSS.
Undoubtedly Facilitated his Difficult pecision to pelay WNP
1 and 3.

That the Supply System was beset with severe
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financial difficulties was a point obvious to all in the
region at the time Peter Johnson assumed office.

For many,

it seemed equally clear that BPA would be compelled to take
a more directive role in dealing with the uncompleted
nuclear plants.

The financial and load uncertainties

surrounding possible resource scheduling decisions were
great, and hesitancy or "paralysis by analysis". could easily
have been an outcome.

Peter Johnson, however, had faced a

similar problem earlier in the private sector and his
company, Trus Joist, had profited handsomely from his difficult but in retrospect correct, decision to close several of
the company's plants.

This successful experience undoubt-

edly helped give Johnson the confidence to delay WNP 1 and 3
in the face of sometimes severe criticism.
5.

Key Members of Power Reguirements Staff were Pre-

disposed to Search for new Technical Approaches as a Result
of the Cognitive pissonance they Experienced Trying to
Resolye Results of the SOM study with the sou Forecast.

The

perception of imminent power deficits remained dominant in
the power planning community in general, and BPA in particular, into the early 1980s.

Had there not also been a

"minority view" present in the late 19705, it is doubtful
that BPA could have readied itself for its 1982 forecast in
time.

The search for alternative forecasting approaches

came as the result of a failed attempt by three key Power
Requirements staff members to reconcile the result of
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Skidmore, OWings, and Merrill's study of regional conservation potential with the Sum-Of-Utilities forecast.

The

disaggregated projections which they made of regional power
consumption fell far below those identified in the SOU
forecast.

This, in turn, led them to distrust the corrob-

orative results of the PNUCC econometric model and prompted
the search for an alternative modeling methodology.
6.

Personal Background Factors of Key POwer Requirements

Staff Constituted a Second Element Predisposing Them to Look

£0; Particular Kinds of New Solutions to Perceived
FOrecasting Problems.

In addition to developing a unique

insight into problems with then-current forecasting procedures as a result of the SOH study, the members of Power
Requirements staff who would spearhead the development of
the system of models used in the 1982 forecast also bore
some distinguishing characteristics related to their backgrounds.

Those who would ultimately guide the development

of the 1982 forecast either were then new to the group, and
not subscribing to the "official" view of the future,
experienced with the representational issues associated with
computer models (as distinct from simple extrapolation) or
both.

These factors influenced their search for the tools

BPA would later use.
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7.

The organizational Climate under the Hunro Administra-

tion Provided the Necessary Context for the Search for New
Forecasting Tools to Occur.

Irrespective of staff percep-

tions or desires, an organization will not allow the expenditure of resources on projects which are not viewed as
important.

Under Sterling Munro, BPA was preparing itself

to address the issues central to the Regional PQwer Bill,
then being written.

It was within this context that the

need for a greater forecasting capability first gained
recognition.

Without this recognition, Power Requirements

would not have been able to begin the model and data
development which they deemed necessary.
Conclusions from T- and O-Perspectiye Cross-Cues
Before identifying those conclusions resulting from the
cross-cuing of two (or more) perspectives, several remarks
are first in order.

A conclusion can be said to result from

the cross-cuing of perspectives when the use of investigatory criteria from more than one of the approaches or paradigms are required for it to be inferred.

Thus, If one

observes that a party in public involvement submits technical comments, this is simply use of the O-perspective.
The technical comments are an organizational output, likely
the result of identifiable standard operating procedures.

By contrast, i£ one were to examine the specific technical
contents of the comments and indicate how and why the
particular SOPs of the involved organization shaped the
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comments as they did, then T- and

O-pe~spectives

vould

b~

cross-cued.
A point made earlier should be here reiterated.

It is

not uncommon for more traditional analyses made predominantly according to the investigatory paradigm of a single
perspective to occasionally venture outside that paradigms
boundaries.

AnalysiS of technical material will often

identify non-technical influences on the product.
"cross-cuing", however, is at best informal.

This

Without the

explicit use of the paradigms encompassed by Multiple
perspectives, such efforts are neither systematic nor
thorough.

Deeper insights are thus lost.

The most fruitful area of "paradigmatic interaction" in
this case study was where the T- and O-perspectives crosscued each other, as can be seen from the sheer number of
conclusions presented below.

Where a conclusion derived

from the use of more than one perspective specifically
deepens the insights provided by one of the conclusions
listed above derived using one of the perspectives in
isolation, this is noted.

This more clearly and directly

shows the strength of using multiple perspectives of
investigation.
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1.

The Relative predictive Success of the sum-of-ytilities

Forecast in the 1970's Crvstalized the Perception of High
Growth Load Futures in the Hinds of Power Planners.
Conversely. this Widespread Consensus Picture of Load Growth
and General Faith in the SOU in Turn Discouraged the Search
for New Forecasting App,oaches with G,eate, Explanatory
Powe,.

For a surprisingly large number of years, the SOU

forecast provided a reliable guide for planning despite its
SimplistiC underlying methodology.

Given background

conditions of sustained economic growth and opportunities
for expansion of the Columbia river hydrosystem, projections
of future growth
reasonable.

based upon historical rates appeared quite

These technical prOjections formed the informa-

tional basis for the establishment of the Hydro-Thermal
Power Plan and the construction of the WPPSS plants.

Once

the high growth perception was entrenched, an organizational
apparatus grew up which was geared to resource development
in a t1me of 1mpending def1c1t.

w1th1n such an organ1za-

tion, priority was placed upon tasks other than developing
new approaches to a forecasting problem believed to be
already solved.

Response to changing regional circum-

stances, as a result, was conspicuously slow.
2.

The A;ab Oil Emba,go of 1973. Pe,haps the Singlemost

Important Eyent in Recent Ene,gy History. waS the Ultimate
cause of a NUrobe, of Hodel and Fo,ecast Deyelopment Effo,ts.
both Nationally and Regionally.

While regionally, the
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stability of the electric power industry had been taken for
granted prior to the mid-1970s, worldwide the stability of
the petroleum market similarly seemed a foregone conclusion.
The sudden and sharp increase in oil and gas prices following the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 brought the dependency of
the American way of life en inexpensive energy sources
suddenly into the foreground.

For the first time since

perhaps the Second World War, the idea of different energy
futures, some of which might well entail the curtailment of
consumption, was taken seriously.

Both nationally and

regionally, new energy policies were debated and, both
nationally and regionally, new models and methodological
approaches were sought.

The development of end-use models

at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was part of the Carter
Administration's reorientation to the changed world energy
outlook.

The NEPP and SOH studies were among early regional

technical responses.

Ultimately, though largely indirectly,

the Embargo then had an impact on BPA's first independent
forecast through the models used in its production.
3.

The Need to Legitimize the Findings of its First

Forecast Prompted BPA to an ynprecedented Leyel o£ Technical
Response to its Critics.

Characteristically, an organiza-

tion's initial efforts at preparing a product are critical.
Credibility must be established with those affected by the
organization's efforts.

Given the short- and long-range

impacts of new WPPSS plant scheduling deciSions, it was
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imperative that Bonneville's forecasts be accepted as a
guideline for resource planning.

As

a result, organiza-

tional factors demanded an extremely thorough technical
review of the forecast.

The technical workshops, the

detailed model and input documentations, and the written
replies to comments (which served as justification for what
had and had not been done) all were intended to make BPA's
subsequent decisions as credible and defensible as possible
given the methodological framework chosen.

Thus, organiza-

tional needs dictated the level of technical expertise
expended in producing the forecast, while this expertise, in
turn, strengthened the organization's position on resource
development.
4.

The Perceived Theoretical Sophistication of BPA's

Modeling Approach Served to Confer an Air of LegitimaCy to
the Agency's pecisions (expands on T-perspectiye conclusion
~

The perceived sophistication of models used to

produce a forecast has organizational as well as technical
consequences.

Often, the fact that a set of numbers is

produced by a formidable looking computer model will, in and
of itself, make a technical product appear of higher quality
or greater defensibility whether this is truly the case or
not.

Big models are more impressive than small ones, and

provided that no errors are detected in their operation,
their outputs inspire greater confidence.

Though some

reservations were expressed about the complexity of BPA's
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modeling system, the fact that it

~as

run

~ithout

any

apparent serious problems likely enhanced the acceptance of
the forecast.
5.

Ihe Major Modeling Alternatives Available to BPA we;e

Strongly Constrained by What

waS

Available "Off-the-Shelf"

(expands on T-perspective conclusion 12),

An

organizational

constraint placed upon BPA as an agency is that it is not
permitted to do basic research in-house,

Though models may

be respecified, tailored to specific needs, or integrated
with other tools by staff, basic developmental work is
prohibited.

New models (and new modeling approaches) must

be developed under contract or obtained "off-the-shelf"
(I.e. ready-made models are purchased or obtained).
that

~

Given

organizational support for Power Requirements'

forecasting system development came only after the passage
of the Regional Act and given the types of models preferred
by the utility industry, staff was limited to existing
regional models and the ORNL models.

Though the models

were "state-of-the-art", they were still limited in terms of
the variety of approaches to forecasting they embodied.
(The consequences of this conclusion and its immediate
predecessor are spelled out in the section combining
insights from all three perspectives.)
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6.

The structure o£ the Forecast Models. to the Extent

That they Determined the Types of Questions Which Could be
Asked. Exerted a strong Influence on Forecast outcomes and
Uses (expands on T-pe;spectiye conclusions 12 and 112).
All approaches to modeling invariably simplify the reality
they represent.

These simplifications are necessary, but

tend to follow directions defined by user needs and data
limitations.

Models are geared to ask certain questions,

but not others.

Those chosen by BPA put a premium upon

looking at conservation policies (or at least those elements
which could be most directly affected by such policies).
They did not, and could not, look at other potentially
significant factors such as marketing opportunities,
technological innovations, or the effects of cyclical
business activities.

Thus, though the structures of the

models did not predetermine the results, they limited
possible outcomes and, in doing so indirectly affected
organizational decisions.
7.

The peyelopment of a Fo;ecast Using a Range ApprQach

Set Limits on its O;ganizational Applicability (expands on
T-pe;spectiye conclusion 13).

Just as the selection of

models sets constraints on a forecast in terms of the type
of questions which can be asked, the general methodological
approach underlying a forecast defines how it can be used
organizationally.

The range approach used by BPA repre-

sented an advance over previous approaches which focused
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upon a single scenario for the future.

At the same

tlme~

by

limiting its analyses to three "likely" scenarios of regional load futures, BPA limited its organizational preparedness
to a wide array of possible events which might prove significant (more on this issue later).
8.

The Issues Raised as a Result of BPA's Changed Role

Under the Regional Act Virtually Necessitated Both the
Acquisition of End-Use Models and the Integration of a Price
Component into the Forecasting System (expands on
I-perspective conclusions 12 and 14).

The modeling system

used by BPA for its 1982 forecast was built from the
bottom-up -- that is, the individual components were first
developed independent of one another and afterwards integrated.

This approach was Virtually mandated by the Regional

Act with its ratemaking provisions and emphasis on conservation.

First emphasis was upon demand models which could

represent conservation, then upon integrating them with an
electriCity pricing model.
9.

Most of the Explicitly Stated Assumptions Underlying

the Forecast Can Be Seen as the Technical Representation of
Consequences of the Regional Act (expands on T-perspectiye
conclusion 15).

In addition to which models were selected,

BPA's responsibilities under the Regional Act largely
determined how the models were ran.

Assumptions about

resource scheduling, rate levels, and conservation programs
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all reflected BPA's interpretation of their responsibilities
under the Act.
10.

The Scope of Exploration and Hodel Development at BPA

was Most Directly Limited by Practical Time and Resource
Constraints (expands on T-perspective conclusions 11. 18.
111. and 113),

When look ing for the myr iad subtle ways in

which an organization shapes or constrains its technical
products, it is easy to overlook perhaps the most obvious.
Organizations only have a limited amount of resources (time,
money, and people) which they can expend in dealing with an
issue or solving a problem.

Though Power Requirements and

other Divisions associated with the forecast's development
were beneficiaries of a period of growth in the early 1980s,
their time was fully committed under the preestablished
forecast schedule.

Resource limitations generally deter-

mined the avenues which could

~

be explored (e.g. criti-

cally examining the ORI model operation, testing the
Significance of missing feedbacks in the modeling system,
investigating possible technological innovations, correcting
weaknesses in the ORNL technology curves and the NEPP lag
structure and, more importantly, opening up first-order
strategic methodological questions to wider scrutiny).
in all, these resource limitations were significant.

All
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11.

Given BPA's Organizational structure. it is Likely That

a Number of Different Interpretations were Giyen to the
Forecast Probability Assignments (expands on T perspective
conclusion 19).

Power Requirements staff added probabili-

ties to their range forecast after its completion, acknowledging the judgmental and subjective nature of the numerical assignments in their documentation.

Even under such

conditions, numbers often confer a false sense of certainty
to users divorced from the technical process who assume more
"objective" underpinnings to the probabilities.

This

usually leads them to perform further mathematical analYSis
(e.g. expected value calculations, averaging, factoring)
which are unwarranted.

Given some of the remarks made

during public involvement, and some of the uses to which the
forecast was put, it seems likely that a variety of interpretations were placed upon the highly subjective forecast
probabilities.
12.

The Preponderant Disciplinary Orientation of Power

Regui;ements. Rooted Heavily in Economics. Limited its Range
of Approaches to Issues such as Technological Change
(expands on T-perspective conclusion Ill).

BPA's approach

to modeling addressed a wide variety of issues and load
determining factors which had previously been ignored.

The

preponderance of staff members in Power Requirements had
graduate level degrees in economics and were well schooled
in the issues that discipline identified and the methods for
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addressing them.

(More generally, in the utility

ind~stry

economists, engineers, and mathematicians dominate technical
staffs and tend to select modeling approaches with which
they are most familiar.)

At the same time, this training

generally circumvented (or superficially dealt with) other
issue areas which, though potentially significant, lay at
the periphery of the science.

As

a result, issues such as

cycles of technological change were not addressed explicitly, the apparent assumption being that whatever impacts were
not captured in demand elasticities or productivity functions were not capable (or worthy) of being addressed.
13.

The Unresolved Problems at the End of the First

Forecast Set Directions for Qrganizational as well as
Technical Development in Power Requirements (expands on
T-perspectlye conclusion t13).

Resource limitations

prevented Power Requirements staff from making all the
improvements to their modeling system that were desirable
within the time horizon of the 1982 forecast.

A number of

data and model development projects were initiated under
contract during, or soon after, the first forecast production cycle.

New, more highly regionalized versions of the

demand models for each of the sectors were developed, the
modeling system was fully automated, supplementary load
research was initiated, and plans were made for a short-tomidterm forecast capable of dealing with cyclical business
and weather effects.

The development of the tools, and
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their use in resource planning became the overriding organizational missions for the Energy Modeling and Analysis
Branch of Power Requirements.

The formal and informal rules

for guiding this development and using the tools became the
Branch's SOPs.
14.

From an organizational Standpoint. the contrast Between

the Results of the Two Independent Forecast Reviews Helped
Legitimize BPA's Results (expands on T-perspective conclusion 114).

Potentially, the type of "counter-forecast"

developed by both HERA and EVA can hurt an organization like
Bonneville since they raise important questions about forecast results and the wisdom of using them.

HERA's review

was primarily a challenge to BPA on the behalf of stakeholders in WPPSS fearing adverse effects if plant completion
schedules were unnecessarily delayed.

In

eff~ct

it explored

the impact of possibly conservative growth assumptions, by
substituting different values for key input variables.
called BPA's forecast growth rates into question.

This

The EVA

review, using an analogy between consumer behavior on BPA
and TVA service areas, constituted, in effect, a "second
opinion".

Because the two reviews pointed in opposite di-

rections (almost offsetting one another) they actually somewhat strengthened BPA's position, since its forecast fell
roughly in the center of this bandwidth of uncertainty.

In

terms of addressing the wide spectrum of uncertainty actually facing BPA, these two "counter-forecasts" barely scratch-
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ed the surface, though using them for such purposes was
never the intention.

As

will be noted below, attempting

such an exploration involves the examination of a large
variety of qualitatively different environmental and decision scenarios, and benefits from investigating perspectives
other than the econometric and trend-based approaches almost
exclusively used by consulting firms such as NERA and EVA.
15.
ments

The Development of ad hoc Procedures by Power Require-

waS

Strongly Influenced by the Data Requirements of

the Forecasting Models and the Data Development Methodology
(expands on a-perspective conclusion 11).

Virtually all

standard operating procedures evolve by a process involving
significant experimentation and a substantial amount of
trial and error.

For Power Requirements staff, developing

an independent forecast was a first-time event.

The

specific ad hoc procedures, many of which would later become
"institutionalized", developed by the staff were structured
along the lines of forecast data flows and model development
priorities.
16.

The Growth of Organizational Complexity Among Units

Concerned with Resource Analysis Reinforced (and was
Reinforced by) the Development of More Complex and
Sophisticated Tools (expands on a-perspective conclusion
~

Before and during the production of the 1982 forecast,

a number of organizational units within BPA underwent a
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rapid and steady expansion.

In addition to Power Require-

ments, portions of Rates, Resources, and Conservation
contributed to the development of the demand forecast.

The

portions of these Divisions involved in the forecast productions evolved along with their tools in a mutually reinforcing pattern.

New questions prompted the development of

new models and the data needed to operate them.

As the

tools were delivered, their complexity necessitated additional positions designed specifically to manage the use and
further development of these models.

This in turn created

further new needs, resulting in additional budgets and more
personnel.

This process continued until the major problems

had been "bounded" by the organizations within BPA responsible for their solution.
17.

The Public Involvement Process was Responsible for a

Number of Technical Changes. but BPA's Responses to These
Challenges were Limited by Resource Availability Within

th~

Organization (expands on a-perspective conclusion 16).

BPA

made a legitimate effort to produce the most technically
defensible forecast it could within the 1981-1982 production
schedule.

This included explaining, justifying, and

defending its modeling, choices to critics

where technical

modifications were inappropriate or impractical.

(More

important, from the standpoint of Multiple Perspectives,
these resource limitations constrained public involvement so
that potentially useful insights on risk, uncertainty, and
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the effects of various core assumptions were foregone.

Time

limitations required that BPA staff confine themselves to
techniques familiar both to themselves and their counterparts in the power planning community with the strongest
voices.)

In most cases where a criticism was acknowledged

but not acted upon, it was the unavailability of resources,
usually time, which made the necessary change impractical.
In many of these cases, extensive data collection or new
basic research would have been required to bring about the
desired modification.

Thus, as with model development, the

ceiling on model modification efforts were as much a
function of organizational resources as technical expertise.
18.

In General. the Technical comments of Stakeholders in

the outcome of those BPA Decisions which were Based upon the
Forecast Reflected their Interests. Though the strength of
this Reflection varied (expands on O-perspectiye conclusion

ill. Parties having stakes in the outcome of the WNP 1 and
3 decision tended to partiCipate heavily in the public involvement process.

Generally they fell into two groups:

those with financial interests in the nuclear plants,
wishing to see their completion, and those desiring to
protect the environment and explore conservation alternatives as completely as possible.

A review of their

technical comments shows that their remarks tended to
reflect their interests, though with varying degrees of
strength.

PNUCC members comments did not always imply
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technical modifications which would increase the forecast,
but never suggested changes which were against their
interests.

Environmental protection groups more explicitly

suggested technical changes which would either lower the
forecast or encourage more ambitious regional conservation
programs than BPA's forecast and resource analysis implied.
Conclusions from T- and P-Perspectiye Cross-Cues
1.

The Fact that End-Use Models were "Intellectually

Fashionable" at the Time of BPA's First Forecast Hade Their
Acceptance Easier (expands on T-perspective conclusion 12),
The ORNL End-Use Demand Hodels ultimately selected for
commercial and residential forecasting contained a number of
technical features specifically geared to policy analysis.
During public involvement, these featUres were generally
cited as the models' technical points of strength.

While

these capabilities for the basis for their selection, it is
also true that the models had a reputation for being "stateof-the-art" in terms of their overall theoretical approach.
This fact was known by many upon entering public involvement
and those unfamiliar with the models could perceive their
"intellectual popularity" in the remarks and behavior of
panelists at the workshops.

Given this, it seems likely

that at least part of the models acceptability stemmed from
a wbandwagon effect" rather than detailed technical evaluation.
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2.

The cognitive Dissonance springing from the Attempt to

Reconcile SOM and SOU Reports

waS

the Consequence Qf the

Technical Approaches Ayailable at the Time (expands on
P-perspective conclusion 15).

The search for new fore-

casting tools by BPA staff grew out of a failed attempt to
build up load projections to the levels of the

sou forecast

using a "paper-and-pencil" disaggregated approach.

It was

the limited tools available at the time, however, which
prompted the ad hoc attempt to build load project10ns up
from the bottom using available data and forecasts of
economic activity.

Had other modeling tools been available,

this labor-intensive approach might not have been considered
and the conclusions drawn radically different.
3.

The More "Politically Open" Climate of the Hunro

Administration was ConSistent with the Concerns Built into
the ORNL End-yse Models (expands on P-perspectiye conclusion

11l. Sterling Hunro assumed the office of Bonneville Power
Administrator under the Carter Administration when a
national energy policy was the foremost concern of the
President.

Hunro's background was political, and his

central focus as Administrator was to reconcile the complex
problems of regional energy politics, chiefly through the
mechanism of the Regional Power Act.

The ORNL End-Use

Models, also a product of the Carter Administration, were
explicitly constructed to address policy issue central to
the energy politics of the time.

Thus, the "political
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openness" under Munro not only permitted the search for new
forecasting tools to occur but made the capabilities of the
ORNL models both acceptable and attractive.
4.

Model structures Helped to Define. More Globally. how

Individuals View the World. Define Problems. and Search for
Solutions.

A commonly used procedure in creative problem

solving is to reframe the problem.

Viewing old issues or

concerns with a fresh eye, or from a new vantage point,
often permits novel solutions.

It is when a methodology or

approach to a problem is automatically adopted that vision
becomes limited.

The models used by BPA were very flexible

tools, but they set up a way of looking at the world (e.g.
energy use in the commercial sector as square footage
serviced by equipment of a particular efficiency using a
specific fuel at certain level of intensity) which quickly
became second nature to its users.
can be seen to limit approaches.

In the long run, this
The question becomes how

to use the available models to solve a problem (or a reduced
definition of the problem) rather than just how to solve a
problem.
Conclusion from 0- and P-Perspective Cross-Cues
1.

The Selection of Administrators

waS

Based upon views of

the Problems Facing the Region Held by the Federal Ggvernment (expands on P-perspectiye conclusion 12).

Each

Bonneville Power Administrator has assumed office facing a
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slightly (or greatly) different set of problems and bringing
a somewhat different set of skills to bear.

It is through

policy setting for the agency that the Administrator exerts
a unique influence on the management of power-generating
resources in the region.

The choice of Administrator,

however, is by political appointment, and most frequently
follows a change of partisanship in the Presidency.

What-

ever background skills the new Administrator brings to
office, then, are deemed appropriate by the party then
prevailing in national government and are seen as consistent
with their general (and sometimes specific) policy leanings.
2.

By Crosscutting Lines of Command. the Forecast Produc-

tion Process "Selected For" Different Types of Management
Skills (excands on O-perspective conclusion 15).

One major

school of organizational theory would insist that a large
bureaucracy such as BPA must function as a well-structured
hierarchy, with tasks and responsibilities falling within
the unique domains of particular organizational subunits and
authority following formal chains of command.

In reality,

this picture of the organization is rarely fully supported
by fact, though organizations do vary greatly in terms of
how closely task performance corresponds to organizational
structure.

BPA was in a transition period during the 1982

forecast production cycle.

During such times, the ability

to communicate laterally across involved Divisions and to
develop a "big picture" of the overall technical priorities
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and requirements becomes of paramount importance.

These

circumstances thus "selected for" the skills possessed by
the chief developers of the forecasting tools, as prime
qualifying factors for management positions.
3.

As with virtually all Organizations. BPA's Operating

Procedures Helped Shape Perceptions of the Staff.

Mind sets

develop not only in response to the characteristics of the
tools used to carry out a project, but also in response to
the organizational procedures governing their use.

Hence,

the "approved way of doing things" can easily become the
only way of doing things considered when confronting a
problem.

In the crystallizing operating procedures develop-

ed for forecast production can be seen emerging perceptual
frames for seeking problem solutions.
Conclusions from T. O. and Pi

The Big Picture

The true strength of Multiple Perspectives lies not in
the useful two-dimensional descriptions which it generates
when perspectives are paired but in the union of technical,
organizational, and personal perspectives.

The "big

picture" encompasses the three individual paradigms of
investigation and its manifold cross-cues.

Because of the

complexity of three-way interactions between perspectives,
however, it is easier (and clearer) to sketch a coherent
picture of the BPA forecasting process than to produce a set
of numbered items, as was done above.

While BPA's forecast
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was state-of-the-art in the utility industry: and while it
~epresented

a major improvement over its predecessors, its

overall methodology left its users still vulnerable to the
effects of unforeseen or surprise events (such as WPPSS or
the oil crisis had surprised planners a decade earlier).
The big picture allows an insightful evaluation of the BPA
forecast (through the question of risk and uncertainty),
identifies several areas needing development, and leads to
some recommendations on how to evolve a forecasting
apparatus in an organization environment such as BPA's.
Forecasts become meaningful as a part of a support
system for decisions.

To function successfully, a forward-

looking decision support system should contain three components.

The first is a forecasting component, which permits

decision makers (or their staff) to trace out the consequences of different actions or events.

The second com-

ponent is planning, which presents a set (or sets) of
actions an organization should take to meet its objectives
given certain anticipated conditions.

The third component

is a monitoring system, providing the

feedback necessary

for an organization to judge the effectiveness of its
decisions.

The integrated use of these three mechanisms

provides the means by which organizations address the risk
and uncertainty surrounding decision making.
Although In common usage the terms "risk" and "uncertainty" are used interchangably an important, and too often
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overlooked, distinction is made between the terms.

In

the simplest case, which contrasts with both conditions of
risk and uncertainty, the outcome of a decision or the
consequence of an event, once it occurs, is both unique and
inevitable.

This is decision making (or planning) under

certainty, and requires the simplest of guiding strategies.
Under conditions of

~

or event is not known.

the unique outcome of a decision

The full set of possible outcomes,

however, are known (or assumed to be known) along with the
odds or probabilities of their occurrence.
(e.g. dice) exemplify conditions of risk.

Games of chance
By contrast,

under conditions of uncertainty not only is there no single
unique outcome to be expected, but the odds associated with
a series of possible outcomes are not known (i.e. multiple
paths, unknown probabilities).

Often under uncertainty an

additional, and significant, condition also holds: it is not
even possible to specify the full array of possible outcomes
(Martino, 1978:340).

In such an unenviable environment for

planning, the spectre of a "surprise" or "shock" future
always lurks over those assigned to deal with it.
It is in the addressing of uncertainty that the prImary
areas of concern illuminated by the three perspectives
display the largest degree of overlap.

From a strictly

technical point of view, it is recognized that modeling
techniques and strategies must be rigorously fitted to each
of the critical dimensions of the situation being modeled.
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Unfortunately. unless strictly technical criteria for
problem definition are supplemented by broader concerns
e.g. those of the 0- and P-perspectives -- many of the key
dimensions go unrecognized.

From an organizational perspec-

tive, principal actors do not want surprises which complicate their jobs, hurt their professional reputations, or
jeopardize their continued access to people and resources.
From a personal perspective, key decision makers want to
avoid the stigma associated with making conspicuously bad
decisions.

Thus, from all three perspectives, the choice of

a strategy to address uncertainty is an important one.

That

such choices frequently prove inadequate is largely because
the participants are unable to see the overall problem
through the lenses of ill of the three perspectives, but,
rather, focus upon portions or fragments of the overall
situation.

From these more fragmented vantage points, the

imperative of addressing the full or requisite variety of
uncertainties seems less critical and a potentially dangerous imbalance of effort results.

As such, the imperative

Is often counterbalanced or offset by other, ultimately less
significant, considerations (e.g. familiarity with methodology, expedience, image, etc.).
The use of point forecasts, characterized by a single
trend or trajectory of change, in planning treats the
environment as though it were characterized by certainty.
Essentially the strategy Is "one plan for the only possible
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future".

Using such a strategYi decision makIng 1s rendered

simple (often inappropriately so).

Point forecast may be

used without serious jeopardy when environmental stability
is guaranteed over the lifetime of the plan, when the forecast and planning horizons are short, and/or when a large
and significant portion of the determinants are under the
direct control of planners or decision makers.·
Correctly used, range forecast are employed in risky
(but not uncertain) environments.

It is thus assumed that

the set of forecasts either exhaustively addresses each
possible outcome or future or that the forecast scenarios
bracket the entire range of these possibilities on the high
and low ends.

Furthermore, it is assumed that the behavior

of the environment is sufficiently well known that discrete
probabilities of occurrence can be meaningfully assigned to
each of the alternatives by means other than subjective
judgment.

Such a strategy Is appropriate when the stoch-

astic behavior of the environment has been thoroughly
charted and/or when planners can exert influence to constrain (though not deterministically control) the full
spectrum of elements limiting environmental variation.
Under the conditions of uncertainty, the behavior of
critical elements in the environment which the planner must
confront is incompletely or imperfectly known.

It is

impossible for forecasters to assign odds or probabilities
that reflect anything more than their subjective assessment

462
of the degrees of their confidence in their models' performance.

When they do, as Ascher and Overholt (1983:267)

have noted, they tend to overrate confidence levels consistently.

Moreover, when the future is truly uncertain, it is

also impossible to ascertain whether the complete array of
critical factors potentially affecting the accuracy or usefulness of the forecast have been identified and addressed.
Under these circumstances, however, it is essential that the
possibility of surprise outcomes (however seemingly remote)
not be ignored in the planning process, nor should core
assumptions go unchallenged.

Forecasting should, in this

context, ideally resemble "gaming", where a wide array of
different scenarios or low probability/high impact events
and changes in the very assumptions which are too often
taken for granted are explored with the intent of giving
planners and decision makers a "feel" for the sensitivity of
future outcomes both to the assumptions in their models and
to factors within and outside of their control.

This will

sensitize the users to disaster avoidance planning and to
effective crisis management.

An exploration of key "un-

likely events" or "environmental shocks" should supplement
any futUres "recommended" as reference cases for planning
and, correspondingly, should be incorporated into the actual
planning process.
The SUm-Of-Utllities forecast worked successfully for
so long because of the uncommon degree of regional stability
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during the period of hydrosystem development.

Though load

growth occasionally accelerated or decelerated (resulting in
correspondingly minor under- or overforecasts), the overall
trend was sufficiently steady that a forecasting and planning assumption of (for all practical purposes) a certain
future proved workable.

By the mid-1970s, however, the

impacts of the real, but previously ignored uncertainties
surrounding electricity use (e.g. responsiveness to rate
increases, construction delays and cost overruns, mandatory
building standards for new commercial construction, etc.)
began to be felt with severe consequences.

PNUCC's

development (via contract) of an econometric model to
"cross-check" the SOU findings was a step in the right
direction, but only one step.

The limited range of pos-

sibilities addressed in the assumptions underlying the
model's operation virtually guaranteed that, within only a
few years time, actual loads in the region would fall well
below the predicted lower ninety percent confidence bound.
The model was allowed to run mechanically, driven by
economic and demographic variables without any attempts to
anticipate new policy developments in the region -- the
future it produced looked no different qualitatively from
the past.

The single scenario developed by PNUCC was

characterized by optimistically low electricity prices, and
these prices were in large measure, responsible for the
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continued large increases in levels of regional power
consumption.
The 1982 BPA forecast represented a substantial advance
over the PNUCC forecasts, both in terms of the analytical
sophistication (and capabilities) of the specific models
used and in terms of the wider spectrum of futures considered.

The base, high, and low cases represented distinct

scenarios predicated upon different sets of economic and
policy assumptions.

As

such, they in no sense represented

statistical confidence intervals (such as those developed by
the PNUCC Econometric Model) nor did the unfortunately
misnamed base case represent a midline within the range
(i.e. given the behavior of the economic drivers producing
the high and low cases there was no reason that they should
be evenly dispersed around the base).

Probabilityassign-

ments for actuals falling outside the range or between the
cases were made subjectively, incorporating the multiple but
not necessarily explicit, considerations encompassed by
staff judgment.
To reiterate several important points made in Chapter
II, core assumptions reflect or embody one's beliefs about
the "state of the world" and how it changes over time.
Economic, technological, political, social, and cultural
factors all may effect future load growth, and how these
factors are treated has a significant bearing upon the
outcome of a forecast.

Core assumptions may be built into
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models or govern their use.

These assumptions may be

selected after careful deliberation, but too often modelers
are unaware of much of what they are assuming or its significance.

In constructing its 1982 forecast, BPA provided

detail on the assumptions underlying its forecast range
which, though uncharacteristically great for regional power
forecasting, still left many important assumptions unstated
(or unrecognized) and many dimensions of uncertainty,
therefore, unexplored.

In Chapter II, a number of assump-

tions regarding models and inputs were enumerated.

Table

XVI presents a sampling of core assumptions giving shape to
BPA's 1982 forecast.
The environment surrounding energy planning, however,
particularly over a twenty-year time horizon, is uncertain
(in the technical sense of the term).

Over the past two

decades possibilities which had seemed too remote to
acknowledge or too "improbable" to consider became actualities, stunning (and embarassing) the planners who had
dismissed them.

In the international petroleum markets of

the 1960s, oil shocks resulting from KiddIe Eastern political instability were never dedlt with explicitly, much to
the later chagrin of the Seven Sisters and the American
populace.

Kore recently, within the Northwest power plan-

ning arena of the 19705, construction delays and cost
overruns were not considered in electricity pricing forecasts, since the magnitude and timing of such difficulties
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TABLE XVI
SELECTED CORE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING BPA'S 1982 FORECAST
T-Perspectlve
generating resources (or conservation) will be acquired
on schedule and at cost (a particularly heroic assumption given experience with WPPSS!)
there will be no long-lasting generating resource
failures (e.g. no Three Mile Islands)
improvements in efficiency of end-use technologies
will proceed incrementally (no breakthroughs or innovations)
a-Perspective
the world petroleum market will not experience further
"oil shocks"
though economic activity may decline in the region (or
nation) there will be no Depression
large industries will remain in the region through the
end of the forecast period (e.g. no wholesale outmigration of aluminum companies)
no other wholesale suppliers of electricity (e.g.
British Columbia Hydro) will compete with BPA for
Northwest utility customers
the provisions of the Regional Act will remain in
effect in their current form through 2000
P-Perspective
the 1988, 1992, and 1996 Presidents-elect will not
fundamentally alter national energy policy
future BPA Administrators will not alter the basic
agenda governing resource acquisitions, ratemaklng,
or utility sales agreements
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could not be specified,

In both cases i the seriousness of

the oversights were not anticipated but recognized only in
retrospect.
Based on these considerations, inherent limitations of
the basic forecasting methodology currently common throughout the electric utility industry, and used by both BPA and
the Regional Council, become evident.

From the experience

of the 1970's, the power planning community has learned that
the effects of price and policy cannot be ignored and that
planning for a single, narrow vision of the future is
inadequate.

The models chosen, their core assumptions, and

the methodology guiding their use reflect a recognition both
of uncertainty in the values which economic and price variables may assume and of their ultimate significance.

The

baseline, high, and low scenarios represent only different
levels on a linear scale of economic activity and different
levels of conservatlon program effectlveness.

The major

events which affected the energy industry in the 1970s as
noted above were not smooth, quantitative shifts in levels
of basic economic variables.

They were sudden, unexpected

developments -- outcomes unanticipated and uncertain in the
sense defined above -- with strong, abrupt impacts which
left both power planners and managers in something of a
state of shock.
The use of multiple forecasts in planning, as increasingly recognized by BPA and the electric utility industry,
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is a necessary condition for long-term success.
however, in and of itself sufficient.

It is not,

In the long run, the

only sULprise-free future, to paraphrase the late Herman
Kahn, would be one with no surprises.

The accuracy of a

forecast tends to be inversely correlated with its time
horizon (Ascher and Overholt 1983:105).

Thus, as the scope

of planning lengthens, the need to explore and prepare for a
broader array of distinct environmental and decision scenarios expands.

Scenarios should embrace trends, events,

forces, or impacts which would prove significant, whether or
not they might currently be deemed likely.
Two basic strategies guide the use of diverse forecast
scenarios:

optimizing (good risk) and disaster-avoiding

(good hedge).

Optimizing approaches are most appropriate

and most effective in truly risky environments (i.e. those
where the array of outcomes is known and associated probabilities at least closely estimated, if not known).

As

noted above, range approaches, when properly used, may prove
sufficient in risky environments.
teria, however, must be met.

Several specific cri-

First, and most important, the

environment must be truly risky, not uncertain.

Only under

those conditions are the probability assignments needed to
arrive at an "optimal" solution meaningful.

Second, there

must exist some evidence that the boundaries of the range do
indeed encompass all, or most, significant outcomes.

This

can only be established through tests of, rather than as-
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surnptions of, the comprehensiveness of the range.

Finally~

if the range is characterized by smooth boundaries one of

two conditions must hold.

Either period-to-period trend

fluctuations must not be of significance (in terms of
planning responses) or another means must be available to
deal with these fluctuations.

A smooth progressing series

of events and a wildly oscillating or fluctuating series of
events may ultimately arrive at the same destination, but
they require much different responses.

If such fluctuations

are possible, they must not be ignored.
The range approach to power forecasting, in effect,
addresses uncertainty as though it were risk.

In BPA's 1982

forecast a much wider bandwidth of economic, demographic,
and policy considerations was embodied in the three forecasts than was the case with their predecessors in the
region, but none of the scenarios explores the impacts of
those "extreme" possibilities which produce such serious
consequences for those ignoring them.

The three cases

filter out disruptive effects of possible political upheavals on the energy market (or the world economy as a
whole); they smooth the peaks and valleys of business cycle
fluctuation over the long run; they assume timely and
cost-effective resource completion in the determination of
electricity prices; they ignore the possibility any technological improvements beyond efficiency increases in existing
equipment (i.e. breakthrough technology is dismissed or
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overlooked); and they do not explore the consequences of
out-migration of major industries (especially the DSIs).
Potentially, "surprises" in any of these uncertalnty areas,
if they occurred, could force actual power sales outside of
the predicted range, or at least produce conspicuously
uneven or discontinuous patterns of sales.

In BPA's

forecast, however, the factors deemed relevant' for explicit
consideration are treated

~

though they described the

perimeters of a well-defined and well-known distribution of
future load outcomes (or at least the perimeters of those
outcomes deemed worth planning for).

Probabilityassign-

ments, though explicitly acknowledged to be subjective and
judgmental, are often treated

~

though they could be

meaningfully subjected to the same types of statistical
manipulations or transformations as objective odds (e.g.
expected value calculations).

For all practical purposes,

then, these forecast-producing strategies redefine the
problems of uncertainty as problems of risk.
The disaster-avoiding strategy allows planners to
"hedge their bets", and is most appropriately used in truly
uncertain planning environments (either as a sole or supplementary strategy).

This strategy centers on enabling

unexpected events to be managed, rather than anticipated.
As such, it endeavors to anticipate the effects of high-

impact events, whether they are considered to be likely or
not, and allow the advance preparation of workable responses
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or preemptive

actio~.

The scenarios developed must be

diverse, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
It is unlikely that, had BPA's current forecasting
system (and the guiding strategy for its use) been in place
in the early to mid-1970s, the over-building of the WPPSS
nuclear plants would have been avoided.

Because the new

demand models are responsive to changes in ele'ctricity
price, load predictions certainly would have been lower than
those of the SOU forecasts and, correspondingly, the
overbuilding of resources (and its impact on rates) would
have been less severe.

Given the economic climate of the

mid-1970s, however, it is questionable that even

~

case

inputs developed at that time would have predicted the full
recesslonary impact of the early 1980s on the Pacific
Northwest (the input projections used in the PNUCC Econometric Model were such that, as noted above, even the lower
90 percent confidence bound to forecasted loads exceeded
early 1980s actuals).

Given the general unwillingness of

forecasters and planners to speculate on the introduction of
government standards for new construction, the load-dampening impacts of commercial building programs designed and
implemented during the carter Administration would not have
been anticipated.

Finally, given the optimistic assumptions

on resource costs and completion, electricity price projections would have been unrealistically low.

In short, a

strategy of forecasting for a risky environment would have
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probably improved the situation in the region somewhat but
would not have provided adequate insurance against historical uncertainties and their consequences.
By contrast, a hedging strategy, if performed correctly
and if coupled with appropriately flexible planning, could
have minimized, if not avoided the WPPSS problems.

As with

the Oil Embargo, the precise timing and magnitude of thermal
plant cost overruns for the WPPSS projects could not be
predicted, though given the frequency with which large-scale
projects significantly overrun their estimated costs, the
latter occurrence should not have been considered a "low
probability" event (see Peck and Scherer, 1962: 20-23 for a
discussion of predicted cost errors in military projects).
Both events would undoubtedly have been perceived as
possibilities but might not have been included in any "best
guess" projections.

Had disaster avoidance also been part

of the forecasting and planning agendas at the time, resource development strategies could have been developed
which would accommodate both "surprise" and "business-asusual" futures.

Dependence upon foreign oil could have been

lessened by fuller development of domestic resources and by
expanding reserves.

Greater efforts could have been made in

the Horthwest to wmodularize" generating resources so that
s.aller "chunks" of load could have been brought on line as
needed.

Some overbuilding would likely have occurred, given
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dominant perceptions at the time, but the effects could have
been mitigated more easily.
Knowing what needs to be done from a technical standpoint is helpful only when coupled with knowledge of how to
do it.

Multiple Perspectives offers the means to implemen-

tation by illuminating relevant organizational and personal
elements.

Before examining how BPA's current methodology

might be strengthened however, it is first essential to
illustrate the factors which have in effect bounded the
search for effective forecasting strategies.
For BPA (and the regional power planning community) the
development of the forecast methodology used in 1982 represented a step forward in terms of what kinds of uncertainties could be addressed and required a large recruitment of
organizational resources.

Given the elaborateness of the

models selected for review, the type of public involvement
solicited and the deadline for the WNP scheduling decision,
pursuing alternative methodological strategies became
impractical.

Much of this workload, however, was an arti-

fact of the size and elaborateness of the models considered.
Simpler or smaller models would likely have permitted the
time to consider and evaluate core assumptions, other
perspectives, and surprise events and their impacts, all
essential steps needed to evolve a good disaster-avoidance
strategy.

The factors which are chiefly responsible for the
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selection of the forecast methodology are numerous and
primarily non-technical.
Organizationally, many procedures are set up to use the
results of optimizing strategies as inputs.

When plans or

decisions are based upon the use of expected values, probability distributions, or statistical confidence intervals,
there is pressure (subtle and not-so-subtle) for forecasts
to be designed accordingly (e.g. range plus probabilities).
(This was particularly true at BPA under Johnson, given the
data requirements of the financial analysis process.)
Interorganizationally, new but familiar strategies are more
readily accepted than new unfamiliar ones.

WPPSS stake-

holders were represented by technical experts who, like most
of BPA's staff, were most comfortable with econometric or
engineering approaches to demand modeling, and optimizing
methodologies.

This appears to be generally true of the

electric utility industry.

Disciplinary deoth 1s rarely

counterbalanced by disciplinary breadth, so commonalities in
training tend to focus considerations on a limited number of
approaches considered "legitimate" or "practical", those
involving complex models.

Since BPA was required to obtain

such models "off-the-shelf" or through development under
contract, basic model designs were prepackaged.

Public

review, in turn, focused upon a choice among predetermined
options rather than either a choice of options or a choice
of strategy for their use.

Attention is thus focused almost
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exclusively upon second-order technical considerations
(details of models) and away from first-order technical
considerations (choice of effective strategies for model or
forecast use).
Were the utility industry to undertake actions to
address uncertainty to the fullest extent possible, its
approach to forecasting would need to embody features of the
disaster-avoiding strategies described above.

Such strat-

egies, in many respects, resemble the war games employed by
the military to prepare its leaders for the fullest spectrum
of possible strategic and tactical combat situations.

This

approach must be anchored upon a recognition that the future
itself is uncertain (i.e. future events are not thoroughly
determined by current circumstances and, hence, uncertainty
is real, not merely a measure of imperfections or errors in
models) and as such not predictable.

Rather than only try

to optimize decisions by guessing which scenarios are most
likely and then planning just for those futures, this
approach seeks to explore the widest array of possible
situations, recognizing fully that none of them may actually
occur as represented.

(This requires a freedom from heavy

dependence on specific models, since models not only
determine how the world will be seen, but also limit which
parts may be seen).

In the process of playing the games,

however, the decision makers develop ways of responding to
each type of situation or uncertainty identified, increasing
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the likelihood that nothing

~

occur which could catch

them completely unprepared (Enzer, 1984).
For this sort of approach to be successfully implemented, a number of criteria must be met, both general and
specific in nature.

Multiple Perspectives provides crucial

insights which facilitate the identification and use of
these criteria.

Most generally, the three major components

of decision support -- forecasting, planning, and monitoring
must work in coordinated fashion.

The forecasting

component must consider the factors that would have the most
significant, rather than the most likely, effects upon the
trend under consideration in order to narrow the organization's "window of vulnerability" as much as possible.
Unless the forecasting component explores the consequences
of a wide spectrum of alternatives, even creative and
aggressive planning will remain somewhat superficial, blind
to its sensitivity to critical external factors.

The

planning component must be flexible enough to respond to
unexpected developments or shifts in trends.

These

responses should be, to the extent possible, incremental and
reversible and should be appropriately timed (e.g. the
action plan should not overrespond to brief or transient
alterations of a long-term pattern).

Without flexibility on

the planning and decision-making end, forecasting an
uncertain environment does little more than test the "nerve"
of the decision maker who can see all the possibilities for
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disaster or success but do nothing other than choose a
single plan of action and hope that none of the feared
alternatives occur.

Finally, the monitoring (or intelli-

gence gathering> component Is needed to identify which of
the paths developed in the forecast is closest to the one
actual events are following and to ascertain whether or not
a change of path (requiring a change of plan) ,is taking
place at any moment in the ongoing planning and decisionmaking process.

If intelligence is not gathered on both the

factors that affect the trends considered by the forecasts
and their outcomes, the ongolng process of making decisions
which implement (or, where appropriate, modify) a plan is
severely hampered.

At worst, planners have no idea what is

occurring and can only respond reactively when outcomes are
obvious (such as the members of the Northwest power planning
community did, only seriously reassessing load growth after
it slowed dramatically over a four or five year period).

At

best, planners may know what is happening but, without some
depth in the monitoring effort, will not know how or why.
With good intelligence, problems of understanding may still
arise but they are minimized to the extent possible.
From the T-perspective, the only way to prepare for,
and hopefully therefore avert disastrous surprises (or
alternatively, capture golden opportunities) is to examine a
wider array of alternative scenarios for the future.

The

scenarios, though primarily aimed at disaster avoidance,
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could be built around a flexible optimizing strategy.

In

other words, though a central or baseline resource development strategy, which focused upon a "best guess" of the
future which will occur, might still be at the core of the
approach it would be supplemented by contingency plans, or
preconceived responses to shocks or surprises.

The forecast

scenarios supporting these plans would explore high impact
effects of different environments, different policies, and
different decision making styles.

The 0-, and P-perspec-

tives, however, reveal a number of currently existing
obstacles to the implementation of this more ambitious
technical approach which would need to be overcome.
Regionally the traditional power planning process,
involving PNUCC and the SOU forecast, maintained inertia
through the late 1970s.

BPA's system, based on ranges,

constituted a major development in itself and its architects, like most power forecasters (and decisionmakers),
were (and continue to be) unfamiliar with this proposed
approach to dealing with uncertainty, and underestimate the
usefulness (and in some cases advantages) of smaller,
simpler models.

The need to make decisions on resources

such as WNP 1, 2, and 3 in a timely fashion often precludes
further modification of the forecasting process supporting
it (a particularly grave problem when large or elaborate
models are used), while the need for a final resolution of
the WNP problem, which entails completion of some of the
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plants;

~

priori limits the flexibility of resource develop-

ment, at least until the plants in question are dlsposed of.
Furthermore, Bonneville's forecasting system was put into
place during the early years of the Reagan Administration.
One of the cornerstones of Reagan's Administration has been
to fulfill a 1980 campaign promise to "remove the fat from
the Federal bureaucracy".

The ensuing government-wide

belt-tightening (at least within the civilian portion) has
virtually precluded the acquisition of funds sufficient to
scale up the long-term forecasting and planning process to
include additional scenarios.

The perception, however, is

strongly wedded to the resource requirements of large
modeling systems.

Multiple, simple models may be used for

scenario development at a much lower cost.

Finally, the

1982 forecast established a new precedent for resource
planning.

Organizationally, BPA underwent a major reorien-

tation (reflected both structurally and functionally) in
developing the 1982 forecast.

Its Administrator also made

decisions based on a set of numbers and a methdology.

Par-

ticularly in its experimental stages, an expanded approach
to forecasting and planning, even if ultimately more meaningful and beneficial, would likely add confusion to an
already complicated process of public involvement and could
possibly call into question decisions to which the region
has already committed.

While this would be appropriate if a

blatant error in BPA's planning process was uncovered, it
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would be unnecessarily destructive if the source of disagreement was the result of all-too-common numerical errors
associated with unfamiliar methods.
As

asserted earlier, the application of Multiple Per-

spectives not only results in a useful multifaceted definition of the problem but also provides the beginnings of a
solution.

From the T-perspective, the problem is one of the

consequences of uncertainty: what the organization isn't
prepared to handle can hurt it, possibly severely.

Flexible

planning must be supported by forecasting which examines
both most significant and most likely futures.

This entails

exploring the impacts of numerous scenarios, some surprisefree, others containing surprise events.

From the O-per-

spective, it is imperative that organizational resources be
used efficiently and appropriately and that outside resources be tapped effectively.

To the extent possible,

procedural changes should be kept to a minimum, costs kept
down, and existing operations kept on schedule.

The

organizational expertise of Requirements, Rates, Resvurces,
and Conservation groups would be drawn in to address issues
most closely related to their respective missions.

The role

of the public and signifIcant Interorganlzational actors
should be considered: public involvement might be full or
limited.

From the P-perspective, it becomes clear that any

proposals for changing forecasting (or planning) procedures
must be tailored to the personal styles and priorities of
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BPA's upper management and the prevailing view of priority
concerns.
forec~sting

While the abovedescribed hedging strategy for
and planning would have provided benefits during

the terms of office of the last three Administrators, it
would have to have been "sold" differently.

During Hodel's

Administration the specific models used in 1982 had not been
developed, but other econometric tools were available which
could have been used for scenario analysis.

Selling the

methodology would have been most difficult at this time,
given the apparent stability of load growth.

The regional

drought and impacts of the Oil Embargo, however, could have
been used as examples of "surprise events" which needed to
be planned for.

Under Munro, BPA's forecasting system began

its "gestation period".

A more rudimentary version of the

proposed "scenario methodology" might have been promoted
based upon its abilities to "pre-test" the implications of
different Regional Bill proposals to BPA and regional
interest groups.

Under Johnson, the importance of fore-

casting was recognized.

Because some sort of baseline load

projections were needed for resource acquisition decisions,
the additional scenarios would probably best be received as
supplementary -- extra insurance on the forecast range.
Following is a description of how this might be carried out.
The range forecast, as it stands, could remain at the
center of BPA's planning strategy as three key reference
projections against which to measure resource requirements.
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This would allow the agency to expand its treatment of
long-range load uncertainty without having to "reinvent the
wheel".

Essential to using the range as a point of depar-

ture is the recognition of the limitations of the optimizing
strategy underlying the overall forecast methodology, the
models used, and the assignment of subjective probabilities.
The limitations of an optimizing strategy were discussed at length earlier, and will not be repeated.

Suffice to

say, users as well as producers of forecasts should be aware
of them.

In similar fashion, both staff and management

should be aware of the weaknesses, as well as the strengths
of complex models.

Though complex models do often provide

detailed outputs, or perform a large menu of options, their
mer1ts have been oversold in the ut1l1ty industry.

Stud1es

have shown that methodological sophistication and complexity
add little to forecast accuracy (Ascher and Overholt, 1983:
105), while often rendering models (and their products) more
difficult to use or understand, particularly for executives
or managers.

In particular, the pitfalls of over-dependence

upon national econometric models should be recognized.

Par-

ticularly when the full spectrum of scenarious is confined
to three or four "best guesses" in an optimizing strategy,
accuracy becomes important.

These scenarios, however, are

ultimately driven by visions of national economic futures
which have conspicuously missed significant events, such as
the onset of the 1981-82 recession (Greenwald, 1984:42-44).
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This is not to say that complex models should be discarded,
only that they should be used carefully and that their
sophistication should not be used as an argument for not
considering or using other approaches.

Finally, any

assignment of probabilties should be broken down into its
constituent judgments so that its subjective nature is
underscored and rendered explicit for all forecast users.
As noted earlier, such subjective numerical assignments

represent the modelers' degree of confidence in the performance of their models and the assumptions behind their use.
BPA's assignment of probabilities, however, presents only
the resultant probability values, leaving opaque what
constellation of forecast assumptions and model performance
assessments is embedded therein.

Decomposing the value

would entail listing, in detail, the assumptions defining
the range and defining the resultant compound probabilities
(e.g. "it is assumed that even in the low case no economic
crashes occur, the government does not intervene, plants
still come in on schedule and at cost, etc.").

This

exercise alone forces the fOlecasting staff into taking a
deeper look at their modeling procedures, alerts management
to what the staff has and hasn't considered, and allows
consumers of the forecast to substitute their own judgments
for those of the BPA staff and reevaluate the end product
and the decisions based upon them.

Perhaps more important-

ly, however, the exercise defines a prime starting point for
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exploring potentially disruptive impacts of "unlikely
occurrences", by substituting the assumptions opposite those
included in the forecast, one by one, into the models and
rerunning the forecast (e.g. "what if an economic crash
occurs, or the government slaps new restrictions on energy
use, or plant costs rise sharply due to construction delays,
etc.?")
The construction of scenarios supplementing the range
would be targeted at achieving two major purposes.

First,

the scenarios, composed of constellations of plausible real
world events, would be used to assess the credibility of the
range boundaries and associated probabilities.

If many

plausible scenarios produced values falling outs1de the high
or low, the probabilities should be reconsidered.

By

contrast, if most scenarios fell within the range, this
would constitute a fuller endorsement of its use as a
planning tool.

Second, the scenarios would begin to fill

out a full fledged disaster-avoidance scenario, exploring
likely effects of high-impact events (such as oil embargoes,
resource cost overruns, or technological breakthroughs) on
loads (or elements of the regional economy).

Though it is

nearly impossible to predict when, and exactly how, such
events would occur, it is possible to provide decision
makers with a feel for their consequences and allow them to
anticipate this response.

What is important is that the

scenarios portray the impacts of real world events or
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decisions, rather than simply magnitude adjustments of input
va~iables,

on loads

that the forecasts are linked to

50

things which decision

make~s

would find

conc~ete.

Moreover,

the scenarios should examine numerous technical, organizational, and personal factors which could have significant
impacts on electricity

futu~es.

(One of the

such an exercise is to

dete~mine

which factors do or do not

~esult

in significant impacts.)

Fo~

pu~poses

of

example, technical

factors considered might include uncertainties in assessments of oil reserves, breakthroughs in the development of
alternative energy sources, or the widespread adoption of
ultra-efficient energy using equipment.

Organizationally,

scenarios could explore the impacts on loads of a new oil
crisis through economic boom and bust (i.e. Depression),
competition from Canadian suppliers of hydroelectricity,
amendment or repeal of the Regional Power Act, the wholesale
departure of the aluminum industry from the Northwest, or
changes in budget for BPA conservation programs.

Finally,

impacts springing from differences in personal management
styles at both the national and regional levels could be
explored.

This would not necessarily entail guessing who

might be elected President or appointed Administrator, only
identifying contrasting approaches to bureaucratic management and their consequences.

The scenarios could be simu-

lated exclusively on the existing modeling system or could
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be supplemented with alternative models (used for methodological comparisons) or "back of the envelope" calculations.
The process of generating significant alternatlve
scena~ios

yields much fruitful results when a variety of

diferent 0- and P-perspectives can be tapped.

Ascher and

Overholt (1983) note two research findings that underscore
the importance of incorporating a broad band of insights
into forecasting procedures:

first, that complex models

perform better when guided by judgment than when left to
operate mechanically without intervention (pp. 98-99); and
second, that forecast accuracy and usefulness is largely
determined by the validity of core assumptions prior to the
choice of models or methods (p. 106).

The real problem is

determining what questions should be asked, rather than
merely focusing upon how answers should be sought for
questions which have already been posed.

Ideally, the

process of soliciting insights into the core assumptions
underlying the scenarios-first order methodological considerations -- would extend outside the power plannnlng community.

Business leaders, politicians, lawyers, reporters,

and "lay persons" in general all possess understandings of
parts of the world which would benefit the forecast technician, but these insights are primarily qualitative and not
well suited to usual technical model reviews.

Hence, re-

quests for outside comments should seek open-ended responses
on the questions of load futures, for not only from expert

487

modelers like HERA or EVA, but also from experts on modeling
(like Asher and overholt) and non-modelers as well.

'At a

bare minimum, initial scenario development efforts should
include non-technical types within the organization.
This supplemental exercise of examining the sensitivity
of loads to alternative, and in some cases, radically different assumptions would provide BPA some insUrance against
such devastating surprises as WPPSS without necessitating
anything more than a minor procedural reorganization.

To

minimize stress on the organization, the exercise could be
carried out at times outside the forecast production cycle
(if necessary), could be performed at varying levels of
effort depending upon circumstances, and could be designed
to be cumulative -- that is, rather than repeat the same
scenarios or assumption sensitivity tests each year new
contingencies could be investigated so that the body of
simulations expands in number and scope from year to year.
What would be critical to this process, irrespective of its
design, is that decision makers recognize that the range is
a starting rather than a finishing point, for planning, that
serious thought be given to contingency plans which would
modify Bonneville's operations to respond to the requirements of the various scenarios, and that an intelligence or
monitoring system be devised to provide early alert both to
changes in the planning climate and to outcomes of BPA
actions.
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A full implementation plan would; of course; require
greater detail than the decriptions above, but a more
intense problem-focused use of Multiple Perspectives could
be applied to assess the specific organizational resources
to be tapped and to package communications to appeal to
individuals in the upper management circle.

Such a specific

application, though following logically from this research,
could be the basis of a dissertation in itself.
Table XVII which follows, summarizes the key conclusions produced using Multiple Perspectives, including both
insights derived from the use of a single perspective in
isolation and those derived from two or more of the perspectives taken together.
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES:

WHAT THE BPA

FORECAST SAYS
The Multiple Perspective Concept provided a number of
insights about SPA'S first independent forecast.

The pre-

ceeding section detailed conclusions generated using the
three perspectives both individually and cross-cued with one
another.

The exercise of applying the MP Concept to the

rather intricate set of processes which culminated in the
production of BPA's 1982 forecast not only yielded insights
about the forecast, but, it also provided a second set of
insights about Multiple Perspectives, and their application
to research situations.
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TABLE XVII
A SUMMARY OF KEY CONCLUSIONS FROM MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES
Technical Perspective
1.
BPA's modeling system was more complex than any previously used for regional electricity forecasting.
2.
The use of a range of forecasts constituted a definite
improvement over single trajectory point forecasts.
3.
The ORI national economic model, in many ways the
starting point for the forecast, remained largely a
black box to its users.
4.
Though detailed, BPA's forecasting system left the
effects of feedbacks between electricity prices and
other economic variables explored.
5.
Although the forecast range was developed using a
well-defined methodology, the probability assignments
associated with that range were not •

.

Organizational Pe;sDectiye
1.
The actions of BPA's forecasting group can only be
understood by observing the development of ad hoc
procedures.
2.
The ascendancy of forecasting and resource analysis at
BPA were mirrored in changes in organizational
structures and staffing levels.
3.
The early 1980s reorganization at BPA can best be
viewed as an organizational problem-solving response to
the Regional Act and to the growing WPPSS problem.
4.
The two primary groups of stakeholders participating in
public involvement were those with financial interests
in WPPSS and those promoting conservation and
environmental protection.
Personal Perspective
1.
Through their policies, each of the three most recent
BPA Administrators defined how BPA would perceive and
respond to the resource planning situation.
2.
Administrator Peter Johnson's background in business
influence both how he would approach the WPPSS
decision, and how he would employ forecasting toward
that end.
3.
The leaders of Power Requirements forecasting effort
originally searched for a new approach as the result of
an abortive attempt, years earlier, to disaggregate the
SOU forecast.
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TABLE XVII (Cont'd)
Combined Perspectives
1.
The organizational needs of Financial Management, Power
Resources, and Conservation groups strongly influenced
the selection of models (end-use, with explicit
conservation policy testing capabilities) and
methodology (range forecast coupled with optimizing
strategy).
2.
Public involvement was used extensively during the
forecast process, but, because it followed the
selection of modeling alternatives, could, at best,
address only second-order technical considerations.
3.
A hedging strategy, grounded in a broad variety of load
scenarios, is needed to avoid disasters such as WPPSS.
4.
Lack of familiarity in the power planning community
with hedging strategies and planning under uncertainty
and a perceived environmental stability projected by
recent forecasts are the strongest obstacles to
changing the long-term forecasting process.
5.
A good disaster-avoidance strategy can be developed
without an increase in forecasting staff and budget,
provided less time is spent on maintaining and
operating elaborate models, and more spent on
assumption clarification, consideration of surprises,
and use of the 0- and P-perspectives.
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Listed below are conclusions

a~=!ved

at through the

process of investigation using Multiple Perspectives.

These

conclusions focus upon specific methodological strengths and
weaknesses associated with application of the Multiple
Perspective concept.

They additionally present some new

insights and recommendations on its use which were the
result of this inquiry.

Hopefully, these insights will

facilitate the continuing development of this potent
methodological tool.
Overall Methodological Considerations
In general, conclusions regarding the use of the
Multiple Perspective Concept fall into two distinct groups.
Those lending themselves specifically to the use and application of one of the perspectives, and those more appropriate to the overall investigative strategy.

Since the

latter, in a certain respect, provide the context for the
former they are presented first.
1.

Each of the Indiyidual Perspectives Should be Developed

as Completely as Possible.

Though the emphasis of inves-

tigation is upon multiple perspectives, T-, 0-, and P-perspectives each by themselves yield much useful information.
Researchers employing the Multiple Perspective Concept
should endeavor to develop insights from each of the individual perspectives as completely as possible.

This not

only provides more information, it more cleanly separates
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the viewpoints
pe~spectives

paradigms

o~

cha~acte~izing

and makes the task of

each of the

c~oss-cuing

more

straightforwa~d,

if not

2.

Should Strive for Investigatory Balance

Researche~s

simple~.

both Within and Between Perspectives. Even Though Results

may

Prove Uneven.

In this dissertation, an attempt was made

to devote equal time and effort to exploring each of the
perspectives.

Moreover, within each perspective, an attempt

was made to give significant areas or objects of exploration
consistent and comparable treatment (e.g. all the models in
BPA's forecasting system were
listed, all of the

diag~ammed

o~ganizations

and their inputs

involved in public involve-

ment were examined along certain key attributes such as
mission, history of interaction with BPA, etc.).

This seems

to warrant general recommendation as a methodology, with
checklists, tables, and morphologies the principal tools.
It must be recognized, however, that
likely tend to be uneven.

~esults

will very

In this dissertation, the largest

volume of relevant information came from the T-perspective
investigation (due to the complexity of the modeling
system).

The o-perspective, by contrast, seemed to yield

the largest variety of elements (i.e. diverse organizational
interests) influencing the forecast process.
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3.

Care Should be Taken Not to Overcomcensate for

Technical Training by Undervaluing T- Relative to 0- and
P-Perspectives.

If it is true that no one protests a

zeligion moze strongly than one who has recently lost the
faith, it is also true that few embrace a religion more
zealously than new converts.

For many trained predominantly

in the investigatory paradigm of the T-perspective, 0 and P
are an exciting source of enlightenment.

It is thus

tempting to neglect the T-perspective somewhat in favor of
the challenge (and promise) of the organizational and
personal perspectives.

The T-perspective, however, should

not be undervalued or otherwise given short shrift.

In this

dissertation, the numerous assumptions about the world built
into the structures of the complex models used by BPA were
among the most significant determinants of the forecast
outcomes and constraints on the forecast process.

While it

is imperative to get beyond the perceptual constraints of
the technical perspective, it is equally important to respect this perspectives many strengths.
4.

"Audit Trails" and oigraph Representations are

Important
tives.

Elements of "validation" for Multiple Perspec-

Multiple Perspectives involves the use of several

distinct paradigms of inquiry to examine a common process or
object of study.

While statistical validation criteria

usually associated with the T-perspective are not appropriate to 0 and P, it is nonetheless important that
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explorations proceeding along these other lines of inquiry
be explicitly documented and reproducible (e.g. corporate
and judicial decisions are not validated, but the logic by
which they were arrived at may often by reconstructed).
Investigative reporters, lawyers, organizational analysts,
and cultural anthropologists in the field are all required
to provide evidence for their conclusions.

An "audit trail"

of documentation should accompany the results reported for
each perspective and description should precede conclusions.
At present a need exists for the development of validation
procedures for insights derived from the application of
multiple as opposed to individual perspectives.

The digraph

presented in the preceeding chapter constitute a useful
procedure, but one which needs fuller development.
5.

Participant Observation is a Useful Technique in

Organizational Situations. but to be Applied Fruitfully its
strengths and Weaknesses must be Recognized.

Experimental

research is useful when looking at a few variables or
phenomena in a different approach and multiple methodologies.

To get a true picture, interviews and records

should be supplemented by direct involvement with (and
observation of) the processes under consideration.

As

a BPA

employee, the author of this dissertation was, de facto, a
participant observer in the forecast development process.
The advantages of such an involvement are numerous and
include more complete and direct access to relevant (an~ in
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some cases obscure) data, a broader investigatory scope (due
to a more realistic initial characterization of the research
problem), and a more economical use of research time (since
some relevant information will, almost literally, "fall into
the investigator's lap").

Disadvantages, which must be

adjusted for, flow from potential conflicts of interests.
Job pressures may influence reporting, forcing the
ftofficial"

organizatio~al

interpretation into research

findings, or the parochial perceptions of one's organization
(e.g. defensiveness or hostility to the critics of the
forecast) and work may further taint what of necessity, is
already imperfect objectivity.

A useful way out of the

latter dilemma is for the investigator to "role-play" with
various O-perspectives, seeing his or her own organization
through othets' eyes and acknowledging the legitimacy of
these perspectives where appropriate.
Specific Methodological Conclusions
Listed below are conclusions derived from this research
on the application of a single perspective (or ways of
distinguishing one perspective from another).

To the extent

possible conclusions pertaining to a particular perspective
have been grouped together.
1.

Wben Attempting to Describe Complex Systems or Models

from the T-Perspective. it is Useful to Move Back and Forth
Between a Broad and a Narrow Focus.

Hodeling systems such
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as the one used by BPA are characterized by a great deal of
internal complexity.

To render this complexity under-

standable, it is useful to first assume a broad, comprehensive view of the system as a whole, but with little resolution or detail, and then "zoom in" on specific attributes of
the component parts.

In Chapter II, this procedure was

followed and it served as a useful organizing principle for
research (hopefully rendering the resulting product more
readable).
2.

The Basic Concept of a System. Defined as a Collection

of Elements and the Relations Between. Serves as a Guiding
Erinciple for Completeness of T-Perspective Description.
While moving from big picture to small picture provides the
context for T-perspective description (and renders it
comprehensible), another investigatory principle is needed
to ensure descriptive completeness.

In this study, the

modeling system was treated as a system in the formal,
rather than colloquial sense.

This meant identifying all of

the elements in the system (and in the process, establishing
a boundary which at the same time determined what would be
considered externalities) and mapping the specific information or data flows (relations) between them.

This

required filling in gaps in the official documentation, but
permitted a thorough input-output analysis Which, In and of
itself, yielded numerous insights.
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3.

A Number of Technical Tools (such as Reachability

Matrices. and Flow Diagrams) are Ayailable Which Can be
Generally Applied to T-Perspective Analysis.

While a vast

number of technical and statistical procedures exist which
could be applied to technical problems, most are appropriate
only to specific classes of problems.

A few seem both

generally applicable and generally useful.

These tech-

niques, such as the reachability matrix used in Chapter II,
provide the means toward the end of laying out an explicit
technical system.
applied, these

Even when routinely or reflexively

techniqu~s

are revealing (e.g. missing

feedback loops, concatenated impacts).
4.

An Organization's Own Records are a Useful Starting

Point for O-Perspective Investigation.

As a public agency,

BPA is required to keep, and make available, organizational
records.

Though many organizations do not face such re-

quirements they generally do maintain a number of records
which provide a useful starting point (but rarely a
finishing point) for O-perspective research.

Organizational

charts, staffing records, and "official" histories, by
themselves, can provide significant insight into key
organizational events.

BPA additIonally keeps transcripts

of many public hearings which become indespensable documents
in reconstructing organizational history.
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5.

When Seeking Explanatory Factors for Organizational

pecision-Making (or Decision-Supporting) Processes, Consider
Loci of Organizational

Char~

Though organizations

normally change slowly (and often only under duress) change
usually reflects altered priorities and perceptions.

Even

when these do not directly influence the phenomena or processes being studied, they usually say something important
about the general organizational climate.

In this study,

the relative growth of certain portions of BPA revealed a
great deal about priorities and interorganizational politics
(e.g. Conservation's growth from a Section to an Office).
6.

Though an Organization's Operating Procedures in Many

iaYs Represent the Basic Unit of o-Perspectiye InquirY. it
is Essential to Remember that these Procedures are Often In
Flux.

An organization's habits are embodied in its standard

operating procedures.

Organizations, however, are usually

changing, sometimes (though not routinely) quite rapidly.
Under these conditions, only some SOPs are useful determinants of behavior.

One must look at ad hoc procedures

being developed (somewhat experimentally) and watch their
crystalization into SOPs.

In the case of the 1982 fore-

cast, most procedures were new and only in the infant stages
of standardization.
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7.

In the Interorganizational Arena. Financial Investments

are Good Indicators of Interests and Official Positions.
Not everything an organization does is reducible to profit
maximization.

This is particularly the case among regulated

industries such as electric utilities.

Financial invest-

ments, however, do rank very high among organizations'
concerns and these investments will be protected as fully as
possible.

As

such, they provide a key (though not the only

key) for understanding the basis of an organization's
behavior.

Investments in the WPPSS plants were among the

most significant points of contention in BPA forecasting
process.
8.

A Great Deal Can Be Learned About Organizations by

Looking Into Mismatches Between Structure and Function.
Formal organizational charts only reveal the "official"
structure of that organization
and authority.

the hierarchy of offices

This is rarely sufficient to describe organ-

izational behavior or process in any significant detail.
Many organizational functions crosscut its structural
divisions, as the production of BPA's forecast did, and are
the subject of matrix management.

These mismatches (not

necessarily in the pejorative sense) of structure and
function constitute yet another key to O-perspective
investigation.
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9.

In Examining organizations. Look Not Only to the

Dominant Corporate Culture but Toward Different Corporate
Subcultures.

Deal and Kennedy introduced the notion of

corporate cultures to management literature, and it is
useful to determine which category of corporate culture an
organization falls into.

Organizations are not homogeneous

in character particularly during periods of change.

Identi-

fying different subcultures allows the investigator a deeper
look into corporate dynamics, while at the same time highlighting areas of contrast in both missions and procedures.
Thus, though BPA as a whole strongly resembled a traditional, hierarchical government bureaucracy, units such as Power
Requirements displayed characteristics more like research
"think tanks" with a premium on creative problem-solving,
extensive group interaction, and technical general ism (as
opposed to specialization).
10.

Media Accounts o£ Eyents Can Be Good Points of Depar-

tu,e for 0- and P-Perspective Research.

In many cases,

clear starting points (or "leads") for 0- and P-perspective
research are difficult to locate.

Issues of major signifi-

cance to the public tend to make the attention of the mass
media, and reviewing library archives of newspapers and
periodicals can raise issues worth pursuing (in fact, many
organizations such as BPA make use of clipping services
which collect and consolidate relevant articles).

Newspaper

columns are revealing both in terms of the "newsworthy"
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items they identify (their manifest content) and the
issues or interests they represent (their latent content).
Such written accounts, however, must be points of departure
for investigation to be fortified, whenever possible, with
other research, not prepackaged conclusions.
11.

In Separating 0- and P-Perspectiyes, It is Useful to

Distinguish Persons from the Roles They Play or the Offices
They Hold.

Because they both consider the actions of

people, the 0- and P-perspectives are easily blurred
together.

The essential difference is not, however, their

subject matter but the way they approach it (or their point
of view).

The O-perspective is concerned with the actions

of groups of individuals or the codifications of those
actions (i.e. operating procedures).

The P-perspective, by

contrast, focuses upon individual uniqueness or idiosyncracy
background, style,

~r

personal worldview.

When looking

at the actions of an individual, the question then becomes
one of determining the extent to which those actions were
the routine response of an office holder or behaviors only
someone with a particular background could perform.

When

one delves into the explanatory factors accounting for the
individual's actions, one is in the arena of the P-perspective.
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12.

The Approach one Adopts to P-Perspectiye Research

Depends Upon The Purpose of The Multiple Perspective study.
The Multiple Perspective Concept is a tool which may be
applied to a variety o£ complex decision areas having very
different foci o£ interest.

Technology assessments are

prospective, looking towards possible impacts of proposed
technological developments.

By contrast, other studies,

such as this one, are more retrospective in nature, attempting to explain (or account for) the chief determinants of
complex processes or decisions which have already occurred.
The P-perspective focuses upon unique actions or outlooks
and depending upon the research application may be employed
very differently.

In retrospective studies, the researcher

must try to determine which individuals did, in fact, influence an outcome. and attempt to illustrate how their unique
outlooks served as determinants.

In prospective studies,

the question is on what sort of impacts might be expected
from an action or technology, and a broader spectrum of
viewpoints are sought from the types of individuals that
might be affected.

This more fully taps the explanatory

power of the P-perspective but makes closure more difficult
to achieve.
13.

Cross-cuing Should Seek to Map the Paradigmatic

Elements of One Perspective into Those of Another.

Because

the three perspectives are used in Multiple Perspectives
studies to look at the same subject matter from different
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vantage points, it may become difficult to separate
cross-cues from single perspective views.

Earlier in this

chapter, a basis for distinguishing cross-cues from conclusions flowing from one of the perspectives in isolation was
described: cross-cues must explicitly show how the concerns,
or paradigmatic elements, of one perspective influences or
give shape to the elements of another.

Thus, to expand upon

the example given earlier, if one discusses the technical
product of a group as an organizational output (i.e.
describing only the organizational concerns, operating
procedures, and chain of command underlying its production,
without a description of its contents) one is working from
the a-perspective.

Conversely, if one focuses upon the

contents, but not the organizational infrastructure behind
its development, one is working from the T-perspective.

If,

however, one describes how specific organizational procedures and priorities affect specific technical choices, one
is cross-cuing.
14.

A Yseful Tool for Organizing and Describing Cross-Cues

in Retrospective Studies is a Simple Timeline.

To be fully

useful, cross-cuing should proceed by means of some methodology.

Otherwise it is extremely difficult to even begin to

feel that one has drawn out the significant conclusions in a
study.

At least for retrospective studies, a simple time-

line (or perhaps three parallel timelines) constitutes a
useful organizing principle, not unlike a checklist.

The
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investigator may display the most significant elements of
all three perspectives at once and consider causal or
interactive relationships between them.

This, like the use

of digraphs, often reveals connections previously unseen or
not considered.
15.

Cross-Cuing is an Extremely Useful Technique to Get

Beyond Simplistic one-Dimensional Pictures (or Arguments).
Each of the three perspectives filters and transforms the
world through a different set of lenses and interpretive
structures.

Like one dimensional pictures of three-

dimen5ional objects, such interpretive fllters "flatten out"
certain determinative factors or fill explanatory gaps to
produce a coherent gestalt of sorts.

While the Multiple

Perspective Concept neither guarantees truth nor produces an
exhaustive description of reality, it does reveal features
of the world which would otherwise be obscured.

Cross-

cuing can significantly unbias the findings of a single
perspective.

For instance, looking at the BPA forecast

exclusively from the O-perspective tends to build the
picture of a "turf battle", with special organizational
interests being the "true" determinants of forecast outcomes.

When one couples T- and P-research to this tentative

conclusion one discovers a more complex process of "negotiation through substantive technical products", where the
validity and substantive quality of forecast methods and
conclusions exert a determinative (though not fully
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determinative) influence upon decisions and technical
comments align sometimes weakly or strongly with organizational interests.

This depth of insight provides the

basis for constructive planning where simple adversarial
confrontation might otherwise prevail.
As this study has shown, the use of Multiple Perspec-

tives opens up dimensions of insight into complex decision
areas which would otherwise remain opaque.

In particular,

the exercise of cross-cuing can significantly deepen the
volume of useful knowledge about the object of research.
Like many useful tools, the Multiple Perspective
Concept will evolve or develop only as it is applied to many
different situations, where its potentials can be expanded
and its currently weak or limited aspects limitations
improved upon.

The subject of this dissertation, BPA's

first independent forecast, provided a case study in which a
variety of organizations, with almost as varied interests,
interacted largely through technical products to arrive at a
significant planning decision.

As such, it provided an

excellent case study for the application of Multiple
Perspectives.

The exercise uncovered a wide array of

factors influencing the forecast outcome which more
traditional approaches would have overlooked.

Additionally,

it suggested a methodology or rationale for cross-cuing
which could be more generally applied to Multiple Perspective studies.
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A number of issues surrounding the use of the MP
Concept still remain to be explored.

Host immediately

recognizable are the need to develop firmer distinctions
between 0- and P-perspectives in investigative contexts, the
need to formalize methodologies for exploring the P-perspective, and the need to realize the promise held by digraphs
as a technique of validation.

These will undoubtedly be

developed in future studies, strengthening further our
abilities to bridge analysis and action.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

From the discussion in this chapter, it can be seen
that Multiple Perspectives provides a useful and potent tool
for understanding the many facets of complex decision-making
processes.

The usefulness of the HP Concept, however,

extends beyond the sphere of essentially academic concerns
and into the realm of the more pragmatic day-to-day
considerations of organizations.
nua~er

This study provides a

of insights about power forecasting which are of

significance to both Bonneville and the electric utility
industry in general, and it is appropriate to conclude this
dissertation by summarily reiterating the findings most
important to BPA.
On the most superficial level of its application,
Hultiple Perspectives serves a descriptive function.
defining the fundamental characteristics of the three

By
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paradigms of inquiry, the MP Concept directs attention
to~ard

the technical, organizational, and personal dimen-

sions of decision areas in a more thorough and systematic
fashion.

The detailed descriptions of forecasting models

(and the linkages

bet~een

them), organizational interests,

and effects of different Administrators' policies presented
in Chapters II, III, and IV of this dissertation consolidate
most of the information about the development of BPA's 1982
forecast.

Having such a centralized source of information,

in and of itself, is valuable to organizations like BPA in

that it lessens the likelihood of decisions being made based
upon fragmented or limited perceptions of ongoing organizational processes.
More significantly, Multiple Perspectives can be used
to provide deeper and more penetrating insights into the
dynamics underlying decision processes, and, further,
suggest directions for improving or strengthening these
processes.

The cross-cuing and digraph analysis exercises

carried out in Chapter V revealed the major forces which
shaped the forecast and, at the same time, uncovered
11mi tations or "blind spots" in the process.

Like many

utilities developing long-range plans in the early 1980s,
BPA sought to avoid the technical mistakes
overforecasting in the 1970s.

~hich

had led to

Its forecasting system

contained detailed end-use models which had been developed
specifically for conservation policy testing purposes.

Its
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forecasting methodology reflected an increased recognition
of load uncertainty and substituted a range of forecasts for
the single point forecasts which had earlier been used for
regional power planning.

Its public involvement process

allowed a peer review by other members of the utility
industry and various interest groups.

This process helped

the agency define and better meet its planning objectives,
and the interactions between key participants in this
process, and the effects of their interactions, are illuminated using a digraph analysis of Multiple Perspectives.
A~

or.ganization's objectives, however, are not

necessarily identical to its needs, and it is here that
Multiple Perspectives provides its most valuable insights.
The environment which the utility industry finds itself in
is potentially very volatile.

Load growth is ultimately

sensitive to a number of diverse factors -- political,
technological, economic, and social -- which power producers
need to account for in their planning.

Range forecasts look

at a wider spectrum of possibilities than point forecasts,
but still represent a form of "best guess",

~ne

which

examines quantitatively, but not qualitatively, different
states of key variables.

While ranges may be useful to

develop a core strategy for resource development, unless
they are supplemented by a hedging strategy which identifies
and explores the consequences of high impact/low probability
events, they leave their users vulnerable to potentially
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devastating surprises.

In an uncertain environment,

disaster avoidance should take precedence over optimization.
The findings of this Multiple Perspectives case study
of BPA's first forecast suggest a number of changes irl the
forecasting and resource planning strategy commonly used in
the electric utility industry.
Given the potential for volatility of the factors
influencing load growth, resource plans should maximize
near-term flexibility and responsIveness.

This entails

employing a core strategy which emphasIzes the use of
modular resources which can be developed (or rescheduled)
quickly and preparing a supplemental hedging strategy in
which responses to high impact events (irrespective of their
assumed likelihood) are considered in advance of their
occurrence.

The objective is to plan for many options, not

to predict which surprises will occur.
In order to generate the diverse scenarios needed to
prepare an adequate hedging strategy, models (or techniques)
should be used which are simpler, faster, and less dataintensive than the large end-use tools widely employed in
the utility industry.

These large models should be used

only when the highly disaggregated products of their operation are truly needed.
In scenario development, full use should be made of the
diverse 0- and P-perspectives which can be tapped, both
in-house and through a differently structured public in-
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volvement process.

Internally, Multiple Perspectives may be

used to improve the mix and balance of training possessed by
the staff and to determine what types of skills will be
needed in the future.

In terms of public involvement, the

MP Concept may be used to encourage a thoughtful exchange of
diverse ideas and to avoid reducing technical dialog to the
confrontation of political interests.

Lawyers, business

leaders, politicians, retired military leaders, and
reporters all have insights into qualitative factors which
could have sizeable impacts on load growth.

These insights

should be brought to bear at the front end of the forecast
development process to ensure the exploration of an array of
core assumptions (e.g. war in the Persian gulf, solar photovoltaic breakthroughs, nuclear plant meltdowns, an economic
Depression, etc.) broad enough for disaster avoidance.
Lastly, throughout the planning process, there should
be a continuous movement back and forth between broad and
narrow considerations to ensure not only that the process is
providing correct answers but also posing the correct questions.

Once a preliminary research or planning strategy is

arrived at, it is all too easy to expend more and more
effort perfecting or elaborating already complicated models
or procedures instead of determining whether the correct
issues have been identified and addressed correctly.
The utility community is now generally unfamiliar with
the Multiple Perspective Concept (the exception being the
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Electric Power Research Institute's study prepared by
Linstone, 1986).

Adopting and using it will necessitate a

change in perceptions and horizons.

Though this is not

always a comfortable process, the rewards it offers in
dealing with major uncertainties far outweigh the small
costs.
POSTSCRIPT 1987
Nearly five years have passed since BPA completed its
1982 forecast, and it is instructive to review what has
happened in the years following that pioneer effort.

In

retrospect, Peter Johnson's decision to delay completion of
the two of the WPPSS plants appears to have been correct.
Power sales in the region since 1982 have proven even lower
than BPA's forecast predicted and had Johnson succumbed to
pressure to continue construction on WNP 1 and 3, financing
the projects would have proven untenable (bond ratings for
the WPPSS plants declined even with full attention focused
upon a single project).
Within BPA, ad hoc procedures became routinized as the
basic protocol for forecast development was repeated on an
annual basis.

As noted in the conclusions of this disser-

tation, the unresolved problems identified during the
forecast review process effectively defined the research
agenda for the organizational units involved in forecast
reduction.

By 1983, BPA had developed a midterm forecasting
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model taIlored to ratemaking and a five-year time horizon.
The model was simple in structure, developed as a regression
on employment and temperature variables, and well suited to
representing the affects of cyclical business activity.

By

1984, the long-term forecast modeling system had been substantially overnauled, though its basic methodological
underpinnings remained unchanged.

A Regional Economic Hodel

(REM) was developed for BPA under contract by Wharton
Associates.

The REM displayed two strengths over the

economic and demographic methods it replaced.

First, it

modeled interactive relationships between various elements
of the regional economy formerly not considered (though,
significantly, it still remained unlinked with the price and
demand components of tho modeling system).

Second, because

the model was housed on BPA's computer system, and its
computer code rewritten from FORTRAN to SAS by BPA staff,
the model was much less of a black box than the DR! model
had been.

Though not fully transparent (i.e. it still

required some national economic projections as inputs), its
operations could be understood and evaluated.

New end-use

models were also developed under contract for the residential and commercial sectors.

Similar in structure to those

used in 1982, the new models were developed from regional,
rather than national, data, provided fuller descriptions of
energy-using technologies (though still sidestepping
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breakthrough and innovation): and possessed augmented
conservation policy testing capabilities.
At the same time, the uses to which the long-range
forecasting system was put expanded and diversified.
Scenarios were run to test the consequences of different
rate proposals, resource schedules, and OSI relocation
decisions.

The outputs of the sector-specific models were

used to drive conservation supply curves.

These curves,

like generating resource supply curves, calculate how much
conservation can be expected to be obtained at different
levels of program expenditures.
More recently, however, an awareness of many of the
limitations of the large models being used for forecasting
has emerged.

Although the disaggregated structure of the

end-use models is needed for estimating conservation
programs (e.g. in the internally diverse commercial sector,
consumption patterns and conservation potential differs
significantly from one building type to another), it creates
a number of problems.

Specifically, operating the large

modeling system is expensive, its detail is difficult to
support by data, and slow turnaround severely limits the
number of scenarios, or sensitivity runs, which can be
conducted.

In an attempt to remedy this situation, several

departments within BPA have acquired models or computerized
procedures which substitute for the large forecasting tools.
To assess the impacts of proposed programs, the Office of
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Conservation acquired a systems dynamics model, CPAM
(Conservation Program Assessment Model), which simulates the
key

feat~Les

of the entire modeling system (i.e. demands,

prices, and resources) more quickly.

The Decision Analysis

Model (DAM) was developed for resource planning.

Essential-

ly a Monte Carlo simulator, DAM begins with the growth
rates of the high, medium, and low forecasts and runs a
series of "games" in which load growth rates are randomly
altered on a year-to-year basis.

To an extent, this

procedure addresses the previously unacknowledged problem of
uneven patterns of change in load growth (i.e. trajectories
are no longer smooth or linear), though it does not identify
factors providing the impetus for change, nor have the
erratic load growth paths it generates been reviewed or
assessed by decision makers.

Finally, a number of PC-based

spreadsheet programs have been developed to perform specific
types of sensitivity runs (e.g. effects of building standards or oil price changes).
The perception of long-range load futures characterized
by low rates of growth, though controversial in 1982, has
become firmly entrenched in the minds of power planners
(perhaps

~

firmly entrenched).

Part of the reason for

this entrenchment has been the forecasts produced by the
Regional Council.

Using a modeling system only marginally

different from BPA's, slightly different assumptions, and
four, rather than three, scenarios, the Council produced a
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range of forecasted loads
approximated BPA's.

~hich,

not surprisingly, closely

This agreement between agencies, at

best a quality control check on a particular forecasting
methodology, has been interpreted by many as a convincing
validation of a particular view of the future, and much
planning proceeds under this interpretation.
Thus, while a number of improvements have taken place
in the state-of-the-art of regional power forecasting since
1982, some fundamental weaknesses still remain.

Though the

ranges used for resource planning are wide, their plausibility has never been tested using scenarios representing a
wide array of distinct environmental conditions.

Resource

planning has frequently proceeed using the forecast's
subjective probabilities to compute expected values or
measures of distribution suited to "hard" numbers.

Efforts

to improve the process of assigning probabilities have, to
date focused upon developing quantitative methods for
aggregating and combining the subjectively derived values
rather than examining the assumptions underlying them.
Perhaps most importantly, aside from a conceptual exercise
performed by an Uncertainty Work Group (of which this author
was a member), no serious consideration has been given to
disaster-avoidance planning.

Many of the core assumptions

underlying BPA's annual long-term forecast have evaded
explicit recognition, as have the consequences of alternative assumptions on load projections.

still needed are a
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spectrum of diverse scenarios incorporating qualitative
insights, while challenging key assumptions, on the forecasting side.

To date, BPA has done sensitivity analyses on

select issue areas (e.g. DSI incentive rates, plant delays,
etc.) but has not made an organized or systematic effort to
look at high pact events.
Among planners and decision makers in the power
planning community, the perception of low demand growth now
prevails.
low

BPA

Decreasing electricity sales in the early 1980s,

and Regional Council forecasts, and selected studies

on the effects of rate hikes and DSI outmigration have been
perceived as convincing arguments that most risk to be faced
is downside risk (i.e. loads will, if anything, fall lower
than forecasted, making it more difficult to sell available
power and reduce the regional surplus).

Risk on the upside

(higher loads than expected) is generally thought to be
adequately covered by as-yet-unfinished thermal resources
(e.g. WNP 1 and 3), planned during a time of apparent
impending shortages.

As a result,

difficulties in making its

u.s.

BPA, faced with

Treasury repayments, has

deemphasized further long-range forecasting and resource
planning efforts.

Instead, it has renewed its focus on

marketing aimed to decrease the current surplus and embraced
the newer concept of demand side management which seeks to
reduce future load uncertainties by securing firm power
contracts with its customers.

This reorientation towards
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near-term considerations is reflected in a reorganization
which BPA is undertaking at the time of this writing which,
almost ironically, recombines the forecasting, conservation,
and resource functions which were separated and expanded
prior to the 1982 forecast.
Although this strategy may work for BPA, in the long
run it contains a weakness which could prove dangerous.
Like someone who foregoes insurance coverage, BFA could
either find itself fortunate and operating without mishap or
suddenly find itself confronting large changes in demand for
which it is unprepared.

When BPA, and the Council, moved

away from point forecasts and towards range forecasts, they
took regional power planning a step in the right direction
and explored areas of uncertainty previously ignored.
Unless additional steps are taken (perhaps in a slightly
different direction), however, power planners will miss the
opportunity to ensure the region's preparedness for
potentially disastrous occurrences and develop flexible
responses to the important challenges which likely await the
utility industry.
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